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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers the case of foreign direct investment into the developed 
country, by examining the intemationalisation of Malaysian companies into the 
United Kingdom. The study on FDI by companies from the developing counthes 
has been under-presented in the literature of international business and especially 
not to the extent of those that have been conducted on western countries' 
multinationals. There is also lack of thorough investigation on the influence of 
company's characteristics on FDI practices of developing countries' transnational 
corporations. 
This study was pursued using a qualitative approach where data was obtained via 
semi-structured interview as well as documentary information. A preliminary 
search of the database Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) found 180 Malaysian 
companies in the U. K. which correspond to 80 parent companies in Malaysia. This 
was later scaled down to 45 companies that actually have active operations in the 
U. K. The companies broadly fall into three types: conglomerates, Chinese family 
firms and govemment-linked companies (GLCs). A total of 19 companies in 
Malaysia and 8 companies in the U. K. finally agreed to participate in the research. 
Interviews in Malaysia took place in July to October 2003 and those in the U. K. 
were conducted in November 2003 to January 2004. 
Generally, the International Business (E[3) theory can be used to explain foreign 
direct investment by Malaysian firms into the U. K. As such, the motivation of 
Malaysian firms investing in the U. K. is still enveloped within resource seeking, 
market seeking, efficiency seeking and strategic asset seeking types of FDL 
However, there are other factors that are not clearly explained in the mainstream 113 
theory, especially with regards to the characteristics and types of the companies that 
influence FDI motives and strategies such as Chinese family business, 
conglomerate firms and GLCs. This study found that Chinese family businesses 
undertake FDI to increase shareholder value, that is, the family wealth or family 
capital accumulation. The motive of conglomerate firms is either to create new 
core competence in the hierarchy, to strengthen the existing core competence and/or 
iv 
risk hedging. For the GLCs, the goal to help support the Malaysian government 
policy on transfer of technology has driven them to undertake similar investments 
in the U. K. 
Other specific factors have also driven the investment namely the entrepreneurship 
and opportunistic behaviour of the business actors i. e. the major shareholder in the 
Malaysian companies. The strategy of investment has a strong tendency towards 
A emergent strategy' rather than 'deliberate strategy'. The study also shows that 
Malaysian companies prefer wholly-owned subsidiaries where the parents are in 
control of finance and determine the business directions. There is, however, limited 
direct involvement of parent companies' personnel in the running of the 
subsidiaries. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH BACKGROU-ND 
"In March 2002, YTL Power International Berhad, a subsidiary of YTL Corporation Berhad completed its acquisition of a 100% stake in Wessex Water Ltd, one of the most 
efficient water and sewerage companies in the United Kingdom for total consideration of fl, 239.2 million. YTL is one of many Malaysian conglomerates venturing in the overseas 
operation and among a few venturing into a developed market. YTL is 47% owned by the Yeoh family. It was founded by Yeoh Tiong Lay, and is now run by his son Francis Yeoh. 
This form of business represents a common phenomenon among Malaysian conglomerates 
which are typically Chinese controlled family companies. It is a highly diversified 
company with activities including property, financial services, information technology, 
power generation and utilities. The acquisition of Wessex Water took many by surprise 
since YTL was competing with many companies including from the developed countries in 
an open bid which it eventually won. Ironically YTL has no previous experience in water 
management except it has been involved in power generation activities in Malaysia and 
Australia. The Yeoh family has long had close ties with the U. K. It started as a small 
construction company in 1955, building ammunition depots and garrison for the British 
army when the U. K. still ruled the country. Francis Yeoh graduated from London's 
Kingston University with an engineering degree. He works from a penthouse office that 
looks like a London club: mahogany-panelled walls, leather chairs and English landscape 
prints. In the reception room are photographs of him meeting the Queen and Prince 
Charles" 
[Adapted from YTL (2002) and 
Burton (2003)] 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The study on the evolution of multinational corporations (MNCs) has always been 
dominated by MNCs from industrialised nations. It is therefore not surprising that 
the development of the theory and framework of international business has always 
been a reflection of the behaviour and motivation of western style corporations. The 
widely cited 'product cycle theory' for example, is based on the evolution of 
international production of American firms in the 1960s (Vernon, 1966). Although 
the generalisation of this theory in the broader context of international production 
framework is quite limited (Buckley, 2002), it provided an early understanding of 
the firm's internationalisation behaviour. 
In contrast to the attention given to the study of MNCs from the developed 
countnes, the evolution of MNC from the developing counthes has only received 
attention in the last three decades. Among the writers who have brought this issue 
1 
forward are Ferrantino (1992), Lall (1983), Lecraw (1977), Wells (1983), and 
Yeung (1999). The context of their studies has been dominated by MNCs ftom 
Taiwan, South Korea, India, Singapore and Hong Kong in Asia and Brazil and 
Argentina in South America. Due to the lack of attention given to MNCs from 
developing countries, only a limited number of literatures have discussed 'third 
world multinationals' (Lall, 1983; Tolentino, 2000; Wells, 1983) or transnational 
corporations (TNCs)1 from emerging economies (Yeung, 1999). As a result, the 
literature on third world multinationals and its framework of internationalisation 
has not fully developed as fast as the literature on western multinationals. In 
addition, the existing framework of third world multinationals has not rigorously 
looked into the structure of ownership and types of organisations that might 
influence their foreign investment practices. 
For reasons above, the purpose of this study is to bring into focus TNCs from 
developing countries such as Malaysia into the developed countries i. e. the United 
Kingdom (the U. K. ). Malaysia is a small economy within the ASEAN nations 
which also includes Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, 
Myaninar, Cambodia, Laos and Brunei. There is however, no established 
convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries. The 
World Bank has been using the term 'developing countries' to denote the set of low 
and middle income economies while developed countries refers to high income 
countries. It was based on Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in which low 
income is USD825 or less; lowermiddle income is USD826 - USD3,255; upper 
middle income USD3,256 - USDIO, 065 while high income is more than 
USDIO, 066. Based on the above income parameter, the World Bank classifies 
Malaysia as a developing country and the U. K. as a developed country (World 
Bank, 2005). 
Malaysia was chosen because it is one of the developing countries that has had 
relatively substantial involvement in outward investment (UNCTAD, 2003). In 
1 The term TNCs will be used throughout this thesis to denote developing countries' multinationals. 
It refers to incorporated or unincorporated enterprises comprising parent enterprises and foreign 
affiliates. 
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2004, Malaysian outward stock was valued at USD13.8 billion which represents 
1.3% of total outward investment from developing countries and 0.14% of global 
outward investment (UNCTAD, 2005a). Malaysian outward investment is small as 
a percentage of world's FDI, but it has gown in importance, particularly its 
investment in other developing countries (Ragayah, 1999). Similarly, Malaysian 
investment into Western countries is still limited, but the size of the investment by 
individual companies can be considered quite large. For instance, the acquisition of 
AET Tanker in the U. S. A. by Malaysian International Shipping Corporation 
(MISC) for USDLI billion, the acquisition of Wessex Water in the U. K. by YTL 
Group for USDI. 765 billion (Bursa Malaysia, 2002 2) and the acquisition of Loders 
Croklaan BV in the Nertherlands by 101 Corporation Berhad for USD213.667 
million (Bursa Malaysia, 2003 a). 
A 
. ýpart from looking into their motivation and strategies for investing abroad, this 
study also seeks to find out some inside inforination on the Malaysian companies 
and the extent to which the nature of ownership and type of companies such as 
conglomerates, Chinese family-owned companies and government- linked 
companies (GLCs) are reflected in their intemationalisation process. This study 
therefore hopes to contribute to, and fill in some of the gaps to better understand 
international business framework, especially with regards to FDI by firms from 
developing countries. 
This research undertakes a qualitative approach mainly by analysing qualitative 
data from interviews with the Malaysian parent companies and their subsidiaries in 
the U. K., as well as data obtained from published and un-published documents from 
the respondent companies. 
1.2 A STUDY OF MALAYSIA'S INVESTMENT IN THE U. K. 
This study draws upon Malaysian investment into the U. K. as a case study for 
practical reasons. The researcher is of Malaysian origin and is based in the U. K., 
' Bursa Malaysia is the Stock Exchange of Malaysia. It was formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE). 
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which makes it possible to gain access to information from these two countries. 
Although the U. K. is not the biggest recipient of Malaysia's foreign investment 
globally, in comparison with other western European countries the U. K. has 
consistently received high Malaysian investment over the last decades (further 
discussed in Chapter Four). This seems to suggest that there is a constant interest by 
Malaysian companies to invest in the U. K., for which the reasons are presented in 
this thesis. 
As a small country that has constantly been the recipient of FDI, outward 
investment by Malaysian companies is relatively new compared with other 
countries in Asia such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong that had begun 
their outward investment in the 1950s and 1960s (Tolentino, 2000). The earliest 
figure of Malaysian overseas investment was for 1972, which involved a total value 
of RM 148 million (Ragayah, 1999). The value of Malaysian overseas investment 
was small because prior to the 1970s Malaysia had implemented an import- 
substitution strategy that made it more a recipient of FDI than an exporter of 
capital. In addition, low levels of domestic savings and higher demand for 
domestic investment discouraged any intention to invest abroad (Ramasamy and 
Viana, 1995). As pointed out by Tolentino (2000), this development course of 
inward FDI has been influenced by factor endowments in national resources and the 
level of development of the host country. 
In the context of Malaysia's economic development, it has grown progressively in 
the 1980s and 1990s. During the same period, values of overseas investment have 
also increased which might reflects the notion of the Investment Development Path 
theory (IDP theory). The IDP theory postulates that the development of FDI by a 
country is related to the country's phase of economic development which is 
measured by the Gross National Products (GNP) to the level of inward and outward 
investment (Dunning, 1981). In the case of Malaysia, its gross investment overseas 
in 1992 grew to RM1310.20 million (USD344.7 million) and by the year 2002 , it 
had increased to RM 16424 million (USD4322 million) [see Appendix 1.1 ]. During 
the same period Malaysia's Gross Domestic product (GDP) experienced a constant 
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growth at 8.5% per annurn between 1991 and 1997 (Economic Planning Unit, 
2004). 
Most of the investments by Malaysian companies in the early stages were 
concentrated in other developing countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong. It 
expanded into the industrialised countries from the 1990s onwards. Malaysian 
investment in the U. K. started in the 1970s when Malaysia's state-owned firms 
acquired British empire companies that were operating in Malaysia's rubber 
plantation and tin mining industries (Ragayah, 1999). While early investment was 
state-driven, further investments from the 1980s onwards were as a result of 
initiatives by the private sector. Malaysian investment flows into the U. K. makes up 
between 2.44% to 17.85% of total investment flow over the period 1992 to 2002 
(see Appendix 1.2). The highest investment flow recorded was RMI. 716 billion 
(USD 452million) in 1997, just before the Asian economic crisis (see Appendix 
1.1). 
At present, there is limited understanding on the intemationalisation of Malaysian 
firms into the foreign market. Similar studies about multinationals from other 
countries in the region such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan multinationals 
are easier to find (Tolentino, 2000; Yeung, 1999), One is even less likely to come 
across a study on Malaysian investment into developed countries. For instance, 
Ragayah (1999) examined reverse investment (outward investment) by Malaysian 
companies, but she only looked at Malaysian reverse investment in general without 
looking at any particular host country. The only study about Malaysian investment 
in a developed country is by Gomez (2001) where he examined the intra-ethnic 
cooperation of Malaysian Chinese companies in the U. K. with other ethnic Chinese 
companies. The lack of study on Malaysian outward investment is probably 
due to 
the small amount of FDI originating from Malaysia. 
Despite this lack of visibility, a study of Malaysian investment into the U. K. could 
still be used as a basis for a better understanding of the internationalisation of 
fin-ns 
from developing countries. Preliminary data collection conducted over the period 
October 2002 - January 2003, of Malaysian companies' 
investment in the U. K., 
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revealed that Malaysian investment in the U. K. has mainly been carried out bý' 
companies with different characteristics and ownership structures, narnelý, the 
conglomerates, Chinese family business and companies that are substantially 
controlled by the government or GLCs. These are elements that have rarely been 
explained within the context of an international business framework. Dunning 
(1999), for example, agrees that less attention has been paid to the type of 
internationalisation practised by conglomerates which is reflected in the 
international extension of a company's activities over geographical space. Study on 
these organisational elements could provide insight as to whether firms of different 
corporate structure and type of ownership act similarly or differently in their 
internationalisation process. 
From another perspective, previous studies of developing country TNCs have also 
been biased towards manufacturing TNCs. In contrast, however, preliminary 
information obtained at the beginning of the research shows that Malaysia's 
investment in the U. K. tends to concentrate in the non-manufacturing sectors such 
as hotel, research & development (R&D), utilities, marketing, distribution and sales 
units. It appears that there are different motivations and strategies between 
manufacturing and services firms when they internationalise their operations. For 
example, the majority of Malaysian investment in the U. K. is undertaken via 
acquisition. In some cases, the transactions involved the acquisition of equity 
interest in a failing local company. Malaysian companies also tend to hold majority 
shares in their U. K. affiliates. It also appears that the strength of these companies 
comes from the ownership of large financial surplus together with the desire to 
explore new market potential. 
The case of Malaysian investment in the U. K. thus provides a research opportunity 
in two areas of the international business circle. First, a study on the specific 
motivations of FDI, given the distance between the two countries, can be 
undertaken. In the context of host country, the U. K. is a developed country that 
enjoys a dominant position in Europe as an inward investment location 
(Invest. U. K., 2002). It also has a historical relationship with Malaysia, a fon-ner 
British colony. Second, given the varied ownership structures of Malaysian 
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companies investing in the U. K., such a study could also provide some indication as 
to whether there is any link between the type of companies involved and their 
intemationalisation practice. 
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
Main Obiective 
The main objective of this research is to examine the motivation and strategy of 
direct investment by Malaysian companies into the U. K. The study seeks to provide 
a better understanding on the outward direct investment (ODI) by transnational 
corporation (TNCs) from developing countries, using Malaysia as a case study. 
Specific Obiectives 
1. To examine the general factors that motivate Malaysian companies to 
undertake outward direct investment into the United Kingdom; 
2. To examine the influence of specific factors such as firins, locations, costs 
and actors in the organisation, on the decision to invest in the United 
Kingdom; 
3. To understand the entry strategy and factors that detennined the choice of 
entry mode; 
4. To consider the operational strategy and management relationship between 
Malaysian parent companies and their U. K. subsidiaries; 
5. To consider factors that determined the motives of investment and 
operational strategies that are linked to the characteristic of Malaysian 
companies investing in the U. K., namely Chinese family businesses, 
conglomerate companies and government-linked companies (GLCs); 
6. To consider the general implications of this study to the theoretical 
understanding of the multinational firm theory, developing countries' 
transnational corporations (TNCs), managerial capacity and with regards to 
Malaysian govenu-nent policy. 
In summary, this study aims to generate explanations concerning the process of 
internationalisation involving Malaysian companies and their investment in the 
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U. K, based on the firm's specific advantages, the FDI motive (Dunning, 1993), 
profit maximisation and transaction cost considerations. It is assumed that the 
common determinant of FDI could be the factors that explain Malaysian ODL 
However, specific factors such as firm specific advantages, locational factors and 
the motivation of actors in the organisation will also have influence. For example, 
based on preliminary information available at the start of the stud Y3, some of the 
Malaysian companies do tend to possess a competitive advantage, but it is unclear 
how they use this advantage within the context of their investment in the U. K. 
Since the practices and strategies of investment in a foreign country might be 
different from an internal domestic market point of view, this study also seeks to 
understand the motives and strategies of interriationalisation by companies such as 
the conglomerate, Chinese family businesses and GLCs. For example, would 
Chinese family businesses, conglomerate firms and GLCs retain their operational 
characteristics in their subsidiaries, such as in the areas of control, decision making 
and management practices? In the context of Malaysian government policy, it is 
assumed that investment policy is favourable towards inward FDI rather than 
outward FDL The capital control policy introduced by the Malaysian government 
after the Asian crisis in 1997 is also thought to have affected the flow of capital, 
hence Malaysian outward investment. Similarities and differences in the motivation 
and strategies of Malaysian TNCs with other developing countries TNCs are also 
explored. 
1.4 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
The overall framework of this research is depicted in Figure 1.1. The topic of the 
research is foreign direct investment from Malaysia into the U. K. and research on 
this topic is focused on three main areas. The first and second focus is to look at the 
motivations and strategies of such investment. 
The third focus (under the Research Coverage in Figure 1.1) is to examine the 
companies' characteristics and the extent to which these are linked to their 
interriationalisation process. The inclusion of company's characteristics in the 
3 Information based on company reports and FAME Data Base. 
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research framework is to find the answer to the 5 th objective in Section 1.3. The 
findings are then placed in the existing context of intemationalisation frameýý, ork 
and developing countries TNCs which is hoped will broaden understanding of these 
frameworks in general. 
Fi2ure I. I: Research Framework 
Research Main Research Research Research 
Topic Focus Coverage Implications 
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Countries 
TNCs 
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4. Malaysian 
Government 
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This thesis is organised along nine chapters. The thesis starts with the introduction 
chapter which explains the purpose of the research and provides the background to 
the research. An overview of the present theoretical underpinnings of 
internationalisation framework which forms the basis for understanding the reasons 
why fin-ns operate in more than one country is presented in Chapter Two. Chapter 
Two also presents a discussion of the organisational structure of emerging 
countries' TNCs, another focus of the study, in addition to the motivation for their 
outward investment. Chapter Three looks at the underlying context of the research 
and presents an overview of Malaysian inward and outward direct investment with 
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special emphasis on Malaysian direct investment to the U. K. Chapter Four 
discusses the specific organisational. forms of companies commonly found in Asia 
and particularly Malaysia. These are the conglomerates, the Chinese family 
business and GLCs. The research methodology is presented in Chapter Five. 
Chapter Six to Eight form the analysis chapters that also present the findings of the 
research. They include the determinants of Malaysian companies' investment in the 
U. K. in Chapter Six, and their mechanism and strategies of investment in Chapter 
Seven. The type of investing firms i. e. the conglomerate firm, Chinese family firm 
and GLCs, and their operation and management in international business is 
discussed in Chapter Eight. Chapter Nine presents the summary of the findings and 
concludes the research. 
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CHAPTER 2: GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES'TNCs 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter forms the first part of the two literature review chapters. The first 
section presents the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that underpin foreign 
direct investment (FDI). UNCTAD (2005) defines FDI as 'an investment involving 
a long term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident 
entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise 
resident in an economy other than that of foreign direct investors (FDI enterprise or 
affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate). FDI also involves a significant degree of 
influence on the management of foreign affiliates and flows of capital between 
economies (UNCTAD, 2005 p 297). 
An understanding of the underlying literature of FDI is important for analysing the 
case of Malaysian companies' direct investment in the U. K. Discussion is focused 
on the general theories of FDI and its relevance to firms from the developing 
countries. It includes an overview of the motives of FDI, and the strategies for 
foreign market servicing. 
This is followed by a discussion of the organisational structure of TNCs. For this, 
the discussion is centred on the structures and strategies of international companies, 
and the management of their subsidiaries. The final section presents the results of 
past empirical research on the motivations and evolution of FDI by firms from other 
developing countries. 
2.2 MOTIVES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
The origin of the FDI framework goes back to the Hymer-Kindleberger theory that 
was developed in the 1960s. It addresses the question of why a foreign-owned 
firm 
is able to compete with local firms in the host economy given the advantages of 
local firms (Buckley and Casson 1976). The theory postulates that for a foreign- 
owned firm to compete in a host country market, it must possess some transferable 
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ownership advantages over local firms. It was further argued that barriers to trade 
and other barriers that prevent host country firms from duplicating this advantage 
means that FDI is frequently the preferred form of exploiting this advantage in the 
foreign market (Buckley and Casson, 2002). 
The internationalisation of the firm involves incremental stages in the market 
servicing strategy from domestic-oriented to international market servicing through 
export, licensing, franchising and direct investment. Johanson and Wiedersheim- 
Paul (1975) explain this phenomenon as being an incremental process that starts 
with a nearby country to a more distant country as the firm increases its experience. 
Different approaches have been used by different schools of thought to explain the 
internationalisation of the firm. However, the motivations for the 
interriationalisation are not fixed as they change as the firm grows (Dunning, 1993) 
or emerge as the business environment changes (Mintzberg, 1994a). 
The main impetus for a firm to internationalise lies in its corporate strategy which is 
in turn, influenced by factors in the business environment. The evolution of the finn 
normally starts with 'born local' in which its market, resources, technology and 
assets are locally based. Once the firm reaches a certain size, its corporate strategy 
changes to accommodate new requirements within the business and market, in 
which locally available resources are insufficient for the firm's expansion or to 
maintain its competitiveness. As transactions are considered less efficient in the 
open market, FDI would be the best choice to maintain competitiveness. In other 
words, a firm undertakes FDI in order to maintain its competitiveness locally or 
internationally, as well as to ensure its survival. 
With regard to the literature on types of FDI, Dunning (1993) presents four main 
types of FDI namely, resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency- seeking and 
strategic asset-seeking FDL There are, however, other explanations 
for FDI aside 
from Dunning's FDI types although these are not totally independent of the basic 
Dunning's 'seekers' motive. Buckley and Casson (1976,2002), for example, 
present the view of the emergence of multinational enterprises 
from the perspective 
of the firm's profit maximisation, imperfect market and internalisation 
(as discussed 
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in Section 2.2.2). The following section discusses the different types of FDI which 
is based on Dunning's Model of FDI. 
2.2.1 Dunning's FDI Types 
Dunning (1993) divides FDI types into resource- seeking, market-seeking, 
efficiency- seeking and strategic asset-seeking. 
2.2.1.1 Resource-seeking FDI 
Resource seeking investment refers to the acquisition or utilisation of natural or 
human resources that are in short supply, or not at all, in the home market, in a host 
country. Dunning (1993, p 57) presents three main types of resource seekers. The 
first is the case of, investing firms that seek to exploit physical resources, such as 
raw materials available in foreign countries to complement their current activities. 
The motives for such investment are to secure supply and minimise cost. The 
second form of resource seeker exploits the abundant sources of cheap labour in the 
host country for labour intensive manufacturing. This usually involves transferring 
the investment of manufacturing companies from higher real labour cost to lower 
real labour cost countries. 
In the context of resource seeker FDI (Dunning, 1993), higher real labour cost 
normally refers to home country labour market and lower real labour cost basically 
refers to the host country labour market. However, the reverse is true of investment 
originating from developing countries into the developed countries in which 
developing countries possess lower real labour cost. It is assumed that the objective 
of such an investment is other than for labour intensive manufacturing as it seeks 
skilled labour in technology based investment. It is likely that such resource seeking 
FDI is related to the third type of resource seeker proposed by Dunning, namely the 
case of a company that acquires technological capabilities, management expertise 
and/or organisational skills as a result of its lack of ownership of those capabilities. 
This research therefore, seeks to fill some of the gaps in understanding resource 
seeking FDI. 
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2.2.1.2 Market-seeking FDI 
Market seeking FDI is undertaken to supply goods and services which may 
previously be supplied by exports. The motive for bypassing this market 
transaction, amongst others, is due to transaction costs caused by market 
imperfections (Williamson, 1984), tariff barriers (Dunning, 1993) and/or other 
forms of protections imposed by the host country. Dunning (1993) describes four 
motives of market-seeking FDI: 
9 To follow the customer overseas so as to retain the business; 
To enable companies to adapt their products according to local 
requirements; it also enables firms to familiarise themselves with local 
market enviromnents; 
FDI is assumed to be less costly than supplying from a distance; and 
FDI that is driven by 'follow the leader' or competitors' motives so that 
the firm can be present in the market that is served by the competitors. 
2.2.1.3 Efficiency-seeking FDI 
Efficiency seeking FDI is undertaken to enable the investing company to gain from 
the common governance of geographically disperse activities. The aim for 
efficiency seeking is to take advantage of different factors endowment, cultures, 
institutional arrangements, economic systems and policies and the market structure 
of different geographical locations. The prerequisite for efficiency seeking FDI is a 
well developed and open cross border market. Therefore, a regionally integrated 
market is the best place to realise the benefit of efficiency seeking FDI (Dunning, 
1993). The investing company will benefit from economies of scale, economies of 
scope and risk diversification which is stemmed from cross border product or 
process specialisation or learning experiences and opportunity for arbitraging cost 
and price differences across exchange. It is also to take advantage of differences in 
consumer tastes and supply capabilities (Dunning, 1993, p 59). In the context of 
economies of scale, it arises in all aspect of MNE operations. It can be achieved if 
more units of a good or services can be produced on a larger scale such as 
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producing in fewer countries to supply multiple markets. In the context of 
international business, the idea is that unit cost fall as output rises in supplying 
markets in different countries. Meanwhile, economies of scope come about from 
the joint use of assets that result in lower overall costs than the firm units had when 
they operated independently (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1996, p153). Companies 
are also able to diversify assets and capabilities by exploiting the benefits of 
producing in several countries and risk diversification (Dunning, 1993). 
In addition, Rugman and Brewer (2001) note that efficiency seeking FDI is a 
reflection of the rationalisation of the multinational activities where affiliates' 
activities are specialised, and benefits are gained from the flow of goods and 
knowledge between the firms. 
2.2.1.4 Strategic asset-seeking FDI 
Strategic asset seeking FDI involves the acquisition of assets in a foreign country to 
sustain the firm's strength and competitiveness both internationally and locally 
which otherwise would be costly or difficult to generate internally (Dunning, 1993; 
Rugman and Brewer, 2001). The motive for acquiring the foreign strategic asset is 
to add to the acquiring firm's existing assets (asset augmentation), which the firm 
perceive will sustain or increase its competitiveness in relation to its competitors. It 
is also to capitalise on the benefits of common ownership of diversified activities 
and capabilities (Dunning, 1993, p 60). There is also a relationship between 
strategic asset-seeking FDI and the motive to create a synergy between the acquired 
assets and the other segments in the investing firm. This is in line with Dunning's 
(1993) classification of support investment in which the purpose of the acquisition 
is to support the activities of the rest of the enterprise of which they are part (p 61). 
Based on the above theoretical underpinning, a general assumption can be made 
about the motive of Malaysian FDI into the UK. In general, Dunning's four types of 
FDI could be used to explain Malaysian FDL They would not, however, be able to 
provide a complete explanation. For instance, although the U. K. is a high cost 
country, it is relatively advanced in technology. Therefore, the resource- seeking 
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motive of Malaysian investment into the U. K Is more likely to be around gaining 
access to technological capability and skilled personnel rather than lower cost of 
input factors. Market seeking FD1 could only be used to explain the motive of 
investment by Malaysian manufacturing based companies that are involved in the 
production of exportable goods. It is also assumed that Malaysian companies, 
especially conglomerate firms, aim to gain from economies of scale and scope as 
well as risk diversification from their investment in the U. K. Finally, it is assumed 
that the two most important strategic asset seeking motives of Malaysian FD1 into 
the UX are acquisition of technology and international brands. 
2.2.2 Profit Maximisation and Transaction Cost 
Buckley and Casson (1976) postulate that it is the natural objective of the firm to 
maximise profit. However, because transactions in the market are costly, 
transaction cost reduces the potential profit of the finns. Costs are, for example, 
incurred in contract implementation, discriminatory pricing, asymmetric knowledge 
and tariff restrictions. Costs also relate to the cost of finding and negotiating with 
partners, communication and coordination cost, and failure to adapt to 
envirom-nental condition and safeguarding specific asset, and also the cost of 
monitoring performance (Buckley and Casson, 2002, p 37-38). To maximise profit 
in imperfect markets, there are often incentives for the firm to bypass the imperfect 
markets by bringing the entity that was previously linked by the market into 
common ownership, or by creating an internal market. It is also more profitable for 
the firm to undertake certain activities and transaction within its organisation, rather 
than subjecting them to a market mechanism (Buckley and Casson, 1976). The 
motive to internationalise due to market imperfection is further expanded in the 
transaction cost hypothesis that explains the motivation of the firms involved in 
international operation. 
Williamson (1985) posits transaction cost as a firm's evaluation of the cost of 
integrating an operation within the firm as compared with the cost of using an 
external party to act for the firm. Transaction cost can also be defined as 'the cost 
of running the system' (Standifird and Marshall, 2000) or 'the cost of organIsing 
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the economic system' (Arrow, 1969 cited in Levy, 1985). Theory postulates that 
there is an alternative method of organising the product market in which the market 
is treated as costly and inefficient. Therefore, the theory was brought about by the 
notion of market failure. It begins with the assumption that competition within the 
market discourages supply side opportunistic behaviour and forces suppliers to 
perform efficiently (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1991). Williamson 
(1981) attaches two behavioural assumptions on transaction cost analysis, namely 
bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality implies that human 
actors as well as firms are incapable of perfect contracting due to environmental 
and behavioural factors, which is limited by information and communication 
abilities. Opportunism is a situation where, given the opportunity, decision makers 
may unscrupulously seek to serve their self interests, and it is difficult to determine 
a priori who is trustworthy and who is not (Standifird and Marshall, 2000, p 26). 
Given the situation of market imperfection and asymmetric information, a firm may 
assume that the cost of doing a transaction in the market will exceed the cost of 
organising the activity within the hierarchy, and therefore, the firm may opt for 
internalisation of operations abroad; that is, to conduct FDI (Buckley and Casson, 
1976). 
There are studies that have found the influence of transaction cost in investment 
decisions. Brouthers (2002) in his studies of European Union firms suggests that a 
firm that perceives higher levels of transaction costs tends to venture as a wholly 
owned subsidiary. Transaction cost factors are also strong predictors for the choice 
between joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary irrespective of the nationality 
of the investing firms (Neupert and Makino, 2000). 
The effect of transaction cost on finn's investment decision could also be relevant 
to Malaysian investment in the U. K. Therefore it is assumed that Malaysian firms 
undertake direct investment in the U. K. because they feel it is more profitable to 
undertake certain activities and transaction within the hierarchy rather than 
be 
subject to the market mechanism due to the perceived costs of transactional market 
failure. 
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The above FDI motives provide the basis for explaining the types of FDI in 
international business literature. However, FDI motive varies among fin-ns and 
between business environments. Therefore, it is difficult to embrace all motives of 
FDI into a single explanation. The most that the analyst can reasonably do is to 
formulate paradigms to provide an analytical framework for explaining the various 
FDI motive (Dunning, 1993, p 63). Thus, the motive of finn's internationalisation 
can be explained by relating the firm's business environment and location factors, 
to the firm's overall corporate objectives. Japanese corporations, for example, 
actively pursue investment overseas in response to yen appreciation, protectionism, 
higher labour costs, slower domestic growth and the need to secure natural 
resources and markets (Farell et. al., 2004, p 162). Yeung (1998) in his study of 
Indian FDI suggests heavy home government restrictions have forced many Indian 
TNCs to operate abroad in order to better exploit their ownership specific 
advantages. 
In relation to the notion that it is difficult to find a single explanation on the motives 
and strategies of FDI for every country, this research on Malaysian investment in 
the U. K. seeks to provide an alternative explanation of the uniqueness of factors 
that are specific to the firms and countries that influence their foreign investment 
behaviour. 
2.3 FOREIGN MARKET SERVICING STRATEGY 
Finns have various options on how to serve a foreign market. The decision 
normally involves the selection of direct export, licensing, franchising, management 
contract, joint-venture, merger and acquisition and greenfield entry. These options 
are regarded as an incremental process that normally involves a gradual shift from 
less integrated to more integrated mode (Welch and Luostarinen, 1988; Gatignon, 
1986). The resources and capabilities of the investing firm are the most influential 
determinants of the mode of foreign market servicing types. Theoretically, the 
ownership- loc ation-internalisation (OLI) paradigm is the most widely cited, and 
remains an important model to explain why and how firms decide to be involved in 
a foreign market. 
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With regard to the definition of strategy, some authors consider market servicing 
strategy as 'a deliberate choice' (Dunning, 1993, p 186) and involves setting goals 
and objectives, analysing markets and developing options (Tallman and Yip, 200 1). 
Mintzberg (1994) proposes an 'emergent strategy' which explains that there is no 
fixed strategy because a strategy changes as the environment changes. This point is 
discussed in details in the following section. 
2.3.1 The Emerging Strategy in Intern ation alis ation 
Internationalisation strategy is complex, firm specific and context dependent. By 
definition, strategy is a Greek word meaning 'leading the army', and in business 
this always refers to competitive and corporate strategy (Kenyon and Mathur, 
1993). Leading discussions on business strategy have highlighted the contrasting 
features between conventional 'designed strategy' and 'emerging strategy' (Kenyon 
and Mathur, 1993). 
Briefly, the 'designed school model' of strategic planning associated with the 
Business Policy Group at the Harvard Business School (Mintzberg, 1990b, p 171) 
is based on the following premise: 
Strategy formation should be controlled and conscious as well as a formalized and 
elaborated process, decomposed into distinct steps, each delineated by checklists 
and supported by techniques. The responsibility for the overall process rests with 
the chief executive in principle; responsibility for its execution rests with staff 
planners in practice. Strategies come out of this process fully developed, typically as 
generic positions, to be explicated so that they can then be implemented through 
detailed attention to objectives, budgets, programs, and operating plans of various 
kinds. 
(Mintzberg, 1994a, p 42) 
The 'emerging strategy' is a concept established by Henry Mintzberg, who 
criticises the notion of strategy of the design school which he considers as 'if the 
concept is not exactly dead, it has certainly fallen from its exalted pedestal' 
(Mintzberg, 1994, p 12). According to him, strategies are not only designed or 
planned, but also 'emerge' (Campbell, 1991; Kenyon and Mathur, 1993). Planner 
N craft' their strategies rather than 'design' them (Campbell, 1991). Mintzberg 
argues that during the implementation of a strategy, planners face surprises and 
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accidental discoveries and they react to these environmental changes by modifying 
their strategies either incrementally or even radically (Kenyon and Mathur, 1993, p 
358). However, the design school denies the planners the chance to adapt 
(Mintzberg, 1990, p 180). These two forms of strategies are presented in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 explains that an intention that is fully reallsed is called deliberate 
strategy, or a strategy that is not seen as something inadvertent or accident but 
consciousl deliberate and explicit (Kenyon and Mathur, 1993, p 357). The 
unrealised intention is called unrealised strategy, while emergent strategy is the 
realised pattern that was not pre determined and is sporadic. The design school 
prefers deliberate strategy and does not recognise the emergent strategy. 
Figure 2.1: Forms of Strategy 
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The concept of deliberate strategy is also applied in explaining strategy in the 
international business literature, instead of emergent strategy. Li (1994), for 
example, proposes the definition of strategy as the 'firm-specific choice or 
managerial choice with regard to the broad perspectives and specific actions in 
conformity with the holistic fit between the firm's internal profile and external 
context to obtain, sustain, and enhance its competitive advantages to transform its 
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intended goals into realised performance' (p 149). Dunning (1993) also describes 
business strategy as a deliberate choice taken by entrepreneurs or managers of firms 
to organise the resources and capabilities within their control to achieve an 
objective or set of objectives over a specific time period (p 186). 
In the context of emerging strategy, firms may decide to organise their resources 
and capability across different markets, or to internationalise their operation across 
borders. This may be a reaction to environmental change such as rising cost due to 
market imperfection, a threat to changes in demand in the market and continuity of 
supply of materials and emerging opportunities. Another important element in 
emerging strategy is the role of intuition. This is deeply, often passionately felt; 
rooted in experience of the context, even if the learning is subconscious; and 
emerges as a conscious choice and direction (Campbell, 1991, p 109). The essence 
of intuition lies in the organisation of knowledge for quick identification, and not in 
its rendering for inspired design (Mintzberg, 1994b, p 310). Therefore, a manager 
may make a decision that is not based on a consciously planned process but rather 
on feelings that rely on past experience. 
In the context of international business, one of the basic strategies of 
internationalisation of the firm is to provide services or sell products to every part 
of the world. It is a globalisation of business activities in which multinational 
enterprises engage in foreign direct investment to create foreign subsidiaries which 
add value across national borders (Rugman, 2002, p 3). In reality, however, the 
globalisation strategy of a firm is not as systematic as thought. Crick and Spence 
(2005) in their studies of U. K. high-tech small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) find that a majority of the firms exhibit both planned and unplanned 
strategies, and serendipitous encounters that were important to several firms either 
initially and/or in later times after they had intemationalised. They thus suggest that 
entrepreneurs may not have undertaken planning in a formal sense, but rather react 
to changing circumstances, and had a notional idea of where they wanted to take 
their firms, operating a series of emergent strategies as a result of opportunities that 
were identified (p 182). Karagozlu and Lindell (1998) in their study of small and 
medium US technology-based firms also suggest a similar situation in which 
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dramatic changes in the business environment promoted new management 
paradigms encompassing such characteristics as allowing structure to ernerge from 
action, becoming more responsive, evolving strategies from bottom-up processes 
and focusing human resources more on individuals. 
Emerging strategy also explains the opportunistic strategy in which the manager is 
able to recognise 'chance' opportunities and be ready to take advantage of them 
(Crick and Spence, 2005). Merrilees et al. (1998) cited in Crick and Spence (2005) 
describes a four stage-process with regards to serendipity in international market 
selection. First, networking, referrals and meetings through which entrepreneurs 
widen their horizons and have the chance to identify potential opportunities. 
Second, identification of emerging opportunities where opportunities for one person 
could be considered hopeless encounters by others. Third, is a predisposition to 
respond quickly to relevant opportunities and fourth, 'resource leverage', or the 
adaptability of resources to enable implementation (p 172). It is also the 
entrepreneurial spirit leading to the seizing of opportunities (Karagozoglu and 
Lindel, 1998). Basically, the emerging strategy is relevant at any stage of the 
internationalisation process. The concept of emergent strategy has been widely used 
to explain strategic planning in organisations. Its application in international 
business research is, however, still limited and this research seeks to provide the 
applicability of emergent strategy in the case of Malaysian companies investing in 
the U. K. Therefore, it is assumed that the interriationalisation strategies of 
Malaysian firms are more likely to be guided by business opportunity that is 
I emergent' and not by a well structured investment strategy and norms of 
investment. 
2.3.2 Incremental Process of Intern ation alisation 
The evolution of transnational corporations describes the sequence ln which a 
finn 
evolves from domestic organisation, serving a relatively homogenous home market., 
to becoming an active exporter, and subsequently an international corporation 
serving a large number of diverse multinational and cultural markets 
(Hibbert, 
1997). It can be, therefore, an incremental process in which the 
firm starts 
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internationalisation by exporting, before it eventually begins production in the host 
country. It ranges from buying and selling goods and services in the open market. 
through a variety of inter-firm non-equity agreements, to the integration of 
intennediate product markets and an outright purchase of a foreign operation 
(Welch and Luostarinen, 1988). Incremental internationalisation mostly refers to 
the sequential process of a firm's involvement in the international market, and is a 
function to acquire knowledge and market commitment (Johansson and Vahlne, 
1977). In contrast to incremental internationalisation is the 'born global' finn 
(Gabrielsson and Kirpalani, 2004; Hashai and Almor, 2004; Sharrna and 
Blomstermo, 2003). Gabrielson and Kirpalam (2004) define 'born global' as a firm 
which 'from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantages from the 
use of resources and the sales of output in multiple countries without any preceding 
long term domestic or intemationalisation period'(p557). A born global finn 
essentially leaps over the 'stages' in the internationalisation process by 
internationalising rapidly and almost from its inception (Hashai and Almor, 2004). 
In a broader scope, Welch and Luostarinen (1988) define internationalisation as 
'the process of increasing involvement in international operations'. This definition 
is broad in the sense that it looks at the process of internationalisation that involves 
interconnection and a close link between inward and outward flow of investment. 
Other explanation that is frequently quoted regarding the internationalisation 
process is one that was proposed by Johanson and Vahlne (1977) or better known 
as the Uppsala Model. This model is based on a number of assumptions (for a 
review, see Forsgren, 2002, p 259). The basic assumption is that the major 
constraint to firms to undertake foreign investment is the lack of 
knowledge of 
foreign markets. As this knowledge is tacit, firms have to be in the market to 
acquire it. The second assumption is that the firm will undertake 
foreign investment 
incrementally because of uncertainty about the market. This means that the more a 
firm knows about the market, the less the perceived risk to 
it and the more it is 
willing to undertake foreign investment in that market. 
The proposed 
internationalisation can also start when the domestic market is near saturation and it 
seeks new alternatives abroad. Hence, the process starts as a consequence 
of 
growth and profit motives. In addition, internationalisation 
is a framework N7,, -here 
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the investing finns evaluate their alternative approaches to invest in the host 
countries. 
Empirical evidence of TNCs from developing countries tend to produce a mixed 
result in relation to incremental FDI and developing countries' TNCs. Young et. al. 
(1996) in their study on outward investment by Chinese multinationals show that 
although some results support the internationalisation process models, there are also 
evidence of leap-frogging of stages. Similarly Lau and Rose (2002) in their study of 
the internationalisation process of Hong Kong garment firms show many of these 
firms started exporting from inception. They are also different from some of the 
technologically driven born global firms (see Gabrielson and Kir-palani, 2004 and 
Hashai and Almor, 2004) because they do not have firm specific advantages in 
technology. 
Finns operate in different industries and face different situations in their 
internationalisation process. Therefore, there is no single framework in the 
literature that can explain every aspect of intemationalisation of the firms and 
research that is based on different countries could provide a broader- based 
literature on internationalisation of firms. Andersson (2004), for example, posits 
that firms in an early stage of intemationalisation in a mature industry can succeed 
by means of a slow, incremental internationalisation strategy. When the industry is 
matured and the firm has become more experienced, then its choice of market entry 
is more dependent on the actions of its rivals. 
Based on the geographical location of Malaysia within the Southeast Asia, it can be 
assumed that the internationalisation of Malaysian companies follows the path of 
incremental FDI that started with neighbouring countries in the Southeast Asian 
region before becoming distributed more wider afield. 
2.3.3 Ownership, Location and Internalisation Advantages (OLI Paradigm) 
The international business framework has also been developed based on 
explanation in the context of Dunning's OLI Paradigm. The OLI paradigm is useful 
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in the explanation of the process in international production, but it is more likely to 
offer a framework of intemational production rather than a theory. This was 
explained by Dunning (1988) as follows: 
The intention was to offer a holistic framework by which it was possible to identify and evaluate the significance of the factors influencing both the initial 
act of foreign production by enterprises and the growth of such production 
(Dunning, 1988, p 1) 
The theory suggests that geography and the industrial composition of foreign 
production undertaken by multinationals is determined by the interaction of three 
sets of interdependent variables or sub-paradigm: ownership specific advantages, 
location specific advantages and internalisation advantages. The first sub- 
paradigm, firm ownership advantages, relate to the advantages possessed by the 
investing firms relative to those owned by domestic finns. They are sometimes 
called competitive or monopolistic advantage and must be sufficient to compensate 
for the costs of setting up and operating a foreign value-adding operation, in 
addition to those faced by indigenous producers or potential producers. They anse 
from ownership of specific assets vis-a-vis those possessed by other firms, and 
transaction advantages arising from the capacity of firm hierarchies to capture the 
transactional benefits arising from common governance of a network of these 
assets, located in different countries (Dunning 1988). Cetens paribus, the greater 
the competitive advantages (arising from ownership specific advantages) of 
investing firms relative to those of domestic fin-ns or other firrns, the more they are 
likely to be able to engage in or increase their foreign investment. Amongst others, 
the ownership specific advantages may be those owing to size and established 
position of the firm, product or process diversification, monopoly power, propriety 
technology, patent and trademark, R&D, marketing capability and access to input 
and resources. There are also advantages arising from multinationality such as the 
ability to take advantage of international differences in factor endowment, 
government intervention, and the ability to diversify risk between different regions 
and/or countries. 
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The second sub-paradigm, country-specific location advantages, refers to 
attractions offered by a country or region that needs to be exploited for ý'alue- 
adding activities by investing firms. It may comprise of natural resources, labour, 
infrastructure facilities and government incentives. As argued by Dunning (1988), 
firms will engage in international production whenever they perceive it is in their 
best interest to combine spatially transferable intermediate products produced in the 
home country, with at least some immobile factor endowments or other 
intermediate products in another country. It is also asserted that the more the 
immobile, natural or created endowments, which firms need to use jointly with their 
competitive advantages, the more firms will choose to exploit their ownership 
advantages by engaging in direct investment (Dunning, 2000). 
The third sub-paradigm, internalisation, offers a ftamework in which firms evaluate 
alternative strategies for exploiting their ownership advantages to complement the 
location attractions offered by different countries. Firms have alternatives, from 
transacting in the open market for goods and services to internalising the market for 
intermediate product. They may eventually internalise production in the foreign 
market by outright purchase of the foreign operation. It is perceived that the greater 
the net benefits of internalising cross-border intermediate product markets or the 
greater the perceived costs of transactional market failure, the more likely a firm 
will prefer to engage in foreign production itself, rather than license the right to the 
foreign firm (Dunning, 2000). There are many elements of intemalisation incentive 
advantages such as to: avoid transaction and negotiation costs, avoid cost of 
enforcing property rights, avoid or exploit government intervention, control an 
uninterrupted supply of raw materials and inputs; and also to be able to engage in 
cross-subsidisation and transfer pricing strategies. At the same time, a firm will also 
be able to exploit the economies of large-scale by directly undertaking the 
production of intermediate goods in the foreign market that would eventually 
benefited it in the home country in terms of lower cost of product. Generally, 
intemalisation is undertaken in the event that the international market place is not 
the best place for exploiting specific advantages due to risk, uncertainty and 
transaction costs. 
26 
"qq 
Buckley and Casson also emphasise that the decision to intemalise depends on four 
main factors, namely industry-specific factors which rely on the nature of the 
products and the structure of the industry; region-specific factors based upon 
geographical and social characteristics of nations; nation-specific factors that 
relates to political and fiscal relations between nations and firm-specific factors 
which reflect the internal factors within the firin such as resources and management 
capabilities (2002, p 33). Then, there is a straight forward link between 
internalisation and internationalisation in which different stages of production, for 
example, requires different combination of factors that are available in different 
geographical location. Internalising product value chains in different countries will 
create MNEs, which at the same time gives an explanation on internationalisation 
of the firms. Buckley and Casson's approach on internalisation and the consequent 
internationalisation of the firm is also reflected in the concept of the Eclectic 
Paradigm laid down by Dunning. Dunning (1999), for example, suggests that the 
ownership advantages arise not only from the exclusive possession of certain assets, 
but from the ability of firms to internalise these assets to protect themselves from 
market imperfections. 
The interaction of ownership, location and interrialisation in the OLI paradigm 
could provide a foundation for making an assumption about Malaysian ODI. It is 
assumed that the greater the competitive advantages (arising from ownership 
specific advantages) of Malaysian companies relative to those of the U. K. domestic 
firms, the more likely they are to be able to engage in or increase foreign 
investment. As the U. K. is a developed country, direct investment 
by Malaysian 
companies into the U. K. is assumed to be influenced by 
location cost 
disadvantages. Assumptions could also be made that Malaysian companies will 
engage in foreign operations whenever they perceived it is their 
best interest to 
combine spatially transferable intermediate products produced 
in Malaysia with at 
least some immovable endowment or other intermediate product 
in the U. K. 
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2.3.4 Mode of Entry Strategy 
The internationalisation of the firm is also about selecting an appropriate mode of 
entry into the foreign market. Cavusgil (1984) proposes that direct involvement in 
overseas production facilities happens when a firm reaches a committed 
involvement stage in its internationalisation strategy. Brouthers et. al. (1996), on the 
other hand, categorise the mode of entry choice into independent, cooperative and 
integrated mode. The independent mode refers to finns that are not directly 
involved in the production and sales of product in the foreign country but rely on 
other companies. It includes licensing, franchising, distributing and contracting 
where firms do not take any equity stake in the venture. The cooperative mode 
refers to joint venture (JV) or strategic alliance between foreign and domestic firms. 
The JV may be voluntary or it can be the result of host government regulation. 
Finally, the integrated mode is where firms establish their own production and sales 
in the host country market by acquiring existing local companies or setting up from 
scratch (de novo, greenfield). 
In investment decisions, firms will choose the most efficient mode of entry choice 
from various alternatives and it depends on transaction-specific asset, external 
uncertainty, internal uncertainty and free-riding potential (Anderson and Gatignon, 
1986). There were also studies that relate mode of entry choice to cultural distance 
(Erramili, 1991; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Kogut and Singh, 1988)5 host country 
regulations (Buckley, 2000; Contractor, 1990), level of international experience of 
the investing firms (Coviello and Munro, 1997; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Welch 
and Luostarinen, 1988), characteristic of the investment and motive of investment 
(Casseres, 1990; Kogut and Singh, 1988). 
Most of the studies that relate entry strategy to cultural distance were based on the 
concept of cultural dimension between nations (Hofstede, 1999). Hofstede's 
cultural dimension between nations corresponds to the issue of power distance 
(focuses on the degree of equality, or inequality, between people in the country's 
society), collectivism versus individualism (which focuses on the degree the society 
towards individual or collective achievement and interpersonal relationships), 
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femininity versus masculinity (which focuses on the degree the society reinforces, 
or does not reinforce, the traditional masculine work role model of male 
achievement, control, and power) and uncertainty avoidance (which focuses on the 
level of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity within the society). Hofstede's 
dimension of culture has also been widely referred to in explaining cultural distance 
in other areas of international business studies such as transaction cost theory 
(Gatignon and Anderson, 1988) and the effect of culture on firm's strategy (Hennart 
and Larimo, 1998; Ross, 1999). 
Characteristics of national culture especially with regards to cultural distance 
between markets have been found to influence the selection of entry modes as 
suggested in some studies. Erramili (1991), for example, found that the probability 
of service firms employing full-control modes declines with increasing cultural 
distance of the host country. Similarly, Kogut and Singh (1988) find strong support 
for the hypothesis that the greater the cultural distance between the country of 
investing firm and the country of entry, the more likely a finn will choose joint 
venture (JV) and greenfield over acquisition. They also found that uncertainty 
avoidance which results from cultural distance also has strong correlation with JV 
and greenfield entry. 
It is not surprising to find that companies are attracted to foreign operations first in 
more familiar (culturally) and closer locations which allows experimentation 
without high risk. It also gives them time to gather relevant knowledge and 
experience, before any deeper commitment is contemplated (Coviello and Munro, 
1997; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Welch and Luostarinen, 1988). Apart from this 
internal dimension, multinational firms also need to face and respect diverse local 
institution and markets, legal systems and norms of behaviour or the external 
societal and institutional structures of the host country (Buckley, 2000). 
Host country specific factors also affect the choice of entry mode especially with 
regards to socio-political factors such as industrial growth, which is positively 
related to greenfield entry (Mudambi and Mudambi, 2002), market potential to 
contractual mode (Pak, 2002), country risk and intensity of competition to 
lower 
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resource commitment mode such as licensing (Contractor, 1990; Kim and Hvvang, 
1992). On the influence of host government regulation with regards to entry 
choice, Contractor (1990) in his study of US investors found that in a nation where 
the government is perceived as more intrusive in operation, there is a greater 
tendency to form shared-equity affiliates. Government restrictive policy is also a 
very strong factor for equity sharing in the developing countries. It is the issue of 
conflict between multinational firms wishing for larger shares, where the 
government finds lower equity share ownership by foreigners as being more 
desirable (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001). In terms of parent companies' international 
experience, Erramill (1991) found that firms with little or no experience appear to 
exhibit a disproportionately high affinity for full control entry modes. This finding 
is similar to Casseres (1990) who argues that fin-ns choose whole ownership if they 
have a lot of experience in an industry or a country. 
The firm's characteristics and its business venture also influence its entry strategy. 
Casseres (1990) found that the investing firm will choose whole ownership if the 
subsidiary was in a marketing-intensive industry. Kogut and Singh (1988) found 
that diversified and R&D firms enter via greenfield and JV, while advertising firms 
enter via acquisition. Another factor that seems to influence entry choice is the 
motive of investment itself. Pak (2002) in his study of international franchisers in 
the U. K. and the U. S. A. found that investing firms choose to have equity in the 
foreign unit rather than contractual mode if the motive is to quickly penetrate 
foreign market, gain experience from overseas, gain overall competitiveness and to 
alert themselves of rival firms' activities. An investing firm will also choose JV if 
the investment relies on local input or raw materials, local skills and to gain access 
to technology (Casseres, 1990; Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998). 
Generally, any form of internationalisation undertaken by a firm will face market 
and structural imperfections that anse from uncertainties about the socio-political 
differences in the workplace and business environment between the investing 
countries and the host countries. These include uncertainties about the work 
cultures, distribution network, government regulations, customer preferences, 
political structure and also ethnic relations. In this research, the cultural distance 
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presented is between Malaysian and Britain based on historical ties \A,, ýhere Malaysia 
has had an enormous political and socio-economic influence from the British. This 
relationship is assumed to have a great influence on the choice of the U. K. as the 
location of investment by Malaysian investors. This research seeks to find this 
relationship element as factors that determined Malaysian ODL 
Based on the literature on incremental FDI, it is assumed that Malaysian firins will 
be less inclined to follow a sequence entry choice from less integrated to more 
integrated mode. On the relationship between cultural distance and entry choice, an 
assumption can also be made that the higher the cultural distance between markets, 
the more control the Malaysian companies are likely to maintain over their foreign 
operations, resulting from uncertainty and risk. 
2.4 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CONTROL OF 
SUBSIDIARIES 
Different home countries' TNCs provide different organisation and control systems 
of their subsidiaries. Therefore, studies of emerging countries' TNCs have also 
focused on the business network system, culture and institutional analysis (Yeung, 
1999). Studies on the organisational structure of multinational firms also 
concentrate on ownership (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Newburry and Zeira, 1997), 
control and decision making (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984), human resources and level 
of autonomy (Forsgren and Pahlberg, 1992; Taggart and Hood, 1999). 
The underlying concept is that of the centre-periphery structure. Headquarters (or 
divisional headquarters) is the centre that designs the strategy for the whole system 
and control of the subsidiaries, the periphery (Forsgren and Pahlberg, 1992, p 48). 
However, in reality, the relationship between parent and subsidiaries is more 
complex. It is reasonable to believe that the subsidiary's degree of autonomy may 
have a direct relationship with geographical distance between parent and subsidiary, 
cultural distance and environmental uncertainty. Taggart and Hood (1999) who 
compared the level of autonomy of German and Japanese firms located in the U. K., 
concluded that German subsidiaries have more decision-making powers that 
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gradually increase with time. Japanese affiliates, on the other hand, not only have 
less autonomy than the German firms, the level also tends to decrease over time. 
One of the major elements in the structure of international companies is the 
relationship between parent and the subsidiaries. There is a lot of interest in the 
literature which discusses the way the parent company interact with their 
subsidiaries especially with regards to the forms of managerial control and work 
organisation (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Bartlett and Goshal, 1998; Birkinshaw and 
Hood, 1998; Forsgren and Pahlberg, 1992; Gates and Egelhoff, 1986; Newburry 
and Zeira, 1997; Paterson and Brock, 2002; Young and Tavares, 2004). The 
research on headquarters- subsidiary relationship, for example, focuses on 
centralisation and formalisation of decision making, subsidiary roles and subsidiary 
development (Paterson and Brock, 2002). Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) view the 
relationship as hierarchical, centred-dominated corporations, whose foreign 
subsidiaries were typically limited to local sales and manufacturing, acting as an 
instrument of the parent company and all subsidiaries were treated in the same way. 
Bartlett and Goshal (1988) instead proposed the transnational solution as the way 
forward for successful international organisation. They argue that a successful 
company should be organised independently along the line best suited to its 
envirom-nent. The independent structure of the subsidiaries acknowledges the 
importance of responding to local knowledge to achieve international 
competitiveness and cumulative organisational learning processes by every member 
in the organisation. Therefore, the relationship between subsidiaries and parent 
may be influenced by the business environment and formal control varies 
depending on environmental factors (Paterson and Brock, 2002), and shared 
managerial strategy that could increase success in pursuing global strategies 
(Bartlett and Goshal, 1998). 
Organisation studies recognise that subsidiary companies should be treated as 
separate units for analysis, given their specific roles according to their existing 
capabilities in the local business environment, and they are also autonomous 
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998, p 7). However, the headquarters are not always 
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willing to accept this level of decentralisation (Paterson and Brock, 2002, p 143). 
The above arguments are based on two contrasting organisatlonal behaviour of 
multinational subsidiaries, i. e. centralisation and decentralisation (autonomy). 
Centralisation is defined as the level at which a decision would need to be approved 
before being implemented (Gates and Egelhoff, 1986, p 72) and represents the 
division between subsidiaries and headquarters in the decision making process. 
Young and Tavares (2004) defines decentralisation or autonomy as 'the constrained 
freedom or independence available to or acquired by a subsidiary, which enables it 
to take certain decision on its own behalf (p 228). To become useful, autonomy 
requires resources such as managerial, technological, financial capabilities and 
information (Young and Tavares, 2004, p 216). 
Gates and Egelhoff (1986) in their study on the U. S. A., the U. K. and European 
NINCs posit that centralisation or decentralisation is influenced by the size of the 
MNC and its foreign operation, size of subsidiary, age of the company, the internal 
and external complexity of the organisations, the industry groups and the origin of 
the parent company. Their study found that the European and the U. K. MNCs tend 
to decentralise as the relative size of their foreign operations is larger than the 
U. S. A. N4NCs. The U. S. A. MNCs tend to have more centralised marketing and 
financial decisions than the European MNCs. The U. K. MNCs also have the most 
decentralised marketing and manufacturing decision-making and the most 
centralised financial decision making (p 88). 
Finally, the subsidiary development stream postulates that subsidiaries can grow the 
organisation itself without support from the headquarters (Paterson and Brock, 
2002, p 147). The basic idea is that with time the subsidiary accumulates experience 
and capabilities and is thus able to enhance the scope of its activities. However it 
will still depend on resources availability, the global environment, competition 
from other subsidiaries and the management's desire to increase autonomy as well 
as constraints and opportunity in the host country market (Paterson and Brock, 
2002, p 148). In general, however, the organisational structure of NINEs and 
parent-subsidiary relationship evolves with changes in the global economy and the 
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industry. As such, multinational firms are also becoming multi -dimensional as a 
result of their differentiated subsidiary roles. 
The theoretical framework of internationalisation and organisational structure as 
discussed above is based on the evolution of industrialised market multinationals. 
This is due to the fact that world FDI in the past decades has been dominated by 
multinationals from the 'triad' of U. S. A., Europe and Japan. Theoretical 
frameworks on FDI that originate from developing countries have only been given 
greater attention in the 1980s and 1990s. But often the tendency is to apply 
traditional models of developed country's internationalisation practices. 
This research therefore seeks to provide an explanation for the internationalisation 
practices by Malaysian companies that is based on organisational structure which 
are assumed to be different to other developing country TNCs. Due to the spatial 
distance between Malaysia and the U. K. and it is assumed that Malaysian 
companies are less able to implement direct control over their U. K. subsidiaries and 
therefore the subsidiaries have greater autonomy. 
2.5 INTERNATIONALISATION OF FIRMS FROM DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Multinational firms from Brazil, Argentina, India, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore were the leaders in developing countries' outward investment in the 
1980s and 1990s (Tolentino, 2000). Investment from these countries initially 
concentrated in their neighbouring countries before they eventually expanded into 
developed countries (Ferrantino 1992; Lall 1983; Tolentino 2000). In recent years, 
developing regions still lead the rise in FDL UNCTAD (2005b) for example, stated 
that developing economies, particularly those from Asia, are emerging sources of 
FDI as Asia and Oceania contributed more than four-fifths of outward FDI from 
developing countries. Meanwhile, over the past 15 years, annual FDI outflows from 
developing countries have grown faster than those from developed countries 
(UNCTAD, 2004a). In 2003, for instance, FDI from developing countries 
accounted for over one-tenth of the world total stock and some 6% of world total 
flows (UNCTAD, 2004a, p 19). The composition of outward FDI stock beM, een 
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developed and developing countries is shown in Figure 2.2. With regards to FDI 
from developing countries, UNCTAD (2004a) has concluded that: 
TNCs from developing countries in all regions are acquiring ownership 
advantages. They are becoming a force in the world FDI market. With outward 
FDI stock of already $859 billion, they are building their own international 
production systems. They are driven by the same pressure as their counterparts in 
developed countries to remain competitive in the global economy. 
(UNCTAD, 2004A, p 29) 
Based on region, developing countries from Asia and Oceania are the largest and 
fastest growing outward investors followed by countries from Latin American and 
the Caribbean (Figure 2.3). In 2003, countries from Asia and Oceania were the 
major contributor towards the FDI stock of USD635.3 million (UNCTAD, 2004a). 
The major players include India and Pakistan in South Asia, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and other ASEAN member countries in South East, and Taiwan, People 
Republic of China (P. R. China) and Korea in East Asia (see Figure 2.4 and 
countries by region is shown in Appendix 2.1). In 2004 witnessed a significant 
increase of outward FDI from Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, China and 
India. Outward FDI from Hong Kong, for example, increased from USD5 billion in 
2003 to USD40 billion in 2004 (UNCTAD, 2005b). 
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Figure 2.2: Outward FDI Stock: World, Developed Economies 
and Developing Economies, 1980-2004 (Million of Dollars) 
12000000 
10000000 
8000000 
'15 6000000 
4000000 
2000000 
0 
M, World E Developed countries EJ Developing countries 
Source: UNCTAD (2005b) 
Figure 2.3: Developing Countries: FDI outward stock, 
1980-2004 (Million of Dollars) 
800000 
700000 
i2 600000 
500000 
45 400000 
300000 
2 200000 
100000 
0 
0 Africa 0 Latin America and the Caribbean El Asia and Oceania 
Source: UNCTAD (2005b) 
36 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Year 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1995 2000 2004 
Year 
Figure 2.4: Asia: Outward FDI Stock 1980-2004, by Region 
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2.5.1 Theoretical Perspective: The Investment Development Path (IDP) 
Many studies on developing countries' outward investment have been based on the 
notion of the investment development path (IDP). The IDP is a model that explains 
the evolution of developing countries' TNCs by looking at the correlation between 
the stages of development and the degree of outward and inward investment 
(Dunning, 1981). The IDP hypothesises inward and outward investment to grow 
parallel with national development. Thus, in the early stage of development, 
economic resources have yet to be utillsed and the country has little or no means to 
exploit them. Inward and outward investment during this stage is consequently 
negligible. At the second stage, as the economy develops, there is a significant 
amount of inward FDI but still very limited outward FDI. A significant increase in 
outward FDI only takes place in the third and fourth stages when outward 
investment appears to outweigh inward investment. 
In the second stage, inward FDI predominates in trading, import substituting, ý 
location specific advantages, resource based activities, simple manufacturing, and 
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limited technology and organisational requirements. As the stages of development 
move forward, inward FDI is then transformed into a single activity in a particular 
location. It also requires more technologically advanced operation and more 
complex organisational structure, and an increase in R&D expenditures (Dunning, 
1981). 
In the case of outward FDI from certain developing countries, there is evidence to 
suggest a fundamental shift in both character and motivation of outward investment 
by fin-n form the developing countries described as 'second wave' FDI (Dunning et 
al., 1998). The second wave of FDI from the developing countries actually took 
place during stage three of economic development (Dunning et. al., 1998). In the 
second wave FDI, although the majority of developing countries' investments are 
still regionally concentrated, they have also started expanding into distant 
developing countries and into industrialised countries. The gradual shift of 
investment to industrialised countries is to cope with high competition in the 
domestic market with global economy liberalisation when regional competitiveness 
is no longer sufficient for the firm's survival. It is also to avoid protectionism in the 
developed countries especially due to the development of de facto and de Jure 
economic blocs such as the European Union (EU) and North America Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA). This new wave of FDI from developing countries is entirely 
consistent with the predictions of the IDP (Dunning et al., 1998). 
2.5.2 Intern ation alisation Motives of TNCs from Developing Countries 
The earlier studies on the evolution of multinationals from developing countries 
undertaken mostly in the 1980s have been contributed by Agawal (1981), Chen 
(1981), Dunning (1981), Lall (1983), Lecraw (1981), and Wells (1981). Their 
studies found that the motivation of FDI by companies originating from developing 
countries do not deviate much from those of TNCs based in developed countries. 
Thus, the overall motivation of FDI from developing countries remains within the 
context of resourc e- seeking, market-seeking, efficiency- seeking, and strategic-asset 
seeking (see discussion in Section 2.2.1). Later studies have been contributed 
by 
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Tolentino (2000); Yeung (1994) and UNCTAD (2004) mostly on TNCs from newlý, 
emerging economies such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Brazil and India. 
The evolution of TNCs around the world suggests that, as the industrial 
development of the home countries proceed and as their firms become more mature, 
there is a gradual progression of outward investment towards a more sophisticated 
form of activity, technology and organisational structure (Tolentino, 2000). There 
are a so ind cations that the motivation, direction and type of investment are also 
influenced by home and host countries specific factors. Yeung (1994) lists out the 
motivations as a set of 'pull' and 'push' factors such as sluggish domestic markets, 
local market knowledge exploitation, relative firm-specific advantage exploitation5 
protection or penetration of foreign markets, diversification of risks and 
establishment of cultural and ethnic links. The motives of FDI of some developing 
countries is summarised in Table 2.1 below: 
Table 2.1: Empirical Studies on the Motives of FDI by Selected Developing 
Countries Multinationals 
Authors Country Motive of FDI 
Wells (1978) Hong Kong 0 Reaction to higher tariffs or import quota 
Multinationals 0 Production in lower cost country to supply to 
advanced country 
Diversification of risk 
High investment cost in late 1960s 
0 Search for foreign opportunity 
Kumar and Kim (19 84) Korean Multinationals 0 Used technology of suitable to the condition of host 
country 
Lower cost of expatriates 
Suitable of products 
Marketing skills 
Availability of cheap inputs 
Host country incentives 
Cultural systems 
Geographical proximity 
Fong and Komaran Singapore and Hong Sineapor 
(1985) Kong Multinationals To find new market 
To sell technology expertise 
To overcome protectionism in host country 
Diversification motive to high tech areas 
Hone Kom! 
Labour shortages 
Rising domestic costs 
0 To circumvent quota-and restriction of textile in 
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Authors Country Motive of FD1 
host country 
Technology expertise 
Sourcing raw materials 
Hui and Fong (1986) Singapore 0 To serve local market of host country Multinationals 0 Sourcing raw materials 
1 0 Diversification of risk 
Wells (1988) Brazilian Multinationals Import barriers: prior export experience 
Lack export experience 
Exploiting own technology and managerial skill 
Slowdown domestic market 
Dent and Randerson Korean Multinationals 0 Structural weaknesses of Korean economy, rising (1996) labour cost, appreciation won. 
0 Government policy- Segyehawa program - easy 
application of outward investment 
0 Imported technology is increasingly difficult to 
obtain natural resources 
0 Lower labour cost 
Gang(1992) China Multinationals 0 Opens up new market 
0 Circumvent trade barriers and maintain export 
market 
Acquire technology 
Acquire raw materials 
Home government incentives 
information seeking 
Trade experience 
Abundance of funds 
Neto (1995) Brazilian Multinationals Export of technology 
Indigenous technology breakthrough 
Appropriateness of process and product technology 
to overseas market 
Pecking order stage in product life cycle 
Lower operational cost site 
Economies of scale 
Cultural and ethnic ties 
limitation size in domestic market 
Horne government incentives 
Incentive from international agencies 
Regional economic integration (South American 
Common Market) - expansion to neighbouring 
countries 
UNCTAD (2004c), 
Brazilian Multinationals Natural resources seeking 
To avoid trade barriers 
To improve logistic structure of their export 
Follow the client motive 
Close to customers 
Market seeking 
" Financial motive rather than international 
production 
" Capital flows seeking tax shelter from taxation 
Young et. al. (1996) Chinese Multinationals 0 Market seeking - near to distant countries 
Efficiency seeking - reverse technology transfer 
Regional protectionism within China 
" Risk diversification due to volatile government 
policy 
" Vertical integration 
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Authors Country 
-- 
Motive of FDI 
Encarnation (1982) Indian Multinationals To protect an export market for manufacturers 
To extend a new market for capital goods 
To expand capacity utilization and foreign exchange 
earnings 
Home government trade policies and unintended 
domestic regulatory policy (monopolies legislation) 
Tariff and quota of host government 
Foreign trade tends to lead FDI 
Technical collaboration 
Government support public Technical collaboration 
sector enterprises 
UNCTAD (2004b) Indian Multinationals Improving Ownership specific advantages 
Increase financial capabilities 
Growing competitiveness 
Near to client 
Growth opportunity 
Expose to knowledge 
Access to market 
Access to production facilities 
Acquire brand name 
Access to technology 
Securing natural resources 
0 improvement in home country regulative 
framework 
Lecraw (1992) Indonesian 0 Market seeking- export enhancing 
multinationals 0 To gain access to technology 
0 Access to channel of distribution 
40 To buy management, technology, marketing 
advantages through FD1 
Tolentino (2000) Singapore 1970s 
Multinationals Finding new market 
To exploit investment opportunity 
To sell technology expertise 
Need to diversify towards high technology industry 
Keep abreast of rapidly changing technologies 
Respond to neighbounng countries' upgrading of 
their natural resources 
1980S 
Abundant foreign exchange and recycle to portfolio 
investment abroad 
Government actively promoting outward FDl 
Limited size of domestic market 
Accelerated pace of wage increase and tightened 
foreign labour importation 
1990S 
Accumulation of large financial surplus 
Emphasis on outward investment to overcome 
vulnerability of Singapore to external shock 
Need to diversify into high technology industry in 
developed countries 
Taiwan 1970s 
Lim: ited opportunity for growth in home country 
Seek new market 
To establish foreign market position 
To overcome import quota of host country 
To export indigenous technology abroad 
To keep. abreast with other home country world 
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Authors Country Motive of FD1 
MNC 
1980S 
To improve external relation with the rest of the 
world 
Liberalisation of trade policy and exchange control 
The strength of domestic currency 
Rapid accumulation of Forex reserve 
1990S 
" Accumulation of world's largest foreign exchange 
reserves 
" Increase of cost of production as labour cost 
increases resulting in comparative disadvantage of 
labour intensive industries 
" Difficulties for expansion as a result of strict policy 
on environment, shortage of land 
South Korea 1970s To secure access to raw materials 
To expand exports market 
" Promote internationaleconomic cooperation with 
developed and developing countries 
" Liberalisation of Korea's outward investment policy 
(restriction to the development of domestic 
industrial growth) 
" Investment incentive by government 
1980S 
Accumulation of BOP surplus 
Strength of Korean currency 
0 Rise of labour cost as a result of the shortage of 
low-skilled labour and an increased pressure from 
labour organisation for wage increase. 
1990S 
The strength of chaebols', a conglomerate created 
by the Koreangovernment 
Ragayah (1999) Malaysia Close proximity and cultural factors not highly 
rated 
Expanding and finding new market 
Cheap and abundant resources for plantation 
ventures 
Diversifying of risk 
Home Government disincentive 
Higher return of investment than in home country 
To exploit expertise available in host countries 
'Chaebols refers to a large, family-owned conglomerates comprised ot- tirms that operate in (atterent 
sectors of the Korean economy (Ferris et al. 2003; Chang, 1988) 
The above Table 2.1 shows that the primary reasons why developing countries' 
TNCs invest in other countries is still based on Dunning's four types of FDI as 
discussed in Section 2.2.1. FDI was also driven by home country's government 
incentives such as TNCs from Korea (Dent and Randerson, 1996), China (Gang, 
1992), Brazil (Neto, 1995), India (Encarnation, 1982) and Singapore (Tolentino, 
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2000). The other primary reasons were to circumvent trade barriers and other host 
countries' trade restrictions. This is amongst the motives of FD1 by TNCs from 
Hong Kong (Fong and Komaran, 1985; Wells, 1985), Singapore (Fong and 
Komaran, 1985), Brazil (UNCTAD, 2004c; Wells, 1988), China (Gang, 1992) and 
India (Encarnation, 1982). The other main motives were diversification of risk such 
as TNCs from Singapore and Hong Kong (Fong and Komaran, 1985; Hui and Fong, 
1986; Well, 1988; ), and exploiting own technology which is found amongst the 
motives of TNCs from South Korea, Singapore and Brazil (Neto, 1995; Fong and 
Komaran, 1985; Kumar and Kim, 1984; ). 
In addition to the studies presented in Table 2.1, TNCs from South Korea provide a 
good example of successful TNCs from the third world. Ghymn (1980) suggests 
that Korean construction firms have dealt successfully with external opportunities 
by exploiting their human resources. The success of Korean firms is also attributed 
to government support such as five years' tax holiday on exported construction 
materials and training facilities for the workers before they are exported to the host 
countries to work in Korean companies (Aggarwal and Agnion, 1990). Different 
level of government support for Korean firms is also targeted at the import 
substitution and export promotion stage. In the import substitution stage, the 
government leads the corporate sector by creating and protecting profit 
opportunities for the corporation, and developing their comparative advantages. 
When the country moves towards the export promotion stage, the government no 
longer plays the role of leader but acts more as a facilitator to private sector 
investment (Aggarwal and Agnion, 1990). At this stage, the comparative advantage 
becomes more firm specific such as competitive advantage in technology of Korean 
firms over foreign competitors (Han and Brewer, 1987). 
The above studies clearly show how difficult it is to find a single explanation of the 
motives of FDI by TNCs from the developing countries. Perhaps, the contextual 
differences between countries contributed to the diversity of the motivations in 
some TNCs. Therefore, the study on Malaysian investment in the U. K. presented in 
this thesis contributes to the existing literature on the intemationalisation of 
developing country firms. 
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2.5.3 International Investment Strategy of Developing Country's TNCs 
The international investment strategy of the firm refers to the way the firm develops 
its position in the transnational value chain in order to build a stronger competiti'Ve 
position in the world market (Craig and Douglas, 1997). It is a value that is created 
from production to marketing to end consumers, as goods and services move across 
borders. Similar to motive of investment, developing country firms' investment 
strategies also cannot be generalised with a single explanation. Commonalities exist 
to a certain extent, but there are also differences due to the uniqueness of these 
TNCs. For example, the strategy of overseas Chinese businesses in Asia is 
influenced by some elements of guanxi and kinship (Gao, 2003; Rauch and 
Trindade, 2002; Yeung, 1999) and the strategy of investment by Korean TNCs is 
influenced by the strategy of Chaebol and the intervention of home government 
(Ghymn, 1980). 
In terms of location, a regional phenomenon exists in the international investment 
by firms from Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore (Tolentino, 2000; Yeung, 
1998) as they invest mostly in neighbouring Asian countries. Investment strategy 
for TNCs from the emerging economies can be traced to partial and complete 
participation as suggested by Craig and Douglas (1997). In their initial investment 
into foreign market, firms from emerging economies tend to adopt a low-cost 
commodity positioning where their competitive advantages are based on low 
production cost. As their capability in mass production increases, these firms tend 
to manufacture for private label or Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) which 
enables them to market their product worldwide, thus overcoming their weaknesses 
in product brandings and marketing. 
Another investment strategy is the production of components for other established 
manufacturers, and is extensively pursued in the computer and automobile 
industries. In complete participation, the investment strategy shifts towards 
becoming a low cost leader aimed at a market that is sensitive to price, while 
having greater control on distribution and marketing. It also focuses on markets 
with similar levels of technology with the home country. The 
firm also targets 
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niche markets to enable it to leverage firm specific tangible and intangible assets 
that have a positive association with the home country (Craig and Douglas, 1997, p 
78). Table 2.2 shows some of the strategies associated with TNCs Erom the 
developing countries which are based on firm level case studies. 
Table 2.2: FDI Strategies of Developing Countries TNCs 
Authors Country of Origin Strategy 
Wells (1978) Hong Kong Defensive strategy 
Aggressive strategy 
Undercutting price of potential 
competitors 
Foreign subsidiaries designed to 
serve host country market and 
no integration with other 
affiliates for econorn1c of scale 
JV with others - Japanese. 
JV with western MNC for brand 
name 
Send old equipment abroad 
Fong and Komaran (198 5) Singapore 0 In small investment - prefer to Hui and Fong (1986) finance their investment from 
their own cash reserves. 
0 In small investment - main 
instrument of control is 
periodical visit by company 
official and periodic reports filed 
by foreign venture. 
0 Direct management in larger 
FDI 
0 Adapting technology to local 
requirements 
Wells (1988) Brazil 0 Competing based on technology 
and managerial skill 111 LDC 
0 In non-advanced technical base 
- the firm competes on the basisi 
of smaller production runs and 
adaptation of technology to local 
climates 
0 Use raw material advantages in 
home country 
Buckley and Mirza (1988) Asia Pacific Multinationals Strategies similar with MNCs 
from small industrialised 
countries 
" Technology appropriate for 
other developing countries 
" The states and elite connections 
Encamation (1982) India Capitalisation in own technology 
and machinery 
Exploiting competitive 
advantages - knowledge of 
small-scale, labour intensive 
production techniques 
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Authors Country of Origin Strategy 
Ragayah(1999) Malaysia 0 Most decision are made at the 
subsidiary level 
" Decisions at subsidiary level are 
reported to the headquarters 
through monthly reporting 
system. 
" Major decision that might have 
significant impact on business 
and profit need prior approval 
from headquarters 
" Basic financial operation done at 
company's level 
2.5.4 FDI Characteristics of TNCs from Developing Countries 
Developing country TNCs display certain characteristics that vary according to 
their countries of origin. Generally, the size of the firm is large locally, but is small 
globally, and they also have a limited number of foreign subsidiaries. In addition, 
the majority of developing country's FDI is in labour intensive manufacturing and 
services with some in capital intensive industry. Yeung (1998) suggested that 
developing countries' TNCs prefer minority equity JV compared to Greenfield 
entry, and more wholly owned forms amongst newly industrialised countries 
(NICs). Yeung also described the relationship between parent and subsidiaries in 
developing countries' TNCs are rather loose, fluid and informal. 
The strategy of developing country TNCs also involved the adaptation of the 
technology for local use. Localised technology innovation includes downscaling 
product technology. Localisation is also undertaken in the production of appropriate 
product for local consumption and using local distribution channel in marketing 
(Hans and Brewer, 1987; Yeung, 1998 p 37). In addition, most developing 
countries' FDI are dominated by private sector initiatives although there are active 
involvement of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) such as in China and Singapore 
(Deng, 2004; Fong and Komaran, 1985; Hans and Brewer, 1987). Developing 
countries' TNCs are also characterised as being self-financing in capital 
input with 
the exception perhaps, for SOEs, as well as drawing capital from the local partner 
in minority JV (Yeung, 1994). Table 2.3 highlights some of the characteristics of 
developing countries' TNCs: 
46 
Table 2.3: FDI Characteristic in Developing Country Case Study 
Author/Journal Country case Characteristics 
Han and Brewer Korean 0 Competitive advantage in technology 
(1987) 0 Ownership advantage in government policies 
10 Technology in small scale and labour 
intensive 
Skilled and semi-skilled labour in labour 
intensive technology 
FDI in manufacturing flows to lower income 
LDCs 
0 Korean trading companies are active 
investors 
0 FDI as export platform investment 
9 Korean bank tend to be in industrial countries 
9 Majority 100% ownership 
0 100% ownership mostly in trading firms 
0 JV dominant in manufacturing, logging, 
fishing, construction 
0 JV to follow host country requirement. 
LNCTAD (2004) Brazil 0 Most of the country's FDI stock is located in 
tax-haven economies. 
" Other Latin Countries are the most prominent 
locations of outward FDI. 
" Prefer Greenfield projects as mode of entry. 
" Large part of outward capital movement has 
taken place for financial motives rather than 
for international production 
" FDI is concentrated in services activities and 
distribution activities 
" FDI in primary activities is negligible and 
FDI in manufacturing is relatively low 
Deng(2004) China Government role/motivation - state 
controlled economy 
Dominant source of outward FDI - finns 
usually owned by county, municipal council 
and SOEs 
FDI primarily triggered by PULL factors - 
technology, barriers, strategic assets etc 
Not efficiency-seeking FDI -i. e. seeks lower 
cost 
It is not an export-platform type of FDI 
To gain access to foreign capital market 
Non-econonlic factors -education, 
citizenship, social security, health services 
Fong and Komaran Singapore Home-grown, family-owned/managed (1985) Home-grown, government-owned/managed 
Firms that have developed ownership specific 
advantages in manufacturing and expanding 
in related activities. 
Conalomerate companies which are involved 
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Author/Journal Country case Characteristics 
in highly diversified activities. 
" Investment in free trade zone is mainly in 
labour intensive activities. 
" Investment mainly in the Southeast Asia 
region 
41 Prefer to be minority partner in foreign JV 
except in Malaysia 
Ragayah (1999) Malaysia 0A standalone affiliates - subsidiary operate 
largely as independent concern within the 
host country. 
0 Link with parent company through 
ownership, technology transfer and supply of 
long terin capital 
The characteristics shown in Table 2.3 are, however, just simplistic representations 
as TNCs from developing countries are generally more complex and context 
dependent. The character of outward investment by developing countries' TNCs, 
for instance, may change due to technological advancement in certain sectors, 
market liberalisation, effects from regional trading blocks and also possibly due to 
the easing of restrictions on capital flows. 
2.5.5 Organisational Structure of Developing Countries' TNCs 
The literature on organisational structure as discussed in Section 2.4 focused on two 
main topics i. e. centralisation/decentralisation and the operational structure of 
multinational enterprises. The main issues are the level of top management 
localisation, the degree of centralisation/decentralisation between parent and 
subsidiaries, the level of policy and managerial formalisation and the utilisation of 
global operational structure. Ulgado et al. (1994), in their study of Asian 
multinationals (primarily involved in general manufacturing) from Hong Kong, 
India, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, found the following 
characteristics: 
0 Asian NINEs do not hire as many host country nationals for top management 
positions as US or European MNEs. In this, they resemble their Japanese 
counterparts; 
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The Asian NINEs sub sidi ary-headquarter relationship is not as highly 
centralised as that of American firms but are more centralised than Japanese 
and German firms; 
The reporting requirements for Asian MNEs were less frequent than US 
MNEs, but are more stringent than their German or Japanese counterparts; 
Asian MNEs do not depend extensively on home office written policies. 
Asian MNEs implement non global management structures (international 
division, export division, branch) 
2.5.6 Developing Countries' TNCs in Developed Countries 
Studies that specifically investigate the motivation of FDI from developing 
countries into developed country are still lacking. As shown in Table 2.4, the 
motivations of FDI into developed countries are to avoid trade barriers, exploit 
price competitiveness (lower cost of production in the home country), seek new 
technology and acquire international brand names. 
Table 2.4: Motivation of FDI into Developed Countries 
Authors Context Motivations 
Wells (1978) Chinese firms from Reaction to higher tariffs or import 
Hong Kong quota 
Production in lower cost country to 
supply to advanced country 
Encarnation (1982) Indian Joint Venture Tariff and quota of host 
Abroad government 
Financial and Technical 
collaboration 
Deng(2004) Outward Investment by 0 Technology seeking 
Chinese MNCs 0 Trade barriers - to protect and 
promote export 
0 Strategic assets-seeking - to 
internationalise its brand name 
Other empirical evidence provided by Chen (1995), who investigated Taiwan's 
outward investment into the U. S. A., suggests that the primary motive for investing 
in the U. S. A. is to expand the local market as well to get access to a third market 
such as Canada. It is then followed by the objective to acquire new technology, to 
collect market information, to diversify risk, and to secure the supply of raw 
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matenal. Unlike the motives of investment in the developed countries by companies 
from Hong Kong, India and China (Table 2-4), the motive to avoid restrictions and 
trade barriers is negligible in the context of Taiwan's investment in the U. S. A 
Chen (1995) also suggests that Taiwanese firms may move their production into the 
U. S. A. to increase their product value. The motivation to move abroad also greatly 
differs between industries and size of the firms. Electric and electronics has the 
highest propensity to invest abroad, and the incidence of FDI increases significantly 
with the size of the company. Dunning et. al. (1998) observe the investment of 
Taiwanese and South Korean firms into the triad market (North America and the 
European Union) and concludes that the major motivation of investment are 
strategic asset-seeking, accumulation of firm specific advantages related to 
marketing and building up a global brand name. A study by Sim and Pandian 
(2003) also suggests that FDI by Taiwanese and Singaporean textile and electronic 
industries into the U. S. A and the European market were driven by market and 
technology seeking motives. 
However, Lau and Rose (2002), who observed Hong Kong garment firms investing 
abroad suggest that firms of mature industry from developing countries, may not 
have the comparative advantages over local fin-ns in the advanced economies. This 
has been indicated by the closing down of one of Hong Kong's garment 
manufacturing investment in Ireland due to failure in generating profit. 
In the context of past study on Malaysia, Ragayah (1999) has spelled out the 
motivations and strategies of Malaysian companies investing abroad but it was far 
from conclusive. Her study looks at the overall motivations and strategies of 
Malaysian ODI but based only on 7 companies which is probably less 
representative. A study on Malaysian investment in this thesis looks at an 
investment into a single country i. e. the U. K. thus seeks to find conformities as well 
as divergences with the findings in Ragayah's study. 
Past studies on FDI by developing countries multinational do not have much 
infon-nation about direct investment into the developed countries. However, some 
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general assumptions can be made on the motives, strategies and characteristics of 
Malaysian TNCs based on these studies: 
(1) It is assumed that there are similarities regarding the general motives, 
strategies and characteristics of Malaysian TNCs with multinationals 
from other developing countries and there are also differences due to the 
location of the investment and contextual factors; 
(ii) The motives of FDI by multinationals from Indonesia (Lecraw, 1992) 
and China (Gang, 1992) could be the nearest description of the motives 
of Malaysian FDI; 
(iii) Malaysian firms are more likely to engage in a defensive rather than an 
aggressive intemationalisation strategy; 
(iv) Malaysian TNCs are dominated by private sectors' initiatives and 
characterised by self-financing in capital input; 
(V) The organisational structure of Malaysian TNCs is dominated by 
centralisation rather than decentralisation; and 
(vi) The primary motives of investment into the developed countries are 
market access and technology seeking. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
The above discussion shows that the traditional theoretical framework of 
international production still forms the basis for explaining the internationalisation 
of the firm. However, the internationalisation phenomenon cannot be explained by 
a single explanation. In other words, the general framework of FDI is not sufficient 
to explain the different types of FDI, the variety of direction and country origins of 
the TNCs. The characteristics of TNCs from the developing countries are more 
context-dependent on the socio-political economy of the home countries. 
The uniqueness of internationalisation practices still exists among firms. Therefore, 
it is important to understand the internationalisation practice of developing 
countries' TNCs vis-a-vis multinationals from developed countries. In addition, 
there are also tendencies for TNCs from developing countries to present different 
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explanations in respect of firm ownership advantages, organisational structure and 
location of investment. 
The discussion thus far suggests that the motives of TNCs are vaned among finns 
and between business environments. The corporate objectives of the fin-ris and the 
changes that occur in the business environments influence firin strategies and this 
raises the importance of emergent strategy. Therefore, research on Malaysian FDI 
into the U. K. will contribute towards explaining some of the diversity in FDI 
motivation and strategy. The lack of available knowledge on the motives and 
process for outward FDI from developing countries (such as Malaysia) in 
developed countries (such as the U. K. ) warranted the study of FDI in this context. 
In general, this research seeks to fill the gaps in the literature in several areas. This 
research seeks to fill some of the gaps in understanding resource seeking FDI 
namely seeking skilled labour in the developed countries. Since it is difficult to find 
a single explanation on the motives and strategies of FDI for every country, this 
research on Malaysian investment in the UK could provide another dimension on 
ODI by firms from developing countries. This research also seeks to provide the 
applicability of emergent strategy in the case of Malaysian companies investing in 
the U. K. It is presented in this thesis that Malaysian and Britain have historical ties 
and Malaysia has had an enormous political and socio-economic influence from the 
British. This relationship is assumed to have great influence on the choice of the 
U. K. as a location of investment by Malaysian investors. This research seeks to find 
elements in this relationship as factors that determined Malaysian ODI. This 
research also seeks to provide explanation for the internationalisation practices by 
Malaysian companies that are based on organisational structure which are assumed 
to be different to other countries. Finally, this study on Malaysian investment looks 
at investments into a single country i. e. the U. K. and thus seeks to find conformities 
as well as divergences with the findings in earlier studies. Some general 
assumptions have been made in this chapter and whether these assumptions are 
confirmed or refuted is presented in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: AN OVERVIEW OF THE MALAYSIAN ECONONlY. -kiND ITS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a background of the Malaysian economy, in particular the 
position of Malaysian inward and outward FDI flow and stock among developing 
countries. The purpose of this chapter is to place the study within its context such as 
socio-economic conditions, societal fabric, government policy, FDI position and 
also the Asian crisis. This is important as the study is primarily based on Malaysian 
incorporated companies, established along specific Malaysian socio-economic lines 
which have, to a certain extent, shaped their FDI motivation, structure and 
characteristics of organisation and their investment behaviour. This chapter also 
presents the background of Malaysian investment into the UX from the historical 
perspective as well as more recent investment. 
3.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF MALAYSIA 
In terms of land mass, Malaysia covers an area of about 330,000 square kilometres. 
Peninsular and East Malaysia are separated by about 450 kilometres of the South 
China Sea. Peninsular Malaysia has its frontiers with Thailand in the north and 
Singapore in the south (See Figure 3.1). Malaysia is a federation of 13 states that 
consists of II states in Peninsula Malaysia and the Eastern states of Sarawak and 
Sabah. It has a population of about 25 million in 2003 of which 66.2% are 
Burniputera 45 25.2% Chinese, 7.4% Indian, 1.2% other ethnic and 5.29% non- 
citizens (Table 3.1). The Malaysian population is multi-ethnic and multi-religious, 
with three major ethnic groups - Malays and other ethnic minorities 
(including 
fbans, Kadazans, Bajaus and Muruts), particularly located in East Malaysia, 
Chinese and Indian. The Chinese and Indian were originally immigrants 
from 
mainland China and the Indian continents (Salleh and Meyanathan, 1993). 
These 
Chinese immigrants were later known as overseas Chinese (Redding, 1993). There 
is also a heavy concentration of Malaysian business and enterprises in ethnic 
Meaning 'sons of the soil' or natives or population indigenous to the country. 
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Chinese hands (Salleh and Meyanathan, 1993). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
about 58% of the companies studied in this research are Chinese owned companies. 
Figure 3.1: Map of Malaysia 
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Table 3.1: Malaysia: Population Size and Structure, 2003 
2003 % to total 
Total Population 25,082.1 100.0 
('000 persons) 
Citizens 23,794.9 
Bumiputera 15,752.2 66.20 
Chinese 5,996.3 25.20 
Indian 1,760.8 7.40 
Others 285.6 1.20 
Non Citizens 1,287.2 5.29 
Age Structure (years) 
0-14 8,325.4 33.20 
15-64 15,724.4 62.70 
65+ 1,032.3 4.10 
Source: Economic Planning Unit, 2004 (Major Economic Indicators, 2003) 
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3.2.1 Growth and Transformation of the Malaysian Economy 
The theoretical framework of IDP suggests that the level of country's economic 
development have an effect on the inward and outward FDI in a particular country 
(Dunning, 1993). Malaysia can be categorised as a small open economy where the 
private and the goverm-nent sectors facilitate each other in the economic 
development process. A small market provides limited scope for expansion for 
domestic firms which at the same time also need to compete with foreign investors 
investing in Malaysia. Economic activity during the 1950s and 1960s was basically 
resource-based; when tin, rubber and palm oil were the main sources of economic 
growth, employment and export. Access to natural resources and the availability of 
cheap labour force have helped Malaysian companies to build competitive 
advantages which have enabled them to compete in the international market. Porter 
(1998) for example noted that 'a nation firms gain competitive advantage if they 
possess low-cost or uniquely high-quality factors of particular types that are 
significant to competition in particular industry. The pre-industri all sation period 
prior to the 1950s was inline with the first stage of country's development as 
projected by the IDP theory (Dunning, 1993). In the late 1950s towards early 
1960s, Malaysia entered a second stage of development with emphasis on 
industrialisation (Salleh and Meyanathan, 1993) which saw an increased of FDI in 
import-substitution industries (Ragayah, 1999). The import substitution strategy 
was adopted to cope with external imbalance such as reducing dependence on 
imported consumer goods; promoting the use of domestic natural resources; to 
promote industrialisation such as broadening the industrial base; as well as creating 
investment opportunities (Alavi, 1996; Salleh and Meyanathan, 1993). In the late 
1960s, the policy shifted to export promotion especially after the formation of the 
Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA). The aim of the export-oriented 
policy was to encourage the production of light manufactures such as textiles, 
footwear and garment (Salleh and Meyanathan, 1993). These were basic labour- 
intensive industries that provided employment opportunities to the public. The main 
impetus for export promotion policy was the setting up of Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs) or Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in which tax incentives were given to pioneer 
industries under Pioneer Industries Ordinance, 1968. During the 1970s onwards, the 
Malaysian government actively promoted export-oriented policies which also 
55 
witnessed the third stage of economic development. In the late 1980s, folloýving 
the further liberalisation of FDI policies, inflows of FDI into the manufacturing 
sector increased significantly, an impetus given by the Promotion of Investment 
Acts, 1986. Towards the end of the 1990s, the policies of the government aimed to 
encourage heavy industry intended to push Malaysia into diversification, creating 
modern manufacturing activity (Salleh and Meyanathan, 1993). This was also the 
stage where Malaysian companies were encouraged to increase competitiveness and 
productivity (MITI, 1996). This could also relate to the acquisition of U. K. 
companies in the 1990s to gain access to technology. 
The transformation of the Malaysian economy also witnessed structural 
transformation from agriculture to services and manufacturing. Figure 3.2 for 
example shows, a drop in the contribution of agriculture and mining to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) between 1970 and 2003. By 2003, services and 
manufacturing had contributed about 82% to GDP while agriculture and mining 
only contributed for 15% (Economic Report, 2004/2005). 
Malaysia's economic policy from 1971 was also guided by the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) with two-pronged objectives to (a) reduce and eventually eradicate 
poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment for all Malaysians 
irrespective of race; and (b) accelerate the process of restructuring of Malaysian 
society to correct economic imbalance so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the 
identification of race with economic function (Malaysia, 1991). It was in particular 
to redress economic imbalance between ethnic groups to improve the economic 
position of the Bumiputera relative to the non-Bumiputera (see Malaysia, 1991; 
Rasiah, 1999). From 1991 onward, while the economic policies were still in the 
shadow of the NEP, the government introduced the New Development Policy 
(NDP) with the objective to promote economic growth and address further the 
inequalities and imbalances within society (Malaysia, 1991 pp 14). The NEP and 
later the NDP were not well accepted by the non-Burniputera (particularly the 
Chinese) and they felt alienated by this policy which required them to share wealth 
with the Burniputera. (Gomez, 2002). As suggested by Yeung (1999) on the effect 
of restrictive equity policy in some countries in ASEAN, it is also assumed that 
56 
some Malaysian companies undertake FDI as a reaction to the NEP and NDP equity 
policy. 
Figure 3.2: Gross Domestic Product by Industry of Origin, 1970,1995 
and 2003 (in 1978 Prices) 
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Manufacturing 
32% 
Mining, 
Cf)n qt 
Services, 
51% 
Source: MITI (1996); Economic Report (2004/05) 
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As far as exports are concerned, Malaysia has long been a major exporter of 
commodities such as rubber, palm oil, sawlogs 
5 and sawn timber, and crude oil. 
Malaysia also exports manufacturing products such as textile, clothing and 
footwear, chemical and petroleum, electronic and electrical products and 
manufactures of metal (Economic Reports, 2004/2005). 
5 technical term for timber prior to it being processed into sawn-timber. 
1995 
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Figure 3.3: Diversification of Exports, 1970 
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Figure 3.4: Diversification of Export 2004 
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Figure 3.3 and 3.4 clearly show the shift of exports from primary commodities such 
as rubber and tin in 1970 to manufacturing products in 2004. There was a 
substantial increase of manufacturing exports from 11.9% in 1970 to 83% in 2004 
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I Irl 
Forestry 19.6% 
16.3% 
, qqqq 
while primary commodities' contribution to export has declined from more than 
50% in 1970 to less than 10% of total exports in 2004. This indicates the shift of the 
Malaysian economy over the period of three decades from commodity and 
agricultural-based to industry based. 
An increase in involvement in manufacturing activities by Malaysian companies in 
the 1990s and 2000s is assumed to have contributed to their gradual involvement in 
direct foreign investment. The thrust for FDI would be resource seeking and market 
seeking (Dunning, 1993). 
Regionally, Malaysia is part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or 
ASEAN. ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five 
original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 
1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. The 
ASEAN region covers a total area of 4.5 million square kilometers and in 2003, it 
had a population of about 500 million, a combined GDP of US$737 billion, and a 
total trade of US$ 720 billion, Its main objective is "The Association represents the 
collective will of the nations of to bind themselves together in friendship and 
cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for 
posterity the blessings of peace, freedom, and prosperity" (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2005). 
ASEAN is the main trading partner of Malaysia, followed by North America and 
the European Union (EU) as shown in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6. Among ASEAN 
countries, the main trading partner is Singapore which, in 1970, accounted for 
84.9% and 33.2% of exports and imports amongst the ASEAN countries 
respectively. In 2004, about 59.9% of total Malaysian exports and about 46.4% of 
total Malaysian imports amongst the ASEAN countries were with Singapore 
(Economic Report, 2004/2005). Singapore has become the major trading partner of 
Malaysia, which could be explained by its close proximity to Malaysia, as well as 
by the fact that Singapore was previously part of Malaysia. High levels of trade 
with neighbouring countries in ASEAN indicates the role of close spatial proximity 
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and stages in the context of intemationalisation process as discussed in section 
2.3.2. 
Figure 3.5: Malaysia's Exports by Destination, 1970 and 2004 
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Malaysia has experienced strong growth during the last three decades. Starting from 
1970 to 1990, the Malaysian economy posed stable growth with an average GDP at 
6.7% per annum. (see Table 3.2). Malaysia, however, experienced a negative growth 
rate of -7.4% in 1998 as a result of the Asian financial crisis. The economic 
recovery after the crisis has been led by strong growth in exports, particularly of 
electronics and electrical products (Economic Report, 2001). However, the 
Malaysian economy has show a decline in 2001 with a growth of 0.3%. The lower 
growth rate was due to volatility in the world economy as well as uncertainty due to 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in Asia (Malaysia, 2003 p 25). It has also affected the 
investment flows such as shown in Figure 3.7 and also the decline in FDI flows into 
the U. K. as shown in Figure 3.13. 
EU. 12.60', ý, ) 
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Figure 3.6: Malaysia's Imports by Origin, 1970 and 2004 
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Table 3.2: Malaysia's Development Growth 
Year Annual Growth 
Average 1970s 7.5% 
Average 1980s 5.8% 
Average 1990s 7.1% 
Average 1971-90 6.7% 
Average 1991-2000 7.1% 
Average 1996-1997 8.7% 
1998 -7.4% 
1999 5.8% 
2000 8.5% 
2001 0.3% 
2002 4.1% 
2003 4.5% 
2004 7.1% 
Source: Malaysia (200 1); Economic Report, 2000/200 1; Bank Negara Malaysia (2005) 
Malaysia also experienced a tremendous increase in GNP per capita from USS368 
in 1970 to US$3,775 in 2003 and unemployment remained low at 3.1% to 7.4% 
during the same period (see Table 3.3). The increase of GNP per capita also 
indicates the rapid pace of economic development which is related to the propensity 
to be involved in outward investment (Dunning, 1993). The inflationary pressure 
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remained benign and was controlled below 2% between 2000 and 2003 (Malaysia, 
2001; Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005). 
Table 3.3: Major Economic Indicators 1970-2003 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 2003 
GNP per capita 
RM 1,132 31737 6,299 13,333 13,716 14,343 
US$ 368 1,717 2,329 3,509 3,610 3,775 
Unemployment 7.4 5.6 5.1 3.1 3.5 3.5 
Inflation 1.9 6.7 3.1 1.6 1.8 1.1 
Fed. Govt. -4.0 -13.5 -2.9 -5.8 -5.6 -5.4 
account 
(% to GDP) 
Current a/c of 0.2 -1.2 -2.1 10.3 7.6 10.2 
BOP 
(% to GNP) 
Source: Malaysia, 200 1; Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005 
3.2.2 The Asian Crisis and Malaysian Capital Control 
After nearly a decade of strong economic growth, Malaysia was hard hit by the 
regional financial crisis at the end of 1997, which pushed down its growth rate to 
minus 7.4% in 1998 (Economic Report, 2000/2001). The crisis first started in 
Thailand before spreading to other countries in the region. The effect of the crisis 
was so severe that it brought the collapse of the stock market and asset prices in 
Malaysia, and a steep fall in the dollar value of the currency. Businesses that were 
dependent on foreign funds or that had loans quoted in US dollars found their loan 
obligations climbing dramatically, and many were obliged to go out of business. 
Real GDP was volatile but started to show a positive growth after the crisis 
(Economic Report, 2000/2002). 
There are many possible effect of the Asian crisis to foreign direct investment. 
Poon and Thompson (2001) for example suggest that I whereas international capital 
flows into Asia were once thought to drive the region's modem economic 
development, the 1997/1998 financial crisis would appear to have suggest the 
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opposite' (pl2l). The region saw massive outflows of capital in the period 
subsequent to the crisis. Although this capital probably represent a highly mobile 
portfolio investment (Poon and Thompson, 2001), there is also the possibility of 
N capital flight' in terms of redirecting the investment by local firms and also foreign 
firms residing in Malaysia. Cuddington (1987) refers to capital flight as short-term 
speculative' capital exports by the private non-bank sector. However, resident 
investors which are better aware of the changing nature of risks in the domestic 
market, facing heightened risks and fear of the crisis might exit the market and thus 
may drive their outward direct investment overseas. The crisis has also affected the 
ability of Malaysian companies to serve their existing investment due to liquidity 
problems. 
After the economic downturn, the government undertook measures to revive 
confidence in the economy. Among the measures taken were to strengthen external 
demand, provide stronger fiscal stimulus, and to provide low interest rate 
environment. This was undertaken to spur the private sector activities that were 
dampened by the high interest rate during the period of 1997 and 1998. In August 
1998, the government launched the National Economic Recovery Plan which had 
six main objectives, stabilising the Ringgit by implementing a fixed exchange rate 
policy by which the Ringgit has since been pegged to the US Dollars (USDI = 
RM3.80); restoring market confidence; maintaining financial market stability; 
strengthening economic fundamentals; continuing the equity and socio-economic 
agenda and restoring adversely affected sectors in the economy (NEAC, 1998). 
One of the measures undertaken by the Malaysian government is to implemented 
controls on international capital flows or capital control. The main elements of 
capital controls (see Hood, 2001) are as follows: 
(i) One year waiting period imposed on repatriation of the proceeds of 
sales of Malaysian securities held in external accounts; 
(ii) Mandatory repatriation of all Ringgit held abroad; 
(iii) Restriction on transfer of funds between external accounts; 
Ov) Limits on transport of Ringgit by travellers; 
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(V) Prohibition of resident/non-resident credit arrangement; 
(vi) Prohibition of trade settlement in Ringgit; 
(Vii) Prohibition of resident/non-resident offer side swaps and similar hedge 
transactions; and 
(Viii) Freezing of transaction of Malaysian companies' shares in CLOB 
(Singapore's Central Limit Order Book market)6. 
The above restrictions that have direct effects on capital movement between 
countries not only affected the inflow of FDI into Malaysia but also restricted 
Malaysian companies that wanted to invest abroad. Hood (2001) argues that capital 
control created uncertainty for foreign investors and this may have raised the cost of 
capital. 
3.3 MALAYSIA AND ITS FDI POSITION 
Malaysia has long been perceived as a recipient of FDI rather than a source of FDI. 
The role of FDI in the Malaysian economy has changed according to the 
transformation of the economy as discussed in Section 3.2. 
3.3.1 Malaysia's FDI Performance Index 
The FDI performance index has been used by UNCTAD to measure a country's 
competitiveness to attract FDI as well as firm's ownership advantages and home 
country's disadvantages in certain countries which induce outward investment. 
Malaysia has experienced a rather inconsistent measure in the context of world FDI 
Index. As in Table 3.4, the World Investment Report (WIR) 2004 reported the value 
of Malaysia's inward FDI performance index 7 to be 4.355 in 1988-1990 which 
6 On 2 January 1990, the Singapore Stock Exchange introduced an over-the-counter market, known 
as CLOB International, to allow investors to trade in a number of international securities which are 
listed on foreign stock exchanges (Singapore Exchange, 2006) 
7 The inward performance index is a measure of the extent to which host countries receive inward 
FDL The Index ranks countries by the amount of FDI they received relative to their econorruic size, 
calculated as the ratio of a country's share in global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP. A value 
greater than one indicates that the country attracts more FDI in proportion to its economic size, a 
value below one shows that it receives less (a negative value indicates that foreign investors 
disinvested in that period). Thus, a higher index implies success in the competition, explicit or 
implicit, to attract FDI (UNCTAD, 2004 p12). 
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indicates Malaysia was attracting more FDI in proportion to its economy size and 
has been highly competitive to attract FDI. In 2001-2003, Malaysia's 
competitiveness in attracting FDI had dipped which was reflected in lower ý'alue of 
index of 1.079. Singapore and Hong Kong were more competitive compared to 
Malaysia in both periods. Describing this inward FDI trend, WIR 2004 in its 
statement about Malaysia says: 
One striking features of the Index calculation is the sharp deterioration in 
Malaysia's FDI performance. From ranking among the top 10 till the mid-1990s, 
Malaysia fell in ranking every year in the latter part of the decades, reaching 75 th 
place in 2001-2203. For an economy that depends heavily on FDI to drive its 
exports, this may be cause for concern, especially since the reasons are not clear' 
(WIR, 2004, p 13-14) 
Table 3.4: Inward and Outward FDI Performance Index 1988-1990 
and 2001-2003 of Selected Countries 
1988-1990 2001-2003 
Countries Inward FDI Outward FDI Inward FDI Outward FDI 
Index Index Index Index 
Malaysia 4.355 0.444 1.079 0.638 
Singapore 13.599 2.892 6.000 5.104 
Indonesia 0.794 0.013 -0.324 0.036 
Thailand 2.562 0.091 0.858 0.110 
Vietnam 1.020 - 1.923 - 
Phillipines 1.689 0.029 0.675 0.013 
China 1.033 0.214 1.969 0.150 
Hong Kong 5.292 3.370 4.822 3.477 
Taiwan 0.927 3.297 0.350 0.974 
Note: Figure of outward FDI Index tor Vietnam is not stated. 
Source: UNCTAD (2004) 
As far as outward FDI is concerned, it shows lower outward investment index as in 
1988-1990 as well as 2001-2003. Based on UNCTAD's definition, this indicates 
that Malaysian companies have fewer ownership advantages which discourage 
them from investing overseas. Malaysia's position in outward investment index is 
lower than Singapore but better than countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, 
Philippines and China. 
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3.3.2 Malaysia's Inward FDI 
The background of Malaysian inward FDI presented in this thesis is to show the 
importance of Malaysia as location of FDL It is also generally accepted that there 
are linkages between outward and inward FDI for countries. The IDP concept 
suggests that there is a link between outward FDI and economic development and 
in turn, FDI has a direct effect on economic growth or FDI is growth enhancing 
(Baharumshah and Thanoon, 2005). Inward FDI also allows countries to reach 
some degree of economic maturity and Dunning (1993) suggests that the OLI 
configuration facing domestic firms may increase propensity to engage in outward 
investment. Inward investment has also exposed Malaysian domestic firms to 
international operations that arise fTom their relationship with foreign firms. Greater 
net inward FDI, as shown in Figure 3.7 also show the propensity for the Malaysian 
government policies to attract inward FD1 more than to encourage outward FDL 
During the colonial era up to the 1950s, inward FDI was almost entirely resource- 
seeking, in this Malaysia was like many other developing countries of the time 
(Jorno and Edwards, 1993; Lindblad, 1997; Rasiah, 1999). In the early post- 
independence until the early 1960s, an import- substitution policy has encouraged 
FDI in food products, beverages and tobacco processing, printing and publishing, 
building materials, chemicals and plastics. Malaysia continued to receive a gradual 
increase of inward investment since the 1970s. There were two occasions in which 
Malaysia has experienced lower inward FDI, during the first economic recession in 
middle 1980s and during economic crisis in Asia in 1997 (based on data by 
UNCTAD 8) . Figure 
3.7 shows Malaysia's FDI inflows dropped from US$6,323 
million in 1997 to US$2,714 in 1998. The detailed data is as shown in Appendix 
3.1. 
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Figure 3.7: Malaysia: Major FDI Indicators (US$ Million) 
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Notes: UNCTAD defines FDI flows and FDI stock as follows: 
1) Flows of FDI comprise capital provided (either directly or through other related enterprise) 
by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise, or capital received from FDI enterprise by 
a foreign direct investor; 
2) FDI Stock is the value of the share of their capital and reserves (including retained profits) 
attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent 
enterprise. 
Source: UNCTAD (2005a; 2005b) 
The FDI inflows started to bounce back in 2000 after the Malaysian goverranent 
relaxed the capital control measures by adopting a repatriation levy instead of the 
twelve months holding period to make Malaysia more attractive to portfolio 
(investment in securities such as stocks, bonds, or other financial assets) investors. 
However, there were many other elements that had influenced the FDI sentiments 
such as in 2001, FDI inflows dipped to its lowest level as discussed ln section 3.2. 
The biggest sources of FDI into Malaysia were Japan, the U. S. A., Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. In the 1970s FDI in Malaysia was dominated by Japan and the 
8UNCTAD FDI Database accessed at http: //www. unctad. org 
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U. S. A. while Taiwanese investors emerged as an important source of FDI in the 
1980s (Salleh and Meyanathan, 1993). 
Figure 3.8: Top Five Investing Countries in Malaysia, Percentage to Total 
Inflows (Selected Years) 
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Note: In Malaysia, the data that captures the magnitude and value of overseas investment can be 
obtained from the Cash Balance of Payment Reporting System, Bank Negara Malaysia. Overseas 
investment covers direct equity investment, purchase of real estate abroad and extension of loans to 
non-residents abroad. It also includes capital invested or loans extended by foreign-owned 
companies to their parent companies 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, 2003 
The hallmark of Taiwanese FDI was in small and medium-sized industry and they 
normally undertook joint venture with the Malaysian Chinese especially in the 
manufacturing sector (All and Rasiah, 2000). In the second half of 1990s and 
onwards, the U. S. A. became the single most important investor in Malaysia. As 
shown in Figure 3.6, in 1997,1999 and 2002, investors from the U. S. A. topped the 
list of major investors into Malaysia. It also shows that major investors into 
Malaysia consisted of almost the same countries each year, the U. S. A., Singapore, 
Japan, Hong Kong, the U. K., and Taiwan with Germany playing a small role. 
Singapore has been the most important investor among Malaysia's neighbouring 
countries. 
Malaysia's inward FDI stock shows an increasing trend during the period of 1970 
to 2003. It did not reduce in absolute value during the economic recession in 1997 
except in 1985 because of economic recession (see Appendix 3.1). The economic 
crisis in 1997 on the other hand, did not affect FDI inward stock in which it was 
increased to US$45,065 million in 1998 from US$42,351 million In 1997 (Table 
3.5). 
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Data on the industrial distribution of Inward FDI into Malaysia has been captured 
by the Bank Negara Malaysia's database starting from 2002. Based on Table 3.5 
inward FDI goes to three main sectors namely manufacturing, services and the oil 
industry. In 2002,39.4% of FDI went to manufacturing, 36.3% to services and 
14.5% to oil industry. FDI in services has become more important by 2003 with 
40.2% of the total FDI inflows. The government poli I icy towards liberation and 
deregulation in finance, insurance, real estate and business service sub-sector and 
favourable fiscal incentive and good infrastructure has contributed towards the 
increase of FDI in services in 2003 (Economic Report, 2004/2004, p 52). 
Table 3.5: Malaysia: Industry Distribution of FDI Inflows, 2002 and 
2 003 (Percentage) 
Industry Share to Total Inflows 
2002 2003 
Total 100 100 
Agriculture 2.0 0.8 
Services 36.3 40.2 
Oil 14.5 20.6 
Manufacturing 39.4 29.8 
Other 7.8 8.7 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2004). 
In the manufacturing sector, during the period of 1999 and 2003, FDI inflows 
mostly went to electronic and electrical products (Industry classification denoted as 
Radio, Television & Communication equipment & Apparatus), petroleum related 
and chemicals and machinery equipment industries (as shown in Figure 3.9). 
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Figure 3.9: Malaysia: FDI Inflows to Manufacturing sectors by Industry 
Classification, 1999 to 2003 
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14.88% 
3.3.3 Malaysia's Outward FDI 
Outward investment by Malaysian companies is relatively new when compared 
with other countries in Asia such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong that 
had begun their outward investment in the 1950s and 1960s (Tolentino, 2000). As 
noted earlier in Section 3.3, Malaysia's economy prior to the 1970s was basically 
import substitution which made her a recipient of foreign investment rather than a 
capital exporter. Low levels of domestic savings and higher demand for domestic 
investment also discouraged any intention to invest abroad (Ramasamy and Viana, 
1995). However, as the industrial development grew progressively in the 1980s 
and 1990s, Malaysia's outward investment also gained momentum. 
The earliest figure on Malaysia's overseas investment is in 1972, which totalled 
about RM 148 million (Ragayah, 1999). However, there is inconsistency in terms 
of data reporting with regards to Malaysia's outward investment. UNCTAD for 
example, started to capture Malaysian data on outward investment at the earliest in 
1980 (Appendix 3.1), while the Bank Negara Malaysia started to produce yearly 
data on Malaysia's capital outflows in 1992 (Appendix 1.2). 
Malaysia has experienced a similar trend of outward investment as its inward 
investment. Both are directly affected by the fluctuation of Malaysian economy 
such as in 1997 and 2001 (Appendix 3.1 and Table 3.5). During the recession in 
1997, outward investment flows dropped from US$2,675 million in 1997 to 
US$863 million in 1998. Similarly, it dropped from US$2,025 million in 2000 to 
US$267 in 2001. However, Malaysia's outward FDI stock grew constantly for the 
period 1970 to 2003 except for 1997 when its absolute value dropped from 
US$15,212 million in 1996 to US$12,361 in 1997. 
Outward FDI stock as in Table 3.6 shows that Malaysia's outward investment stock 
between 1980 and 1995 is comparable with other prominent developing countries 
such as China, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, and was better than countries 
such as India, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand (UNCTAD, 2004). Taking the 
years of 1990 and 2003 as an example, Table 3.6 shows that Malaysian outward 
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investment performance followed the same trend as China, but still lagged behind 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. 
A substantial proportion of the investment outflow is in the form of Malaysian 
equity buying in foreign companies. Based on data produced by the Central Bank of 
Malaysia (as in Appendix 3.2), in 1992, equity investment made up about 59% of 
the total investment flow in 1992 and 42.5% in 2002, an increase from RM 775 
million in 1992 to RM 6993 million in 2002. Only a small proportion of outflows 
consisted of portfolio investment. In 2002 it was reported that from the total of RM 
16424 million outward flows, only RM 59.133 million comprises of portfolio 
investment (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2003) and shown in Appendix 3.2. Portfolio 
investments represent passive holdings of securities such as foreign stocks, bonds, 
or other financial assets, none of which entails active management or control of the 
securities I issuer by the investor. It also has shorter-terin investment horizon. Direct 
equity investments have a significant and long-lasting management interest in the 
company in which an investment is made (UNCTAD, 1997). 
Table 3.6: Outward FDI Stock of World, Malaysia and Selected Developing 
Countries, 1980-2003 (million of dollars) 
Countries 1980 % 1985 % 1990 % 1995 % 2003 % 
World 559629 100 738809 100 1,758,216 100 28975470 100 8,196,863 100 
Malaysia 197 0.03 1374 0.18 2,671 0.15 11042 0.03 29,686 0.36 
China - - 131 - 2,489 0.14 15802 0.05 37,006 0.45 
Hong Kong 148 0.02 2344 0.31 11,920 0.68 78833 0.27 336,098 4.10 
India 4 - 19 - 50 - 264 - 5,054 - 
Singapore 3718 0.66 4387 0.59 7,808 0.44 35050 0.12 90,910 11.09 
Taiwan 97 0.01 204 0.02 12,888 0.73 25144 0.08 65,232 0.80 
Source: UNCTAD (2005a) 
Malaysia's equity investment from 1992 to 2002 is depicted in Figure 3.10. It 
shows a fluctuation before and after the economic crisis in 1997. Equity investment 
increased steadily from 1992 to 1997, after which it began to decline before it 
picked up again towards 2002. 
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Figure 3.10: Malaysia: Annual Outward Equity Investment, 1992-2002 
(RM Million) 
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Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2003) 
In general, Malaysia's outward investment destination has not changed much over 
the years. The four most important destinations are Singapore, Hong Kong, USA 
and the U. K. (see Figure 3.11 and Appendix 1.1). As Singapore is close to 
Malaysia, it remains the popular destination of Malaysian investment overseas from 
1992 to 2003. In 1992, Singapore accounted for 19.74% of Malaysian investment 
overseas. In 1995, this increased to 31.06% and it was still high at 18.82% in 2001. 
The other important destination of Malaysia's outward investment is the US which 
became the top destination between 2000 and 2002. The highest Malaysian 
investment to the US was in 2000 at 38.29% of the total investment. As for Hong 
Kong, Malaysian investment was very high in the early 1990s until 1994. This later 
declined to only 0.91 % of the total investment in 200 1. 
Amongst the European countries, Malaysian investment is mostly concentrated in 
the U. K. On average, Malaysian investment in the U. K. is higher than investment 
in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany and France. Investments in other 
European countries are negligible (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2003). 
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Figure 3.11: Malaysia's FDI Outflows: Top Five Destinations, Percentage to 
Total Outflows (Selected Years) 
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In 1992, Malaysian investment in the U. K. was at 4.81% of total outward direct 
investment and valued at RM63 million (Appendix 1.2). Over the period 1992 to 
2002, the highest Malaysian investment flows into the U. K. was in 1997 which 
represented 17.85% of total Malaysian investment overseas. However, Malaysian 
investment in the U. K. has declined gradually from 1998 when it went down from 
RMS 12 million to RM400 million in 2002. 
It is important to note that in 2003, the highest investment went to the Cayman 
Islands, a tax haven and well known off-shore centre. This Is thought to be related 
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to the acquisition of Wessex Water in the U. K. by YTL Group that was finallsed in 
2002. YTL Group had used its wholly-owned subsidiary, YTL Utilities Limited 
which was incorporated in the Cayman Islands, to acquire Wessex Water Limited 
via another subsidiary, YTL Utilities (U. K. ) Limited (YTL Power International, 
2002, p 78). Another important feature is the high investment flows into Sudan in 
2003 which is related to the acquisition of a stake in Sudan's Block 8, located in the 
Blue Nile Basin by Malaysian oil company, Petronas (Petronas, 2004). 
By region and as in 2002, Malaysian outward investment mostly went to North 
America (35.9%), Africa (14.4%), South East Asia (13%) and Western Europe 
(9.2%). Although North America received most of Malaysia's outward investment 
in 2001, only 3.3% of the amount consisted of equity investment. Investment in 
North America is assumed to have consisted of non equity investment such as loans 
to non-residents and loans extended by foreign subsidiaries in Malaysia to their 
parent companies in North America. Equity investment mostly goes to Affica 
(29.7%), Western Europe (19.2%), South East Asia (17.1 %) and Central and South 
America (9.4%) as presented in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Malaysia Outward Investment Flow and Equity Investment by 
Region, 2002 (RM Million) 
Regions 
Outward 
Investment % 
Equity 
Investment % 
Africa 2369 14.4 2080 29.7 
Central and South America 920 5.6 657 9.4 
North America 5895 35.9 231 3.3 
West Asia 57 0.3 22 0.3 
South Asia 167 1.0 147 2.1 
Southeast Asia 2141 13.0 1197 17.1 
Northeast Asia 894 5.4 472 6.7 
Western Europe 1510 9.2 1344 19.2 
Commonwealth and Independence 32 0.2 32 0.4 
States 193 1.2 96 1.3 
Oceania 1647 10.0 9 0.1 
Labuan IOFC 1685 10.2 1601 22.8 
Others ------- ------- 
16424 6993 
Note: Labuan IOFC is the Malaysian International Offshore Financial Centre, offering a wide range of 
offshore financial products and services to customers worldwide, including banking and investment 
banking, insurance, captives, trust business, fund management, investment holding, company 
management and Islamic financing (http: //www. lofsa. gov. my/lofsa5/index. htm) 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2003) 
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High equity investment into the African nations in 2002 (see Table 3.7) was as a 
result of huge investment by Petronas, Malaysia's national oil company. It 
acquired 35% interest in the consortium for the construction of Chad-Cameroon 
Integrated Oil Development and Pipeline Project with an estimated project cost of 
US D3.5 billion (Petronas, 2004). Overall, most Malaysian investment has been in 
the form of outward investment flows or equity investment. These have mostly 
gone to Southeast Asia, North America, Africa and Western Europe (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2003). 
Data on FDI captured by Malaysia's Central Bank is the most up-to-date available 
on Malaysian investment overseas (Ragayah, 1999). However, it is not wholly 
representative as far as FDI is concerned. Malaysian FDI data is reported in the 
Balance of Payments System which captures the movement of capital in and out of 
the country. It does not capture the sector in which the investment takes place. It 
also does not reflect the total value of Malaysian investment overseas since the 
System used by Bank Negara Malaysia only captures the outflow of more than RM 
50,000 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1995/1996). 
3.4 MALAYSIAN INVESTMENT IN THE U. K. 
The background of Malaysian investment into the U. K. provides a historical 
scenario of early investment as well as recent investment. Malaysia and the U. K. 
have historical and cultural ties dating back from the colonial era in the late I 9th 
century. This relationship perhaps has to a certain extent facilitated Malaysian 
investment into this country because Malaysian investors are more familiar with the 
U. K. market than other countries in Europe. Britain has also placed enormous 
influence on the use of the English language, the administrative system, education 
and law and regulation in Malaysia. As for recent investment, in 1992 to 2003, the 
U. K. emerged as the most consistent destination of Malaysian investment among 
countries in the European Union. Investment in France and Netherlands, for 
example, was only significant in 2000 and 2001 respectively (see Figure 3.11). The 
U. K. is also considered as a gateway to the European Union market and has 
minimal restrictions on inward FDL These historical and recent investment 
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perspectives are important to enable answers to the research question to be fully 
understood and put in context. 
In the beginning of the last century, FDI between the U. K. and Malaysia 'Vvas 
merely a one way FDI flow mostly undertaken by the British East India Company 
and also by British trading house? (Helten and Jones, 1989). The purpose was to 
exploit Malaysian natural resources especially rubber and tin in order to fulfil the 
demand from industrial revolution in Britain and other parts of the world. Only in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, did reverse investment from Malaysia into the U. K. 
take place. 
3.4.1 The History of Malaysian Investment in the U. K. 
Malaysian investment into the U. K. started with the takeover of the British 
Empire's companies by government related corporations in the early 1970s. These 
British-owned companies were incorporated in England during the colonial era. 
Although incorporated in England, their businesses were largely based in Malaysia, 
either in plantations or tin mining. The motion for the takeover emerged from 
several reasons and amongst others was to fulfil the call to reduce the 'foreignness' 
in the Malaysian economy especially after Independence. Two companies in this 
research are former British owned companies, namely Sime Darby Berhad and 
Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad. The take over of the former British companies in 
the 1970s also witnessed the involvement of government institutions and their role 
have remained important in recent investment into the U. K. 
The colonisation of Malaysia (then Malaya) by the British started in 1786 when 
Malaysia became part of the larger British Empire. British colonialisation had 
developed the foundation of a capitalist economy in Malaysia, especially in the 
exploitation of natural resources such as tin mining, rubber and palm oil plantation 
activities. Large plantation activities and more modem extraction methods were 
9 They are British exports and imports companies that had emerged in the late 19 th century. Their 
activities went with (followed) the expansion of British imperial ftontiers. The traders were closely 
connected with the expansion of British shipping. There were also associated with the growth of 
overseas banks. 
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introduced with the help of British capital. This resulted in the emergence of British 
agency houses in the early 20 th Century such as Guthrie, Hanssons and Crossfield, 
Dunlop and Sime Darby that were mostly involved in plantation. By the 1920s the 
Guthrie Group of companies had become the largest of the Malaysian rubber group 
(Helten and Jones, 1989). In the 1930s, 93% of total British investment in Malaya 
was in tin and rubber. In the 1950s, the annual return of the U. K. investment in 
Malaya and Borneo was flO million (White, 1996). After independence in 1957, 
the declining role of British companies in the primary sector such as plantation and 
tin mining saw their roles having been taken over by Chinese family business 
(Jomo and Edwards, 1993). This represents a shift in the Chinese family business 
from small and medium scaled enterprises to larger companies. 
The British administration, however, had been criticised for its 'divide and rule' 
style of government. As a result, the Malays that formed the majority of the 
population were left behind in the mainstream economy while the British trading 
companies controlled the big plantation companies and the Chinese controlled the 
smaller scale economic activities. The Malays, on the other hand, occupied 
government administration machinery and small-scale agricultural activities. After 
Independence, there was a surge in political awareness among the Malays, 
especially among the dominant pressure groups which brought about Malaysia's 
Independence in 1957. Subsequently, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was 
formulated in 1971 to correct the economic and social imbalance among the ethnic 
groups with regards to ownership of wealth. In 1969, the ownership of Bumiputera 
and Thrust Agencies of share capital was only at 1.5% (Table 3.8). This was also in 
response to the worst ethnic riot in 1969. This policy targeted that by 1990, at least 
30% of corporate equity must be in the hand of Bumiputera, 40% non-Bumiputera 
and 30% foreigners. The first measure was to reduce the proportion of corporate 
ownership among foreigners in favour of the Bumiputera. This is also one of the 
reasons for the involvement of goverm-nent institutions in the business in Malaysia, 
which is to hold equity on behalf of the Bumiputera. 
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Table 3.8: Ownership of Share Capital (at Par value) of Limited Companies, 
1969-2002 
Group 1969 1970 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 
Bumiputera Individuals, 1.5 2.4 19.1 19.2 20.6 18.9 18.7 
institutions and Trust 
Agencies 
Chinese 22.8 27.2 33.4 45.5 40.9 38.9 40.9 
Indians 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Nominee Companies 2.1 6.0 1.3 8.5 8.3 8.5 9.2 
Foreigner 62.1 63.4 26.0 25.4 27.7 31.3 28.9 
Others 10.1 - 7.2 0.3 1.0 0.9 0.8 
Notes: 
1. Exclude shares held by Federal and State Governments; 
2. Institutions refer to share held through organisation channelling Burniputera funds such as 
Amanah Saharn Burniputera Scheme (Bumiputera Funds), Lembaga Tabung Haji 
(Pilgrimage Funds) and Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (Arm force Funds); 
3. Trust agencies refer to shares held through trust agencies such as Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad (Investment trust) and State Economic Planning Corporations (owned by the states 
in Malaysia) 
Source: Gomez (2002); Economic Planning Unit (2004) 
In addition to their high foreign equity, British companies in the plantation sector 
such as Sime Darby, Guthrie, and Harissons and Crossfield with their estates 
throughout Malaysia were seen as a visible sign of foreign domination of the 
economy. They naturally became the target of economic nationalisation (FEER, 
1980). It is, however, unclear whether this was a voluntary divestment by the 
British shareholders or some form of forced takeover. Box 3.1 describes the case of 
Cl -- CTuthrie. 
Box 3.1: The Takeover of Guthrie 
The take over of Guthrie probably the most famous event among all of the 
Malaysianisation process in 1970s and 1980s. It was known as 'dawn-raid" since 
Guthrie was in the Malaysian hand within few hours of morning trading in the LSE. 
In 1970, Guthrie was the largest oil palm producer in the world and was listed on the 
LSE (www. kumpulanguthrie. coM). It was incorporated in Britain and was almost 
wholly owned by foreign interest, with a solid proportion in the U. K. and dominated 
by institutional shareholders. Among them was M&G Unit Trust holding almost 
10% of Guthrie's shares. Twenty percent of its shares were held by Asian which 
included Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation Singapore and Kuwaiti Investment 
Company and only a small portions were held by Malaysian namely Permodalan 
Bumiputera Sabah (4%), Bank Simpanan Nasional (3%) and the government owned 
lottery Sports Toto (2%) (FEER, 1981; 1979). Before the success bid by PNB on 7 
September 198 1, Sime Darby, another Malaysian owned company had a lengthy and 
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unsuccessful takeover bid to take over Guthrie in early 1979. Sime Darby had 
offered Guthrie shareholders of 425 pence per share against Guthrie's valuation of 
assets at 628 pence per share, in which Guthrie had urged their shareholders to rej . ect 
the offer. (FEER, 1979). Subsequently, Sime Darby sold the 25% shares in Guthrie 
to PNB (FT, 1981b). The failure of takeover bid by Sime Darby had resulted the 
government undertaken another option. On 7 September 198 1, PNB with the 
collaboration of their British stockbroker firms had successfully taken over Guthrie 
via a 'raid' on the Guthrie's shares on the LSE. The morning before the raid, PNB 
had already bought almost 8 million shares of Guthrie in less than four hours. The 
merchant banker of N. M Rothschild and Sons and stockbroker, Rowe and Pitmans 
had undertaken the buy. The deal had been so secret even some of the merchant 
bankers of Rothschild and partner Rowe and Pitmans had no idea what their 
colleagues were planning to do the next morning (FEER, 1981). The price of 
Guthrie shares at the pre-weekend closing date was at 662 pence. The next Monday 
morning Rowe & Pitman on behalf of PNB had offered to Guthrie's shareholders to 
buy at 901 pence per share and within ten minutes it managed to buy just under 5% 
from number of seller including M&G Unit Trust. Although the transaction in the 
LSE was ruled under the council of Securities Industries " Rules Governing 
Substantial Acquisition of Shares" which says that anyone who already holds 15% 
or more of a company's shares cannot buy more than a further 5% in any seven-days 
period. But since PNB had already owned 25% of Guthrie shares prior to the raid, it 
reached the 30% but did not contravene the Takeover Rule. They managed to 
overcome this technical obstacle, in which the rule no longer apply beyond 30% as 
the City Code requirement for full bid after this point, then by 10.30 a. m. that 
morning, PNB had acquired a total of 42% of Guthrie's shares. By IIa. m. 
Rothschild had sent a letter announcing PNB's attention to make an offer for full bid 
for Guthrie as required by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. By afternoon, 
PNB had acquired 50.4% which make it the controlling shareholder. This event 
took many by surprise. Financial Time September 8,1981 in its comment of the raid 
said ' PNB, the Malaysian equity institution yesterday acquired the U. K. based 
plantation group, in one of the fastest takeover bids the City of London has ever 
seen'. Mr. Ian Coates, the Chairman of Guthrie who was successfully blocked 
earlier bid by Sime Darby criticised the British system as grotesque. In 1989 Guthrie 
has been brought to Malaysia with the incorporation of Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad 
and it was subsequently listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) as a 
fully fledge Malaysian company. 
Source: Kumpulan Guthrie (2004), FEER (1979,198 1) and Moore (198 1, September 8) 
The takeover of Harrisons and Crossfield, on the other hand, was not a hostile 
takeover. However, it took six years of discussion between Harrisons and 
Crossfield and the Malaysian government before it was finally agreed on the 
restructuring of Harrison Malaysian Estate, a unit of Harrisons and Crossfield in 
Malaysia on I June 1982. Moore (1981, September 8), of the Financial Times 
London, described; 'the plantation company had been doughty in resisting attacks 
across the London Stock Exchange (LSE) floor, but Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
(PNB) had proved an irresistible suitor'. Another example is the takeover of Sime 
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Darby in 1980 in which PERNAS, another government statutory body had built up 
a 9% share in Sime Darby during 1975 and 1976. Instead of pursuing an expensiVe 
strategy of buying further blocks of shares, it launched a board-room coup in 
November 1976. This started when PERNAS proposed that four of the six British 
directors due for re-election be voted out of office and replaced by four Malaysians. 
At that particular time, the record of British management in Sime Darby was not 
encouraging. Its former chairman was in jail in Singapore for criminal breach of 
trust. The coup was successful and the process of Malaysianisation was continued 
with the move of Sime Darby head office from London to Kuala Lumpur in 1978 
and its legal domicile since 1980. 
Government statutory bodies namely Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PERNAS) and 
Permodaln Nasional Berhad (PNB) were at the forefront in the takeover process. 
Both are bodies that promote Bumiputera's corporate equity participation in 
Malaysia. The shift of ownership, however, was not to be achieved by force 
sequestration, but by gradual reallocation in the context of a growing economy 
(Helten and Jones, 1989). Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, then the Deputy Prime Minister 
in his speech at a City of London seminar held in Kuala Lumpur in 1979 said that; 
Recently the attempt by a Malaysian-based company to acquire a British-owned 
company'O give rise to yet another bout of vilification. A vicious campaign was 
carried out in the British press accusing Malaysia of backdoor nationalisation and 
urging investors not to invest in Malaysia. We will not nationallse, but legitimate 
acquisitions or mergers carried out by businessmen are something else. We are 
not going to stop them. We are not going to be pressured by any attempt to 
sabotage our investment efforts. We are not going to submit to any form of 
economic imperialism. I hope this hint will be understood by everyone 
Dr. Mahathir Mohammad 
Deputy Prime Minister Malaysia 
197911 
Generally, the takeovers of British companies by Malaysians were undertaken 
through 'board-room coups' and 'raids' on the LSE. Although some of them were 
'hostile', none was reported as illegal. The LSE for example, was strictly governed 
10 He refers to the several attempts by Sime Darby (already under Malaysian control) to acquire 
Guthrie corporation 
11 Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 103, No. 7,16 February 1979, pp 63 
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by the Panel of Merger and Takeovers, which monitors any movement of shares 
especially any transaction that triggers the 30% mark. As a consequence of this 
takeover, the domiciles of these companies were brought back to Malaysia. Some 
of their U. K. subsidiaries remained in the U. K., but over the years many haýýe 
ceased to be in operation or have closed down. 
3.4.2 Recent Investment in the U. K. 
A significant number of Malaysian private investments in the U. K. started to 
emerge in the early 1990s. Most of the investments were undertaken by public 
companies and were privately driven (see example in Table 3.9). 
Table 3.9: Selected Cross Border Merger and Acquisition Transactions 
Involviniz Malavsian ComDanies in the U. K. from 1995-2002 
Year Deal value 
(USD) 
Target companies % Acquirer companies 
(Malaysian) 
1995 11.83 million Bloxwich Engineering Ltd - 100 Mega First Corp 
1995 3.18 million Milleniurn (U. K. ) Ltd 80 George Town Holding 
1995 Undisclosed Proton Cars (U. K. ) Ltd 70 Proton 
1995 15.47 million Croda Cosmetics & Toileteries 100 KL Kepong 
1995 0.81 million Ramus Holdings Plc 42.47 Hong Leong Industries 
1996 64.68 million Costain Group Plc 40 Intria Berhad 
1997 Undisclosed Spitalfield Holdings Ltd 33 Metacorp Berhad 
1997 0.41 million Creightons Plc (Soap Division) - KL Kepong Berhad 
1998 75.04 million Laura Ashley Holdings Plc 40 Malayan United Industries 
1998 26.11 million Lotus Group International 16.25 Proton 
1998 12.58 million Baldwin Ltd 100 Mr Tan Bin Sin 
1999 165.37 million Premier Oil Plc 25 Petronas 
1999 78.30 million London International Exhibition 42.7 Usaha Tegas Sdn Bhd 
2000 1.23 million Baltee Ltd 65 Polymate Holding 
2000 0.50 million Agile Manufacturing Ltd 100 Mega First Corp. 
2001 32.32 million Blakes Hotel London - Atlan Holding Berhad 
2001 Undisclosed Denholm Ship Management Ltd 100 Konsortium. Perkapalan 
2001 0.60 million London Clubs International Plc 2.03 Resort World Berhad 
2002 765.92 million Wessex Water Limited 100 YTL Power International 
2002 17.88 million Rapitest Ltd 100 Ta Ann Holdoings 
Source: Sakran (2003) 
The above table 3.9 also shows that the majority of the Malaysian companies that 
are involved in the U. K. investment are big companies that are listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. Only two parties namely Mr Tan Bin Sin and Usaha Tegas Sdn Bhd are 
non public companies. Ten companies acquired the controlling shares of the U. K. 
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companies in which seven have acquired 100% shares. Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) of the U. K. defines a controlling shareholder as below: 
Any person (or persons acting jointly by agreement whether formal of othemise) 
who is entitle to exercise, or control the exercise of 30% or more of the rights to 'ý, ote 
at general meetings; or able to control the appointment of directors who are able to 
exercise a majority of votes at the board meetings. 
(Financial Services Authority, 2005) 
It is believed that many other acquisitions may have taken place, but difficulty in 
obtaining data means that this could not be proven. 
3.4.3 Sectoral Distribution and Location of Investment 
Based on ICC Plum database (accessed between October to December 2003), 
Malaysian investment into the U. K. can be categorised into four groups as follows: 
i) Manufacturing, trading and retailing, engineering and services; 
ii) Research and Development (R&D) activities; 
iii) Banking and financial institution; and 
iv) Property and hospitality services 
The investment in manufacturing involves the manufacturing of car components, 
bicycle, toiletries products, gan-nent and home furnishing, industrial equipments, 
machines parts and components. In trading and retailing, Malaysian companies 
have been investing in the distribution and retailing of medical gloves, garment and 
toiletries, pewter products, vehicle tyres and passenger cars. In the services sector, 
the investment is in the oil and gas industry and shipping. Malaysian investors have 
also invested in hotels, for example Malayan United Industries Berhad which 
controls the Corus Hotel chain in the U. K. In financial services, there are three 
Malaysian banks that have branches in London namely Malayan Banking, 
Bumiputera Commerce Bank and also a branch of Malaysia's Central Bank. 
Investment in properties is also prominent especially during the early years of 
Malaysian investment in the U. K. However, most of the investment is small and 
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limited to the investors' personal use. There is, however, one substantial property 
investment. This is the acquisition of London International Exhibition Centre by 
Malaysian Country Height Holding Berhad before it was disposed to a privately 
owned company, Usaha Tegas Sdn Bhd in 1999 (Table 3.9). Malaysian companies 
are also involved in R&D with the handover of Tun Abdul Razak Research Centre 
near London ftom the British Government to the Malaysian government decades 
ago. 
Figure 3.12: Location Distribution of Malaysia Investment in the U. K. 
Source: Fame Database (2003) 
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In tenns of location, Malaysia's investment into the U. K. is mostly concentrated in 
the Southeast, East, London, Wales, West Midlands and in the Northeast. Two 
Malaysian companies also have investment in Scotland. A sample of Malaysian 
investment location is depicted in Figure 3.12. Since most of the investments are by 
acquisition of existing U. K. companies, the location will be the same location as 
that of the acquired company. In other words, the premises have not been moved to 
other locations. 
3.4.4 Investment Value 
The value of Malaysian investment into the U. K. has increased on an annual basis 
from RM 63 million in 1992 to RM 1716 million in 1997. It, however, dropped 
substantially from 1998 onwards. The value of investment non-nally comprised of 
the amount of money brought by Malaysian companies into the U. K. upon the 
acquisition, and ongoing funding afterwards. Overall, the trend of the gross 
Malaysian investment into the U. K. is depicted in Figure 3.13. 
Figure 3.13: Malaysia's FDI Flows into the U. K., 1992-2003 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2003) 
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As far as the trend of investment is concerned, there are two possible reasons for 
the sharp decline of Malaysia's FDI flows into the UK after 1997. First, the Asian 
crisis in 1997 had effectively reduced company's cash flows and subsequently 
discouraged any overseas investment. Second, the introduction of capital control by 
the Malaysian government had made investment overseas more difficult. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented a background of the Malaysian economy which clearly 
shows the transformation of Malaysian economy from commodity based into 
exporter of manufactured goods. One of the main contributions to the growth of the 
manufacturing sector was the inflow of foreign capital into the economy. Malaysia 
holds a commendable position with regards to inward and outward FDI in the world 
and among developing economies. Although outward FDI is becoming more 
important, Malaysia remains a net importer of FDL 
Without comprehensive outward investment incentives provided by the Malaysian 
Government, many private companies have undertaken investment into the U. K. in 
various economic activities. There are several issues regarding this direction of 
investment such as U. K. as a developed country, the distance between Malaysia and 
the U. K. and high cost of running business in the U. K. Therefore, this thesis 
presents an important step in researching investment by developing countries TNCs 
into industrialised country. 
Home country's factors namely the economic development, socio-political 
environment and historical background of Malaysia could provide the basis for 
understanding Malaysian outward direct investment overseas and in particular jnto 
the U. K. 
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CHAPTER 4: A REVIEW OF CONGLOMERATE FIRMS, CHINESE 
FAMILY BUSINESS AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, this thesis has pointed out that Malaysian companies 
investing in the U. K. mainly consist of conglomerates, Chinese family companies 
and goverm-nent-linked companies. This chapter presents a review of the literature 
regarding these three forms of organisation as it seeks to provide a broader 
understanding of the organisations commonly found in Malaysia and in other Asian 
countries. In addition, discussion is centred on the theoretical underpinning of these 
three forms of business organisations and its relation to motivation and strategy of 
their overseas investment. 
The section starts with the theories on corporate diversification, followed by a 
discussion of conglomerate diversification, Chinese family business and 
government-linked companies. 
4.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF CORPORATE 
DIVERSIFICATION 
The study on corporate diversification often refers to Richard Rumelt's published 
book: Strategy, Structure and Economic Performance in 1974. This study has 
proposed that diversification did pay off if a firm could exploit its specific 
advantage such as skill and technology in new areas and related diversifier 
outperformed both single business firms and unrelated diversification (see Goold 
and Luchs, 1996 p 258). Many other authors have also contributed to the 
explanations of diversification of firms such as Buckley and Casson (2002), Choi 
and Cowing (2002), Davis and Diekman (1994), Hyland and Diltz (2002), Lee et al. 
(1991), Martin and Sayrak (2003), Montgomery (1994), Teese (1980), and Pitelis 
(2004). 
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Montgomery (1994) views diversification strategy in the context of three theoretical 
perspectives) namely the market power view, the resource based view and the 
agency view. 
The market power view stems from the concern about the size of the fin-n and its 
benefit, where the bigger group sometimes have internal financial source to finance 
more risky operations by having bank and finance company within the group. The 
argument about the advantage of having an internal capital market is based on the 
fact that it gives advantage to the firm since internally raised equity capital is less 
costly than funds raised in the external capital market while the firm's manager can 
exercise superior decision control over project selection rather than leaving the 
firm's investment decisions to the whims of less well-inforined investors in the 
external capital market (see Martin and Sayrak, 2003, p 41). 
The resource based view argues that rent-seeking firms diversify in response to 
excess capacity in productive factors such as human resource, special skill and 
knowledge and special type of services. A firm therefore undertakes an expansion if 
this is the way of utilising its under-used resources. Although some resources can 
be efficiently sold in the market, some of it, such as knowledge, is 'tacit' and is 
deeply embedded within the firm, and as separation from the firm would be 
impossible or difficult to undertake and may cause failure, expansion is the best 
alternative for the firm (Teese, 1980). Therefore, a finn's level of profit and breadth 
of diversification are a function of its resources stock (Montgomery, 1994). 
An earlier framework of 'excess resources' goes back to Edith Penrose (1959) in 
her book Theory of the Growth Of The Firm where she described the firm as a 
bundle of human and non-human resources which are coordinated to produce 
products for sale for a profit. The interaction between these resources may gave rise 
to 'value creation' and as productivity increases, less and less resources are required 
to perform the same activities thus creating surplus resources within the firm. 
Excess resources could be put to profitable use at zero marginal cost which 
encourages firm to expand (in Pitelis, 2004, p 525). 
view suggested by Montgomery (1994). 
This is s1milar to the resource 
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The agency view arises as a result of new forms of corporate management xvhere 
there is separation in company ownership and management. This vie"v proposes 
that owners and managers have different goals for a firm and their perceptions of 
risks are also different. This determines whether a firm's diversification is 
undertaken for the sake of benefit to the manager at the expense of the shareholder. 
There is wide discussion in the literature about the different motivations between 
outsider-manager and owner-manager in running the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Katz and Niehoff, 1998; Lloyd et. al. 1987). The study by Lloyd et al. 
(1987), which is based on Fortune 500 data during the merger wave in 1960s and 
1970s, suggest that there is evidence that manager-controlled finns do not pursue 
the same objectives as the owner-controlled firm. The motivation is reflected in the 
conflict between profit orientation of the owner and self-interest of the manager. 
The study also suggests that the contradiction between manager- controlled 
companies and owner-controlled company's behaviour occurs in four different 
ways. Firstly, manager-controlled companies have a significantly greater tendency 
to engage in conglomerate mergers than do firms with strong owner control; 
secondly, the income streams of manager-controlled firms are more diversified than 
those of companies with strong owner control; thirdly, individual owners tend to 
monitor their managers closely even if their ownership interest is relatively small, 
and finally, the value-to-sales ratio is lower for manager-controlled companies than 
for owner-controlled companies. 
There are several other reasons as to why the separation of ownership and control is 
an issue. By definition, the relationship between owner and manager is a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the agent) 
to perfonn some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, 
if both the 
principal and the agent (manager) are utility maximisers it is unlikely that the agent 
will act in the best interest of the principal (owner). In addition to the above, 
Denis 
and Denis (1994), in their study of the behaviour and efficiency of majority owner- 
managers, suggest that there is a strong relationship between family 
involvement in 
the management and control of the firms and the incidence of majority ownership. 
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As the family involvement in management becomes diluted, the fin-n is 
significantly less likely to be majority-controlled. This indicates that the choice of 
majority ownership is more owner-specific than firn-i-specific 
Management studies also suggest that managers make different decisions in owner- 
controlled firms compared to manager-controlled firms and there are differences in 
ten-ns of risk aversion, executive activity, merger and acquisition activity (Katz and 
Niehoff, 1998). The manager's risk can be associated with income risk and 
employment risk and this is closely related with the firm's risk. As the manager's 
income may constitute profit sharing,, bonuses and shares in the company, the 
manager can effectively diversify his or her income risk by diversifying the 
company's income. However, the manager cannot diversify his or her employment 
risk as human capital cannot be traded in the open market. Hence, the risk-averse 
manager is expected to diversify his or her employment risk by other means, such 
as engaging the firm in conglomerate mergers which would generally stabilise the 
finn's income stream (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Katz and Niehoff, 1998). Most of 
the above research was based on U. S. A. data. 
Similarly, Buckley and Casson (2002) argue that, unlike shareholders, managers are 
rewarded only partly by dividend and mainly by salaries. Therefore, managers may 
be more risk averse than shareholders and put the safeguarding of salaries and jobs 
before profit earning. If a manager overvalues risk and undervalues profit then the 
manager may diversify to safeguard their job. Buckley and Casson further argue 
that diversification through direct investment is preferable to managers because it 
widens the scope of their discretion. From a different perspective, Hyland and Diltz 
(2002) view the agency theory as a ftee cash flow theory in that when a firm 
generates positive cash flow, management may either reinvest the cash in the firm 
or distribute it to shareholders. 
It is important to note that the above conclusions seem to suggest diversification 
strategy in the context of risk reduction strategy by the manager which leaves the 
shareholders out of the picture. In reality though, the shareholders 
have the 
collective power to remove a manager who acts against their interests. 
It is also 
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plausible that the owner-manager may undertake a risk-reduction strategy. The risk 
involved may also be different such that the owner-manager may be motivated to 
prevent appropriation of wealth by the home government income distribution policy 
or any other government discrimination policy. 
The difference in the contextual setting of the firms and their period of study as 
undertaken by Lloyd et al. (1987) seem to contradict the structure found in some 
Southeast Asian corporations and some western conglomerates. They suggest that 
manager-controlled companies have a greater tendency to engage in conglomerate 
mergers than do firms with strong owner control in the context of Asian firms. 
However, many conglomerates in Southeast Asia are family owned and their 
substantial owners are directly involved in the firm's day-to-day operations (owner- 
managed). At the same time these companies diversify into related and un-related 
business within the country and across borders. 
Lee et al. (1991) alternatively explained diversification as being driven by three 
elements, namely entrepreneurial-driven, surplus resource-driven and problem- 
driven. Entrepreneurial diversification occurs when there is a gap between a firm's 
goals and its actual performance; thus it diversifies the product or market to make 
up for the gap that exists. Surplus-resource-driven diversification occurs when a 
firm diversifies to find new opportunities due to limited business opportunities in 
the current industry although the firm has surplus resources. Finally, problem- 
driven diversification occurs when a firm is forced to diversify when it encounters 
unexpected changes such as competition, change of government regulations and 
scarcity of raw materials. 
Corporate diversification is a strategy that allows the firm to utilise its resource over 
different segments and industry thereby providing optimum contribution to the 
overall firm value. Burch et. al. (2000) suggest that diversification provides 
managers with the ability to move capital to other market segments, which allows 
capital to flow to its highest use among segments, depending on 
industry conditions 
or they can shift funds from operating divisions with limited opportunities 
to others 
that are more promising, to create shareholders value (Martin and 
Sayrak, 2003). 
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Diversification also relates to efficient resource allocation (Williamson, 1975). 
Hyland and Diltz (2002), on the other hand, propose that a firm diversifies as a 
result of agency considerations namely to pursue a strategy that centres on the 
holding of large cash balances and the pursuit of growth through diversification 
mechanisms rather than research and development. It has been argued that such 
diversification would generate benefit to the firm such as the creation of internal 
capital markets, building economies of scope and scale, stable cash flow that 
benefits from multiple activities and thus possibly able to obtain better financial 
deals (Choi and Cowing, 2002; Davis and Diekman, 1994; Markides and 
Williamson, 1994; Teese, 1980). Meanwhile, in the context of geographical 
diversification, a firm would benefit by exploiting fin-n-specific assets, by 
increasing operating flexibility and by diversifying shareholders' risk. 
Several elements are associated with diversification, namely the relationship 
between diversification and core competence, synergy, firm's value, risk and 
international diversification. 
4.2.1 Diversification and Core Competence 
Core competencies may be used to explain the ability of smaller firms to undertake 
an intemationalisation strategy. Intemationalisation, whether through 
diversification or not, will expose the firm to competition with existing fin-ns in the 
industry or any competition that may appear in the future. In the process of 
intemationalisation, the competition may start at the entry point in which firms bid 
to acquire another company or tender for a certain project. In addition, the 
decision 
to diversify means the company is making a strategic choice to enter a new 
business 
domain. Therefore, the choice of diversification strategy depends on the core 
competencies possessed by the firm which is also related to the 
firm's competitive 
advantages. 
Many authors postulate core competence as the determinant of success in 
diversification motive (Gronhaug and Nordhaug, 1992; Markides and 
Williamson, 
1994; Very, 1993). Gronhaug and Nordhaug (1992), for example, 
define core 
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competence as what a firm is able to perform with excellence compared to its 
competitors. The core competence is developed and maintained with a combination 
of technology and organisational knowledge and skill, and it is further linked to its 
envirom-nent, its value-generating activities and the organisatIon of these actIvities. 
This competence can be used to propel another business strategy or business unit 
via related diversification or even unrelated diversification. 
Very (1993) views core competencies as a key success factor of a firm's business 
and constitutes a barrier to the entry of new competitors into the business. 
Therefore, a core competence must be a source of a firm specific or ownership 
advantage and must be unique to that firm, and inimitable. In addition, the core 
competence concept explores how competitive advantage is linked to unique 
resources and firm specific assets, which are the basis of the value-creation process 
(Post, 1997). Post (1997) also views strategic capabilities which are the elements of 
core competencies as tacit, subject to learning, firm-specific, and developed over 
time through interactions among resources. Post also distinguishes between 
competence building and competence leveraging. Competence building is a process 
by which a firm achieves qualitative changes in its existing stocks of assets and 
capabilities to coordinate and deploy new or existing assets and capabilities in ways 
that help firm achieve its goals. Competence leveraging, on the other hand, is the 
application of a firm's existing competencies to current or new market opportunities 
in ways that do not require qualitative changes in the firm's assets or capabilities. 
Core competencies can also be a managerial skill or an operational competence. It 
is developed from within and is not given to the firm. Very (1993) for example, 
noted that managers need to assess their managerial competence if a firm decides to 
venture into diversification. In the case of diversification strategy, for instance, 
diversification performance depends on the ability of the managers to transfer core 
competencies to the new business. Javidan (1998) explains that a firm develops 
core competencies within four hierarchies. First, the resources that belong to the 
firm such as plant and equipment, and human and organisational resources. Second, 
the firm's capability to exploit the resources such as a set of activities that 
transforms an input into product. Third, the competence that is a cross- functional 
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integration and coordination of capabilities among business units, and fourth, the 
highest level in the hierarchy is core competence that results from the interaction 
between different business units competencies i. e. the collection of competencies 
that are widespread across the corporation. 
4.2.2 Diversification and Capturing of Synergy 
Synergy is a notion that is often used to justify corporate action especially in 
acquisition strategies. It has been an essence of corporate strategy in diversified 
firms but it may represent an objective that rarely occurs in practice due to 
problems of implementation (Porter, 1996 pp 178). The basic idea of synergy is the 
benefit that could be realised as a result of collaboration or interrelationships 
between business units (Porter, 1996; Very, 1993; Vizjak, 1994). To realise 
potential synergy between business units, decentralisation has to be controlled since 
uncontrolled decentralisation will reduce interrelationships. 
Porter (1996) categonsed inter-relationships between business units into three; 
namely tangible inter-relationships, intangible inter-relationships and competitor 
inter-relationships. Tangible inter-relationship is about sharing of activities in the 
hierarchy or value chain among related business units such as sharing common 
buyers, technology and networks. Intangible inter-relationship involves sharing of 
management know-how among business units, and competitor inter-relationships 
are present when fin-ns compete with diversified rivals in more than one business 
unit. The competitive advantage of a firm will depend on the inter-relationship it 
has achieved compared to its competitors. Kanter (1996) suggests the outcome of 
synergy could be cross-selling between business units, product links, combining 
expertise, sharing market intelligence and leaps in efficiency. 
The sharing of activities, resources and know-how will lower the cost of activity 
and will lead to competitive advantage (Porter, 1996). Finns will also benefit from 
economies of scale and scope that result fTom inter-relationships between business 
units. Sharing will increase the scale of business activities and has a potential to 
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reduce cost. The scope of activities will also have the potential to increase such as 
through sharing of networks. 
The potential of synergy is not limited only to business units within the same 
boundary but may across geographical borders, namely between parent and 
subsidiary and between subsidiaries in different countries. 
4.2.3 Diversification and Firm's Value 
The connection between diversification and corporate or firm value is related to the 
reallocation of resources between diverse entities within the group. Overall, the 
potential cost and benefit of diversification can be deduced from Berger and Ofek 
(1995) as follows: 
The potential benefits of operating different lines of business within one firm 
include greater operating efficiency, less incentive to forego positive net present 
value projects, greater debt capacity, and lower taxes. The potential costs of 
diversification include the use of increased discretionary resources to undertake 
value decreasing investments, cross-subsidies that allow poor segments to drain 
resources from better performing segments, and misalignment of incentives 
between central and divisional manager. There is no clear prediction about the 
overall value effect of diversification. 
(Berger and Ofek, 1995, p 40). 
Theoretical arguments suggest that diversification has both value-enhancing and 
value-reducing effects (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Chen and Ho, 2000; Choi and 
Cowing, 2002; Singh et. al., 2003). Various studies have looked at the relationship 
between diversification and firm value. Empirical evidences suggest that 
diversification destroys firm value (Berger and Ofek 1995; Chen and Ho 2000; 
Doukas et. al. 2002; Graham et. al. 2002; Lamont and Polk 2002) and subsequently 
shareholder wealth (Bodnar et. al., 1997). Berger and Ofek (1995), for example, 
found that controlling for other sources of value, industrial diversification reduces 
firm value by 13% to 15%. The loss in value is due to the problem of over- 
investment in low growth activities and cross-subsidisation of loss-making 
activities. Therefore, diversification reduces the value of the firm, which is 
associated with over-investment and subsidisation of poorly performing segments. 
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There are also positive arguments about diversification. These arguments mostly 
relate to the formation of internal capital market. Since information asymmetry 
increases the cost of external capital, diversification will allow the firm to bypass 
external capital markets in favour of an internal capital market. The advantage of 
an internal capital market is that segments of high cash flow but limited investment 
opportunities will provide financing to the segments that have low cash flow but 
high investment opportunities (Lin and Servaes, 2002). However, the efficacy of 
the internal capital market is not guaranteed as it depends on market volatility and 
information gaps between segments, especially in developing markets. In addition, 
value-enhancing diversification is also influenced by the ownership structure of the 
diversified firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976), cited in Lin and Servaes (2002), 
suggest that managers who are owners are less likely to squander corporate wealth 
via poor diversification choice. Chen and Ho (2000) in their study of Singaporean 
firms found that multi-segment firms are valued less than single segment finns only 
for those firms with low insider ownership. 
Matsusaka (2001) alternatively views value-enhancing diversification as a dynamic 
value-maximising strategy revolving around the notion of organisational capability. 
Finns can be seen as having organisational capabilities and skills at different levels 
of management and these may be transferable across products and industries. In the 
case of finns facing a downturn in one segment, these capabilities could be utillsed 
in new ventures in new market segments, thereby diversifying into new activities 
while maintaining the existing ones. This diversification can be considered as a 
value maximising strategy. Similarly, value-enhancing diversification can be 
realised when firm optimally chooses the number of segments in which it operates 
depending on its comparative advantage (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002). 
4.2.4 Diversifleation and Risk 
The basic notion of diversification with regards to risk can be looked at from two 
perspectives. First, the motive of diversification is to diversify corporate risk. 
Second, diversification itself is a risky venture, especially for international 
diversification. As stated earlier in this chapter under agency theory, there is a 
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conflict of perception between managers and owners with regard to diversification 
and risk. This section focuses on corporate risk diversification motives perceived by 
the firms. It is based on the argument that a firm can avoid marked fluctuations in 
performance and better secure its future if it includes businesses spread across 
different industries with different risk characteristics and subject to different 
economic cycles (Goold and Luchs, 1996, p 12). This risk-spreading argument is 
based on the expectation that good business units act as the saviour for weaker 
units, thereby providing firms with balanced perforinance throughout. 
An earlier study by Rugman (1976), shows that it is possible for multinational firms 
to reduce the risk of their profits (increases the stability of earnings) by engaging in 
foreign operations. In other words, multinational firms enjoy the additional 
advantage of profits stability than does a similar sized firm selling most of its goods 
in one national market. This means that stability of earnings through time is an 
increasing function of the ratio of foreign to total operations (p 75). 
4.2.5 International Diversification 
As noted earlier, diversification may encompass geographical boundaries. 
However, the existence of conditions which make corporate international 
diversification valuable are difficult to identify and measure in the international 
context (Garrod and Rees, 1998). It is difficult, as different cultural, institutional 
and envirom-nental contexts will give different result on the benefits of international 
diversification. Quoting other authors, Garrod and Rees indicate several scope of 
gains from international diversification such as gain accrued from imperfections in 
product and factor markets, imperfections in international financial markets, the 
management of real exchange risk and operating benefit from multinational 
structure. Other studies have also indicated that the benefit from international 
diversification may stem from the ability of the firm to arbitrage restrictions 
imposed by institutions and governments and gain from economies of scale 
(Doukas et al. 2002). 
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Denis et al. (2002) also suggest several possible benefits can accrue with global 
diversification, namely firm value is increased by the creation of flexibility within 
the firm to respond to changes in relative price, difference in tax codes and other 
institutional differences. Similarly, the multinational has the ability to lower the 
firm's overall tax liability by exploiting tax differences between countries. Having 
operations in different locations gives multinational firms a string of options such 
as where to declare profit, which location is appropriate to exercise market power 
and where to raise low cost capital (Bodnar et al., 1997). 
In contrast, global diversification may also incur transaction cost to the firm such as 
cost of monitoring and coordinating between parent and affiliates, cost of 
asymmetric information, inefficient cross-subsidisation between affiliates and also 
cost resulting from the agency problem. 
From the above theoretical foundation on diversification, an assumption can be 
made about Malaysian investment into the U. K. Among the perspectives on 
diversification discussed above (i. e. market power view, resource-based view, 
agency theory, core competence and synergy), it is assumed that diversification by 
Malaysian companies into the U. K. can be best explained by the resource based 
view, risk diversification and leveraging on the subsidiary's core competence. 
4.3 CONGLOMERATE DIVERSIFICATION 
Conglomerate is one of the many types of corporate diversification of firms. 
Buckley and Casson (2002) categorise firm diversification into three types. A firm 
is horizontally diversified if it produces the same product in several different plants 
(either in the same or different regions). A vertically diversified firm produces 
intermediate products that correspond to different stages of the same productive 
sequence. Finally, a firm is conglomerately diversified if it produces in more than 
one type of production sequence (p 20). Conglomerate diversification is, therefore, 
the outcome of firms undertaking product diversification into unrelated activities 
outside their core activities. 
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A classic description of the conglomerate finn applies to companies that are 
involved in business activities that are unrelated to each other, but the term is also 
relevant for companies whose operations extend over more than one distinct 
business, or multi-business/multi -products firms (Goold and Luchs, 1996). Davis et 
al. (1994) define the conglomerate as a corporation with relatively autonomous 
business units operating in numerous unrelated or weakly related industries, with a 
corporate headquarters acting as an internal capital market, allocating resources 
among the units. An early form of conglomerates among the US companies was 
the M-Form (multidivisional form) diversification (Davis et al. 1994). The M-Forrn 
involved substituting quasi- autonomous operating divisions (mainly organised 
along product, brand and geographic lines) for the ftinctional divisions of the 
Unitary-Fonn (U-Fonn) structure, as the principal basis for dividing up tasks and 
assigning responsibilities (Williamson, 1985). 
4.3.1 The Rationale of Conglomerate Structure 
Most discussions on conglomerate firms tend to concentrate on its organisational 
structure, financial and business management (Choi and Cowing 2002; Davis and 
Diekman 1994; Markides and Williamson 1994; Teese 1980). A conglomerate is 
assumed to create value through diversification by reducing the variability of total 
cash flow in comparison to the sum of the variabilities inherent to the cashflows 
generated in each business (Very, 1993). Very (1993) also argues that some 
conglomerates can create advantage through financial complementarity between 
different business units in which the profitable business supports the weaker unit. 
The conglomerate merger wave became a phenomenon during the 1960s as firms 
experienced dramatic growth in the short term, prompting other firms seeking 
growth to imitate this strategy. The emergence of conglomerate firms in the 1960s 
also resulted in the development of theoretical arguments that explained this form 
of organisation. Over the course of the twentieth century, conglomerate mergers 
became a dominant form of industrial firms and were very fashionable, particularly 
in the U. S. A. Conglomerate acquisition was used as a corporate strategy for firms' 
growth via diversification. The antitrust policy of the U. S. A. that restrains growth 
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via vertical and horizontal integration resulting in a monopoly also contributed 
towards this trend. As a result, firms seeking growth were forced to diversify 
beyond their primary activities into unrelated activities through mergers, which 
formed the basis of conglomerate firm (Scott, 1989). 
However, by the 1980s, the prevalence of conglomerates declined substantially. 
Davis et al. (1994) suggest that conglomerate structures did not work as measured 
by one crucial metric namely stock market valuation. The stock market 
undervalued the conglomerate relative to the focused firm, and punished firins that 
acquired unrelated businesses with drops in their share price (Morck et al, 1990 as 
cited in Davies et al, 1994). 
The rejection of the conglomerate strategy by the stock market made sense as there 
are compelling theories and evidences that propose conglomerate diversification to 
be a financial mistake. Theoretically, conglomerate diversification appears at first 
to provide a motive of risk reduction. But as Amihud and Lev (1981) argue, in a 
perfect capital market, risk reduction via unrelated diversification cannot be 
beneficial to stockholders as they can achieve on their own the desired level of risk 
through portfolio diversification. Amihud and Lev (198 1) further argue that even in 
an imperfect capital market, given the low cost of portfolio diversification, the risk- 
reduction benefits of conglomerate from the stockholders' point of view seem 
highly questionable. 
Katz and Niehoff (1998) also suggest that the failure of conglomerate mergers over 
the last decades occurred for three reasons. First, key decision makers attached 
unrealistic expectations of synergies on the merger. Second, conflicting company 
cultures obstructed plans for rapid consolidation of redundant functions; and third, 
firms were unable to quickly meld their operations, giving managers the freedom to 
either expand or insulate their personal domain. 
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4.3.2 Empirical Studies on Conglomerate Enterprises 
Hill (1983) examined the performance between conglomerate and non- 
conglomerate British companies in the 1970s, and found that the performance of 
conglomerate firms was more volatile than that of non-conglomerate firms. There 
were also studies that looked at the comparative performance of conglomerate and 
non-conglomerate firms to establish the effect of conglomeration on firm 
performance, but the findings were rather inconsistent. Studies by Utton (1969 cited 
in Hill, 1983) on U. K. conglomerate firms found no difference between their 
performance and that of non-conglomerate firins. However, studies by Econtel 
Research in 1969 and Kumps in 1975 (also cited in Hill, 1983) saw conglomerates 
out-performed non-conglomerates. Hill (1983) on re-examination of the above 
phenomena on a sample of the U. K. companies within the context of the whole 
economic cycle, found the performance of conglomerates to have improved 
significantly more than the performance of two non-conglomerate finns during the 
boom period, but they deteriorated significantly more rapidly than the non- 
conglomerate during economic downturn. 
Bergh (1997) conducted a study to explain some of the differences between 
divested and retained unrelated acquisitions, and found that a high proportion of 
unrelated acquisitions are divested, often shortly after their purchase. His study 
supported his prediction that unrelated acquisitions would be divested if they fail to 
meet expectations based on a set of motives and conditions that prevailed at the 
time of the acquisitions. His study also showed that unrelated divestiture occurred 
when the unrelated acquired firms did not contribute to the cash flow, are relatively 
small, and did not increase group financial synergies. 
The conglomerate firm is also studied in the context of efficient resource allocation 
across industries. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) in their study based on the 
U. S. A. census data for the periods 1974 to 1992, noted that conglomerate discount 
(which means the firm is valued at a discount relative to the value imputed from 
103 
single segment firms in the industries in which it is present 12) caused by differences 
in underlying firm organisational or managerial ability can arise endogenously. 
They found that conglomerate firms are less productive than single-segment firms 
of a similar size except for the smallest of firm, and that plants in the larger 
segments of conglomerate firrns are more efficient than plants in the smaller 
segments. Lamont and Polk (2002) gave two explanations for the conglomerate 
discount; 
First, it could be that diversification itself somehow destroys value. Second, it 
could be that diversification and lower value are not causally related, but merely 
reflect firms' endogenous choice. For example, perhaps low value firms choose 
to diversify leading to negative correlation between diversification and value 
(Lamont and Polk, 2002, p 52) 
Core discussion on conglomerate firms have also concentrated on risk 
diversification (Ramanujan and Varadarajan, 1996), linkages and synergy 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1996; Kanters, 1996) and other corporate management 
issues, which are related to the ability of this organisation structure to create value. 
There are also studies on Asian conglomerates by Choi and Cowing (2002) and, 
Lins and Servaes (2002). Lins and Servaes (2002) compared the value of diversified 
and focused firms in emerging economies, namely on corporate diversification in 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. 
They found that diversified firms traded at a discount of approximately 7% 
compared to single-segment firms, and diversified firms are less profitable than 
single-segment firms. The discount is most severe when management control rights 
substantially exceed their cash flow rights. 
In contrast, a study on the relationship between corporate diversification, 
concentration and performance of Korean firms by Choi and Cowing (2002) found 
that an increase in industry diversification does not affect chaebol's profit, and the 
existence of an internal capital market in diversified firms does not affect the group 
12 Burch et al., 2000 
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profit. Chen and Ho (2000) looked at different firm's ownership in which they 
postulate that the value loss from diversification is only significant for fin-ns with 
low degree of managerial ownership, but not for firms with high degree of 
managerial ownership. Managers with lower ownership stake have more incentiVes 
to pursue value-reducing diversification because the private benefit may outweigh 
the value loss from diversification. 
In the case of developing countries, Lin and Servas (2002) also found that the 
relationship between diversification and firm value for firms from emerging 
markets is rather different. Thus, the relative costs and benefits are not necessarily 
of the same size, as market imperfections are more severe. This probably suggests 
that the effect of diversification on firm value might be different between larger and 
smaller markets. However, Khanna and Palepu (1997) in their study of Indian 
Conglomerates suggest that diversification can be valuable in emerging markets 
because diversified firms can mimic the beneficial functions of various institutions 
that are present in developed markets. There is also a variety of market 
imperfection elements in emerging markets such as underdeveloped and illiquid 
capital market, scarcity of well-trained people in labour market, asymmetric 
information between buyers and sellers in product market, government 
interventions in the market and unpredictable contract enforcement that are in 
favour of the diversified firms compared to focused firms. 
In a country with an under-developed capital market, investors have little 
information about companies and tend to invest in large and well-established firms, 
an advantage to conglomerates. Conglomerate firms can also exploit the 
imperfection of information in the product markets using their established 
companies' name in multiple product categories, and at the same time build up 
brand name. On the other hand, it is costly for small firms to establish a brand if the 
mechanism for information dissemination is under-developed. In the labour market, 
conglomerate firms have the capability to under-take staff development and are also 
able to spread the fixed cost of professional development and allocating the 
employees over the businesses in the group. In developing countries also, 
conglomerate firms have a close relationship with the government, thus giving them 
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an advantage in dealing with regulatory bureaucracy. Finally, conglomerate firms 
can also use their reputation and successful dealing in the past to reduce the 
possible cost of contract enforcement (see Khanna and Palepu, 1997). 
4.3.3 Conglomerate Diversification of Asian Firms 
Thus far, discussion on conglomerates have concentrated on the developed 
countries, namely the U. S. A. and Europe, and in a few Asian countries notably 
Korea and Japan. The prominent characteristics of the Korean chaebol lies in its 
ownership and management, decision making, family involvement, the role of the 
founder and heavy support from the government (Choi and Cowing, 1999; Lee et. 
al., 1991; Shin and Park, 1999). Lee et al. (1991), for example, described the 
chaebol as follows: 
0 Ownership and management are not separated; 
0 Family dominance in management; 
0 Top-down decision making process; 
0 Founder still holds top management post; 
0 Close support from the government; 
0 Unique corporate culture based on the social fabric of Confucianism. 
The Japanese keiretsu which dominated Japanese economy in the 1980s closely 
resembles the chaebol. McGuire and Dow (2002) suggest that the two important 
characteristics of this system are stable shareholdings dominated by institutional 
and corporate shareholders, and close ties with financial institutions (or bank ties). 
This type of ownership also promotes efficient monitoring and control by equity 
holder without short term perforinance pressure. The distinct features of keiretsu 
groups have been considered as the major force in the Japanese economy of the so 
called 'Japanese miracle' (Lin, 2005). The Japanese keiretsu system, for example, 
has contributed to the emergence of large Japanese conglomerate groups which 
played a major role in the Japanese economy in the 1980s. Mitsubishi Corporation, 
for example, experienced a 27% annual sales gain in the U. S. auto market and 
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Japan's world market share in the semiconductors industry has doubled to more 
than 50% since 1980s (Lin, 2005). 
Lin (2004) describes two types of keiretsu. One, vertical keiretsu, which consists of 
upstream suppliers and downstream distributors affiliated with large manufacturing 
or commercial firms. The second, the financial keiretsu, consists of a commercial 
bank along with other financial institutions joined with one or more trading 
companies as well as a range of manufacturing firms. There are, however, some 
differences between chaebol and keiretsu. The chaebols use explicit centralised 
control, whereas the linkages within a keiretsu are more informal; chaebols do not 
employ a main bank system like keiretsu in which the main bank acts as 
shareholder and creditor to member firms; and chaebols are more family oriented 
and thus Chaebol firms do not migrate between groups as keiretsus do (Shin and 
Park, 1999 cited in Ferris et. al. 2003) 
Asian conglomerates in general differ from US and European conglomerates. The 
motivation for conglomerate formation in the US was inadvertently promoted by 
the anti-trust policies of preventing horizontal and vertical diversification to prevent 
industries from being dominated by monopolies. Management consultants and 
organisational economists were also promoting this model, which resulted in a 
widespread adoption of the 'finn-as-portfolio' model by large corporations. This 
model implies buying business in industries that are neither potential buyers, 
suppliers, competitors, or complement to the firm's current business (Davis et. al., 
1994). 
Finns in Asia, on the other hand, tend to diversify into more segments and related 
activities through vertical relatedness and complementarity; they are more 
diversified and diversification did not diminish the corporate value of the firm 
(Claessens et al., 2000a). In relation to these different characteristics of diversified 
firms, Claesens et al. (2000a) compared East Asian firms with firms in the U. S. A. 
and found that firms in East Asian countries and Japan diversified into more 
segments and engaged into more related businesses than firms in the U. S. A. 
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The competency aspect is also relevant for the study of Asian firms. Carney (1998) 
postulates that the organisational characteristic which is less formal compared to 
western organisations and top management which is dominated by kinship and 
ethnicity contributed to the drawback in competence enhancement of the family 
firms in Hong Kong. Simple organisational structures of Asian firms appear unable 
to provide the coordinating capacity necessary for the operation of complex value 
chains. The absence of loyal employees, high staff turnover, and high turnover in 
transacting partner, all reduce the ability of the firm to create organisational 
learning and competencies. As competency generation within the existing 
organisational structure faces a lot of obstacles, it is then sought through investment 
ventures into international markets. 
The conglomerate structure of Asian firms is also evident in Malaysian companies. 
Malaysian multinational companies consist of large firms engaging in several 
diverse related and non-related activities within a business group. Claessens et al. 
(1998), for example, found that, from his total selection of 531 Malaysian 
companies, 70% consisted of multi-segments firms (p 7). The conglomerate 
companies normally acting as an investment holding providing corporate and 
management services to the business group. The business group consists of separate 
firms in which the substantial shares are owned by the family-related parties, who 
at the same time hold important management posts in the company (Claessens et 
al., 2002b, p 13). Some unrelated diversification resulted from guanxi networking 
(Yeung, 2006 forthcoming). 
In general, theoretical discussions on corporate diversification and conglomerate 
structure are based on studies of western corporations with some studies based on 
Asian corporations. Literature on Malaysian conglomerate diversification is 
however, still limited apart from Claessens et al (1998). This research seeks to fill 
this gap. It is assumed that the structure of Malaysian conglomerate firms is 
different from western conglomerate and instead resembles the structure of Korean 
conglomerates (chaebol). Direct investment into the U. K. is assumed to be part of 
their conglomeration strategy to expand their multi-product business. 
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4.4 OVERSEAS CHINESE FAMILY BUSINESS (OCFB) 
Another prominent feature of Malaysian business is the dominant role played by 
ethnic Chinese business companies. This, however, is not a feature found only in 
Malaysia as the Chinese have dominated business throu hout the Asian region. 9 41-1) 
They have even been successful in dominating economies in which they are the 
minorities (Redding and Whitley, 1990). In terms of organisational structure, 
Redding (1993) described OCFB as representing a close overlap of ownership, 
paternalism, concentration of control among family members and the role of 
kinships. 
However, since Redding's early finding, OCFB have undergone an evolution where 
in some cases they are no longer small-scaled or have simple organisational 
structure. The geographical scope of their investment have also changed where 
many have invested in western countries such as the U. S. A. and the U. K. Redding 
(1993) also argues that, where western firms developed their competence based on 
their entrepreneurship skills and access to global networks, Asian corporations are 
known for their business networks especially among ethnic Chinese business. As 
such, their competencies have been developed within the context of inter and intra 
region investment. 
With the exception of Singapore, all overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian countries 
are minorities. They make up 8% of the total population in Thailand, 4% in 
Indonesia, 1% in the Philippines and 3 7% in Malaysia (Redding, 1995). Although a 
minority, ethnic Chinese controlled 37.9% shares of limited companies in Malaysia 
in 1999 (Malaysia, 2001), down from 40.9 % in 1995. In 1991, it was estimated that 
Chinese in Malaysia owned 50% equity in the construction sector, 82% in 
wholesale trade, 58% in retail trade and 40% in manufacturing. The Chinese also 
controlled 70% of Malaysia's small-scaled enterprises (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). 
The Chinese also dominate the domestic economies of Thailand, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and the Philippines (see Diao and Mely, 2001; Mackie, 2001; Redding, 
1993; Theresa, 2001; Yeung, 1999). 
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4.4.1 The Concept of Family Businesses 
Apart from ethnic Chinese dominance, one of the main features of Malaysia and 
other ASEAN countries I corporate business is the high incidence of family-owned 
firms. The family business is a worldwide phenomenon and not exclusive to any 
particular country or ethnicity. It is estimated, for instance, that between 90 to 95% 
of American businesses are family-owned or family-controlled (McCann et. al., 
2001). In the European Union countries, family- enterprises form 75% to 90% of all 
companies. One in eight companies on the London Stock Exchange is family-based. 
In Asia, family-based chaebols in Korea and keiretsus in Japan spearheaded the 
industrialisation process in Korea and Japan respectively (Lin, 2005; McGuire and 
Dow, 2002). 
Getz and Carlsenb (2000) note that family business has no commonly accepted 
meaning and at its most basic, can be defined as an enterprise which in practice is 
controlled by members of a single family. Tsang (2002) defines family business as 
one where a family owns the majority of stock and exercises full managerial 
control. Any attempt to define family business, however, should make a distinction 
between two types of family business as suggested by Morris et. al. (1997). They 
are family-owned (controlled) and managed business; and family-owned 
(controlled) but pro fessionally-managed business. However, whatever the category 
of the family business, Getz and Carlsenb (2000) highlight several potentially 
important considerations for understanding the family business, such as the 
ownership and control of the enterprise, the involvement of family members in 
management, family business interdependencies and the succession or generational 
transfer. This fon-ns the basic difference between family-controlled firms and non- 
family controlled firms. Morris et al. (1997) also proposed several differences 
between these two types of firms as in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Differences between Family-Owned and Managed Firms and 
Non Family-Owned Firms. 
Family-owned and managed firms Non family-owned firms 
1 Family members in managerial positions have 1. Manager's interest in firm is limited more so to 
lifetime and personal stake in firm. specifics of employment contract. 
2. Family members in managerial positions may 2. Managers seldom remain with one firm for 
be with firm for entire career. entire career. 
3. Family members have indefinite time horizon. I Managers have shorter time horizon. 
4. Failure of the business has dramatic personal 4. Failure of business has relatively less personal 
and career implications for the family members, impact on the manager. 
especially those in senior management positions 5. Likelihood of a manager being terminated or 
5. Likelihood of family member in managerial his/her position eliminated is greater. 
position being terminated is low 6. Personal gain results from advancement, 
6. Personal gain resulted from a sense of pride in promotion and increased compensation. 
organisation's growth, success, job creation, 7. Organisational performance tends to be less 
and family wealth creation. directly correlated with what a particular 
7. Organisational performance tends to be manager earns 
correlated with managerial compensation 8. Decision making is often more participative and 
8. Decision making tend to be more centralised, team-based. 
although this may lessen across generations. 9. Internal control systems tend to be more 
9. Internal control systems tend to be more formalised. 
informal. 10. Succession can involve conflict and 
10. Succession can be problematic and traumatic competition, but stockholders will monitor the 
even if planned for; rivalries can arise among process in an effort to ensure it is accomplished 
family members, while conflicts occur between in a timely and orderly fashion. 
the business head and heirs 11. The manager is accountable to stockholders. 
11. Family member managers are accountable to 12. Conflicts tend to follow a more linear pattern 
self, family. such that the impacts are more traceable 
12. Conflicts tend to further a dynamic pattern that overtime and isolated. 
is circular; conflict within the family can impact 13. Employees are apt to have a greater sense of 
on business decisions made at a much later equal opportunity in terms of advancement and 
date, which in turn influences future family participation in decision making; this may 
dynamics. produce more internal competition. 
13. Non-family employees may perceive real limits 14 While the personal lives of employees affect 
to their upward mobility and personal their job performance, the impact is likely to be 
opportunities within the firm. on the individual than the firm. 
14. Family affairs can directly affect business 
affairs and vice versa. 
Source: Morris et al. (1997) 
4.4.2 The Characteristic of OCFB 
The characteristic of family business suggested by Morris et al. (1997) in Section 
3.4.1 is actually based on a study of family business in the United States. It 
provides the basis for identifying the characteristics of family business in Southeast 
Asia, in particular the OCFB. However, OCFB have other distinctive characteristics 
because of their cultural and social context. Camey (1998) highlighted several 
charactenstics of the OCFB such as: 
ill 
0 Close knit network 
0 Wealth preservation goals 
0 Limited managerial capacity 
0 Concentration of decision making 
0 Management on the hand of family member 
0 Limited reliance on professional manager 
0 Informal organisational structure 
0 Low degree of role specialisation 
0 Role of senior owner-manager paramount 
0 Opportunistic investment into liquid assets such as land and property, or 
into unrelated business. 
Tsang (2002) notes that the OCFB is a company that is essentially a family 
possession or controlled by the family, where top management positions are filled 
by the close knit family members, and the management ideology is based on the 
Chinese culture with a clear hierarchy, reciprocal vertical obligation and benevolent 
autocracy. Carney and Gedajlovic ý(2002) also explain that the OCFB as a 
corporation is a tightly-controlled and family-centric operating structure. These 
points are similar to those of Redding (1993) where he describes the OCFB as 
being small-scaled operations tied together in circuitous web-holdings, but 
ultimately controlled by the family where their strategic goals are to create and 
protect family wealth. Redding further highlighted the characteristics of the OCFB 
as follows: 
(i) The company remains in essence a family fortress that involves a very 
specific set of people; 
(ii) It is guarded against incursion from outsiders and its workings are not 
publicly known; 
(iii) It is usually run nepotistically with a benevolent paternalism throughout. 
Redding also indicates that the OCFB people are very secretive and keep 
information within the family, and that their power is hidden. 
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One, however, has to be cautious about making generalisations of the 
characteristics of OCFB. The above description of OCFB is rather static as many 
OCFB have experienced transformation. The characteristics mentioned tended to be 
that of a more traditional form of OCFB and presumably best in explaining the 
small and medium scale OCFB. The larger OCFBs in contrast, have mostly been 
transformed into a more open establishment where the family is the company's 
majority shareholder or retains a strategic stake and holds the top management 
position. Lower management posts, however, are left to non-family, professional 
managers. This form of company is common in Malaysia (Gomez, 1999), 
Singapore (Chen and Ho, 2000) and other Southeast Asian countries such as 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines (Yeung, 1999). Many have expanded and 
been transformed into public companies, although some are still controlled by the 
family. This suggests that many OCFB do respond to globalisation and 
modernisation. However, to understand the OCFB as a whole, it is still necessary to 
understand the characteristics of the traditional Chinese family business in 
mainland China (see Chen, 2001). 
Key influences in Chinese family business are paternalism, personalism, feeling of 
insecurity and business networking. Explaining the concept of paternalism, Redding 
(1993) argues that in Chinese society, the family is largely self-sufficient, 
fundamentally competitive and largely motivated by the pragmatic exigency of 
protecting and enhancing family resources, where within the family the father's 
authority is legitimate and his power is widely accepted by the family members. 
This value has been extended into the Chinese business in which the relationship 
between leader and subordinates is clear. Thus, in the typical firm there is always a 
single dominant leader and power is highly centralised (Redding, 1995). Within this 
scope of paternalism, the concept of nepotism is widely exercised. The son, 
normally the eldest, will be groomed to take over the business from the father and 
the key posts in the firm are commonly filled by the relatives. It is common that 
family members are exposed to the business in the early stage and probation is 
exercised even when they are well educated (Redding, 1993). 
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In Chinese family business there is also the tendency to allow personal relationships 
to enter into the decision making process, which underlies the concept of 
personalism. Personalism is when that it is difficult to make anything happen in the 
absence of the blessings of those in key positions, and successful organisational life 
comes to be based on the building and maintenance of appropriate contacts 
(Redding, 1993). Personalistic networking is also the main means of expanding a 
person's capacity. 
As ethnic Chinese in South East Asia are immigrants and represent a minority in 
these countries, they have developed organisations that are deep-seated in mistrust 
that caused them to be defensive. This feeling of insecurity is rooted in historical 
China where mistrust existed between merchants and government. The government 
intervened in the creation and distribution of wealth, and family power was not 
allowed and beaten back if it looked like becoming a social power (Redding, 1993). 
This feeling of insecurity set in among the first generation of migrants to the 
Southeast Asian countries where they faced similar hostile environments5 being a 
minority in every country except Singapore. 
Even in hostile envirom-nents, however, OCFB still grow regardless of whether the 
government is genuinely supportive, as in the majority Chinese countries such as 
Singapore and Hong Kong, and even where the goverm-nent is accused of being less 
supportive or even discriminating in favour of the majority indigenous people, such 
as in Malaysia and Indonesia. Redding (1993) suggests that this could be due to the 
pragmatic nature of the OCFB that is based on a controlled structure, where trusted 
people are put in key positions and important supplies depend on networks of trust 
or obligation. 
OCFB has also been said to be developed based on network or guanxi that is 
referred to as personal relations and connection. Redding (1993) identifies four 
main lines of networks among the overseas Chinese. It is based on kinship and 
identification by surname, defined by the area of origin in mainland China, those 
that perpetuate a dialect, and those based on occupation or craft reminiscent of the 
guilds of traditional China. Dialect, however, is very much related to the area of 
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origin. Crawford (2000) suggests that the level of integration and cross border 
synergy is achieved through these transnational and culturally rooted business 
networks and it remains socially embedded in their 'birth culture 5. 
The network also exists with the political master of the government of the day. 
Gomez et al. (2001), for example, described that many Malaysian Chinese tycoons 
have established a close relationship with the Malay patron including the Pnnie 
Minister of Malaysia. In Indonesia, Liem Sioe Liong of Salim Group, an Indonesian 
Chinese tycoon, was reported to have benefited from his close association with the 
former President Suharto (Diao and Mely, 2001). In Thailand, the Sino-Thai (of 
Chinese descent) has played an active role in Thai political circles. Since 1988, the 
leaders of the main political parties and all but one of Thailand's Prime Ministers 
have been Sino-Thai , in part or whole 
(Mackie, 2001). 
The network is also based on the cooperative arrangement, either in share 
ownership, link or joint venture where people and capital are brought together to 
share risk and reward. This alliance building has resulted in the emergence of a 
new breed of multinational in the Southeast Asian region (Redding, 1995). This 
network is then extended to include alliances with European multinational 
companies that is based on the matching of international technology and expertise 
with the local company's access to local investment environment. This relationship 
works because the overseas Chinese have now accumulated substantial 
organisational skills needed to form alliances with Western fin-ns; they have a 
dominant position in the region including the webs of network, and they are 
familiar with local investment regime. This network also helps them to accumulate 
funds (Redding, 1993). 
However, traditional networks are the source of development of overseas Chinese 
business and remain prominent, although the companies may function in a different 
manner especially in the context of internationalisation. Yeung (2006, forthcoming) 
argues that there are three particular dimensions of continuity in Southeast Asian 
overseas Chinese capitalism, namely the continual significance of the family 
firm; 
strategic deployment of 'Chineseness' for business and economic purposes such as 
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an investment in China; and Chinese culture as a strategic resource for business 
expansion. But, the involvement of overseas Chinese business in international 
production means that the tight network structure cannot remain static. Thus, the 
larger the corporation and the wider the business activities, the harder it is to 
maintain the ethnic network. Recent trends in overseas Chinese business networks 
has, therefore, changed as a result of globalisation and changes in domestic politics 
(Crawford, 2000). Overseas Chinese business and their networks have been forced 
to restructure as a result of declining monopoly power enjoyed by the leading 
overseas Chinese firm. This was the result of increasing measures for privatisation 
and greater participation of the indigenous people, for instance, in countries such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia (Yeung, 2006, forthcoming). 
4.4.3 The Management of OCFB 
Management in OCFB as indicated in section 4.4.2 is usually about the prominent 
role of family members in the management of the company (or owner-managed 
company). Carney (1998) in his study of 50 manufacturing firms of Hong Kong 
OCFB notes that important decision making and management in the OCFB remain 
in the hands of family members and close trusted associates, and are rarely 
delegated to professional managers, and this structure has changed little in the 
modern era. Although the OCFB faces management capacity constraint in which 
the need for professional managers has increased due to business expansion, 
reliance on outsiders for managerial, technical and marketing skill is minimised, 
and they are retained as subordinates to the family-member manager. 
They key feature of OCFB organisation is that they make little use of formal 
organisational structures such as designated function of division i. e. personnel, 
market research, and there is a low degree of role specialisation (Carney, 1998). 
Instead, the role of senior owner-manager is dominant. In addition, Tsang (2002) 
notes that top posts are mostly filled by close family members. Non-family 
members have to serve for a long time before they could be trusted to fill the senior 
management posts. Decision-making is concentrated with the senior managers and 
most of the strategic decisions made are normally family affairs behind closed 
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doors. Concentration of ownership in the hand of few shareholders is also one of 
the important features of Asian corporation. Claessens et al. (2000b) in their study 
on East Asian countries including Malaysia, found that more than two thirds of the 
fin-ns under study were controlled by a single shareholder. In addition, the 
separation of management from ownership is rare, and the top management of 
about 60% of the firms that are not widely held is related to the family of the 
controlling shareholders. 
4.4.4 Investment Strategy of OCFB 
The investment strategy and capital allocation of OCFB is closely channelled 
towards the firm's original or core business, and profit earned is reinvested into 
liquid assets such as land and building or unrelated business ventures (Camey, 
1998; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002). This argument is based on the same study by 
Carney as in Section 4.4.3. He gives an example that property business accounted 
for 50% of turnover and 75% of profit of Lai Sun Garment (International) Ltd, the 
company that stated garment manufacturing for export as their core business. There 
is also a tendency for the controlling shareholder to disperse their investments 
across multiple operating units to diversify risk to the family wealth while 
maintaining undiluted control over business operations, but such a trend deprives 
firms from developing specialised assets since firms have taken minimal investment 
in dedicated capital equipment but utilised available capital intensively for non core 
business. 
Yeung (1999) identifies ethnic Chinese conglomerates from Southeast Asia adopted 
several strategies in their intemationalisation. First, internationalisation through 
forward and backward integration, a situation where specialisation takes place in 
different segments of the production chains. This strategy aims to penetrate new 
markets and to consolidate the competitive position in particular business field and 
extend the value added activities in the production chains. Secondly and similar to 
diversification and risk as discussed in section 4.2-4, ethnic Chinese conglomerate 
diversify into unrelated businesses as a way of alternative risk hedging. This 
diversification strategy has also been motivated by the social relationship in the 
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guanxi circle. As such, the agreement for investment started from the relationship 
or to promote the relationship and not because of strategic necessity. Third is the 
internationalisation strategy that exercises strict family and ownership control and 
intra-group coordination among foreign affiliates. Based on his study of Hong 
Kong firms, Carney (1998) suggests that the growth of the conglomerate is also 
influenced by a weak institutional environment, the absence of product market 
regulation and weak contract enforcement regulation. 
In another study, Tsang (2002) highlights several contrasting approaches to FDI 
between the OCFB and non-OCFB based on his study of Singapore multinationals' 
investment in China as in Table 4.2: 
Table 4.2: A Contrast of Approaches to FDI 
OCFB Non-OCFB 
Information collection and Low degree of High degree of 
analysis formalisation and formalisation and structured 
unstructured 
Negotiating team Small and consist mostly Large and consisting of 
the boss and his immediate functional managers 
family member 
Assignment of expatriate Family members in charge Systematic rotation of 
manager of key expatriate positions expatriate manager 
Communication between Rely heavily on visits by Rely heavily on detailed 
Singapore and China the boss and systematic written 
reports 
Experience sharing in Strategic experience mainly Strategic experience spread 
Singapore headquarters held by the boss and his among managers through 
family members channels such as meetings 
and management 
artici ation 
Source: Tsang (2002) 
4.4.5 A New Hybrid of OCFB 
While the traditional value and structure of OCFB business continue to be the pillar 
of today's OCFB, it has experienced a gradual variation derived from particularistic 
institutional, political and market condition found among Asian countries. Yeung 
(1999) terms this the new hybrid of OCFB namely a transformative process in 
which traditional and new elements are continuously adapted and recombined into 
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something that resembles neither ethnic Chinese capitalism nor global capitalism. 
The influence comes both from western and Japanese firms operating within the 
same market. For instance, OCFB has emulated the conglomerate business structure 
of former colony agency house especially in Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong 
(Camey, 1998). 
Carney and Gedajlovic (2002) raised three reasons behind the conglomerate 
diversification of OCFBs. First, the instinct of familism creates a distrust of 
outsiders and therefore, conglomeration provides the means for wealth 
diversification without the need to relinquish control to outside investors. This 
structure also allows them to exploit new business opportunities and limits risk in 
their suspected hostile environment. Second, conglomeration provides them with 
camouflages about the real family ownership and wealth and this is assumed as a 
rational means of managing risk of discrimination and appropriation. Third, the 
growth of business corporations into a large unit means the need for outside 
manager also grows. OCFBs address this problem by structuring the family 
business into small-scale business units which meant that it allows the company to 
monitor the performance of the smaller units through their financial result, have 
more effective control and minimise the impact of hire managers on family wealth. 
However, while the dilution of family wealth could be contained in this way, such 
tendency deprives the firm of access to capital and human resources to develop 
more specialised assets (Redding, 1993). 
The new generation of OCFB are in general different from those established by 
their predecessors (Yeung, 1999). Although the businesses were inherited from 
their parents, over the years some have been transformed into new conglomerates 
with new business strategies. The goal of securing new forms of financial resources 
is among the factors that lead to the adaptation of international business norms and 
practices (Yeung, 2005, forthcoming). Thus, where in their early stage, OCFB were 
more domestic oriented, and their management systems typical of Chinese family 
businesses within the concept of paternalism and personalism, they are now 
involved in investment in more than one country. Intemationalisation of OCFB has 
been prompted by several possible influences. Amongst the reasons are the 
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saturation of the domestic market that resulted from increased competition with 
western MNCs and loss of monopolistic advantages due to government market 
deregulation. In addition, the policy of the governments of Malaysia, Philippines, 
Indonesia and Thailand have been accused of ethnic bias in favour of the 
indigenous (Yeung, 1999). In relation to this, Yeung and Olds (2000) note that 
ethnic Chinese business firms in Southeast Asia have responded to ethnic-biased 
economic policies in two basic ways: by establishing political- economic alliances 
with the political master of the country; and globalisation through diversification in 
search of new investment opportunities that were often denied to them in their 
home country because of state regulation. 
Certain impetus for internationalisation may arise from within the organisation such 
as a change in the internal structure of the OCFB. Thus, many past features that 
appeared to hinder modem economic life have been altered, such as the softening of 
autocratic power of the senior generation which implies more incentives and 
autonomy for their sons (Yeung, 1999). Their sons now have more flexibility to 
expand their family business into modernisation. 
4.4.6 Critical View of the OCFB 
The OCFB model has been criticised for being path-dependent which does not 
require them to develop the capabilities and resources necessary to institutionalise 
new product development, establish brand name or build global distribution 
networks (Carney, 1998). They have continued to focus upon low-cost 
manufacturing and adapted plant relocation into neighbouring countries in the event 
of higher cost of production in the adopted countries. They also tend to use their 
excess resources to acquire new businesses in view of facing maturity in their 
traditional market (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002). If the conglomeration was taken 
in response to the perceived 'continual existence of hostility and discrimination' 
against ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia (Yeung, 2006 forthcoming) and not in 
response to strategic business practice, perhaps this will not bring about the 
development of competitive advantages among OCFB. 
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Carney (1998) in his study of Hong Kong OCFB finds that there is little evidence 
that larger manufacturing firms have developed the capability to produce, distribute 
and internationally market a product of their own design or manufacture. When 
firms do move downstream into marketing and brand management they do so 
through the acquisition of established brands. The strategy of buying and selling 
business units and properties can be very profitable during a period of rising asset 
value, but it is rarely a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Carney, 1998). 
Carney also notes that the corporate structure of OCFB has frequently been 
reorganised in which the common strategy is to de-merge business units into a 
separate legal entity and re-list the entity as a new public company. 
Yoshihara (1988) as cited in Hamilton (2000) criticised that OCFB cannot grow 
large and cannot undertake sizeable and complex projects. This is because OCFB 
cannot succeed in enterprises requiring scope or scale. Tracy (2002) argues that 
Chinese business seeks to multiply small units rather than expand a single large 
one. Economy that comprises of this type of firms has been labelled as 'ersatz 
capitalism' or speculative economies that are hollow at the core (see Hamilton, 
2000; Yeung, 2006 forthcoming). The OCFB, however, cannot be evaluated purely 
based on the characteristics of individual firms without understanding the growth of 
the firm in a broader context. Hamilton (2000), in defending OCFBs, suggests that 
during the economic crisis in Asia in 1997, many of them survived because their 
strategies are less influenced by state directive and their levels of debt were lighter 
and spread over a variety of financial sources, including substantial networking of 
the co-owner. Those that went into bankruptcy were because of the effect of 
currency depreciation and also because much of their resources had gone into 
unproductive sectors such as property. Similarly, Yeung (2000) argues that the 
allegations of inherent limits to growth of OCFB become less relevant when the 
firms venture into regional and even the global market place (pp 65). 
The study of Chinese capitalism forces us to understand the social context of the 
Chinese family, in which this value is embedded in the managerial and conduct of 
OCFB. In addition, the new generation of OCFB has experienced structural change 
due to changing global competitive context, local institutional conditions as well as 
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firm-specific strategies. Redding (1995) acknowledges the implications of this new 
force in which the OCFB have now accumulated substantial organisational skills of 
the kind needed to make alliances work with western firms and they can bring 
substantial capital into a deal by the use of their networks and their accumulated 
resources. The need for access to brand names, international markets and new 
technology has also driven them towards intemationalisation. In general, this 
research seeks to fill the gap in the literature by providing the understanding of the 
characteristics and investment practices of OCFB into the developed country such 
as the U. K. Past studies presented in this section tend to look at OCFB in the 
context of the Asian region only. 
The above discussions provide some general perceptions about OCFB. However, it 
is thought that modemisation has changed some of the characteristics of OCFB. 
With regards to Malaysian OCFB, it is assumed that they are becoming more 
modem, westem-like organisations but while retaining the fundamental elements of 
Chinese family business such as preservation of the family wealth and close control 
and family member influence in decision making. The pressure to become an open 
and modem business organisation is assumed to be critical when they are investing 
outside Malaysia. Guanxi or business networking is expected to be an important 
element of the business in Southeast Asia but becomes less significant in western 
countries. 
4.5 STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (SOEs) 
By definition, SOEs are enterprises in which the govemment is the pnncipal 
stockholder, or otherwise has the ability or potential to exercise control over the 
broad policies followed by the enterprise and to appoint and remove the enterprise's 
management (Thomas, 1986). This definition of SOEs, however, represents one of 
the altematives of organizational structure of SOEs. The ownership by the 
govemment in SOEs varies between wholly-owned, state-holding companies and 
partly-owner between private sector and govemment body. 
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The role of the states in the political economy of international business can be 
analysed using the 'collusion and rivalry' framework proposed by Pitelis (1991) 
and cited by Dicken. (1992). Collusion means mutual dependence and induces 
cooperation between States and TNCs. Rivalry on the other hand exists because 
both States and TNCs share the common objective of raising global surplus by 
exploiting the benefits from the division of labour (see Yeung, 1998; Dicken, 
1992). 
The involvement of States in the business is also about retaining its power and 
authority. Yeung (1998) argues that the State may regain its power and authority 
through collusion with private capitalist institutions. The rationale for the State's 
involvement in business is increased competitiveness at the State level position 
through incorporating transnational capital in national development (p 393). 
SOEs are also a common feature in many Asian developing countries. They act as 
omnibus policy vehicles, incorporating political, economic, and social goals at once 
(Negandhi et al., 1986). In China, the government controlled 84.9% of the total 
listed companies in 2001 (Qia-ng, 2003). The Singapore government through its 
investment holding companies namely MND Holdings, Singapore Technology 
Holdings and Temasek Holding holds substantial shares in big companies in 
Singapore (Feng et al., 2003). SOEs also contribute a significant percentage to 
gross domestic product (GDP). In Indonesia, for example, 164 State enterprises 
account for 29% of GDP and in Thailand, 67 government- linked companies are 
responsible for more than 20% of national output (Stride and Nydam, 1999). 
Discussion on SOEs in the literature basically surrounds the issue of government 
intervention in the economy (Negandhi and Ganguly, 1986). The motivations for 
this intervention include controlling strategic industries, income distribution by 
virtue of providing employment, rescuing failing companies, driving 
industrialisation by promoting exports, protecting infant industries and ideological 
imperatives (Negandhi and Ganguly, 1986; Thomas, 1986). It is also argued that it 
is necessary for the government to possess strategic important resources for the 
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development of the economy and to fill gaps not covered by the private sector in 
low return, high overhead and high risks industries (Thomas, 1986). 
Often, the main goal of SOEs is not primarily to maximise profit like a private 
company, but to provide a threshold of socio-economic welfare. The involvement 
of states in the business is also about power and authority retention (Yeung, 1998). 
Government intervention in international business is not merely for economic 
reasons, but is also politically motivated. Negandhi and Ganguly (1986) argue that 
when formulating economic policies, governments are not always motivated by 
economic rationality but by the desire to maximise political support (p 36). One of 
the motives is to provide employment, which in turn realises the policy of income 
distribution, a motive related to political policies. 
4.5.1 Intern ation alisation of SOEs 
In recent years, there has been increasing involvement of SOEs in international 
business where they become multinationals. Explanation on the motivation for the 
establishment of SOEs in the domestic arena, however, does not necessarily explain 
why they go international. Collins (1986), for example, uses the eclectic theory to 
explain why SOEs invest abroad. He argues that country- specific advantages could 
become firm-specific advantages in favour of SOEs such as in the petroleum 
industry where many SOEs were created for reasons of economic nationalism. And 
like private oil companies, these SOEs in petroleum have to go international to 
secure sources of petroleum and take advantage of differences in factor prices and 
other costs. 
The internationalization of SOEs is also related to the role of the government as in 
the case of China and Singapore. Deng (2004) reported that the dominant source of 
Chinese outward FDI is SOEs where their outward FDI are part of the government 
development scenario, and their investment strategies largely reflect government 
priorities. Yeung (1998), in his study of regionalization of Singapore firms, argues 
that the state needs to take up the initiative for outward FDI due to 
underdevelopment of indigenous entrepreneurship. The government also has 
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sufficient political legitimacy and economic resources to take up the role as 
entrepreneur through government linked companies. 
4.5.2 Govern ment-linked Companies in Malaysia 
By definition government-linked companies (GLCs) are companies in which some 
shares are owned by the government (Feng et al (2004). They are like other private 
companies which are doing transactions in a competitive market. In the case of 
Malaysia, GLCs are companies owned by the Government or its agencies in which 
the Government or its agencies has the authority to appoint members to the 
company's Board of Directors and senior management, as well as make major 
decisions (e. g. contract awards, strategy, restructuring and financing, acquisitions 
and divestments) (Khazanah Nasional, 2005). The Malaysian government's 
involvement in business is conducted by its investment arms namely Khazanah 
Malaysia Berhad (Ministry of Finance Incorporated). It was established "to hold 
and manage the investments entrusted to it by Government of Malaysia, to 
undertake new investments in strategic, high technology and of national interest and 
any other investments which meet the financial criteria as defined" (Khazanah 
Nasional, 2005). The Malaysian government also controls companies through other 
agencies owned by them. Control means the government has substantial interest, 
usually up to 20%, as a single shareholder. In this study, seven out of the nineteen 
companies in the sample have government shareholding. The government also 
holds the shares through The Bumiputera Unit Trust (Amanah Saham Nasional) 
besides Khazanah Nasional Berhad. In the case of GLCs, there are elements of 
separation between ownership and management. In managing the company, the 
government usually nominates a professional manager to run the business. 
The role of government and institution in private business in Malaysia could 
contribute to fill the vacuum in the literature that discusses the role of government 
and institutions in the process of ODI by firms from developing countries. It is 
assumed that government companies will continue to be involved in outward direct 
investment, especially in technology seeking FDI and used the companies to 
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achieve Malaysian competitiveness 
different from Chinese SOEs. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Malaysian GLCs however are thought to be 
This chapter has provided insights into three prominent features of Malaysian 
companies selected for this study, namely conglomerate firms, Chinese family 
businesses and GLCs. It also presented the basis for comparing these organisations 
with other forms of business organisations especially with regards to their process 
of internationalisation. It is, however, important to realise that in many cases, these 
three forms or organisational structures can be manifested in one company. Thus, a 
company can be categorised as a 'family conglomerate' in that it is owned and 
managed by the family but at the same time it can be a conglomerate in its own 
right. 
This chapter has also provided an avenue for trailing the intemationalisation 
practice of multinational companies which not only looks at their common 
motivations and strategies but into deep understanding of the factors and actors 
behind their overseas venture. The significant occurrence of conglomerate firms, 
Chinese family business and the involvement of the government in private limited 
companies in Asian business, among others, are important to be clearly understood 
in the context of internationalisation of firms from the developing world. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the whole process and method of collecting data for this 
research. The use of interviews as the main data collection strategy rests on the 
realist presumption forwarded that behind surface appearance lies structure that 
gives rise to observable phenomena (May, 1997). Researching owner-managed or 
family-ownýed organisations require qualitative approaches, because quantitative 
approaches typically meet with no response. Such organisations do not respond to 
survey questionnaires, and do not generate available secondary data and 
information about themselves. Interviews were considered the best method of 
interrogating them. 
This chapter explains the methodology that has been used to collect and analyse 
data for this research. This study uses primary data collected via face to face 
interviews with the managers of the responding companies. In addition, 
documentary data from the public domain and company-owned documents were 
also collected. The first section therefore deals with the design and in particular the 
protocol that was followed to undertake data collection, both in Malaysia and in the 
U. K. 
The next section outlines the strategy for data analysis. The last section deals with 
reliability and validity issues and how they are handled in this research. 
5.2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This research uses a qualitative approach to study why Malaysian companies 
choose to undertake outward investment, a naturally-occurring social phenomenon. 
Qualitative research is one of the many structures and orientations used for 
investigating social phenomena. It provides a framework within which data are 
collected and analysed (Bryman, 1988; Hancock, 1998) and is concerned with 
finding the answers to questions which begin with 'why', 'how', and 'in what way' 
(Hancock, 1998). In addition, the overall focus of the study involves investigating 
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and analysing the investment decisions of the companies, asking why they chose to 
invest outside Malaysia, and specifically why they chose to invest in the U. K. As 
this investment decision is an evolving process and not static, a qualitative approach 
is considered appropriate. As emphasised by Blaikie (2000), 
As a general rule, qualitative authors view the social world as processual rather 
than static, as being about the dynamics of social relationships between social 
actors rather than the characteristics of individuals and the relationships between 
abstract concepts. 
(Blaikie, 2000, p 252) 
Additionally, finding the answers to the research questions of this study, concerning 
for example the motives and strategies of FDI, requires a rich description and 
explanation of sequential events. As Miles and Huben-nan (1994) describe: 
With qualitative data one can preserve chronological flow, see precisely which 
events led to which consequences, and derive fruitful explanations. 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p 1) 
Miles and Huberman (1994) posit that although qualitative research has always 
been a primary method of research in social science, notably in anthropology, 
political science and history, it has also now been widely applied into other fields of 
research including organisational and business studies. The relevance of using 
qualitative methods in international business research is also a reflection of arguing 
the relevancy of linking business behaviour with sociological and anthropological 
perspectives (Chapman, 1997). Qualitative and intensive interviews are also one of 
the preferred modes of gaining access to the realm of international business (Yeung, 
1995, p 322). The qualitative research approach is also appropriate in many 
different situations. Yin (1994), for instance, argues that the first and most 
important condition for differentiating among the various research strategies is to 
identify the type of research questions being asked. He proposed that the qualitative 
approach is appropriate to answer 'what and why' questions. 
The choice of qualitative data collection has been frequently made in past 
international business studies. For example, Yeung (1995), in his study of Hong 
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Kong TNCs, argues the advantages of using a qualitative approach in international 
business research as follows: 
I argue that the qualitative personal interview method is a much better technique 
than other common techniques in international business research such as postal 
surveys and telephone interviews. This argument is particularly relevant when the 
research is conducted in an urban context and the objective is to probe deeply into 
the process and mechanism of international business. Another dimension of the 
qualitative personal interview method is that it provides much flexibility both in 
the conduct of data collection and subsequent analysis 
(Yeung, 1995, p 313) 
Despite the growing popularity of qualitative research, there is no consensus on its 
definition. As Mason (1996) qualifies, qualitative research does not represent a 
unified set of techniques or philosophies; it has grown out of a wide range of 
intellectual and disciplinary traditions. Taking into consideration its common 
elements, she defines qualitative research as grounded in a philosophical position 
which is broadly 'interpretivist' in the sense that it is concerned with how the social 
world is interpreted, understood, experienced or produced. It is therefore based on 
methods of data generation which are flexible and sensitive to the social context in 
which the data are produced, and is also based on methods of analysis and 
explanation building that involve understandings of complexity, detail and context 
(Mason, 1996). Merriam (1998) also argues that an important element of 
qualitative research is that it covers several forms of enquiry that help us understand 
and explain the meaning of social phenomena with as little disruption to the natural 
setting as possible. 
A qualitative research approach is appropriate for this study because of the 
following reasons: 
(1) The approach of this research is 'interpretivist' and not 'positivist'. This is 
not to establish cause-and- effect relationship but the understanding of social 
world through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its 
participants (Bryman, 2001); 
129 
Qualitative research is able to examine the process of events (appropriate in 
the context of motive, process and strategy of an investment), and to be able 
to create a link between events and to explore respondent interpretations of 
the factors that produce such connections; 
(iii) The motive, process and strategy of ODI by Malaysian companies are not 
static accounts of events but are interconnected to each other. The 
complexity of these issues did not favour quantitative investigation; 
(iv) The limited number of potential respondents (due to small population of 
Malaysian companies investing in the U. K. ) limits the ability of producing 
meaningful results in statistical analysis of quantitative data; and 
(V) Quantitative data present less intricate details which are necessary to explain 
the reason for companies to invest abroad. 
5.2.1 Research Strategy 
In determining the research strategy, Saunders et al. (2000) suggest choosing 
between experiment, survey, case studies, grounded theory, ethnography and action 
research. For this research, a case study is preferred as the phenomena being 
studied are contemporary observations that occurred as a result of the behaviour or 
decisions that were taken in the past. This is in line with the argument that a case 
study is particularly appropriate when there is a need to unfold the history of 
particular companies (Yeung, 1995). 
Yeung (1995) defines a case study as being a detailed investigation, often with data 
that is collected over a period of time, of one or more organisations or groups 
within organisations with a view to provide an analysis of context and processes 
involved in the phenomenon under study. On the other hand, Yin (1994) defines it 
as an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the 
context are not clearly evident. Yin further argues that a case study is preferred 
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when a 'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary set of events 
over which the investigator has little or no control. Although there is an overlap 
between case study and history, as Yin argues: 
The case study's unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence 
- documents, artefacts, interviews, and observation - beyond what might be 
available in the conventional historical study 
(Yin, 1994, p 8) 
The rationale for using a case study approach in researching Malaysian investment 
into the U. K. is: 
The type of research question to know 'why' and 'how' Malaysian 
companies undertake ODI into the U. K. are in line with the suggestion by 
Yin (1994) in which he noted that 'these questions deal with operational 
links needing to be traced overtime, rather than mere frequencies and 
incidence' (p6). The unique strength of the case study is its ability to deal 
with a full variety of evidence such as documents and interviewing (as was 
done for this research); 
Malaysia is considered as a developing country (based on classification by 
the World Bank; refer to Section 1.1) and one of developing countries 
mentioned in the World Investment Report 2002 as actively involved in 
outward direct investment. Meanwhile, the UX as the host country 
represents a developed country, also as classified by the World Bank (see 
Section 1.1). Therefore, this strategy follows the notion that a case study is a 
research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present 
within a single setting (Eisenhardt, 1989) and in this case, Malaysian ODI 
into the U. K; 
Malaysian companies consist of various type of organisation and ownership 
structure and this would be one of the factors that also influence their ODI 
motive and strategies; and 
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Geographically, Malaysia and the U. K. are distant countries and the ODI by 
Malaysian companies is assumed not to be influenced by geogaphical 
closeness. 
5.2.2 Data Generation Technique 
Qualitative data is collected through direct encounters with individuals (Hancock, 
1998). For the purpose of this study, data is primarily drawn from field research by 
way of interviews with selected companies. Interviews are the primary data 
generation technique used, as some information could only be realised from 
probing and detailed explanation. Interviews are appropriate for this study as the 
author intends to explore in some depth the companies' experiences, motivations 
and reasons for their investment in the U. K. Interviews allow the author to speak 
with the right person and make instant adjustments to the interview protocol as 
necessary. An interview is also a symbolic interaction through which inter- 
subjective knowledge is gained and can be validated, which is impossible to be 
achieved through statistical formulae (Yeung, 1995). Saunders et al. (2000) also 
note that managers are more likely to agree to be interviewed, rather than complete 
a questionnaire, especially when the interview topic is relevant to their work. The 
interviews were undertaken using a process of data collection protocols or field 
procedures as presented in Section 5.6. 
In addition to data drawn from field research, data is also obtained from public 
domains and companies' publications. Except for studies of preliterate societies, 
documentary information is likely to be relevant to every case study topic (Yin, 
1994). In addition, documentary information was used in collaboration with the 
interview to check the consistency of the information provided during the 
interview. As Yin (1994) stresses, documentation is stable and therefore can be 
onnation and reviewed repeatedly. It is also unobtrusive, provides the exact inf 
covers a broad range and number of events. 
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Three main sources of documentary data available for this research are: 
1) Official documents and reports obtained from the companies and also 
announcement by the companies to Bursa Malaysia which is kept in the 
Information Centre of Bursa Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur; 
Secondary data from the government offices at the federal level namely the 
Central Bank of Malaysia, Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) and Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA); and 
iii) Secondary data from the United Nations Centre for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) especially with regard to FDI statistics. 
The first source of data such as company's annual reports is obtained from the 
company during the interview and also from the Information Centre of Bursa 
Malaysia. These reports contain important information on the companies such as 
the directors' background, major activities, shareholding structure, and financial 
accounts. Bursa Malaysia also provides information on company's corporate 
announcements, circulars to the shareholders, paper cuttings and any letter of 
correspondence between the company and Bursa Malaysia. The data that is readily 
available in the filing system of Bursa Malaysia only covers data before 1999 while 
data for 1999 and beyond was downloaded from the Bursa Malaysia's website. 
Information was also obtained from the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers' 
(FMM) website. This website contains brief information about the companies such 
as the addresses and contact persons and description of the companies' activities. 
This information is crucial for the research as it gives the author a broad picture of 
the company concerned and it also helps in the interview and subsequent data 
analysis. The equivalent information for the U. K. subsidiaries was obtained from 
the FAME website accessible through Leeds University library. All information 
about companies and their recent financial reports are presented on this website. 
The second source posed a more difficult situation. The national data on Malaysian 
outward investment can only be obtained from the Central Bank of Malaysia. The 
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Central Bank data covers investment by country, equity investment by country and 
portfolio investment by country. This data is only available from 1992 onv, 'ards. 
This data reported a flow of funds from Malaysia every quarter which is recorded in 
the balance of payments reporting system. It is difficult to ascertain the reliability of 
this data in relation to direct Malaysian investment overseas. This is because the 
data covers a wide range of capital flows such as equity investment, portfolio 
investment, purchase of real estate abroad and loans extended to non-residents. 
Whether loans extended to non-residents can be considered as direct investment is 
13 unclear MITI and MIDA, on the other hand, only collect data for inward 
investment into Malaysia and their data only cover investment in the manufacturing 
sector. In addition, none of the government offices claims responsibility for 
collecting outward investment data beyond that captured by the Central Bank of 
Malaysia. 
The third source of data is obtained from the UNCTAD website. In the case of 
Malaysia, UNCTAD data is mostly restncted to investment inflows and outflows as 
well as FDI stock. 
5.3 DATA GENERATION PROTOCOL 
The data collection protocol for this research consists of initial preparation for the 
interviews (such as selecting respondents and identifying persons to be 
interviewed), gaining access to the companies, conducting the interviews and 
recording the interviews. The author used the same protocol for the Malaysian and 
the U. K. interviews. 
5.3.1 Selection of Respondents 
The Malaysian companies were selected because they have undertaken direct 
investment into the U. K., and have at least one subsidiary or associate company 
located in the U. K. at the time of the study: the period, that is, between October 
2002 and October 2003. At the start of the research, a total of 180 companies 
" Unforturiately, the request by the author to meet the official from the Central Bank to discuss 
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wholly-owned or partly-owned by Malaysians in the U. K. were identified (based on 
the FAME Database as of June, 2003). The ownership of these 180 U. K. -based 
companies corresponds to 80 parent companies in Malaysia. The 80 parent 
companies were then scaled down to 45 qualified Malaysian parent companies. 
'Qualified' here means that the companies own a subsidiary or subsidiaries that 
actually have active operations in the U. K. This measure was undertaken to ensure 
that the author would be able to meet people who run the subsidiary in the U. K. It 
also emerged, at the initial stage of the search for the respondent companies, that a 
high proportion of the Malaysian-owned companies in the U. K. are not active. 
They had either ceased operations in the U. K. after their parent companies 
(incorporated in the U. K. and were formerly owned by the British) were taken over 
by Malaysian companies and their operation were transferred to Malaysia (some of 
the subsidiaries remained in the registration of Companies House) or the company 
was incorporated but had yet to commence business. Scaling down of the sample 
was therefore necessary to exclude dormant companies, companies that had been 
dissolved, and companies that are only maintained as registered offices in the U. K. 
Among these, there are also companies that have assets or business in Malaysia but 
none in the U. K. 
To confirm that these 45 Malaysian companies do have active subsidiaries in the 
U. K., reference was made to their respective Annual Reports of 2002, which are 
accessible from Bursa Malaysian website (www. klse-ris. com. my). After the 
Malaysian parent companies were determined, the U. K. respondents then selected 
were those subsidiaries that were still active. 
The main objective of the interview was to get an explanation of the company's 
overseas investment, in particular the motivations and strategies of their investment 
in the U. K. In order to have access to this information, the most suitable person to 
interview was the person involved in the investment decision process and at the 
same time is holding the highest management post in the company. Holding highest 
mana ement -post means this person is responsible to report to the shareholders (or 9 
about the data was tumed down 
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owner) about the operation of the company. For the Malaysian companies, these 
should be the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), 
Managing Director or the Executive Chairman. They are considered knowledgeable 
about the history of the company and often they are either the majority shareholder 
or have had a long tenure in the company. The initial correspondence was targeted 
at the above office bearers, but the final decision was with the companies, to assign 
anybody they considered suitable for the interview. The initial correspondence was 
undertaken in early July 2003. 
For the U. K. interview, the selection of the respondents in the U. K. 's subsidiaries 
was based on information given by the parent companies in Malaysia. The U. K. 
respondents were variously CEOs, Managing Directors, Directors or General 
Manager. All parent companies in Malaysia had given permission for the author to 
conduct the interviews with their subsidiaries in the U. K. 
5.3.2 Obtaining Agreement to Participate in the Research 
Access to an organisation is the key point that detennines the success or failure in 
qualitative interviewing research. Unlike anthropologists who often need no 
cpen-nission' to go and do their study (Buckley and Chapman, 1996), qualitative 
interviewing must be done with permission. Therefore, a letter of request had to be 
sent and an agreement needed to be obtained prior to the actual interview. The letter 
of request contained a brief introduction of the author's background, the objective 
of the research, and a request to the company to participate in the research project. 
Since the method of data collection is in-depth interview, the company was also 
requested to assign the most senior official, who would be considered 
knowledgeable about the subject of the research. This is necessary as the interview 
requires the respondent to recall historical events or experiences. 
Prior to sending out the letter, the author was aware of two obstacles. Firstly, the 
interviews were to be conducted in English. As such, the author's ability to pursue 
an in-depth interactive interview on certain issues was a concern, since the English 
proficiency of the respondents was unknown to the author. Second, was the issue 
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of non-response. After considering all possibilities, the author chose to introduce 
himself as a Malaysian government officer, and in his letter to the companies had 
also attached a recommendation letter from his previous office, the Foreign 
Investment Committee (FIC) 14 , with which most of the companies have had 
dealings. It is thought that to a certain extent this helped the author in getting 
responses. The letters were sent directly to the persons holding the highest position 
in the companies, asking them to consent to participate in the research project. A 
sample of the letter is as shown in Appendix 5.1. 
A lot of effort was put into gaining the agreement and participation of all of the 
target companies. Due to the small number of companies, the allowance for non- 
respondents was small. Reminder letters were sent two weeks after the first letter 
and this was followed by a series of phone calls. Efforts were also made through 
third parties, for example by contacting a person who worked in the subsidiaries of 
the same parent company, or by contacting other government officials who have 
dealt with the companies or who happened to know someone in the company. 
Finally, twenty five companies responded to the invitation letter. Of these, three 
companies indicated that they no longer have active companies in the U. K. or have 
ceased operation. One company agreed to have the interview in London. One 
company returned the initial survey document but never responded for the 
interview, and one company agreed to be interviewed but cancelled afterwards. In 
total, nineteen companies took part in the Malaysian interviews. In the U. K., a total 
of twenty three companies were invited to participate in the research, of which eight 
agreed to participate. The sample invitation letter is as shown in Appendix 5.2. 
Interviews with government officials were also undertaken to help the author to 
understand and confirm issues pertaining to government overall policy on outward 
investment in Malaysia. In Malaysia, there are two government bodies that are 
involved directly or indirectly with capital inflows and outflows. These are the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Bank Negara Malaysia. An 
14 The FIC is a government body that monitors the acquisition of assets, mergers and takeovers by 
Malaysian or foreign companies in Malaysia 
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interview with MITI was concluded successfully, but the request for an interview 
with Bank Negara Malaysia was turned down for no given reasons. Informal 
meetings with officials from the Malaysian Trade Commission in London, and with 
the London Director of MITI, were also undertaken. 
Most of the scheduling was done through telephone and all the interviews were 
undertaken throughout a three month period. 
5.3.3 Conducting the Interviews 
Most of the interviews were successfully conducted with persons at the managerial 
level in the Malaysian parent companies and also in the U. K. subsidiaries. A total of 
nineteen interviews were conducted in Malaysia. Another eight interviews were 
successfully conducted in the U. K. In all, a total of twenty eight people from both 
the Malaysian and the U. K. subsidiaries were involved in the whole interview 
process. Descriptive data of interviewees for the interview conducted in Malaysia 
and in the U. K. are presented in Table 5.1 and 5.2. 
The interview was semi-structured with a mixture of closed and open-ended 
questions. A Semi-structured interview means that the interviewer sets up the 
general structure by deciding in advance what ground is to be covered and what are 
the main questions to be asked (Drever, 1995). This method provides the author 
with a set of questions to guide the whole interview and at the same time prevents 
uncontrolled deviation from the research questions. 
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The person interviewed was given a reasonable time to answer the questions and 
the author also responded using prompts, probes and follow-up questions in cases 
where the author required further clarification on the answers. 
The rationale for using the semi-structured interviewing technique is: 
(i) The basic rationale of unstructured interview in this study is that it reveals 
something about the company, derived from the interviewee concerned and 
not the interviewer concerned, as in survey interviewing (Bryman, 1988); 
(ii) It is a study of a perspective as seen through the eyes of the manager 
involved in the process or have knowledge on companies investment 
abroad, based on specific facts and recollection of historical events and 
sustained period of involvement i. e. the interview is necessary to gain the 
information; 
(Iii) Ethnography for example is not appropriate when the data involved is not 
current but a recollection of past experience. 
Qualitative research allows the researcher an access to unexpectedly important 
topics which the researcher may not have prior knowledge such as the insight of 
Chinese family business and the use of structured and potentially rigid approach 
such as survey interview. 
The interviews were undertaken at the time convenient to the interviewees. The 
interview was conducted in English. In the case of the Malaysian Interviews, worry 
of misinterpretation due to different background and use of English as medium of 
conversation was overcome because all the interviewees had a good command of 
English. All of the interviews were conducted at the office of the companies except 
for one of the Malaysian interviews which was conducted over lunch. 
Before the actual interview took place, the author read and made notes of the 
company's profile. This gave the author prior knowledge about the company which 
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also helped in the interview. The author also studied the manner of how the 
interview should be conducted, especially regarding the ethics and protocol of the 
interviewing elites in business organisation (Welch et al. 2003; Yeung, 1995). 
These measures are necessary to establish a good rapport and credibility as well as 
to project true professionalism and enthusiasm on the part of the author. 
At the beginning of the interview, the author briefly explained the purpose of the 
interview including a brief description of the research project and how the company 
was selected for the research project. The interviewees were also told that the 
interview might take up to one hour, but the length of the interview was left to the 
interviewees themselves. 
The interview session lasted between one to two hours, depending on the length of 
explanation of certain topics, and also on the other commitments of the interviewee 
on the day. The level of explanation has very much to do with the rank of the 
interviewees and also the length of their tenure in the company. Different ranks 
basically produced different depths of the explanation, in line with their level of 
authority in the company. 
The interview process posed a number of issues for the author. The interview is a 
process of conversation that requires more than the ability to speak. It is a test of the 
ability of the author to be an investigator and an examiner, and at the same time to 
be involved in casual conversation. Interviewing of this kind not only requires 
training, but also experience. The choice of language to be used in the conversation 
also contributes to the success of any interview. In the case of this research, the 
author used English in the interview, even with interviewees of Malay descent. This 
merits comment, since the author is a Malay speaker. It might be felt that the use of 
Malay, where it is a shared ethnic language, might be desirable, creating a feeling 
of commonality and harmony which might lead to better and deeper 
communication. However, in the Malaysian business envirom-nent, people tend to 
communicate more in English than in Malay, Chinese or Tamil. The use of English 
in these interviews followed, therefore, normal local practice and therefore, the 
author started the interview in English. 
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Another cause for concern is that of cross ethnicity issues. The author is of Malav 
descent, while the interviewees comprised of Malay, Indian, Chinese and British. 
The author did not experience any obstacle in terms of the ability to communicate 
effectively, but it remains possible that cultural and ethnic background played a role 
in the way some interviews developed. For instance, Malaysian interviewees might 
be reluctant to address directly issues which are felt to be sensitive to the 
interviewer's ethnic background, especially concerning ongoing debate on the 
corporate equity imbalance between ethnic groups in Malaysi I in ia (as discussed i 
Chapter 4.2). There could be elements of withholding information because of 
prejudice due to differences in ethnic background and the interviewee's concem 
that the information given by them might be wrongly disseminated. The problem of 
withholding information was not only relevant to interviews with Malaysians in 
Malaysia but also to interviews with Malaysian managers in the U. K. subsidiaries. 
However, British managers are more open (or even too open, according to my 
sensibilities) when they described the internal conflict within the organisation and 
their dissatisfaction with some of the ways that the subsidiary has been managed 
and the role of major shareholders. Perhaps the British interviewees could speak 
more freely compared to Malaysian interviewees, since the ethnicity issue of the 
interviewer is not a cause of concern for them. Most of British interviewees are 
salaried staff while some of the Malaysian interviewees are owners of the company. 
Perhaps an owner is likely to be more cautious than the employee. If anything goes 
wrong, the worker can always change job but the owner cannot simply close one 
company and set up another. Not withstanding the above, some of the Malaysian 
interviewees are also salaried staff, but still tended to be more surreptitious 
compared to the British. The research of this thesis has not been directed to 
exploring this question in detail, but it seems likely that there may be cultural 
differences at work here. Malaysia, for example, scores high on Hofstede's 'power 
distance' index, while the U. K. scores comparatively low. Malaysia also scores 
considerably higher on the 'Collectivism' index than the UX (itim. International, 
2005; Hofstede, 1999). The argument can be made that in business contexts that 
are both 'high power distance' and 'collectivist', knowledge is likely to be treated 
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as a source of power, and not freely shared either vertically or horizontally in an 
organisation. The data from this research seem to be consistent with this argument. 
This then relates to the issue of transparency. One example is when the author 
wished to investigate the family business or family controlled company. The 
interviewees were reluctant to discuss this matter openly. Although some of the 
companies were still controlled by the family, interviewees nevertheless declined to 
admit that they were a family-owned business. They preferred to portray the 
company as a public company, professionally run, and subject to corporate 
governance as approved by Bursa Malaysia. Referring to the cross-shareholding 
nature of family business, Chen (2001) noted that Chinese families generally prefer 
to keep information about cross-holdings private, especially where the Chinese are 
a minority population and suspicious of their possible treatment by the national 
authorities. This means that for an outsider (such as the researcher), detecting such 
cross-holdings and conducting due diligence can be an extremely frustrating 
process. 
The author also realised the importance of the 'gate-keeper' of the company. Since 
the invitation letter was sent to the highest ranking official in the company, the 
person who first received the letter would normally be the personal assistant to the 
CEO or the Managing Director. There were occasions when the company, knowing 
the author to be a student, tended to treat the letter lightly, and even indicated that 
they were all too busy to find the time for an interview. This was reflected on one 
occasion when a company initially declined to be interviewed, but reversed the 
decision after a request was made by a third party. 
5.3.4 Recording the Interviews 
Most of the interviews were tape-recorded with the permission of the interviewees. 
Otherwise, the author recorded the conversation manually. As well as using the tape 
recorder, the author also made an effort to jot down the important points manually. 
Out of the twenty interviews, three Malaysian managers in the parent companies 
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declined to be tape-recorded. In contrast, the U. K. managers all agreed to the use of 
the tape recorder. 
In cases where the interview was not allowed to be recorded, this limited the ability 
of the author to recall some of the interviewee's arguments and explanations. The 
worst scenario was where the interview was held over lunch at a crowded 
restaurant. Since the use of the tape recorder was not possible under these 
circumstances, the author had to make every effort to record the important points of 
the discussion manually. 
At all of the interviews, except with companies of private limited status, the author 
was provided with the documents about the company at the end of the interview 
session. Most of the documents were the companies' annual reports and brochures 
about their products. However, the companies were reluctant to hand over 
documents that were not for public consumption, where these might contain 
confidential or sensitive information. For private limited companies, written 
documents are more difficult to obtain because unlike the listed companies, they are 
not required to submit their annual reports to Bursa Malaysia. Moreover, being 
private limited companies, they have no obligation to make inside information 
available to the public. The only information that they made available were 
contained in brochures promoting their product and services. 
5.4 STRATEGY FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis, as suggested by Yin (1994), consists of examining, categonsing, 
tabulating or otherwise recombining the evidence to address the initial propositions 
of a study. Neuman (2002) posits that a qualitative researcher should analyse data 
by organising it into categories on the basis of themes, concepts or similar features. 
Silverman (2000) notes that data analysis in qualitative research does not come 
after data gathering but begins once transcription has started. 
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Figure 5.1: Flow of Data Collection, Data Reduction and Analysis 
Stages 
Selecting, Focusing, 
Data Reduction Simplifying according to 
themes and category 
Data Display Thematic Display 
Conclusion Drawing Regularities, Patterns, 
ExDlanations 
Verification 'Confirmability', Validity 
Familian'sation 
Reflection of the 
context 
Conce ptualisation and 
Catalquing of conce p/ýs- 
Re-codiq 6- linking 
and dijplay 
Data Evaluation 
Re-evaluation 
Source: Developed from Miles and Huberman (1994), Saunders et al. (2000) and 
Authors's experience 
Data analysis for this research was undertaken through several stages as, depicted in 
Figure 5.1. This involved data collection methods, processing of data which 
involved transcribing the interview, data reduction and data display. These 
activities have contributed in achieving a meaningful outcome of the data to answer 
the research questions. 
5.4.1 Initial data management 
The first step in data management was classifying the companies according to their 
types. This was based on their ownership, and also on the scale and variety of their 
business activities, as shown in Table 5.3. Ownership differentiates the 
characteristics of the companies, such as distinguishing between family businesses 
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Methods Activities 
and government-linked companies. The scale and variety of business, on the other 
hand, differentiates conglomerates from other companies. Classification '%vas also 
based on the equity structure of the company, in which the single largest 
shareholder was considered as controlling the company. Once the single largest 
shareholder was identified, the companies were then categorised into conglomerate 
corporations, Chinese family companies and government-linked companies. The 
objective of segmenting the companies into the separate clusters was to find 
explanations for their investment behaviour within the same group and between 
different types of group. 
However, this method of clustering poses a difficulty. Companies, for instance, may 
have more than one of the relevant characteristics; there are, for example, 'family 
conglomerates' within the sample. As such, it may be difficult to correlate any 
inferences drawn to the actual type of company. However, as the research is 
concerned with the motives and strategies of investment, this clustering is plausible 
as the finding is attached to the characteristics of the companies and a conclusion is 
drawn upon those characteristics. In other words, each motives and strategies are 
analysed according to more than one characteristics of the company. 
The next step involved the transcription of the interviews and rationalisation of the 
notes taken during the interviews. Transcribing meant producing a full script of the 
interview. Prior to the transcription, the tapes were labelled with the name of the 
company, the name of person interviewed, the date of interview and duration of the 
interview. Where possible verbatim transcription was done immediately after each 
interview so that the topics discussed during the interview could easily be recalled. 
The author also cross-referenced the verbatim transcription with notes taken down 
manually during the interviews. 
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5.4.2 Theme and Category Identification 
As noted earlier, the approach of the interview was semi-structured , in which a set 
of general guiding questions were developed prior to the interview. These guiding 
questions (as shown in Appendices 5.3,5.4 and 5-5) were put under the main 
themes, which were: (1) Characteristic of the investing firms; (2) Motivation for 
overseas investment; (3) Motivation according to the character of firm/product; (4) 
Motivation for U. K. investment; (5) Approaches and mechanism of investment; (6) 
Strategy of investment; (7) Problems in investment. A set of categories was then 
developed for each theme. These are based partly on predetermined categories 
derived from the literature review (categories used by other researcher), partly on 
the transcribed interviews, and also from the author's own understanding of the 
research. This follows from the suggestion by Merriam (1998, p 182) that the 
categories can come from at least three sources: the author, the participants, or 
sources outside the study such as the literature. 
Table 5.4: Code Used For Malaysian Parent Companies, the U. K. Subsidiaries 
and the Interviewees 
CODES DESCRIPTION 
CA to CS Malaysian companies 
SA to SS U. K. Subsidiaries 
Pm Parent Companies in Malaysia 
Suk Subsidiary in the U. K. 
Min Malaysian Malay 
Mc Malaysian Chinese 
Mi Malaysian Indian 
Mo Owner Manager 
Mp Professional Manager 
Bm British Manager 
CFb Chinese Family Business 
GLc Government-Linked Company 
Cg Conglomerate 
Mf Manufacturing 
Svs Services (Hotel, Shipping & Utilities) 
Bnk Banking and Finance 
Su Sales Unit 
Cas Associates Companies 
Tr Trading and Retailing 
R&D Research and Development 
Eng Engineering Services & Construction 
-PL Plantation 
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Codes are also been assigned to the respondent companies and the interviewees as 
shown in Table 5.4. These codes represent identification of the interviewees, types 
of companies and also the industry. These codes are also used in the analysis found 
in Chapters 6. 
The next step involved reading through the transcripts of each company and placing 
quotations into the designated theme and category cells. An example of this 
exercise is presented in Box 5.1. 
Box 5.1: Example of Designating Quotation to Theme and Category 
CHAR/CC: FAMILY BUSINESS 
(REASON FOR RELEGATION)" 
"because of the need to broaden the business activities" 
(Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
CHAR/CC: GUANXI 
(GOVERNMENT CONTRACT) 
"specialising in those day a lot in the government 
contract, army barracks, housing, work with JKR (Public 
Works Department of Malaysia), schools, hospitals and 
offices" (1) 
(Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb_Cg) 
IMPA: PROFIT AND TURNOVER 
(LESS SUCCESFUL) 
"So we thought, this is not all. Initially it is a very heavy 
expense. But I think we just about to see the light at the end 
of the tunnel. It was 6-7 years. 
(Pm-Mc-Mo) 
Source: Author's Survey 
From the above sample, the theme was coded as 'CHAR/CC', which represents the 
characteristic of the company where 'CC' stands for Chinese-owned companies. 
The category was presented as 'FAMILY BUSINESS' and 'GUANXI'. IMP/L is 
another example of a theme which represents the impact of the investment and 
'PROFIT AND TURNOVER' as the category. The sub-category such as 'REASON 
15 Handing over the business to be managed by the sons/daughters 
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FOR RELEGATION15 'GOVERNMENT CONTRACT' and 'LESS 
SUCCESSFUL' are used to further categorise the meanings of the quotations. The 
themes and categories were, however, not final as they were subject to revisions 
throughout the data management process. This exercise was undertaken on all the 
transcribed interviews. 
For the U. K. interview, a total of seven themes were identified and these are: (1) 
Familiarity with the parent company; (2) Motivation for U. K. Investment; (3) 
Mechanism of Investment; (4) Strategy of Investment; (5) Management of 
subsidiary; (6) Perception by British manager; and (7) Problem of U. K. investment. 
Data analysis was approached in two stages, namely within-case and across-case 
analysis. Although the ultimate objective of the data analysis was to find a general 
explanation to answer the research question, each case also needed to be treated 
exclusively as the details for each case varied. Within-case analysis involved sifting 
through the data, discarding the irrelevant information and bringing together those 
that are relevant to the themes and categories. As Eisenhardt (1989) suggests, the 
overall idea is to become intimately familiar with each case as a stand alone entity, 
and this process allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge before 
investigation pushes to generalise patterns across cases (p 540). The author also 
reckoned that a clear understanding of each single case would help in the 
construction of cross-case analysis. The purpose of cross-case analysis is to 
enhance generalisability. Although generalisability is not warranted for case study 
research (see Section 5.5.2), it is useful in finding the relevance or applicability of 
findings to other similar settings. The objective of cross-case analysis is therefore to 
find whether the findings are typical or diverse and whether they make sense 
beyond their specific case (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Cross- 
case analysis also deepens the understanding and explanation (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). 
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5.4.3 Thematic Charting 
The purpose of thematic charting is to sort material of similar properties under the 
same category. This allows the author to analyse data within the same category and 
across cases before further analysis across categories is undertaken. This process, 
which is called thematic charting, means summarising the key points of each piece 
of data, retaining the context and the language in which it was expressed, and 
placing the data in themes (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The purpose is to display the 
data according to themes and categories across cases. 
In the sample thematic chart shown in Table 5.5 below, each table represents a 
separate individual theme. Each column then represents a category while each row 
represents a respondent. The quotation from each unit of analysis was inserted 
under the category column. The idea for the charting was to summarise the 
transcripts in a way that context can be easily retrieved for later analysis. It was also 
meant to group together answers to the same question from the different units of 
analysis. Since the interviews were conducted using guided questions, regrouping 
was necessary as the answers given would not be found in the same place in the 
transcripts. This was the first step of content analysis. The objective was to arrange 
the data into some manageable portions. Patton (1990) noted that a classification 
system is critical as without it there is chaos. 
In order to standardise data presentation, a similar method was made for reducing 
documentary data thematically. Documentary data was arrayed and displayed 
thematically, according to similar themes and categories as were used for thematic 
charting of interview data. 
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Table 5.5: Actual Example of Thematic Charting 
Motivation of 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 
Investment 
Gov. Malaysian Regional Market Access 
Encouragement market Factor 
CA in a small if we market "We are 
(Pm 
- 
Mc Mo CFb economy such in this region actually market 
Mf Su) as Malaysia is like a driven, we are 
you will die natural death" forward 
naturally" (5) (1) looking" (1) 
(SMALL (MARKET 
MARKET) DRIVEN) 
CB 44 we follow the we must 
(Pm-Mc_Mp-CFb_ order of our penetrate a very 
Cg_Svs) Prime Minister lucrative 
that encourage European 
Malaysian market" 
company to (MARKET 
invest abroad" CAPTURE) 
(2) (PM 
ENCOURAGE 
MENT 
cc "Malaysia is a 
(Pm-Mm-Mp-Bnk_ very small 
Glc) country with a 
population of 
23 million" 
(1). (SMALL 
MARKET) 
Source: Author's Survey 
The researcher used manual coding, categonsing and thematic technique (see 
Ritchie and Lewis (2003) and Basit (2003) in data analysis. Coding and 
categorising of qualitative data are tedious and time consuming when carried out 
manually. However, the rationale for choosing this approach is as follows: 
(i) The Researcher considered that 19 Malaysian interviews and 8 U. K. 
interviews would be manageable for manual coding, categorising and 
thematic charting; 
(ii) The Researcher can make sense of the data since the researcher is immersed 
in data coding and categorising; 
Manual coding, categonsing and thematic charting enable the researcher to 
gain deeper understanding of the research area and at the same time able to 
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continue to refine interpretation of motivation, process and strategy of 
overseas investment. Basit (2003), for example, noted that manual coding 
and categorising helps the researcher to ask questions, to compare across 
data, to change or drop categories and to make a hierarchical order of them. 
5.4.4 Drawing and Verifying Conclusions 
After thematic charting was completed, the author proceeded with cross-case 
analysis of the data using themes and categories. This involved describing and 
rationalising all the events and the processes of overseas investment by each 
company into a holistic account according to categories and themes. A deduction 
was then made from the thematically presented data for all companies. Evidence 
supporting the categories and themes was displayed, and any counterevidence and 
subsidiary or branching paths were laid out, either to support the existing patterns 
or otherwise. Themes were also analysed within individual cases and findings on 
each theme aggregated across cases, The objective of cross-case analysis is to find 
similarity in terms of pattern and process for all case studies, as well as finding 
explanations for divergent cases before the final inferences can be made. The 
results of data analysis were presented topically in narrative form, based on the 
research questions. Data analysis was basically a process of making sense out of 
data which involved consolidating, reducing, and interpreting what people have 
said and what the author has seen and read (Merriam, 1998). The next step was 
making conceptual and theoretical coherence of the findings, in which the author 
started with the observations about the motives and strategies of Malaysian 
companies investing into the U. K., developed a description of what was happening 
and found the explanation of why it happened. The data were then used to structure 
the explanation in terms of the existing theoretical foundations in international 
business. 
The author views this study as explanation building. It starts with observation, in 
which a picture of what is happening and why was developed, then data are used to 
structure the assumptions about the research questions. in other words, the 
explanation of the research findings is still within the context of international 
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business theory. The objective is to find a link between the research findings and 
the existing body of knowledge in the research area. Thus, the research will be the 
basis for developing an understanding of the issues of interest. 
5.5 THE CREDIBILITY OF THE RESEARCH METHOD 
The credibility of the research method such as the validity and reliability, need to be 
carefully dealt with in any research methodology. All research is concerned with 
producing valid and reliable knowledge in an ethical manner (Merriam, 1998). 
Below are the explanations on how these issues have been dealt with in this study. 
5.5.1 Validity 
Validity is another word for truth (Silverman 2000). Essentially, the two most 
important elements of validity in qualitative research are internal validity and 
extema va 1 ity. 
Internal validity concerns whether or not we are measuring or explaining what we 
claim to be measuring or explaining (Mason 1996). In this study, the author has 
tried to improve internal validity by comparing different sources of data and 
information, thus achieving some degree of data triangulation. Many authors such 
as Silverman (200 1), Merriam (1998), Miles and Huberman (1994) and Yin (1994) 
suggest that triangulation will help improve internal validity of qualitative research. 
In the case of this research, most of the target companies are Malaysian public 
companies which are required to make public announcements about their 
investment, and these announcements are well documented. Data triangulation was 
achieved when detailed explanation of the public announcements by the companies 
was secured from the interview. The subsequent interviews with the subsidiaries in 
the U. K. were another forin of triangulation. Using outside sources to validate the 
case study materials also enhanced internal validity (Merriam, 1998, p. 204). In 
addition, interviewing parent and subsidiary in the same study has been a common 
feature of international business research (Yeung, 1995). 
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External validity concerns the extent to which the research can be generalised into 
other contexts. Qualitative research has been criticised for being less able to be 
generalised. Some (for example Saunders, 1999) have argued that it is less rigorous 
than other methods, that it provides little basis for generalisation, takes too long, 
uses small and unrepresentative samples, and generates massive unreadable 
documents. Blaikie (2000) notes that in qualitative method, probability sampling is 
uncommon and is inappropriate in many instances, and that this contributes to the 
problem of generalisation. 
It is not the intention of the author to argue that this research could be exactly 
generalised to other developing country TNCs. The study of Malaysian investment 
in the U. K., which is presented here, is a study of the reality of a particular 
internationalisation phenomenon, at the time it was collected, and in the words and 
understanding of the people who were interviewed. Generalisation to other case 
studies in qualitative research is always to some degree problematic and arguable. 
This is because studies conducted by different authors, at different locations and 
times, will be unique to a particular research and its environment (Blaikie, 2000). 
Therefore, this study is less likely to provide the kind of generalisation commonly 
made in quantitative research. The most plausible generalisation is across cases in a 
similar research context, which might be similar cases may show similar features. It 
is more difficult to make generalisations with cases from different countries, as 
companies may be established under a different footing and in a different business 
environment. However, these are not reasons to assume that this study cannot be 
generalised theoretically. The interactions of the findings of this study with the 
existing body of knowledge in international business show the research has broader 
significance. Since it is a case study approach it follows what Yin (1994) 
emphasises, that is, case studies do provide generalisations to theoretical 
propositions but not to population and universe. 
5.5.2 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the degree of repeatability and consistency of the research. For 
example, would the techniques used in the research yield the same results on 
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different occasions? Or would different researchers give consistent results on the 
same occasions (Merriam, 1998; Saunders et. al. 2000)? In the context of this 
research, the use of a clear research framework, well-structured guiding questions, 
tape-recording of the interviews, and written documents of transcription, satisfied 
research reliability, and the use of thematic charting ensured the repeatability of the 
analysis, leading to consistent results. Silverman (2000) for example argues that 
reliability can be achieved by tape-recording all face-to-face interviews, carefully 
transcribing these interviews according to the needs of reliable analysis and 
presenting long extracts of data in the research report (Silverman, 2001), and these 
procedures have been followed in this thesis. In the case of the threats to reliability, 
the familiarity of the interviewer with the background infori-nation of the companies 
that was obtained from Bursa Malaysia has lessened interviewer bias. Respondent 
bias has also been reduced since most information given by the Malaysian parent 
companies can be confirmed with the subsidiaries. Furthermore, the author is the 
single interviewer in this research, and thus the issue of inter-intervi ewer reliability 
does not arise. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
Doing research on organisations in Malaysia, especially the qualitative interviews, 
proved to be very challenging. The lack of openness of some interviewees has 
resulted in a lack of detailed explanations. However, some of the information was 
obtained from the subsidiaries in the U. K., where the respondents were more 
willing to talk and more open compared to their Malaysian counterparts. Being a 
government officer has been a plus point for the author in making the first contact 
with the private companies. This networking shows how the corporate sector in 
Malaysia still considers that fostering relationships with the government is an 
important element in their daily business activity. Although connections were 
important in making contacts, there remained elements of unwillingness and 
caution on the part of the respondents to disclose information about family business 
and government-related transactions. In addition, secrecy is a known phenomenon 
in Chinese business, and as most of the units of analysis are Chinese owned 
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businesses, it is unsurprising that problems of disclosure were encountered. Given 
the nature of the companies, this is probably unavoidable. 
Interviews were mostly conducted with the top level management of the parent 
company and also the U. K. subsidiary. This data collection method has contributed 
to the validity of the research since these two interviews (Malaysian and UX) 
provide avenues for triangulation. Triangulation with documentary data obtained 
from various sources with verbal interview data ensure data are reliable and 
representative of the general position of the company. 
The qualitative research approach proved, therefore, to be a valuable method for 
undertaking research on Malaysian investment into the U. K. Of course there are 
drawbacks to qualitative methods, as there are to any methods. It is, however, 
difficult to see how recollection of past experiences by the respondents about their 
motives and strategies of investment in the U. K. could be well interrogated using 
other than a qualitative approach. In this, as in numerous other ways, the choice of 
qualitative methods can be robustly defended. 
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CHAPTER 6: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTO THE U. K: 
MOTIVES AND SPECIFIC-FACTORS INFLUENCE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to unfold the various motives of direct investment by Malaysian 
companies into the U. K. It draws upon the theories of the international production 
of firms (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1993), and multinational 
corporations from developing countries (Dunning, 1981; Tolentino, 2000; Yeung, 
1998). This thesis also argues that outward FDI by Malaysian companies can also 
be partly explained by host country and firm specific factors, and specific features 
of the organisations and actors involved. 
To identify the motivation for Malaysian companies to invest in the U. K., data were 
analysed using Duiming's four motives of internationalisation. Data were also 
analysed, based on the OLI Paradigm, to identify the firm specific factors, 
geographical considerations and internalisation advantages (Buckley and Casson, 
1976; Dunning, 1988) of the Malaysian companies, and how they are used in U. K. 
investments. Additionally, Yeung's (2002) institutional regulations and the social 
organisation of capital for explaining transnational. operations were also employed 
in the data analysis. Finally, the actors and in particular the company 
owners/founders were singled out for their role in internationalisation. 
The background of the interviewees' to which the quotations are referred to in this 
Chapter and the following Chapters 7 and 8, are presented in Table 5.1 and Table 
5.2 in Chapter 5. 
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6.2 MOTIVES OF MALAYSIAN FDI 
Data on Malaysian FDI into the U. K. as in Table 6.1 show that no single motiVe 
ftom Dunning's four categories (natural resources seeking, market seeking, 
efficiency seeking and strategic asset seeking) stands out as the primary reason for 
Malaysian companies' investment in the U. K. Instead, the data shows a mix of 
reasons as to why Malaysian companies choose to invest in the U. K. Of the four 
categories, natural resource seeking is the least cited motive for investing in the 
U. K. The other three motives, on the other hand, tended to be cited more frequently 
by the companies as their reason for investment. At the same time, the data also 
suggest that the motives of FDI by Malaysian companies are beyond Dunning's 
four types of FDL There are other types of FDI such as synergy seeking, core 
competence seeking and growth seeking FDL The motives for their investment in 
the U. K. are also driven by specific factors as discussed in Section 6.3. Therefore, 
the findings support the assumption made in Section 2.2.1.4 that Dunning's type of 
FDI can only provide partial explanation about Malaysian FDL 
6.2.1 Resource Seeking 
Resource seeking, viewed in the 'traditional' sense as being to exploit natural 
resources, is the least suggested motive for Malaysian companies' direct investment 
in the U. K. Table 6.1 shows that only two companies highlight the motive of 
exploiting skilled labour force in the U. K. that are in short supply or limited in the 
home market. This contrasted with Malaysian companies that undertake investment 
to seek natural resources (abundant raw materials and cheap human resources) in 
other developing countries such as in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, 
Vietnam, China and Africa (Ragayah, 1999). However, because labour is still 
considered a resource (see Dunning, 1993, p 57), the motive of some Malaysian 
companies to exploit skilled human resources in the U. K. seems to fit into this 
category. 
The data shows that two Malaysian companies seek highly skilled labour in the 
U. K. such as in technology driven investment (see Table 6-1). Company CI which 
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is involved in rubber R&D activity (see Table 5.3) for example, has retained its 
research centre in the U. K. since the 1950s although it also has a similar 
functioning R&D centre in Malaysia. The reason being, all technical staff in its 
R&D centre in the U. K. are British, and to learn the technology they prefer to bring 
their Malaysian staff to the U. K. Similarly, company CO which is involved in car 
manufacturing (see Table 5.3) tends to send its engineers to work with engineers in 
its U. K. subsidiary or attach them to specific projects in the subsidiary. 
As we move along, the justification for us to continue remained in the 
U. K. after we took over after the Independence because at that time we 
don't have enough scientists[ ... ] We need to admit that there is certain 
thing that we cannot do. That's why some people didn't like me, because 
I want it to be done there. We don't want to say that we don't know. We 
need to get to the stage that having the culture that can generate this thing 
in our own way. For the time being the place is needed to be there 
(CI: Pm-R&D_Mm_Mp_Glc). 
We send our engineers to work with Lotus engineers. This is where you 
get the technology. There are also some Proton engineers that were 
attached to Lotus on specific projects (CO: Pm-Mf Mmý_Mp_G1c) 
This trend to acquire highly developed technical experts and skilled employees, and 
high-functioning teams for product development was common in the 1990s (Ranft 
and Lord, 2000). They argue that because knowledge development is costly and 
capabilities are embedded to a large degree in tacit and socially complex knowledge 
of personnel, either individually or collectively, retention of personnel was crucial 
for the acquiring firm to realise its aim of enhancing its technology capabilities. 
Accordingly, acquisition of a high technology firm was seen as the best option to 
undertake (e. g. company CI and CO). 
6.2.2 Market Seeking 
Market seeking motive is normally associated with the selling of product and 
services in another country. It differs from one host country to another as it depends 
on the overall host country market size and on trade barriers (Farell et al., 2004). 
For Malaysian investment into the U. K., the flow of investment and the market 
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access motive depends on the Malaysia's domestic market, the nature of the product 
and the type of business activity. 
Data show that 63.2% of the companies studied cited market seeking as one of the 
motives for their direct investment into the U. K. (see Table 6.1). This finding 
confirms the assumption made in Section 2.5.5 on the primary motive of FDI by 
Malaysian companies. A majority are distributing their products in the U. K. market. 
They are creating sales and production subsidiaries which can be regarded as a 
second step of internationalisation after exporting (Barber, 2001). The companies 
needed to seek new markets as they faced limited demand in the domestic market 
and competition from other domestic firms. As the companies looked towards 
expansion and sustainable growth, and if the demand for the product was bigger in 
the international market or other countries, it therefore made sense for the 
companies to establish sales units overseas. Table 6.2 shows some of the companies 
that have established sales or distribution units in the U. K. to help them capture the 
market. 
Table 6.2: Sales Unit and Products Marketed in the U. K. 
Malaysian Companies U. K. Subsidiaries Products 
CA (CFb 
- 
Mf) Sales Unit Security seals 
CE (Mf) Sales Unit Gloves 
CO (Glc 
- 
Mf) Sales unit Passengers Cars 
CP (CFb_Mf) Sales Unit Pewter 
CD (Glc Mf Cg) Sales Unit Tyres 
Source: Author's survey 
The companies had each started their involvement in the U. K. by exporting, By 
establishing their own subsidiaries, the companies sought to serve the market 
directly and explore new market potential rather than being dependent on third 
parties or agents. While using agents or third parties distributors, Malaysian 
companies perceived it will reduce profit and unable to control the export volume. 
This kind of product requires the selling to be more personal especially 
to the farmers or farmers cooperative. If you assign the distributor they 
may not do that type of selling for us. If you assign distributor, the profit 
will reduce. Tyres business very competitive and we started our own and 
we are quite successful (CD: Pm-Mc-Mp_GLc_Cg) 
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We had initially a distributor in the U. K., but of all of these distributors 
in the world as you know, they want to sell their own brand. They bit 
reluctant to buy full container load from you (CE: Pm_Mf Mc_Mo) 
Market seeking undertaken by Malaysian companies, however, does not necessarily 
refer to the direct sales of Malaysian finished products (e. g. company CG, CK and 
CN). They do not sell the product that they have produced in Malaysia. Instead, 
they supply intermediate products to their U. K. subsidiaries that are then used to 
produce end products under the U. K. brand name or other international brand. 
Company CC (banking), company CB (Hotel), and company CR (engineenng 
services) are also considered as undertaking market seeking FDI (See Table 5.2). 
This approach of market seeking in foreign distribution depends on product 
acceptability to local conditions and location of the customers. As such, the data for 
example shows that company CO markets passenger cars for the U. K. market based 
on what they perceived as 'appropriate technology', aiming to occupy a niche 
market. With lower product cost, company CO is able to export into a perceived 
"readily available Commonwealth market" that only requires minor modification to 
the products. This use of 'appropriate technology' is similar to that of Korean 
multinationals (Kumar and Kim, 1984). 
Another form of market seeking investment is based on the 'follow the client' 
motive (Dunning, 1993), and is typical of services companies. Interviews with three 
Malaysian companies engaged in service activities support this argument. company 
CC, a commercial Malaysian bank, has branches in cities such as Hong Kong, 
Tokyo, Singapore and London and provides financial services in import and export. 
The company serves Malaysian companies and also companies that have 
investments in Malaysia. The company acknowledges their 'follow the client' 
motive in their foreign investment as follows: 
We would try to trail wherever Malaysian goes, because we know our 
customers best. If we need to have office overseas then we go where our 
customers are (CC: Pm-Bnk_Mm_Mp_GLc) 
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The 'follow' the client motive is also applicable to non-financial companies such as 
company CR. They provide services in the oil and gas industry and needed to be 
present in different countries: 
For shore inspection you need a presence globally. Because for shore 
inspection like Petronas, Shell etc, they will buy equipment from all over 
the world, Italy, Germany, Argentina and so on (CR: 
Pm-Eng_Mrn, 
__Mo_Glc) 
Similarly, company CA, is a trading company that produces plastic seals, where its 
customers include international companies such as DHL and Shell. These 
companies operate in different parts of the world. For this reason, company CA 
considers that their presence in the international market is vital so as to be close to 
their main clients: 
So we sell to company like Shell, DHL and when this company buy from 
you they are not just using in Malaysia or Pacific region, they use all 
over the world (CA: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
Data on Malaysian investment in the U. K. shows that the investment location offers 
another explanation of the underlying market seeking objective. The data reveals 
that Malaysian companies do not see the U. K. as just a final market destination. In 
addition to its market potential, 26.3% of the companies studied see the U. K. as a 
base for accessing the larger European Union (EU) market: 
The obvious market is always U. K. U. K. is seen as a spring-board to 
European market (CA: Pm_Mf Mc_Mo_CFb) 
We also look Britain as a gateway to EC (CC: Pm_Bnk_Mm_Mp_GLc) 
So the basis for setting up centre in U. K. is for export into other market 
(CD: Pin Mc M 
_GLc 
o, ) 
--p -Cblf 
As far as the EU is concerned, Malaysian companies perceive Europe as a big 
market that cannot be ignored, and even bigger than the U. S. A. market (e. g. 
company CA). The U. K. is also seen as a base to access markets outside the U. K. 
and EU. By having their subsidiaries in the U. K., many of the companies are able 
165 
to penetrate other non-European markets such as the Middle East, the U. S. A., Hong 
Kong and China: 
Many years we are trying to penetrate the Middle East market. Our cost 
is low. But somehow, we can never enter this market. But nevertheless as 
far as Middle East market is concerned, it has to be from the U. K. So we 
do the finishing in the U. K. The mind set is that they don't mind to pay 
the premium price (CK: Pm_Mf Mm_Mo_CFb) 
In addition, the U. K. company that was acquired by company CK is recognised in 
China and Hong Kong, potential future markets that company CK has yet to 
penetrate. Dunning (2000) explains this as dynamic ownership specific advantages 
which refers to the ability of the firm to locate their value added activities in 
countries and regions both for creating or acquiring new ownership specific 
advantages, and for exploiting their existing advantages (p 173). 
Other ways in which Malaysian companies use the U. K. to enter other markets are 
through the existing networks of their U. K. partners and/or leveraging on their UX. 
subsidiaries' reputation. Company CR, for example, uses their U. K. partner's 
existing network to expedite their market access to other developed and developing 
countries' market. For company CR, their U. K. partner has also helped them to 
penetrate non-traditional markets in the Middle East, the U. K. and the U. S. A., 
where previously their market was limited to neighbouring countries in the ASEAN 
region: 
Without Joe Wilson, we may be still in Thailand and other neighbouring 
countries. With the tie up we would be able to go to Middle East, U. K., 
U. S. etc (CR: Pm_Eng, Mm_Mo_Glc) 
Company CA, on the other hand, used their U. K. subsidiaries' reputation in the 
international market to penetrate into other industries and produce more 
sophisticated products: 
It is expected that acquisition will allow the group to penetrate into other 
growth industries, notably electronic seals engineering and logistic 
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tracking programmes and systems where Encrypta has established a 
reputation in the international marketplace (CA: Pm-Mf CFb)" 
In all of the above cases, Malaysian companies are aiming towards the U. K. market, 
the EU and also other developing countries' market. Malaysian companies' direct 
investment in the U. K. is justified because the U. K. itself is a good market for their 
products. It also has the added distinction of offering companies the anticipation 
and potential to access the bigger European market. They are also using their UK 
subsidiaries to export to other developing countries' markets which perceive U. K 
products as being of better quality than Malaysian products. The companies studied, 
however, have not cited their motive of FDI as being to avoid trade barriers as in 
the case of TNCs from Hong Kong (Wells, 1978), India (Encarnation, 1982) and 
China (Deng, 2004) (shown in Table 2.4). 
6.2.3 Efficiency Seeking 
Dunning (1993) postulates that one of the motives of efficiency seeking FDI is to 
benefit from differential cost and availability of traditional factor endowment in 
different countries (see Section 2.2.1.3). In the context of international business, it 
was traditionally assumed that the availability of natural resources and cheap 
traditional factors such as labour is an element in the developing countries. The 
differences in these factor endowments have encouraged ýfficiency seeking MNEs 
from the developed countries to exploit the benefit in investing in the developing 
countries (Dunning, 1993). It is not, however, widely acknowledged that efficiency 
seeking FDI is about developing countries undertaking investment in the developed 
countries to exploit their access to cheap factor endowment that is available to them 
in the home country. Data on Malaysian companies investing in the U. K. suggest 
that 42% of the companies studied cited efficiency seeking as one of their motives 
of FDL Among others, they are undertaking upstream value-added activities in the 
U. K. at relatively lower real cost due to their access to cheaper factors endowment 
in the home country. A similar motive was observed by Wells (1988) on Brazilian 
multinationals (see Table 2.2). In terms of industry, the data show these companies 
16 Bursa Malaysia (1999a) 
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(e. g. company CA, CF, CH, CK, CN, CO, CP and CR) are manufacturing based 
companies and services companies (see Table 6.1 and Table 5.3). 
I think in the longer term what will allow us to take advantage of lower 
cost is when our components and raw materials are available in the Far 
East as well and we don't have to travel and we don't have to take our 
components or raw material send them out there and make a product, it 
does not make economic sense. Once you have got the infrastructure in 
place that allow you to buy locally to build the product and bring it here, 
the I think we will be in much better position (SG: Suk_Tr_Bm_Mp) 
We have a lot of plans that have been delayed. Such as we want to 
manufacture burners in Malaysia because the cost is cheaper, we have 
enough space in Pasir Gudang. But the unforeseen circumstance has held 
back our plan. I thing it will be better in future after four years we are in 
red (CK: Pm-Mf Mm-Mo-Ub) 
In the context of Malaysian investment in the U. K., real labour cost such as 
production cost and labour is a negative influence to their foreign investment 
decision. This is because to most of Malaysian companies in the U. K., they 
consider U. K. to be a high cost country. Therefore, cheaper unskilled and semi- 
skilled labour factor is not relevant in this context. Malaysian companies are not 
relocating labour-intensive production to the U. K. due to its position as high cost 
country. By investing in the U. K., they are actually employing skilled labour force 
while at the same time sacrificing higher wages they are paying to the U. K. 
employees. 
In the context of economies of scale, this arises in all aspect of MNEs operation. It 
can be achieved if more units of a good or services can be produced on a larger 
scale and at a reduced cost. In the context of international business, the idea is that 
unit cost falls as output rises in supplying markets in different countries. In the 
context of Malaysian investing in the U. K., efficiency seeking FDI can be achieved 
if the access to R&D, marketing expertise and skilled labour in the U. K. will 
increase the quality and larger number of products produced and then the company 
have better chance to decrease its cost. Network expansion and brand acquisition 
also allow production at a bigger scale. 
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What attract us to buy over the U. K. company, since all along we do our 
own R&D, own design. Over the years we become stagnant. But in U. K. 
they are very strong in R&D. But they are not innovative in 
manufacturing like us. By nature we are more creative; they are more 
concentrate on R&D and design. So it is a good blend. We do swap 
people around. What they can pick up from us, it is transferred to the 
other side (CK: Pm-Mf Mm-Mo-CFb) 
In contrast, the above motive could generate the diseconomies of scale due to 
disadvantages of division of labour, distance between Malaysia and the U. K. which 
cause irregularities in communication and slow decision making, poor labour 
relations, higher labour wages and higher overall cost of investment. 
6.2.4 Strategic Asset Seeking 
Strategic asset seeking in the context of Malaysian investment in the U. K. is related 
to the acquisition of technological assets and product brands. It is to fulfil the 
objective of sustaining or advancing their international competitiveness (see 
Dunning, 1993 p 60). It is also to gain product improvement and competitiveness 
via association with a well regarded technology and product brands. Technology is 
considered as a strategic asset as it is embedded within the company together with 
the brand, and includes intellectual property rights or intangible assets (see 
Galbreath, 2005). A combination of product, technology and brand is therefore 
considered as an asset owned by the company. Data show that 63.2% or 12 
companies studied could be considered as undertaking strategic asset seeking FDI 
(see Table 6.1). This motivation of FDI is similar to FDI by Taiwanese and South 
Korean firms into North America and the European Union as observed by Dunning 
et al (1998) and noted in Section 2.5.6. 
6.2.4.1 Technology Sourcing FDI 
The motivations of FDI by Malaysian TNCs are best described as to access rather 
than to export technology, unlike TNCs from Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Brazil and Singapore (as in Table 2.1). This might explain the difference in the 
level of technology capability and phases of FDI between Malaysia and the above 
countries. The basic route of technology seeking FDI normally involves the 
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acquisition of companies that have the technology and expertise that the Malaysian 
companies could leverage on. From the study of the nineteen Malaysian companies 
in the U. K., 9 cases or 47.3% of the companies studied could be considered as 
technology seeking FDI (see Table 6.3), where the objective was to own the 
technology via outright takeover or mutual technology transfer through 
shareholding of the target company. 
LEC Refrigeration was originally intended for reverse technology 
transfer. LEC is a very established British manufacturer of refrigerators 
since 1942. The idea was to buy the company and take the technology to 
Malaysia and start technology transfer (CD: Pm-Mc-MP_GLc_Cg) 
We cannot even do it by ourselves here in Intria. So as you can guess one 
of the primary reasons is to tap their expertise, their knowledge and their 
global reach (CF: Pm-Eng_ýMi_Mp_Glc) 
So when we buy this company, our intention was to buy the technology 
(CM: Pm-Mf Mc__Mp_CFb) 
Learn the technology. That was the intention of acquiring the company 
(CO: Pm-Mf Mmý_Mp-Glc) 
Most of the technology seeking investment involves outright acquisition of the U. K. 
companies concerned. This results in ownership of the companies' technology. 
Table 6.3 shows the Malaysian companies and the technology of the U. K. 
companies that they acquired. A majority of the companies are manufacturing 
based except for company CR. Five are GLCs which confirms the assumption made 
in Section 4.5.2 about the motivation of GLCs in FDI as being to acquire 
technology. 
Table 6.3 Malaysian Companies and U. K. Technology 
Malaysian Company Technology Acquired 
CF (Glc-Eng) Infrastructure Engineering 
Cl (Glc_R&D) Rubber Product 
CK (CFb 
- 
Mf) Industrial Boilers 
CL (CFb-Mf) Automotive components 
CM (CFb 
- 
Mf) Paper null machinery 
CN (CFb-Mf Cg) Reffigeration 
CQ (Glc-cg) Reffigeration 
CO (Glc-Mf Su) Car Engineering 
CR (Glc Eng) Off Shore 
Source: Author's Survey 
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Obviously, technology seeking is one of the major motivations for Malaysian 
companies to invest in the U. K., especially manufacturing companies. In this 
regard, the Malaysian companies have described the technology of the U. K. target 
I 
companies as superior in many aspects: established British manufacturers have, for 
example, a long established international expertise and reputation (e. g. company 
CS)17 , extensive experience 
in their field (e. g. company CO), strong R&D (e. g. 
company CK and company CL), a centre of excellence (e. g. company CL), and its 
own higher specification technology (e. g. company CM). Acquisition is therefore 
expected to help push the Malaysian companies forward, as in the case of Company 
CK which expects to revive their R&D in Malaysia because they consider the U. K. 
company as being good in R&D: 
What attract us to buy over the U. K. company, strong R&D. Our own 
R&D, own design, years we become stagnant. But they are not 
innovative in manufacturing like us. They use the U. K. Standard and the 
U. S. Standard for boilers. We in Malaysia don't have the Standard Code 
for boilers. Our chief design engineer in the U. K. sits on the Committee 
of Governor of British Standard (CK: Pm-Mf Mm-Mo-CFb) 
An extreme case shows one company, company CO, which considers their 
acquisition of the U. K. company as being 'a matter of survival' after their failed 
collaboration with a Japanese car maker: 
This is a matter of survival. Survival for Proton is technology. Unless 
you have the technology you can't access market. Maybe to Mitsubishi 
when we built Proton, we are competitor to them. So in terms of 
technology transfer this may affect the speed of technology transfer 
(CO: Prn-Mf Mm-MP_Glc) 
Technology and product competitiveness also arise from the notion that the quest to 
go global requires the company to have a technologically advanced product. 
Although many Malaysian companies have developed their own products, the 
capacity of the products to compete internationally is still quite limited. As such, 
the acquisition of technology to improve product branding is deemed necessary to 
enable the product to be marketed globally: 
17 Bursa Malaysia (1996). 
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If we Just intend to settle within Southeast Asia should be enough, but we 
want to go global. If you want to go global, no matter how, the brand 
name is so important. If we want to promote Mechmar boilers (our own brand) it can only penetrate into limited country. We are only twenty 
years in the manufacturing. Beyond that, we cannot do it, although we 
have tried (CK: Pm-Mf Mm-Mo-CFb) 
In the above example, the acquisition of the company with years of producing 
similar products but with a different brand name is expected to open the door for 
the Malaysian product to enter other markets with very little improvement needed 
to be made on the product. Consequently, it also contributes to achieving the market 
seeking motive. 
For the service-based engineering company, however, the motivation for 
technology seeking FDI is less obvious because for them the technology is in the 
equipment that they could acquire from the best supplier: 
Technology is actually international. We are a service company. 
Technology is something to equipment, technique. Actually technology 
comes from all over the world. No such thing that company A transfer 
the technology to company B. For us the technology is equipment. We 
buy the equipment (CR: Pm_Eng_Mm-Mo-Glc) 
It is fair to say that technology seeking FDI is more relevant for investment from 
developing country into developed country than vice versa. This motive, for 
instance, is similar to India's investment into the U. S. A. and the U. K., which is to 
get access to technology and knowledge to enable them to strengthen 
competitiveness and move up their production value chain (UNCTAD, 2004b). It 
is also similar with the motive of FDI by TNCs from China and Indonesia (see 
Table 2.1). 
6.2.4.2 Acquisition of Established Product Brands 
Malaysian companies have two motives with regard to product branding. One is to 
promote the Malaysian own brand in the international market. This involves 
Malaysian companies establishing subsidiaries in the foreign market to sell and 
promote their own brand. This motive of FD1, which is also considered as the 
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market seeking motive, was discussed earlier in Section 6.2.2. The other motive is 
to acquire international brands because the company is unable to promote their own 
brand in the international market. This is considered as the acquisition of the 
strategic assets of the target companies (Dunning, 1988). 
Malaysia has long been recognised as a destination for OEM manufacturing 
especially from multinational companies from all over the world. Many Malaysian 
companies have used the knowledge gained from OEM production to move up the 
value chain by creating their own product brand. However, the success of 
promoting Malaysian own designs and original brands is still very limited. Most 
companies have experienced difficulties in promoting their local brand in the 
international market. Company CN, for example, had started with their own brand 
but received limited coverage. They later acquired U. S-based international brand, 
McQuay for the international market. Company CK too has been trying to promote 
their own brand in neighbouring countries but without much success: 
We have tried. More than seven years we tried it. We only succeed in the 
playing field of Asean region. Beyond that we haven't succeeded. 
Because these are the product that has been produced before us. To them 
our product is still a secondary product. Again this is the mindset. But 
sometime it is true also. They started earlier than us (CK: 
Pm-Mf Mm-Mo-CFb) 
Backman (2005), however, sees this problem as stemming more from the 
conventional and traditional wisdom that most Asian entrepreneurs, and by 
association Malaysian entrepreneurs, are not good at building brands. He further 
adds that their dislike of spending on intangibles such as consumer research, 
marketing and brand development have led some to resort to the backdoor method 
of owning a brand by buying into existing brands that have been accepted 
internationally. The high cost of developing an own brand also suggest that the 
Malaysian companies may perceive that the cost of buying an international brand is 
less than the marketing expenses required to establish a Malaysian brand as an 
international brand. There is also the question of whether the Malaysian products 
are just as good as other well established brand, but perceived not to be? By asking 
the question to the respondent the answers are always that their products are as 
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good as products from developed countries. However, in reality the product maybe 
substandard thus received negative perception from the consumer. Some interview 
results in this study are certainly suggestive of the difficulties of developing own 
brand internationally: 
We acquire brand name, because it is an international brand. Malaysian 
brands are still very restrictive. So this is the opportunity for us. We 
make use of the brand name. It is whether you develop a brand name or 
you acquire one (CG: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb_Cg) 
It could take a long time to build a brand to an international recognised 
standard and the chances of success are uncertain: on the other hand, 
buying a successful international brand would be very expensive (CJ: 
Pm-CFb_Cg)" 
Tried more than seven years, succeed in ASEAN region only because 
new product. To them our product is still a secondary product. Again this 
is the mindset. But sometime it is true also. They started earlier than us. 
Customer afford premium brand buy premium product (CK: 
Pm-Mf Mm-Mo-CFb) 
Table 6.4 lists the Malaysian companies that have acquired U. K. brands. They 
represent 42.1% of the companies studied which also confirms the assumption 
made in Section 2.2.1.4. The brand names represent sectors such as manufacturing, 
retailing and services. 
Table 6.4: Malaysian-Owned U. K. Based International Brands 
Malaysian Company Product Brand (Acquired) Business 
CD (Glc-Mf Su-Cg) LEC Refrigerator 
CG (CFb_Cg) Crabtree & Evelyn Personal Care Products and Toiletries 
CJ (CFb_Cg) Laura Ashley Home Furnishing & Fashion 
CK (CFb_Mf) Cochrane and Beel Industrial Boilers 
CM (CFb_Mf) McLean & Gibson Engineering 
CN (CFb_Mf Cg) J&E Hall, Jackstone Froster Air Filter 
CO (Glc_Mf Su) Lotus Automobile Engineering 
CS (CFb_Svs_Cg) Wessex Water Water Treatment 
Source: Author's Survey 
Data on Malaysian investments in the U. K., however, also suggests that not all 
companies have acquired the U. K. brand because of their failure to develop their 
own brand. Company CD had acquired the LEC brand in the U. K. although the 
18 Sze(2002b) 
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company is not involved in any kind of refrigeration manufacturing in Malaysia, 
which is the activity of the acquired company in the U. K. Neither is it involved in 
any activity related to promoting refrigeration brands. Similarly, company CG 
whose main activity in Malaysia is in plantation had acquired the well-recognised 
brand name of Crabtree and Evelyn when it acquired the same-named manufacturer 
and retailer of personal care products and toiletries. Although these companies are 
not involved in brand development in Malaysia, with their acquisition of the 
product brands they can still be regarded as strategic asset seeking. The activities 
of the acquired companies in the U. K. then become the downstream activities of the 
Malaysian companies. 
Another significance of brand ownership to Malaysian companies is its inferred 
association with technology superiority. Company CO acquired Lotus Car Limited 
in the U. K. because it wanted to be associated with high quality and high 
technology cars. Being a relatively new car manufacturer, company CO felt the 
need to associate themselves with an established brand. Their first collaboration 
with Mitsubishi had failed to create market confidence in their product. Following 
this, they acquired Lotus to enable them to be associated with a stronger and well- 
known brand which in turn contributed to the acceptance of their brand in the U. K. 
market and world wide: 
In fact we need to leverage on a very strong brand. Mitsubishi is not that 
strong in term of brand. In fact in Malaysia they are also not strong. But 
at that time Mitsubishi is willing to become our partner. But we need to 
look at the future of the company, what need to be done. May be to 
Mitsubishi when we built Proton, we are competitor to them. Lotus 
acquisition was entirely different. It is in the sense that how we can 
enhance our brand. Increase acceptability, better brand. So it is the 
opportunity for Proton to increase the confidence among the consumer. 
With this association we amend the credibility of the product (CO: 
Pm-Mf-Mm-Mp_Glc) 
Developing countries' markets seemingly perceive products from developed 
countries such as the U. K. and the U. S. A. as being of higher quality. As such, by 
having their production in the U. K., Malaysian companies thought that this could 
create and increase customers' confidence in their products: 
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Boiler is not to say is very high-tech but it is a long engineering product 
so the confidence factor is not there. Somehow even the Middle East like 
Bahrain, Kuwait, they strictly follow American and British. Reason 
being because for all the projects, they always appointed British or 
American consultants. So the mindset is that anything from Malaysia and 
other Asean countries are inferior to them, even the Japanese. This is the 
problem actually. This is one of the reasons we bought over two 
companies in the U. K. (CK: Pm_Mf Mm_Mo_CFb) 
6.2.5 Synergy and Core Competence Motives 
Dunning (1993), when he discusses strategic asset seeking motives, has noted that 
the strategy asset acquirer aims to capitalise on the benefit of the common 
ownership of diversified activities and capabilities. These benefits may be 
contributed by the realisation of synergy and core competence as a result of the 
acquisition of foreign subsidiaries. As discussed in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, synergy 
seeking and core competence could also contribute to economies of scale and scope 
which is the basis of efficiency seeking FDL 
6.2.5.1 Synergy Seeking Motive 
Synergy seeking with regard to Malaysian investment in the U. K. is applicable to 
both manufacturing and services companies. As presented in Table 6.1, although It 
is not as highly rated as market seeking and strategic asset seeking motives, 36.8% 
of the companies studied cited their U. K. investments as being to realise synergy 
between the Malaysian and the U. K. subsidiaries. This motive has not been widely 
recognised in previous studies of developing countries' multinationals (see Table 
2.1). The expectation of the Malaysian companies' investment in the U. K. with 
regards to synergy seeking can be summarised using four elements of synergy 
creation, namely complementary, combining network, platform and combining 
resources. This is depicted in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1: How Malaysian Companies Create Synergy through FDI. 
Motive Means Target Realisation 
Synergy is expected to be achieved with the acquisition of shares in a target 
company that has a similar type of business, but has different levels of experience 
and expertise, so that their activities complement each other or allow functional 
skill transfer (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1996, p 154): 
When we acquired Costain, company CF is supposed to be a global 
construction group. Leveraging on Costain, one of the leading U. K. 
construction company. More than 132 years experience in the business, 
operation worldwide including infrastructure jobs such as Hong Kong 
airport, the tunnel and other maj or projects (CF: Pm-Eng_Mi-Mp_Glc) 
We have money, they have technology. But they view us also in terms of 
collaboration of expanding their product outside of the U. K. This Is 
because Lotus business is very much in U. K. and Europe and not in other 
parts of the world. By collaboration with us, their products can be 
exported to other parts of the world (CO: Pm_Mf Mm_Mp_Glc) 
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Source: Author's Survey 
It (Laura Ashley) also fits well with the group's strategy of focusing on 
global business in the fields of retailing (0: Pm_CFb_Cg)" 
Malaysian companies also expect to create synergy through combining networks to 
increase the market coverage of their product. This value creation occurs when 
capabilities transferred between firms improve a firm's competitive position and 
consequently its performance or domain strengthening (Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1996, p 147). Company CA, for instance, expects to use its foreign subsidiaries as 
a platform to cross-sell its range of products across various countries (Bursa 
Malaysia, 2000a). Similarly, company CH considers its acquisition of an American 
tanker company as a means of widening its coverage and network into other 
regions. In its announcement to Bursa Malaysia about the acquisition, company CH 
noted that: 
The combined group of AET and MISC will allow new platforms of 
growth to be established in markets in the North Sea, African and 
Mediterranean, partly backed by synergy opportunities available through 
a larger fleet and the Petronas group of companies' upstream 
developments in the same markets (CH: Pm-Svs-GIC)20 
Synergy seeking acquisition is also expected to increase product value added, and 
consequently to aid the market seeking objective of the firms or domain exploration 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1996): 
Encrypta's patent rights to its product technology will allow the 
combined marketing resources of Abric and Encrypta to maximise the 
market potential of all future sales and product developments (CA: 
Pm-Mf CFb)" 
MechMar has an existing subsidiary, BEB Group Plc in the similar 
business of boiler manufacturing in the United Kingdom (U. K. ). The 
combined businesses with the new acquisition will now place the Group 
to be the largest player in the U. K. for the fire tube boiler market (CK: 
Pm-Mf CFb)22 
19 Bursa Malaysia(l 998) 
20 Bursa Malaysia (2003) 
21 Bursa Malaysia (1999b) 
22 Bursa Malaysia ( 2000b) 
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The added value captured from synergistic motive FDI is also realised by using 
subsidiaries in the advanced countries to improve upon the product that is produced 
by the acquiring company in their home countries, and to market these improved 
products in countries where products from western countries are more acceptable 
(as discussed in Section 6.2.2): 
Laura Ashley fits well with Company CJ's strategy of expanding into the 
international retail industry as the London-listed company has carved a 
niche in both fashion and furnishings with private label offer that ensure 
exclusivity and fetches premium pricing (CJ: Pm-CFb-Cg)" 
In terms of combining resources, synergy is expected to be created through 
increased size and sharing of networks for market expansion: 
The pooling of resources and expertise resulting ftom this transaction 
will enhance Company CH's capability and capacity to better meet the 
needs and demands of its customers, particularly in regards to fleet size 
and flexibility, market reach, improved customer service and new 
products (CH: Pm-Svs-Mm-Mp_Glc) 
6.2.5.2 Core Competence Motive 
Core competence motive of FDI has been cited by 31.6% of the companies studied 
(see Table 6.1) which is essentially a significant motive of FDL In the context of 
Malaysian investment in the U. K., the core competence driven investment can be 
categorised into two. These are to seek new competence or to enhance the existing 
core competence by acquiring a foreign company, and to exploit the existing core 
competence of the company. 
Competence enhancement has been widely cited as the motive of FDI by the 
companies studied (e. g. company CF, CG, CO and CR) as shown in Table 6.1. 
Competence enhancement can be achieved by way of acquiring and leveraging on 
foreign subsidiaries' core competence. This can happen, for instance, in situations 
where the company feels that their existing core competence which has been 
developed over the years, have not enable them to compete effectively in the 
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domestic or international market. To achieve higher core competence, therefore, the 
Malaysian company seeks to acquire a company that has a higher level of core 
competence: 
We cannot even do it by ourselves here in Intria. So as you can guess one 
of the primary reasons is to tap their expertise, their knowledge and their 
global reach. As up to date I don't think it is a very successful 
experience. Although we have use them for our own proposals here in 
Malaysia especially some of our big job before (CF: 
Pm-Svs-Mi-Mp_Glc) 
So our association with Lotus, we expect we can sell not because of the 
price but we have to sell based on value. So you have the capability to 
sell the product but not putting it below the value (CO: 
Pm-Mf Mm-Mp_Glc) 
The two companies quoted above provide good examples of the acquisition of the 
core competence of others as a route to success. In the case of company CF, it has 
been successful in infrastructure projects in Malaysia, but feels less able to engage 
in international infrastructure projects because of lack of international expertise or 
competence. They expect to obtain this competence by acquiring a well-known 
infrastructure company in the U. K. In the other example, company CO markets 
their passenger car in the U. K. based on price competitiveness or by offering lower 
prices. By associating with a well known British car company, they expect to move 
from selling based on price to selling based on 'value' (the word is the company's 
own, and serves here as a figure for brand-based premium pricing). 
The second category of core competence-driven investment relates to Malaysian 
companies' utilisation of their existing core competence in other countries via direct 
investment (e. g. company CA, CD and CS in Table 6.1). This core competence had 
been developed over the years via their involvement in domestic projects or in other 
developing countries. This core competence can take the form of management 
capability, and/or of product competitiveness: 
In part because we felt that we need to take advantage of our skill that we 
acquired in the late 1980s when we went to Zimbabwe, South Africa, 
" Shamnugam (1998) 
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Papua New Guinea, China and Indonesia. A lot of it is focusing in the 
developing countries (CS: Pm_Mc_Mo_CFb-Cg) 
Social factors also help bring in opportunity to us. By being able to 
combine good hard work, good market position because we were looking 
to get a better deal and ability to match the people (CH: 
Pm-Svs-Mm-Mp_Glc). 
We are the first in Asia Pacific and among the first in the world to 
produce plastic as a seal. It is very unique product, very, very unique 
(CA: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
For Sime Europe, its core competency is in marketing. They have 
knowledge for the European market for tyres, and secondly it serves as 
intelligence for us. We gathered information, data, trend and market in 
Europe. So we survive because of marketing. They have done a good job 
over many years (CD: Pm-Mc_, 
_Mp_GLc_Cg) 
The above quotations also show that some companies have accumulated skill in 
management capability (e. g. company CH), marketing (e. g. company CD), 
competitive cost structure (e. g. company CS) and product competence (e. g. 
company CA). Table 6.5 shows the example of the evolution of company CS in 
developing its core competence. 
Table 6.5: Map of Competences of Company CS 
First stage - Infant small establishment 
- run by founder 
- family run and funded 
- Small project 
- Government contract 
Second stage - Higher degree of - bigger establishment 
competence - Bigger project 
- Change management 
- Professionally managed 
- Stronger balance sheet 
Third Stage - Exporting Competence - Utilise financial strength 
- Strong financial engineering 
- Increase experience 
- Identify new venture overseas 
Fourth Stage - Interdependent - Mixing competence with 
Competence/seeking higher degree of subsidiaries 
competence - Effect - Increase competence in 
home country 
- On going - Building competence 
internationally 
Source: Author's Survey 
181 
In the above example, company CS started as a family business with limited 
activities. It began to build up its competence via government contracts, a lucrative 
and secure form of investment. It first was involved in smaller construction projects 
awarded by the government and later went on to bigger projects, both government 
and private construction projects. These projects helped the company become a 
cash-rich company. This can be viewed as being in line with the suggestion by Post 
(1997) who describes core competence as being subject to learning which develops 
over time (see Section 3.2.1). 
Another important core competence that Malaysian companies consider to have 
driven their overseas investment is the possession of financial strength. This 
involves companies that have built their cash reserves for years and those that have 
managed to get funds from external financial markets. The data suggest that their 
core competences are based on strong balance sheets that enable them to put in 
respectable bids for foreign acquisitions (e. g. company CH, CS and CR). Company 
CS is further ahead by having the financial engineering skill or the ability to source 
cheaper funds from domestic and international markets, which they also consider as 
their core competence: 
[ ... ] And third we have a very strong financial balance sheet position. Able to go into the market and procure funding at the much cheaper rate 
than our competitor. So all the financials pointed to the right thing, all 
our capability was right, the cost was right and we were able to put in a 
respectable bid (CH: Pm_Svs_Mm_Mp_ýGlc) 
Of course we have the capacity in financial terms. By that time we have 
already accumulate almost US$I billion dollars of cash. Part of it is 
leverage through competitive price borrowing. We are very strong in 
financial engineering skill, in identify cheap money to borrow and at the 
same time using that money to invest in a very strong asset (CS: 
Pin Mc Mo CFb Co, ) 
In general, product and financial strength are the two most important features of 
core competence that drive Malaysian investment overseas. The core competence 
within the companies is used not only to start the investment but also to further 
increase other forms of competence that the company seeks. The mix of core 
competences between parent and foreign subsidiary is as such seen to improve the 
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company's position in the home country and abroad. Increased financial strength is 
also considered as core competence that needs to be redeployed to exploit its 
benefit (Lee et al., 1991; Montgomery, 1994; Teese, 1980). 
6.2.6 Diversification 
In earlier chapters, it was noted that some of the Malaysian investment in the U. K. 
was undertaken by conglomerate corporations. Analysis of the dvers1fication 
motive of these companies that follows is based on the definition of diversification 
as proposed by Buckley and Casson (2002), Davis et al. (1994), Montgomery, 
(1994) and Ramanuj an and Varadaraj an (1996). 
6.2.6.1 Forms of Diversification 
As presented in Table 6.1,36.8% of the companies studied cited that their 
investment into the U. K. is to diversify their existing businesses. The data also 
show that the diversification motive is not merely associated with conglomerate 
firms. From the seven companies that are undertaking diversification, company CM 
is a non-conglomerate (see Table 5.3 and Table 6.1). The data also show that the 
practice of internationalisation by Malaysian conglomerate companies into the U. K. 
is not all representative of conglomerate practice, that is, investment into 
completely unrelated business. The nearest examples to diversification into totally 
unrelated business domains are company CQ and company CS. Company CQ, a 
highly diversified group, has never been involved in the manufacture of 
refrigeration equipment such as its investment in the U. K. Company CS, although it 
has engaged in infrastructure projects and power generation activities in Malaysia 
and Australia, made investments in the U. K. in water supply and treatment. It could 
be argued that the latter was unrelated diversification; however company CS argues 
that this business is still related to their business in Malaysia, in the sense that they 
are all regulated utility businesses: 
Water is different from electricity in the sense that electricity is 
electricity and water is water. But the two businesses operate under 
regulatory regimes. So if you have the opportunity to study the regulated 
businesses, you will find that there are similarities in certain type of 
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electricity and water business particularly in Australia and the U. K. The 
electricity businesses are substantially the same (CS: 
Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
The investment in Wessex Water is YTL Power's first investment in the 
water and waste water industry (CS: Pm-CFb-Cg)" 
Most Malaysian investments in the U. K. are in weakly related activities (Davis et. 
al., 1994) or in vertical or horizontal diversification (Buckley and Casson, 2002). 
Company CM is involved in a weakly related business as it produces paper cartons 
in Malaysia, while its U. K. subsidiary produces parts and components for paper 
mills and is presently moving towards the business of buying second hand paper 
mill machines, breaking them up and sell them to interested buyers. Company CG 
can be considered to be involved in vertical diversification, with its acquisition of 
Crabtree & Evelyn. The main activity of the parent company, company CG, in 
Malaysia is plantations, while their U. K. subsidiary produces soap and toiletries. 
However, the company also produces soap noodles as part of its oleo chemical 
activities in Malaysia. Consequently, they regard their subsidiary's activity to be an 
upstream integration with the Malaysian activities: 
The acquisition of Standard Soap Company because it's related with our 
core business in Malaysia i. e. in oleo chemical industry (CG: 
Pm Me Mo CFb 
Company CJ meanwhile is involved in horizontal diversification with its renowned 
Corus hotel chain in the U. K., a business that complements its Malaysian activities: 
The decision to purchase is in line with the NIUI Group's intention to 
further consolidate its interests in the hotel and leisure business and was 
taken after considering the potential capital appreciation of the properties 
held by Corus and Regal Group and the earnings potential of such 
properties. The Corus and Regal Group properties consist of 88 hotels 
located throughout the United Kingdom (CJ; Pm-CFb_Cg)" 
24 Bursa Malaysia (2002b) 
25 Bursa Malaysia (2001) 
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6.2.6.2 Reasons for Diversification 
The data show that one of the reasons for diversification by Malaysian companies 
in the U. K. is due to excess resources (as presented in the following Table 6.6) as 
explained by resource-based theory (Montgomery, 1994; Peteras, 1996). 
Companies may diversify to utilise their excess resources (Penrose, 1959; Pitelis, 
2004; Teese, 1980), where excess resource refers to the holding of large cash 
balance (Hyland and Diltz, 2002) that have driven firm diversification as discussed 
in Section 3.2. All of them are conglomerate firms which are big in size and have 
large capital. Company CQ and company CG, for instance, consider that excess 
funds have driven their diversification activities into overseas market: 
According to Chief Executive we are not going into businesses that are 
not grow into a major core business. Such as power has been stated as a 
future core business. We want to get more involved in power generation. 
We choose power generation because it has a future. Not everybody can 
involve, you need a lot of capital. So Sime Darby has capital, we can go 
big. So that's what we have done (CQ: Pm-Mc-Mp-GIc-Cg) 
In terms of internal driving force, our financial strength is one of the 
reasons we invest overseas. At the same time the main reason is the 
business itself Whether the bottom line is the same as ours (CG: 
Pm Mc Mo CFb Ca) 
---- &I 
In the above example, company CG had received huge compensation from the 
Malaysian government which had acquired their plantation land. Nevertheless, the 
high cost of alternative land made it uneconomical for them to expand their core 
activity in plantation sector. Thus, diversification in another country was seen as a 
way forward for future business growth, and to enhance earning potential and 
widen their asset base. This shift of business activity from the core activity is a type 
of diversification that is common in Asian corporations (Claessens et al., 2000a). It 
is also suggested that FDI by TNCs from China is also amongst others driven by 
lack of abundant resources at home (Gang, 1992). 
Possession of excess resources as shown in the above quotations, however, cannot 
be viewed in similar terms to ownership specific advantage as it only seems to 
facilitate market entry. In addition, in the context of market power, the advantage to 
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Malaysian companies by having excess resources may only be applicable in the 
domestic rather than the international market. If the Malaysian capital market is still 
considered as imperfect, then companies that have excess resources might be 
unable to fully utilise their liquid assets to earn return because of limited and 
inefficient form of investment instruments. Thus, buying assets is one easy way of 
investment. In this case, companies that have excess resource could be assumed to 
have market power by the ownership of assets. In international markets, small 
company size and investments mean that they are less likely to affect the 
international market as a whole. Additionally, in Malaysia, companies cannot 
exploit the internal financial entity (bank or financial institution owned by the same 
shareholder) within the group because it is under the control of Malaysian Banking 
and Financial Institutions Acts, 1989 (BAFIA). 
Section 61 provides that no licensed institution shall grant to any single person any 
credit facility or incur any liability whatsoever on behalf of any single person in 
excess of any amount prescribed by the guideline issued by the Central Bank 
(single person is an individual, his or her spouse, child or family corporation. 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2003) 
As a result, banks and financial institutions are not allowed to extend their credit 
facilities to companies if they are owned by the same group: 
In Malaysia, under BAFIA we do not allowed to finance via internal 
market. You cannot use your own bank to fund your own operation. It 
was way back in 1980s after the Tan Kun Swan case. Government 
already ban it (CD: Pin-McýMp-GU-Cg) 
Malaysian conglomerates therefore closely resemble Korean chaebols with regards 
to the issue of internal capital markets. In contrast, within the Japanese keiretsu the 
main bank acts as shareholder and creditor to member firms (Lin, 2004). 
The other likely reason could be opportunity (also presented in the following Table 
6.6). Mintzberg's (1994) concept of emerging strategy seems to apply to Malaysian 
companies' investment in the U. K. because their diversification motives have been 
driven by opportunity rather than by well-designed business plans. This 
is in line 
with the argument posed by Lee et al (1991) on surplus-resource-driven 
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diversification (see discussion in Section 3.2). Thus, with surplus resources, the 
companies really want to diversify their activities and are just waiting for the 
opportunities to come before them: 
Eventually the real thrust of it is we want to diversify. We can diversify 
in Malaysia but there was no opportunity come to us (CG: 
Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-('g) 
Another motive for internationalisation of Malaysian firms with regard to 
diversification is risk diversification as proposed by Goold and Luchs (1996). They 
argue that a firm can avoid marked fluctuation in performance and better secure its 
future if it includes business spread across different industries with different risk 
characteristics and subject to different economic cycles. In line with this argument, 
managers in Malaysian firms consider investment in multi-business activities as 
being motivated by risk diversification: 
Suppose we invest in 10 businesses, if five fall to deliver may be the 
other five can give return so it can compensate. it is risk diversification 
in that sense (CB: Pm-Mc-MP_CFb_Cg) 
Diversification of risk that mean you must get out from this congested 
place, where there are opportunities and the risk is perceived to be 
manageable in relation to the reward (CC: Pm-Bnk_Mm_Mp_GLc) 
The diversification of risk, however, is not to the extent that the profitable unit is 
supporting the weaker unit in a different country, but more on diversifying the 
source of income so that group income will be more stable. 
We look it quite differently. It is not from one off shore to another off 
shore. If plantation in Indonesia is not performing we need to address the 
issue in Indonesia. Not using the resources from UK for example to 
support business in Indonesia. We have got to be clear so we should not 
mix up offshore business (CG: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
You cannot have that kind of balancing anymore. So when other country 
is in bad shape, we also suffer. So I don't think we look in that 
perspective. What we are looking is stability of earnings (CD: 
Pm_Mc_Mp_GLc_Cg) 
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The above quotations indicate Malaysian companies' agreement with the notion 
that expanding one's business across borders could reduce risk, compared with if 
the business is only concentrated in one country. This is similar to the observation 
made by Fong and Komaran (1985) and Hui and Fong (1986) on Singaporean 
TNCs where their FDI were driven by the motive to diversify into high technology 
areas and diversification of risk (see Table 2.1). They also confirm the observations 
made by Yeung (1999) on TNCs from Hong Kong and Latin America which invest 
abroad to avoid risk of domestic political instability (Yeung, 1998, p5 1). Although 
the findings contradict the argument that investors can easily diversify by spreading 
their investment portfolio across sectors, especially in perfect capital markets and 
even in imperfect capital markets (Amihud and Lev, 1981), they support the 
suggestion made by Khanna and Palepu (1997) that various elements of market 
imperfections in emerging market favour the firms that diversify overseas. 
6.2.7 Growth Seeking FDI 
Another motive of Malaysian companies undertaking FDI into the U. K. is to 
achieve growth of the company. However, it was not highly cited by the companies 
studied. Only three companies view their investment into the U. K. as to seek 
growth opportunities. 
Desired to go out and grow our petroleum business, need to look for 
means to do it and doing it organically. But growing it organically meant 
that you have to build and buy in the market. The market buys are not 
necessarily at the right timing (CI: Pm_Svs_Mm, __Mp_Glc) 
Whether it is push or pull, it is not important to us. This is not a typical 
Malaysian company. We are maybe the only company trying to be a truly 
multinational (CN: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb_Cg) 
We don't have the choice. Stays in Malaysian just remain status quo. To 
grow, then you have no choice but to go overseas (CR: 
Pm-Eng___, Mm-Mo_Glc) 
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6.3 SPECIFIC FACTOR INFLUENCE 
The theoretical framework in international business, the OLI Paradigm, also 
suggests that the decision for internationalisation, amongst others, is determined bv, 
firm specific factors, geographical considerations and internalisation advantages 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1988). Yeung (2002) also argues that 
transnational operations do not occur in a time-space vacuum: rather, they are 
always embedded in specific historical and geographical contexts of institutions and 
organisations. Within these time-space contexts, institutional regulations and the 
social organisation of capital are very important in explaining transnational 
activities. Therefore, this study has identified various specific factors that have 
influenced Malaysian firms' investment into the U. K. (see Table 6.6). 
6.3.1 Firm Specific Factors 
The data show (see Table 6.1) that about 52.6% of the companies cited that they 
have strength that is specific to their firms. However, the influence of firm specific 
factors on the decision of Malaysian companies to invest in the U. K. is unclear, 
except for financial strength. Detail investigation on their investments in the U. K. 
does not clearly show that the decision to invest in the U. K. is to deploy the specific 
capabilities arising from the existence of specific intangibles in the firms. Although 
most companies claim to have a strong feature or ownership advantage (Dunning, 
1988) compared with similar companies in the market, it appears that they do not 
depend on this feature so much in their decision to acquire or establish new 
subsidiaries in the U. K. This finding does not support the assumption made in 
Section 2.3.3 that FDI into the U. K. resulted from firm-ownership advantages. This 
is also in contrast to firms from Korea (Kumar and Kim, 1984), Singapore (Fong 
and Komaran, 1985) and Brazil (Neto, 1995) in which these countries' TNCs utilise 
their own technology to suit host country's requirement. Table 6.7 lists the 
ownership advantages that Malaysian companies surveyed claimed to have: 
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Table 6.7: The Ownership Advantages of Malaysian Companies 
Company Ownership Advantage/Finn Specific Factors 
CA (CFb 
- 
Mf SU) One of the pioneers 
CC (Glc 
- 
bnk) Special relationship 
CQ (Glc-Cg) Advantage on big capital 
CD (Glc-Mf Su-Cg) Advantage in marketing skill 
CE (Mf Su) R&D as an advantage 
CM (CFb 
- 
Mf) Advantage in cost control 
CN (CFb-Mf Cg) Low price 
CR (Glc-Eng) Low price 
CP (CFb 
- 
Mf SU) Product design 
CS (CFb Svs Cg) Good Track record 
Source: Author 7s survey 
In Table 6.7 above, company CA, claims to be one of the pioneers in plastic 
security seal products in the world. But it still faces stiff competition in the 
industry, including from one Malaysian-owned company that sells similar products 
in the U. K. This indicates that their pioneer status did not afford them much 
advantage over their competitors. One possible reason could be because the product 
has become standardised and therefore not much different from their competitors' 
products. As such, although the strong feature did facilitate their operation and 
entry into the international market it does not constitute a sufficient advantage over 
other finns such as to have been the driver of FDI. 
The OLI paradigm also assumes that ownership specific advantage lies in access to 
inputs and resources. Applying this argument to the data, resources can be seen as 
excess funds within the Malaysian companies which have encouraged them to start 
looking at the potential of venturing into overseas operations. However, only three 
companies studied have directly cited excess funds as having driven their FDI (see 
Table 6.1) and these are conglomerate finus. 
If we put too much money in the bank the return is limited. So from there 
we have some cash and start looking to Indonesia and at the same time 
we look into other country. in terms of internal driving force, our 
financial strength is one of the reason we invest overseas (CG: 
I'm Mc Mo CFb al 
--- -C&. 1 
But an excess fund, whether internally or externally generated, Is still Inadequate to 
support the argument of firm specific advantages over other firms. This is because 
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the data show that Malaysian companies have mainly acquired failing U. K. 
companies. They do not, however, clearly indicate that the successful takeoN-er Is 
actually due to the financial capability of the Malaysian companies over other 
potential buyers. It could be that the target companies were not attractive to other 
competitors in the first place because of their already weak position. Nevertheless, 
excess funds can still be considered as a firm specific advantage if the transaction 
involved multiple interested parties or many companies bidding for the same 
company. Company CS, for example, had entered competitive bidding and 
successfully acquired a U. K. company which they claimed was possible partly 
because of their financial capability: 
Of course we have the capacity in financial terms. By that time we have 
already accumulate almost US$I billion dollars of cash. Part of it is 
leverage through competitive price borrowing. We are very strong in 
financial engineering skill, in identify cheap money to borrow and at the 
same time using that money to invest in a very strong asset (CS: 
Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
Firm-specific advantages may also be owing to the strength in R&D capability 
(Dunning, 1988). The data show that R&D is not widely cited as a firm specific 
advantages (see Table 6.6). In this study, firms that claim to have advantages in 
R&D are not basing their decision to invest in the U. K. solely to exploit their R&D 
capabilities. Company CE's FDI decision, for example, is largely due to transaction 
cost considerations such as the cost of assigning agents or distributors. Only 
company CP that has firm specific advantage in ternis of design has suggested that 
this actually drove their investment in the U. K: 
Because the majority of the pewter manufacturers are very small 
operation, not more than 20 individuals involved in Birmingham or 
Sheffield, they are not producing a very significant quantity for the sort 
of retailer that we are doing the business with, departmental stores and 
high quality j ewellery stores (CP: Prn-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
Another important firm ownership resources identified in the literature is human 
resources (Dunning, 1988). For the investing firm these resources, which are firm 
specific, have been used as a means to assist the FDI process. The data, however, 
does not suggest that Malaysian companies actually use their excess human capital 
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for foreign investment. Malaysian companies rarely deploy Malaysian expatriates 
to run their overseas companies, except for a limited period or only for certain 
positions. It is possible that the companies perceive that even without Malaysian 
expatriates, the objective for the investment could still be achieved. In this respect, 
Malaysian companies differ from South Korean companies which regularly bring 
their own workers to work in their overseas construction projects (Ghymn, 1980). 
Dunning's ownership advantage does not seem to hold true in most of the 
Malaysian U. K. investments. In cases where firms do have an advantage such as 
excess capital, they are not necessarily exploiting this advantage over host country 
companies. Instead, they use this advantage to acquire local companies irrespective 
of the potential local competitor's capability. Post market entry, the subsidiaries 
depend on their ownership advantages to stay afloat. As such, although Malaysian 
companies have developed some ownership specific advantages, they are still not 
sufficient for FDL This finding is similar to Singapore TNCs as put forward by 
Fong and Komaran (1985), or to defensive FDI as suggested by Wells (1978). 
6.3.2 Host Country Factors 
There is a mix of location advantages and location disadvantages with regard to the 
U. K. as an investment location. As a host country, the U. K. does not offer much in 
terms of location specific advantages of cheaper cost, government incentives, 
investment promotion and other investment-related incentives to Malaysian 
companies. On the contrary, the investment costs in the U. K. are high and it is also 
far from Malaysia. The cost of psychic distance (Hofstede, 1999) and different 
business culture invariably contribute to the element of location disadvantage. 
Despite this, the U. K. still offers other location advantages where the perceived 
benefit could outweigh the cost of investment in the long run. One such advantage 
is the localisation of products according to local requirements (DunnIng, 1993) or 
market presence. Malaysian companies believe it important for them to be present 
in the U. K. market in order to experience the local business environments which 
include market trends, marketing networks and regulatory frameworks. As shown 
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in Table 6.6, about 47.3% of the companies studied feel that they need to be 
directly present in the U. K. market. These are companies that sell their own 
products in the U. K. (see Table 5.3). In some ways, the companies feel the need to 
understand the developed country markets so that their product can be produced 
according to local taste and needs: 
Tap the market by building up own distribution, to understand the 
developed country market, its environment so we will better prepare 
when we produce our car. Opportunities for you to know their operating 
environment, rather than you be just a mere exporter, you own the 
company and you need to understand the marketing, network, the trend, 
the regulatory environment (CO: Pm-Mf Mm-Mp_Glc) 
To enable us to be closer to the market and we get a view from the 
market of what they want (CP: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
This is in line with the motive within the market seeking FDI as suggested by 
Dunning (1993) in Section 2.2.1.2. Having a presence in the market to facilitate 
market access is not only important for manufacturing companies but also for R&D 
companies. Company C1 acknowledges that their research centre in the U. K. has 
helped them to understand customer preferences and provided them with technical 
backup. It has especially boosted customer confidence and acceptance of 
Malaysian rubber products in the market: 
So the center must be close to the consumer which is in U. S. and Europe, 
this center become the center for consumer research. If we don't do this 
(consumer research) who are going to buy our products? [ ... ] If the 
consumer have the problem with our rubber we help to solve them. We 
are doing in that time so that the suppliers are in the close proximity with 
the consumers. Research in England to meet the British standard. It not 
because the centre is in the U. K. people are more confident with the 
outcome of the research. So for our research it got to be done in England 
because we must know what people want, thus we cannot do research 
here for something that other people want. So you must know the 
condition. Want to capture the market because it is where the problems 
are. Product develop over there, for that market, design for temperate 
climate, it design for this performance or temperature. So we have the 
centre there to assist us. Technology developed here and there (Cl: 
Pm-R&D_Mm_Mp_Glc) 
It is common, however, for companies to establish R&D centres in Industrialised 
countries. Florida (1997, p. 90) has shown that the objective of globalisation of 
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R&D activities in a sample of foreign-affiliates of R&D laboratories in the U. S. A., 
is to customise products for the U. SA. market and obtain information on scientific 
and technological developments in the U. S. A. 
Other factors associated with location, but outside the location advantages 
postulated by the OLI paradigm, are familiarity, perception of country risk, and 
market security and growth potential compared to other countries in the region. The 
respondents in this study have provided additional information on their perception 
of the U. K. environmental factors such as socio -economics, politics, and rules and 
regulation which have contributed to their decision to undertake direct investment 
in the U. K. The data suggest that given a choice between countries in the European 
region, Malaysian companies tend to invest in the U. K. because of familiarity, their 
confidence in the socio-political system, and the reliability of rules and regulation. 
Predictably all of the Malaysian companies in the U. K. feel that familiarity with the 
U. K. is one of the reasons why they chose the U. K. as a base for their investment 
(see Table 6.6). As noted earlier in this thesis, Malaysia was a British colony until 
1957. As a result of British rule, Malaysian laws, administrative and education 
systems have been essentially inherited from the British: 
We also have Commonwealth people, who we think we know and 
understand them better. If Malaysian wanted to go to Europe they 
probably go to London first, familiarity as against country like France, 
we do not know Napoleon and thing like that (CC: 
Pm-Bnk_Mm_Mp_GLc) 
We also have historical relationship with British. We are more or less 
familiar with their culture (CJ: Pm-Mc-Mp_CFb_Cg) 
The U. K. market is chosen because with British we have more things in 
common. Our first market is essentially in the U. K. (CO: 
Prn-Mf Mm, 
__Mp_Glc) 
We are familiar with the U. K. and feel more comfortable. That is why 
our European HQ is in the U. K. (CR: PM_EngýMm_Mo_Glc) 
Education also contributes to familiarity where the U. K. has long been the place 
chosen by Malaysians to pursue educationý especially tertiary education. 
Many 
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managers in the study have graduated from U. K. universities and this has 
contributed to their familiarity to and fondness for the U. K.: 
For me U. K. is like second home, educated there, so use to the culture. If 
we look at it, U. K. is a market place itself, you can assimilate into 
environment quite easily (CA: Pm_Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
They then decided to set-up European office, this is because mainly our 
management are British trained graduates, our Chairman, is a British 
Chartered Accountant (CD: Pm_Mc_Mp_GLc_Cg) 
Education has played an important role in the U. K. investment. Many 
Malaysian graduated from British University. Given the example of YTL 
Group, most of the siblings were educated in the U. K. (CH: 
Pm-Svs-Mm-MP_Glc). 
The directors most of them studied and trained there. To certain extent it 
is a personal motivation. They felt that they will do well in the U. K. and 
Australia. I live in Australia for few years. They speak English and it 
also a former British empire (CS: Pm-Mc-Mo_CFb_Cg) 
Another factor related to familiarity is language. English is widely used in daily and 
official communication in the Malaysian business sector. All respondents agree that 
easy communication in terms of language is one of the factors that Malaysian 
companies take into consideration when they decide to invest in the U. K. They also 
feel it to be more practical to have an office or investment in the U. K. compared to 
a non-English speaking country: 
As English speaking country so obviously putting sales office in U. K. is 
more relevant and appropriate. Otherwise it is difficult such as you have 
Frenchmen, difficult to communicate (CI: Pm_R&D_Mm_Mp_Glc) 
A lot of it is to do with language. We speak the language. If you want to 
do business in Germany and France, although some of them speak 
English but there are greater level of parochialism in these country (CS: 
Pm Me Mo CFb C -' 9) 
[ ... ] the mode of communication 
is very important. The U. K. has been 
chosen since we speak the same language (CJ: Pm_Mc_Mp_CFb-Cg) 
Similarly, law and regulation in Malaysia have been based on British laws as a 
result of Malaysia being a past colony of Great Britain. It follows therefore that 
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most of the Malaysian companies regard Malaysian law as being similar to British 
law: 
We inherit the British law, some form of British conservatism, we want 
to be predictable, we are conservative (CC: Pm-Bnk-Mm-Mp_GLc) 
A lot of laws, regulation and business structure similar to the U. K. (CS: 
Prn Me Mo CFb Ccyý 
The law is quite similar just like we pluck it from the U. K. It is easier to 
do business in U. K. than with China where the laws are not clearly 
written (CA: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
About 21.1% of the companies studied gave positive view of British law and 
regulation but one gave a negative view. To him, "the British law is the most 
cumbersome law, which only enrich the lawyer" (Pm 
- 
Mc 
- 
Mo 
- 
CFb_Cg). He 
praised China's law instead, which contradicted the statement of company CA 
above which regarded China laws as being not clearly written. This side-line 
opinion may not suggest the state of British Law but rather may represent a 
difference of perception based on the different business experience of both 
managers. The manager of company CA graduated from a U. K. university and has 
work experience in the U. K. while the manager of company CN has more 
experience in China. 
This study also reveals that 36.8% of companies studied view the U. K. business 
environment as being more favourable than other EU countries. They feel more 
comfortable with the corporate culture such as fair government, transparent rules of 
laws, good corporate culture, less risk in terms of labour unrest, and acceptance of 
foreign investors: 
For Britain, they have good track record, they have a fair government, 
transparent, and uphold the rules of laws. Impartially whether you are 
foreigner or local (CC: Pm_Bnk_Mm_Mp_GLc) 
We when go to the U. K. obviously because we are very comfortable with 
the corporate culture there. Nowadays Malaysian company don't look at 
the U. S. market, geographically we are far and U. S. such a huge market, 
you can't go in and play around with it, either you lose or gain. It is 
however ffightening doing manufacturing in South America, overnight 
the value of currency might be half, at one glance ok it is good the 
197 
currency is down but most of the component imported in U. S. dollar 
(CA: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
For companies involved in product distribution, the U. K. is considered a good 
marketing centre for distribution to the whole of Europe due to its accessibility to 
the other countries' network (e. g. company CA, CD and CH). A manufacturing 
company, company CR, also feels that although the manufacturing costs are high in 
the U. K. they are still cheaper compared to certain European countries. Company 
CB, which has a hotel in London, considers London as a centre of tourism in 
Europe and a place that everybody wishes to visit. For services companies such as 
company CC and CH which are involved in banking and shipping, their 
consideration of the U. K. as a place of investment is more because the U. K. and its 
neighbouring countries present a large market with potential for more business 
development. Company CS also chose the U. K. because of its regulated utility 
businesses where the revenue has already been set by the regulator at a fixed basis. 
Company CC also looks at the U. K. as the biggest financial centre in Europe and 
the second biggest financial centre in the world. A stable economy and exchange 
rate are also two important criteria for selecting the U. K. as a place for investment 
(e. g. company CA). 
The above findings show that familiarity is not only confined to neighbouring 
countries, as suggested by the Swedish School framework of 'incremental foreign 
investment' (Johanson and Wiedersheim, 1975). Historical relationships can help 
bridge the distance as familiarity influences the investment decision, and brings 
about easy assimilation, understanding and a sense of security: 
[... ] can assimilate into environment quite easily (CA: 
Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
we know and understand them better (CC: Pm-Bnk_Mm, __Mp_GLc) 
feel more comfortable (CR: Pm-Eng-Mm-Mo_Glc) 
Dunning (1988a), in his study of the U. S. manufacturing affiliates in the U. K. found 
a similar perception by the U. S. investors of the U. K. The first and foremost reason 
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was the language. In addition, they also found familiarity in terms of commercial, 
legal and educational features. 
In contrast to other developing countries' TNCs (such as Chinese and Indian TNCs) 
FD1 into developed country (Wells, 1978; Encarnation, 1982; Deng, 2004), data in 
this study does not suggest tariff and quota imposed by the host country as factors 
that have driven Malaysia FD1 into the U. K. 
6.3.3 Home Country Factors 
The small home country market is considered as one of the major push factors for 
Malaysian companies to invest overseas. This was cited by 26.3% of the companies 
studied (see Table 6.6). Malaysian companies widely consider the Malaysian 
market as small and it restricts their business expansion. The respondent companies 
perceived that small market means: limited opportunity for business expansion and 
the small population means less business (e. g. company CG); it is too small for 
economies of scale and global products could not emerge from such a small 
economy (company CA); the place is quite crowded for those that want to grow big 
(e. g. company CQ; the saturated market results in low returns (e. g. company CF); 
the market is small but there are many players (e. g. company CE). The small 
market makes it difficult for certain companies to gain and maintain their market 
but a perception about small Malaysian market is open to question. Many small 
economies in the world have produced global products such as Switzerland and 
Sweden in Europe and Taiwan in Asia. Therefore, the perception that the 
Malaysian market is small might not be true in absolute terms. Limited opportunity 
for the companies to expand is probably due to the high numbers of companies or 
similar products in the same industry which result in competition for resources or 
opportunities. Company CO, for example, has faced reducing domestic market 
shares because of competition. 
Since we are opening our market, there are pressures for us to maintain 
the market shares. So we need to compensate the loss of volume and also 
the market shares by venture into export and cross border assembly if 
you want to compete. For example we are in Iran, we sell complete 
knockdown cars (CO: Pm-Mf Mm-MP_Glc) 
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The above company manufactures the Malaysian national car by association 'with 
Mitsubishi of Japan. As an infant car manufacturer it has been heavily protected by 
the government tax structure. However, when the government started to liberallse 
the market in compliance with ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), its market 
share started to shrink. To maintain the volume of production, company CO started 
to export their products which eventually resulted in direct investment such as into 
the U. K. A similar limited domestic market has driven FDI from Taiwan, 
Singapore and Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s (Tolentino, 2000; Neto, 1995) [see 
Table 2.1 ]. 
It might also be because of limited demand for certain product in the domestic 
market due to small market segments and limited consumers that are willing to use 
the products because of its higher price: 
We are not making those low quality products anymore. They have to 
prepare to buy our quality product and pay the price. If they cannot pay 
the price we don't do the product. That's why our local sales very 
negligible (CE: Prn-Mf Me-Mo) 
The small home market also triggers market competition which pressures the price 
to go down. However, companies that produce high quality product vanants are not 
willing to absorb lower prices. Instead, they choose to go overseas to market their 
product: 
Over production cause low product quality. Sell cheap and we have other 
big factory in other part of the country buying those type of product and 
ship out. So price cutting comes in. Not interested to build the name and 
market for themselves. Think the quick bucks. We cannot afford to sell 
cheap. Every time you have a big buyer comes around, they want a price 
cut by a dollar. We don't want to sell. There is no point subsidising their 
profit, they are not selling at loss back in the U. S. (CE: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo) 
Many companies have also started to realise that Malaysia is losing its 
competitiveness to neighbouring countries. Porter (1998) describes this 
phenomenon as the shifting advantage of nations, where the availability of 
resources and skills necessary for competitive advantage in the industry 
has eroded 
compared to other countries (p 481). For some manufacturing companies e. g. 
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company CA, it has become cheaper to produce in neighbouring countries. The 
company produces industrial security seal products. It had factories in Malaysia and 
a few other countries. In 2000, it relocated its factory in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia to 
Rayong, Thailand to take advantage of lower production costs and attractrý, e tax 
incentives: 
In particular, it takes into consideration the competitive labour and 
production costs and attractive tax incentives (eight-year-tax-free pioneer 
status, followed by a five-year period of 50% reduction of corporate tax) 
awarded to the Company's joint-venture company Eastern Abric 
International (EAI) Co Ltd by Thailand's Board of Investment (CA: 
Pm_Mf CFb 26 
Tham (2001) suggests that rising labour costs and labour shortages domestically 
have led Malaysian investors to relocate to labour surplus economies (p. 18), and 
that competition with other ASEAN developing countries has accelerated because 
they share common strategies and goals in developing their respective economies (p 
22). Contraction of the domestic market is also considered to be related to the Asian 
Crisis in 1997 and for company CD, it was already affected by the earlier economic 
recession in 1985 to 1987 (when it seeks new overseas market). As the recession 
put a slowdown to economic activity, it brought down demand for the product (e. g 
company CO) and companies had to venture into overseas markets to keep afloat. 
Company CD, for example, produced primarily for the local market. As Malaysia 
was hit by first recession in 1985, however, the company started to export their 
product overseas: 
Recession in 1985-1987, was badly hit, At that time the Sime Tyres are 
predominantly for local market. As a strategic decision, we have to 
export. One, we export from here to nearby countries in ASEAN for 
example, Second, we must penetrate a very lucrative European market 
(CD: Pm-Mc-MP_GLc-Cg) 
The data also suggest that some Malaysian companies undertake FDI in response to 
unfavourable government policies. However, to obtain sincere views about 
government policy was hard especially negative ones. The study revealed that three 
companies view the restrictive Malaysian government policy as having influenced 
26 Bursa Malaysia (2000) 
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their decision to invest overseas in particular. The companies that raise their 
dissatisfaction on government policy are all Chinese family businesses (see Table 
6.6 and Table 5.3). Company CS, for example, considers Malaysia as having an 
unfavourable policy in the utility industry, citing unfavourable market regulation 
and a confused state of affairs (CFb_Svs_Cg). The company considers foreign 
markets such as Australia and the U. K. as being more favourable: 
Here in Malaysia you have a situation is very haphazard since suppose 
suddenly the need to spend more money on capital expenditure. At the 
end of the day you have increase the tariff between 40-50%. It may not 
be the best solution. So by introducing this type of regulated models you 
can ensure the consumer is paying a fair tariff for water, electricity and 
for gas. This is very much of our framework (CS: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb_Cg) 
Data show that the New Economic Policy which requires the allocation of at least 
30% of corporate equity and business to Bumiputera (see details in Section 4.2) has 
influenced the decision of some Chinese-owned companies to diversify overseas. 
This finding confirms the arguments by Yeung and Olds (2000) that the 
globalisation of Chinese-owned companies through diversification is in search of 
opportunities that were often denied in their home country as a result of state 
regulation. 
However, due to the sensitivity of the equity issues between ethnic groups in 
Malaysia, it is difficult to get a direct response from the respondents on this issue. 
Many respondents are reluctant to speak of their true feelings on the matter. Instead, 
they tend to present two viewpoints to the question whether their overseas 
operations are a result of the NEP. First, they tried to be positive about it by 
portraying their company as having complied with government requirements in 
relation to the NIEP: 
KLK in Malaysia is a listed company which has deemed to comply with 
the Bumiputera equity (CG: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
Secondly, they choose to describe their overseas diversification as being due to the 
restrictive policy but indirectly: 
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[ ... ] Going to China, we applied the manufacturing license and Nve get 100% ownership. Nobody force you to have partner with anybody. Not like Malaysia where you are required to have a strange partner (CN: 
Pm Mc Mo CFb Ccrý 
--- -ý511 
By implication, the strange partner in the above quotation can be taken to mean that 
the company felt compelled to divest shareholdings to Bumiputera to comply with 
the NEP. Beyond the two stances, it proved difficult to go into details on the issue. 
The data also reveal that Malaysian companies have mixed feelings about the 
Malaysian government's role in promoting outward investment. Table 6.6 shows 
that only two companies view the government outward direct investment incentive 
positively. This is because unlike many other Asian economies, the Malaysian 
Government only offers very limited incentives for outward foreign investment. In 
contrast, there are significant home country government incentives for outward 
investments from Singapore (Tolentino, 2000; Yeung, 2002) and South Korea 
(Tolentino, 2000). In the case of Malaysia, the only incentive for companies 
engaged in foreign activities is to maximise the benefit from tax exemption for 
repatriated profits from abroad. A government official from the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry Malaysia (MITI) explains: 
We just encourage or facilitate people who want to invest overseas. 
Simply for the reasons that they are looking for business opportunities. 
That the only reasons. Basic and very general. We don't have a specific 
department to take care of their investment abroad (MITI) 
Therefore, as far as incentives are concerned, this is not the main criterion that 
motivates Malaysian direct foreign investment. Even the government officials 
admitted that Malaysian policy on cross border investment is very basic and general 
as in the above quotation. At the same time, most of the companies interviewed 
agreed that there have been foreign investments initiated through bilateral 
government-to-government agreement. MITI for example has bilateral agreements 
with 137 countries around the world. These include trade agreements, investment 
guarantee agreements, avoidance of double taxation agreements, bilateral payment 
agreements, air services agreements, economic, technical, scientific and cultural 
cooperation agreements and shipping agreements As a result of these govemment 
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initiatives in overseas investment, some companies acknowledge the importance of 
government involvement in FDI arrangements: 
A good relationship with our government, because if we are in trouble 
we can go to the government and ask for help. So obviously the political 
affiliation with a country is very important because in the event that the 
investment in trouble they can recourse to their government [ ... ] We give one license for their bank to operate in Malaysia, they give us one license 
to operate there (CC: Pm-Bnk_Mm_Mp_GLc) 
Another company, company CS, went further to acknowledge that they have 
actually benefited from government encouragement and incentives: 
It to certain extent the impetus created by MITI or the government. They 
encourage a lot of Malaysian company to go to other developing 
countries look for opportunities in Southern Africa, Europe, Middle east 
through program like South-South development cooperation, NASCORP 
and other numerous program that government has play a significant role 
in drawing the private sector to go out there. In that sense it would be fair 
to say that our success here and overseas isn't entirely resulted from our 
corporate method. I think the national program devised by the 
government is instrumental in giving us those opportunity and confidence 
as well (CS: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb_Cg) 
The limited involvement of the Malaysian government has drawn criticism that the 
government is not doing enough to promote cross border investment. Company CE, 
for example, prefers government to provide support in promoting Malaysian brand 
overseas. Its Managing Director argues: 
Every now and then, we hear the government encourage us to sell 
Malaysian brand, but when it come to incentive, if you make profit there 
will be tax exemption but that is not the time that I need your exemption 
(CE: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo) 
He also does not see that the Malaysian Trade Promotion Mission has benefited the 
company and declared that he had built the market himself without government 
help. 
The Asian crisis discussed in Chapter 3 which is assumed to have driven the 
outflow of capital from Malaysia could not be confirmed by the data in this study. 
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Most of the companies studied cited that the Asian crisis has directly or indirectlY 
affected their cash flow and profit. This in turn has a negative effect on the abilltv 
to invest overseas or increase current investment in overseas subsidiary. Table 7.6 
shows that about 31.6% of the companies studied cited financial constraint prevents 
the expansion of their overseas investment which amongst others is due to the 
Asian crisis. 
The above findings suggest several views in relation to home country push factors 
for outward FDL Obviously, outward FDI is more likely to be driven by a small 
home market and stiff competition in that market. The Malaysian government 
actively encourages investment in Malaysia, but encourages outward investment 
only in so far as it offers perceived benefit to the country. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the motivation for Malaysian companies to invest 
abroad is more likely to have emerged from corporate strategy rather than 
government influence. This is different from the studies on TNCs from China, 
South Korea and Singapore, which have shown an important role for government 
support in encouraging outward FDL In the case of Malaysia the government may 
have created some limited opportunities and support for outward FDL But as in 
many other developing countries, inward investment is still a preferred measure for 
overall economic development. 
6.3.4 Transaction Cost Factors 
Data show that Malaysian companies undertake foreign investment to avoid the 
costs of transacting in the market. Table 6.6 shows that 31.6% of the companies 
studied cited minimising transaction cost as one of the factors that drive their FDL 
To minimise the cost of doing business in an imperfect market (Williamson, 1984), 
Malaysian companies try to internalise some of their activities within their 
hierarchy of companies. The assumption made in Section 2.2.2 on the positive 
influence of transaction cost factors in Malaysian FDI is therefore confirmed. 
Direct involvement in the market is seen to increase profit and control and to cut 
costs (e. g. companies CD, CE, CO and CM). These companies are involved in the 
marketing of products and have experienced difficulties with distributors and agents 
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in the foreign country. Company CD, for example, sells tyres in the U. K. and 
Europe. They undertake direct marketing in these countries to remove the need for 
agents who take a fraction of their profit as quoted in Section 6.2.2. 
Agents or distributors are also seen to slow down the flow of goods to the customer, 
mark up the price and place infrequent product demand: 
So now we use U. K. also as our launching pad, whereby anything urgent 
we get from them. They will send to us much faster then going to trading 
house. Agents will mark-up the price. Our purchasing with the U. K. is 
inter-company transaction. So we cut the layer of trading house, agents 
etc (CK: Pm_Mf Mm-Mo-CFb) 
1f we just stay here and exporting to the country, we will totally depend 
on the distributors to tell us what they want. They may have other 
priority as well (CP: Pm-Mf Me-Mo-CFb) 
The above example suggests that transaction cost can be reduced if the product is 
supplied on time and the company can take advantage of being close to customers, 
compared with if supply were to come direct from Malaysia. Another example for 
reducing the potential transaction cost is through the control of the source of 
supply, when change to the existing contract or situation becomes inevitable. 
When they started off in 1970 it has two machines and in 1988 we 
bought one machine but it was very costly because we bought it from 
third party. Over the years we buy it from the U. K. So decided to control 
the source (CM: Pm-Mf Mc-MP-CFb) 
He is the owner of distributorship. He did quite well with the business. 
He passed away. It is best if we acquire the company rather than the 
company taken over by somebody else (CO: Pm_Mf Mm, __Mp_Glc) 
The above quotations suggest that the companies wanted to control the supplier and 
the distributor company when they were informed that the companies concerned 
were being offered for sale. They were not willing to enter into new contracts with 
the new owner as this might incur cost to them. To ensure continuity, acquiring the 
U. K. target company was therefore the best option available to them. 
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6.3.5 Actors in Organisation 
The internal factors within the organisation that play the main role in investment 
initiative, apart from the resources, are its social actors. These can be the major 
shareholder or owner, individual member of the family and the government. In the 
context of the Chinese family business, for example, the actors may be the founder 
or the owner of the company. Much evidences suggest that they have played a 
major role in bringing their investment overseas. Three major elements can be used 
to explain the characteristics of the actors in Malaysian companies with regards to 
the decision to venture overseas. They are 
behaviour and personal relationship. 
6.3.5.1 Owner Entrepreneurship 
entrepreneurship, opportunistic 
Owner entrepreneurship with regard to Malaysian companies can be defined in a 
similar manner to transnational entrepreneurship. Yeung (2003) defines these as 
the exceptional qualities required of social actors in the process of creating and 
sustaining particular business ventures across national boundaries. There is 
evidence of the active role of the owner in the internationalisation process of 
Malaysian firms in this study as cited by three companies (see Table 6.6) and also 
supported by Sze (2002a) and Shanmugam (2002). 
What Tan Sri Francis did is that he feels there is a need to corporatise the 
family business so it takes on more professional and expansionary 
position (CS: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
I don't know how much they got (cash) but I know Datuk. Yong and he 
brave enough if you like. He willing to have a serious look and 
pragmatically walk away if there is no opportunity (SP: 
Suk Su Bm M-P) 
The driving force of our overseas operation was Dato' Lim. He is the one 
that behind Intra-Muda Group. He also oversee the venture and strategic 
development of the group, not only operation (CM: 
Pm-Mf Me-MP_CFb) 
He is forward looking, a visionary who is unafraid to try new thing (CS: 
Pm-CFb_Cg 27 
27 Sze(2002a) 
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Quek and his brothers are reputed to have uncanny ability to spot 
potential business opportunities (CN: Pm_CFb_ cg)28 
The last quotation in the preceding Section describes the owner of company CN 
who decided to buy an ailing Hong Kong-based Bank in 1997 during the Asian 
currency crisis. They managed to grow the bank within two years which then 
expanded into other countries (Shanmugam, 2002) 
All the above elements of owner entrepreneurship are summarized by Yeung (2003) 
as 'he/she has internalized certain exceptional qualities and his/her strategic action 
is facilitated by the repertoire and network of resources in which he/she is 
embedded' (p 15). 
6.3.5.2 Opportunistic Behaviour 
Investment internationalisation by Malaysian companies is not always the outcome 
of stringent business strategy and corporate planning (Mintzberg, 1994). A 
company may have a broad investment strategy with regard to foreign markets. The 
company will engage in direct foreign investment if they see the opportunity is both 
within their range of target business market, whether it is related or unrelated to its 
core activity. The data shows that 42.1% of the companies studied cited 
opportunistic behaviour of the owner as one of the factors that influence their FDI 
decision. Data also show that opportunistic investments have mostly occurred 
among conglomerate firms (see Table 6.6 and Table 5.3). 
Opportunistic behaviour in relation to investment opportunities indicates the 
willingness of the owner or major shareholder to diversify, based on resources 
within the company, and on condition that the investment contributes to corporate 
wealth. Company CS had focussed its business venture on regulated assets. In 1999, 
it acquired an Australian electric transmission company and in 2002 it concluded 
the acquisition of a water company in England. Both are regulated business but 
28 Shamnugam, 2002) 
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otherwise are completely different activities. The company's statement after the 
acquisition of both companies is as follows: 
YTL Power will continue our strategy of looking for quality regulated 
assets in the European market where we see many opportunities (CS: 
Pm-CFb-('g)'9 
Bluemint and ETS (Australia) provides an opportunity for investment in 
the electricity transmission business (CS: Pm_CFb_ Cg)30 
Further to the above statement, one newspaper report stated: 
Mr Yeoh admits business success does not come from financial formulae 
but from intuitive and instinctive measures. When measuring up a 
possible acquisition target he asks himself. "Can I smell the cash. Can I 
taste it? " (CS: Pm_CFb-Cg)" 
Evidence also suggests that Malaysian companies look for opportunities to expand 
or diversify their business overseas and when the opportunity emerged in the U. K. 
they went for it. In some cases, the companies already have knowledge of the U. K. 
companies from their previous business relationship as a supplier, customer or as 
business rivals: 
The investment in the U. K. was happened not by design but by 
opportunity. There was nothing about assigning consultant to search for 
business opportunity but mostly by chance (CJ: Pm-Mc-MP-CFb-Cg) 
In our case, it is because of this chance meeting (CR: 
Pm-Eng_Mm-Mo_Glc) 
There was an opportunity then, four to five years back whereby Rolls 
Royce wanted to divest their boilers division and they wanted to 
concentrate more on turbines. It was just Roll Royce wanted to 
concentrate with other business. It happen our timing was right at that 
time (CK: Pm-Mf Mm-Mo-CFb) 
29 Bursa Malaysia (2003) 
30 Bursa Malaysia (2000) 
31 , Can I smell the cash. Can I taste it? " means whether the investment will be profitable 
(Macalister, 2003 
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Investment opportunities emerged from several circumstances. One, the acquisition 
is considered a good buy when the acquired company is in financial difficulties and 
the Malaysian side has the capability to fill the gap financially: 
When Company CF acquired 37% of Costain Plc, it was an opportunity 
because Costain Plc was in deep financial problem at that point in time 
especially after losing close to E200 million from coal mining deal in the 
USA (CF: Pm-Eng_ýMi-MP-Glc). 
Intria Berhad, now the controlling shareholder of Costaln Group Plc is 
confident of turning around the troubled U. K. based construction and 
engineering company within a year (CF: Pm_Glc_Eng) 12 
Company CF was actually in the midst of restructuring their business in Malaysia 
with the intention to become a big conglomerate and a prospect of having seven 
listed companies in the group. The acquisition of Costain Group was part of their 
conglomerate plan. Another good example is the acquisition of an established home 
furnishing company by company CJ in 1998 in which its manager considered it as 
A an excellent buy'. At its height, the price per share of the target company was 200 
pence but it was 26 pence when company CJ decided to buy 48% of its shares 
(Shanmugam, 1998). 
The link between the target companies' financial situation and the timing of the 
acquisition by the Malaysian companies seems to suggest that Malaysian 
companies see target companies' weak financial situation as matching their 
financial capacity, and consider that this opens the doors for acquisition. They are 
also optimistic that they can revive the target company and that many of the 
acquisitions could be considered as 'rescue operations': 
We believe our remedial actions will effectively stabilise the company 
and eventually steer a turnaround in its results as we put concerted efforts 
to realise its potential for growth (CJ: Pm-CFb-Cg)3' 
These companies were private company, so I think the owner and the 
management don't have the capability to compete. In term of technology 
they have the technology. But to run the company and to compete they 
32 New Strait Times (1996) 
33 Shamnugam (1998) 
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cannot because they used to receive order and work based on order. So 
they decided to sell the company. Since we know this because it is our 
supplier, so we think it is a waste of technology if it closed down and at 
the same time we lose a good source of supplier [ ... ] That is how we go in and started a new company called Intrapac (U. K. ) Ltd an investment 
company that buy over the Lean & Gibson (CM: Pm-Mf Mc-MP_CFb) 
The motivation at that time for acquiring Costain was, one, there is an 
opportunity because Costain was in deep financial problem at that point 
in time in 1996. They have bangers at their doorsteps. They have this 
financial problem because of the acquisition of coal mining operation in 
the U. S. which is a real bad deal for them since they are losing close to 
E200 Million. So that really put them under financial problem. So 
Costain was put up for sale (CF: Pm-Eng_Mi_Mp_Glc) 
LEC which is in severe financial condition after the founder passed 
away. It was run by the trust, which has no leader, then they negotiated 
and Sime Darby agreed to buy (CD: Pm-Mc-Mp_GLc_Cg) 
It was an opportunity because the owner wanted to find new partners and 
need fresh money to continue investing (CO: Pm_Mf Mm_mp_Glc) 
Second, Malaysian companies anticipate that their foreign investment would provide 
them with potential future growth as mentioned in Section 6.2.7. Investment 
opportunity is also seen to drive the investment in certain market segment where 
companies utilise the existing business position of the target company to help 
strengthen their existing venture, and gain what they perceive to be a readily secure 
position in the U. K. market: 
The acquisition of Wessex Water for example represents a rare 
opportunity to acquire a privatized water company in a matured and 
developed market (CS: Pm-CFb_Cg) 34 
So we take a stake since we saw this is an opportunity to own an outlet 
there since U. K. has the technology and every car players are there. So 
this is the opportunity for us to continue be present in the U. K. market, 
continuing promoting our brand (CO: Pm_Mf Mm,. _Mp_Glc) 
Our investment as the 
immediate, direct and 
under a name that 
Pm-CFb_Cg)" 
34 Bursa Malaysia (2002) 
35 Shamnugarn (1998) 
largest shareholder in Laura Ashley allows us 
substantial participation in worldwide retailing 
has been established for three decades (CJ: 
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Because all these opportunities such as technology, brand name and strategic asset 
are embedded within the firms, acquisition was seen as the best way to capture 
them. 
6.3.5.3 Personal Relationship and Trust 
Malaysian investment into the U. K. market has developed from personal 
relationship between the owners of the Malaysian companies and their counterparts 
in the U. K. This is not to suggest that all Malaysian investment in the U. K. 
deliberately involves a personal relationship, although this does play an important 
role in certain cases as shown by company CG and CE in Table 6.6. Company CG 
started their investment in a U. K. company in the 1970s when the motivation for 
the acquisition of the shares in the 1970s was purely based on the personal 
relationship between the owner of the U. K. company and the owner of the 
Malaysian company: 
Last time more of domestic thing. It is because the relationship between 
the owner of Yule Catto, and KLK that encourage KLK to acquire shares 
in the company (CG: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
Personal relationship and trust is also important when location of investment is 
distant from the parent company. The owner of company CE in Malaysia had 
developed a personal relationship with his British counterpart for more than seven 
years before he decided to set up a new company in the U. K: 
Start something it must be with somebody that you can trust. We don't 
have relative in the U. K. But this guy, I knew him since I started trading 
for 7-8 years before we decided to start. He with me for almost 7 years 
now since we started (CE: Pm-Mc-Mo) 
Personal relationship is more critical for smaller companies. Because remote 
monitoring of business is costly and reporting has to be based on trust, small 
companies with limited budget have to be careful in hiring foreign managers. 
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6.4 CONCLUSION 
Malaysian outward investment is driven by many factors where the importance of 
the factors depends on the firm's investment objective, products and also internal 
elements within the organisation. In the context of investment via acquisition, the 
data show that many occurred not by design but because of opportunity, such as 
when business started with personal communication among businessmen, 
friendship and events. This is not to suggest that Malaysian companies are not 
undergoing strategic investment process, but there are elements of 'grab the 
opportunity when it is there' and work out the benefits from the acquisition later. 
The objective of the acquisitions are various; among these are, the objective of 
Malaysian companies to become global companies, and the need to secure 
technology and in some cases to ensure continuity of supply of equipment and to 
control the source. Malaysian companies also expect that by having subsidiaries in 
the U. K., they will realise synergies between their activities in Malaysia and 
expertise in the U. K. Therefore, many acquisitions involved companies that have 
linkages with their activities in Malaysia. The objective of direct investment into 
the U. K. is also to have a closer market presence so that the companies can receive 
feedback in terms of market preferences. 
The investment in the U. K. also enabled the company to get access to third country 
market as many third world countries still perceived product ftom the U. K. as 
being of better quality. To be closer to the market and customers especially in the 
western countries requires Malaysian companies to have subsidiaries in the U. K. in 
order to supply to European market, because of the need to supply in time and to 
enable the customer to audit the producer. Companies have also wished to acquire 
established brands, following on the realisation that this is more feasible than 
promoting a Malaysian brand. Finally, language, familiarity, culture and education 
are factors that influence the choice of location in respect to Malaysian investment 
in the U. K. 
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Using Dunning's four motives of internationalisation, data on Malaysian companies 
show a mix of motivations for their investment in the U. K. This makes it difficult 
to present a generalised explanation. The findings also show that Malaysian 
companies believe that specific factors facilitate and expedite their investment in 
the U. K. Because the factors tend to be country-specific, it may not be possible to 
use them to generalise the determinants of investment between two countries. 
Nevertheless, the determinants of FDI that are confined to a specific country's 
investment in another specific country still merit study, as they highlight and 
confinn the need for a broad framework on firm internationalisation in the subject 
of international business. To a certain extent this also confirms Dunning's (1993) 
conclusion that it might help to formulate a general paradigm for explaining 
multinational activities, but that this should not be seen as an attempt to suggest a 
single explanation for FDL 
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CHAPTER 7: MALAYSIAN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTO THE U. K: 
PROCESS AND STRATEGIES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to understand the process and strategy of direct investment of 
Malaysian companies into the U. K. given the host country's environmental factors 
together with the firms' competences and emerging opportunities. Nilsson (1996, 
p. 161) argues that the internationalisation process can be understood as an 
interplay between four basic factors - corporate strategy, the corporation's internal 
assets, the competitive situation, and the flow of opportunities with which the firm 
is confronted. In addition, corporate objective refers to the specific ways in which 
companies seek to achieve their overall corporate objective (Yeung, 1995). 
Therefore, internationalisation strategy is the way in which companies seek to 
achieve their objective of undertaking investment in other countries, and is part of 
the overall corporate objective. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section investigates the process 
of investment into the U. K., starting with firms' prior business relations with the 
country before they undertook direct investment. The second section analyses the 
finns' mode of entry strategies. The third section lays down the post-investment 
operational strategies undertaken by Malaysian companies in their subsidiaries. 
7.2 STRATEGY PRIOR TO DIRECT INVESTMENT 
The literature on foreign market servicing strategy suggest that most companies go 
through incremental stages of interriationalisation (Johansson and Vahlne, 1977; 
Welch and Luostarinen, 1988) where exporting, licensing, and franchising are the 
most common routes used (Hibbert, 1997). As summarised in Table 7.1, the data 
show that Malaysian companies in the U. K. generally fall into two broad groups: 
those that were already in the export business prior to their investment in the U. K. 
and they are mainly Malaysian companies selling their products in the U. K. market; 
and companies that were not involved in exporting products into the U. K. market 
but that invested in the U. K. as a result of an opportunity that can be considered as 
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an emergent rather than deliberate strategy. There are, however, companies that fall 
into both groups. 
Table 7.1: Intern ation alis ation Strategy of Malaysian Companies 
Malaysian Prior Direct Investment E ntry Strategy Acquisition 
Company 
Export Emergent Greenfield Acquisition/ 
Takeover 
J-V 
of a failing 
U. K. 
CompanN, 
CA (CFb_Mf Su) V/ 
CB (CFb_Svs_Cg) V/ 
CC (Glc-Bk) V/ 
CD (Glc_Mf Su_Cg) V/ 
CE (Mf Su) V 
CF (Glc_Eng) V/ 
CG (CFb Cg) 
- b. 1 V/ V/ 
CH (Glc_Svs) V/ 
CI (Glc_R&D) V/ 
CJ (CFb-Cg) V/ 
CK (CFb-Mf) V/ V/ 
CL (CFb_Mf) V/ V/ 
CM (CFb-Mf) V/ V/ 
CN (CFb_Mf Cg) V1, 
CO (Glc_Mf Su) V/ 
CP (CFb-Mf Su) 
CQ (Glc-Cg) V/ 
CR (Glc_Eng) V/ 
CS (CFb_Svs_Cg) V 
Frequency 8 8 6 13 2 8 
Percentage 42.1% 42.1% 31.6% 68.4% 10.5% 42.1% 
Source: Author's Survey 
7.2.1 Market Servicing Through Export 
A shown in Table 7.1 , about 
42.1 % of the companies studied exported into the U. K. 
market prior to direct investment. We can look first at the group of Malaysian 
companies that had established prior relations in the U. K. through export using 
agents and distributors. Malaysian companies in this category are mainly 
manufacturing-based companies (see Table 5.3), producing tyres, medical gloves, 
car components, cars and pewter products (e. g. companies CA, CE, CO and CP). 
They then moved into direct investment, as a defensive strategy to secure local 
market share, as a result of losing or lacking market share because of their 
dependence on local agents and distributors. This finding is similar to defensive 
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strategy by Hong Kong multinationals (Wells, 1978) and confirms the assumption 
made in Section 2.5.5. Direct control of the marketing network is also one of the 
reasons for the shift from export to direct investment. This decision to move from 
export to direct investment, however, still falls within the context of market seeking 
strategy: 
All distributors in the world, as you know, want to sell their own brand. 
They are reluctant to buy full container-loads from you. We have to go 
and look for the market ourselves. That was the reason why we started 
the company in the U. K. (CE: Pm_Mf Mc-Mo) 
We used to trade overseas using our agent. But later we decided to 
incorporate our own office overseas. We then developed our 
independence of the agent. It has always been like that. When we start in 
a new market, we always use agent. Later we want to establish our own 
control (CM: Prn Mf Mc M-P CFb) 
The reason he did that was because he had some experience with 
Bloxwich and with Universeals. Both companies were agents for Abric 
in the U. K. The problem is that both companes also have their own 
interests in the security seal market. They just use Abric to complement 
what they were doing. As a result, the sales of Abric products were very, 
very small. And I think Albert also believed that Abric could build up its 
own position by setting up a U. K. operation. Our own subsidiary and 
then develop the market sales ourselves. We have had mixed experience 
with JV (SA: Suk_Su_Bm_Mp) 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that location and distance are 
important for FDI between nations. However, FDI by Malaysian companies in the 
U. K. does not necessarily follow the sequence of near to distant country. Company 
CO, for example, was exporting its product into both the neighbouring countries 
and into the U. K. market at the same time. 
7.2.2 Emergent Investment Strategy 
The second investment process involves companies whose decision to acquire U. K. 
companies can be described as an emergent rather than a deliberately pursued 
strategy (Mintzberg, 1994a). Data in Table 7.1 indicates that 42.1% of the 
companies studied could be considered to undertake FDI based on emergent 
strategy. This finding confinns the earlier assumption made in Section 2.3.1. The 
data suggest that Malaysian companies may be on the look out for opportunities to 
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expand overseas, but how they pursue it tends to be infonnal and unplanned rather 
than deliberate. 
Some companies started with business relationship with the U. K. companies. From 
this business contact, they were made known that the target companles were for 
sale (see also section 6.3.5.2): 
In Malaysia we use Acson and York. We started as an agent for York. 
Then we expanded our business overseas and have our own brand (CN: 
Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb_Cg) 
It (the acquired company) was our supplier. We think it is a waste of 
technology if it closed down and at the same time we lose a good source 
of supplier. We don't want to have a problem in the future finding 
another supplier (CM: Pm_Mf Mc_Mp_CFb) 
Their dealing with the suppliers in the U. K. have exposed them to foreign market 
experience and by taking over the business of the suppliers, it has been considered 
as the opportunity to undertake activities up the company hierarchy. 
In another instance, potential acquisitions in the U. K. are known or made known to 
them through personal contacts or third parties. Identification is done quickly and 
not by prior design: 
There was nothing about assigning a consultant to search for business 
opportunity, but mostly by chance (CJ: Pm_Mc_MpSFb_Cg). 
This company was introduced to us by Albert Ong (close friend). Albert 
used to be in the trading business. He knows them and we were looking 
for an automotive business. He told us that this company makes 
automotive components and their customers are Honda, Toyota, BMW, 
Mercedes, and Rover. He linked us up and he helped us run for two years 
(CL: Pm-Mc___, Mp_CFb) 
The data support the notion of 'intuition' (Campbell, 1991; Mintzberg, 1994b), 
chance opportunities and taking advantage of a changing situation (Crick and 
Spence, 2005; Merrilees et. al., 1998) in the four stages of international market 
selection as discussed in Section 2.3.1. 
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The data also revealed that Malaysian companies have tended to acquire poorly- 
performing or failing U. K. companies. Indeed there seems to be evidence that the 
emergent strategy has mostly been undertaken with ailing U. K. companies. 
Although the respondents would not admit that they were deliberately targeting 
such companies, and preferred instead to couch the acquisition in terms of 
ownership advantages, Table 7.2 shows otherwise. It shows that only two target 
companies were seen to be profitable at the time of the acquisition. Table 7.1 shows 
that 42.1% of the companies studied have acquired failing U. K. companies. This 
suggests that there is a direct relationship between the emergent strategy and the 
condition of target companies. 
Table 7.2: Profit and Loss of the Acquired U. K. Companies (at the time of 
acquisition) 
U. K. Company Year Acquired (ýL Prorit and Loss Position 
Costain Group Plc 1996 _ -63,600,000 
Wessex Water Limited 2002 26,600,000 
Laura Ashley 1998 -49,300,000 
Lotus Group International Ltd 1996 -222,000 
Crabtree & Evelyn 1996 -417,000 
Lec Refrigeration 1993 -425,000 
Bloxwich Engineering Ltd 1995 405,000 
BIB Cochran Ltd 1998 -738,000 
Intrapac (U. K. ) Ltd 1994 -128,573 
Source: FAME Database (2003) 
There are two possible explanations. It could be due to the limited opportunity 
available to Malaysian companies to acquire more stable and profitable U. K. 
companies, either due to lack of resources or other firm specific advantages. It is 
also costly to acquire a well established and profitable foreign company. Company 
CS, for instance, acquired Wessex Water Services Ltd for fl. 24 billion (RM6.67 
billion), as a result of entering a competitive bidding process. As such, Malaysian 
companies may have opted for an easy way to get into the U. K. market. This is, to 
buy into well-established U. K. companies, with products well-known the world 
over, but in dire need of external funding which the Malaysians were able to 
supply. As shown in Table 7.2 above, many of the U. K. companies acquired by 
Malaysian companies were weak financially and the Malaysians were expected to 
inject new and fresh funds to save the companies from liquidation: 
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LEC was in severe financial condition after the founder passed away. It 
was run by a trust which had no leader. Then they negotiated and sime 
Darby agreed to buy (CD: Pm-Mc-Mp_GLc_Cg) 
Costain, as you know was in deep trouble. They, especially the bankers, 
expected new shareholders to come and pump in the money to continue 
operating (CF: Pm-Mi-MP-Glc) 
The company was actually up for sale and the reason I suppose may be 
they couldn't cope up with costing and all that. But it was still profitable 
(CG: Pm Mc Mo_CFb Cg) 
--- 
b1f 
I think the company in 1997 suffered a financial crisis following their 
very vast expansion in the U. S. and North America. But it didn't work 
and the company was in a bad shape and then I think they were looking 
for somebody to inject capital into it (SJ: Suk_Mm_Mp) 
This strategy, however, is not new or unique to Malaysian companies; the same 
strategy was used by Taiwanese companies in the late 1980s when they acquired 
the production facilities of failing British textile companies, with the primary 
purpose of obtaining marketing channels (Yeung, 1998). Although this investment 
strategy of acquiring a non- or under-performing company may not fit well into the 
strategic practice of merger and acquisition (M&A), for Malaysian companies it 
represented an opportunity for market entry, and a chance to leverage on the target 
company's strength: 
NWI saw it as a good opportunity, WI has tremendous belief and 
confidence that this is a great brand and this is a good opportunity that 
could be exploited and they could turn the company around over time 
and so they decided to take over the company (SJ: Suk-Mm-MP) 
Although initially Malaysian direct investment may have occurred through chance, 
in many cases, the acquisition process involved many negotiations and due 
diligence: 
With Crabtree & Evelyn nothing came easy because they had the brand. 
It took many years to come through. The negotiation took 6 months 
before everything was finalised (CG: Pm_Mc_Mo_CFb-Cg) 
Follow up examination will be undertaken if a particular party is 
interested in any particular venture in any country that has been raised 
during conversations (CJ: Pm-Mc-MP-CFb-Cg) 
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Obviously, either it is emergent or deliberate strategies; the Malaysian companies 
have accumulated their experience from their investments in neighbouring 
countries, within the same region or even distant countries and regions prior to their 
investment in the U. K. Company CS, for example, had accumulated their foreign 
experience from their investments in African countries: 
We felt that we need to take advantage of our skill that we acquired in 
the late 1980s when we went to Zimbabwe, South Africa, Papua New 
Guinea, China, and Indonesia. A lot of it was focused in the developing 
countries (CS: Pm_Mc_Mo_CFb_Cg) 
Experience can also be gained between projects and not necessarily within the 
same market. Thus, Company CS had used its experience in similar projects in 
Australia to take over the business in the U. K. In other words, the decision of the 
company to undertake direct investment in the U. K. was due to their accumulated 
experience in other markets. 
7.3 MODE OF ENTRY STRATEGY 
Companies which decide to undertake foreign direct investment have reached the 
committed involvement stage of foreign investment (Cavusgil, 1984). They also 
have a choice between greenfield, acquisition and joint venture entry decision. 
The data on Malaysian companies in the U. K. show that a majority of them have 
opted for acquisition and greenfield entry, and that joint venture is not a popular 
entry choice (see Table 7.1 and Table 7.3). About 63.2% of the companies studied 
entered the U. K. by acquisition and 31.6% established new company or made a 
Greenfield entry. Two Malaysian companies entered the U. K. market on joint 
venture terms, and two were involved in the acquisition of less than 100% shares. 
All greenfield entries have 100% Malaysian ownership. About 77% of all 
acquisitions have resulted in 100% Malaysian ownership, with only two companies 
having acquired minority shares, and two examples of joint venture. All Malaysian 
companies could be considered as the controlling shareholder because there are 
holding more than 30% of the shares, so the latter might still be considered as 
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ownership (see the definition of controlling shares in section 3.4-2). Generallv, it 
would seem that 100% ownership is preferable to Malaysian companies in the U. K. 
In cases where ownership is less than 100%, the Malaysians are still substantial 
shareholders. 
Table 7.3: Mode of Entry for Malaysian Companies in the U. K. 
Malaysian 
Company 
U. K. based Company Shares Mode 
CA (CFb-Mf) SA (Suk 
- 
Su 
- 
Tr) 100 Greenfield/JV 
CB (CFb_Cg) SB (Suk 
- 
Svs) 100 Acquired 
CC (Glc-Bk) SC (Suk 
- 
Bnk_Tr) 100 Greenfield 
CD (Glc_Cg) SD (Suk_Su_Tr) 100 Greenfield 
CE (Mf) SE (Suk 
- 
Su 
- 
TO 100 Greenfield 
CIF (Glc 
- 
Eng) SF (Cas-Eng) 34 Acquired 
CG (CFb_Cg) SG (Suk_Tr-Mf) 100 Acquired 
CH (Glc_Svs) SH (Suk 
- 
SU) 100 Greenfield 
Cl (Glc-R&D) Sl (Suk 
- 
R&D) 100 Greenfield 
CJ (CFb_Cg) SJ (Cas_Tr-Mf) 43.8 Acquired 
CK (CFb-Mf) SK (Suk 
- 
Mf Tr) 100 Acquired 
CL (CFb 
- 
Mf) SL (Suk 
- 
Mf Tr) 100 Acquired 
CM (CFb-Mf) SM (Suk_Mf Tr) 100 Acquired 
CN (CFb_Cg) SN (Suk_Mf Tr) 100 Acquired 
CO (Glc-Mf) SO (Suk 
- 
Su 
- 
R&D) 100 Acquired 
CP (CFb-Mf) SP (Suk-Su) 100 Acquired 
CQ (Glc_Cg) SQ (Suk_Mf Tr) 100 Acquired 
CR (Glc 
- 
Eng) SR (Suk_Eng) 51 iv 
CS (CFb_Cg) SS (SukL_Svs) 100 Acquired 
Note: Company CA have entered the U. K. both via Greenfield and JV. 
Source: Author's Survey 
This finding contrasts with that of Yeung (1998) who found that developing 
countries' TNCs prefer minority equity to greenfield entry. Singapore and Hong 
V_ 
Kong MNCs prefer minority shareholding because of their risk-averse approach 
due to unfamiliar territory. On the other hand, Singaporean firms have a substantial 
number of wholly-owned subsidiaries in Malaysia because of close historical ties 
(Fong and Komaran, 1985 pp 38). Malaysian companies' preference for majority 
ownership is similar to a study by Ulgado et al. (1994) on Asian developing country 
multinationals. It contrasts to Kogut and Singh's (1988) study that firms of 
culturally distant countries will choose JV over acquisition and that Brazilian 
MNCs are principally involved in joint ventures (Wells, 1988). Perhaps the 
familiarity factors discussed in Section 6.3.2 has reduced cultural distance between 
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Malaysian and British and lessened the element of 'foreignness' between these two 
countnes. 
7.3.1 Greenfield Entry 
The choice of greenfield entry is determined by various considerations. It Is the 
choice of organic growth which is influenced by factors such as the nature of the 
product and business, the motive for investment, and the market environment in the 
host country. The data show that all Malaysian greenfield entries into the U. K. 
involved the incorporation of trading subsidiaries or sales units in the U. K., to 
market products imported from the parent companies in Malaysia (see Table 5.3). 
These sales units are wholly-owned by the Malaysian parent companies. This 
finding is similar to Casseres (1990) suggestion that firms will choose whole 
ownership in marketing intensive activities as mentioned in Chapter 2. 
In many cases this is a reflection of the companies' confidence in the U. K. market, 
supported by a build up in host-country experience over time. Because the 
companies are selling their own products, they feel that there is no reason for them 
to acquire existing companies: 
The incorporation of a new company is because there is no need for us to 
buy a marketing company. We are going to sell our own product anyway 
(CD: Pm-Mf Mc-MP-GLc_Cg) 
Aspects of modem trading such as internet marketing have also helped the 
companies to promote and sell their products without the need to establish an 
alliance with a local company: 
There is absolutely no reason, no requirement whatsoever for Malaysian 
to tie up with somebody else in Europe or in the U. S. or anywhere else. 
Having got it right in one country, particularly with the internet and with 
most of the business we are doing, you see I don't have a lot of phone 
calls to make. Even in the tattoo market most of my order comes 
through the internet (SE: Suk_Su_Bm, __Mp) 
Where the need arises to have access to a local marketing network, this is 
done by 
appointing local managers with established networks in the U. K. They 
hired BritIsh 
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managers with vast previous experience of similar products in the U. K (e. g, 
company CA and CE). The companies are, in a sense, making acquisition of an 
individual first, before establishing a company in the U. K. 
7.3.2 Entry via Acquisition 
As noted earlier in this chapter, acquisition involves either the outright takeover or 
the purchase of a proportion of shares in the target company. As shown in Section 
7.3.1, most trading companies entered the U. K. via Greenfield, with the exception 
of company CO and company CP. These companies had started to export into the 
U. K. through local companies that acted as agents for their products. As time 
passed, the Malaysian companies began to acquire their U. K. agents. Subsidiary 
SO, for example was an agent for Proton cars long before their acquisition by a 
Malaysian company. The Malaysian company, company CO, decided to acquire 
this company after the owner died. The acquisition was undertaken to enable 
company CO's direct involvement in marketing whilst ensuring a continuation of 
the existing marketing network. Another company, company CP, had also acquired 
a U. K. based company to take advantage of its marketing network and brand name. 
Lack of local market experience was also thought to be one of the reasons for 
Malaysian companies' acquisition of U. K. companies: 
Royal Selangor to my luiowledge was not distributing seriously to the 
U. K., until that point. So Englefield was used as a vehicle because 
Englefield already had a distribution of manufactured product in the U. K. 
It had sales teams and agents. Royal Selangor just fit into the existing 
ones (SP: Suk_Su_Bm_Mp) 
Initially, company CP has continued manufacture under Englefield's brand together 
with its own brand but later decided to concentrate on its own brand and change its 
name as well. 
Even though we have a small manufacturing base at Englefields, but we 
decided it is not economical to continue the manufacturing there. The 
cost are higher and we already have the manufacturing facilities here in 
Malaysia where the cost is cheaper, labour, packaging, and facilities are 
bigger where we can utilise the economies of scale (CP: 
Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
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In the context of takeover of a U. K. company, it is a strategy that is related to an 
objective to acquire technology and an established brand (see Section 6.2.4). Of the 
19 companies studied, five relate to acquisition of technology and four to 
acquisition of brand names: 
LEC Refrigeration was originally intended for reverse technology 
transfer. LEC is a very establish British manufacturer of refrigerators 
since 1942 (CQ: Pm-Mc_Mp_Glc_Cg) 
The reason we bringing back the technology from U. K. is because they 
are good in R&D. I think they are centre of excellence. So we brought 
back this technology to make pulleys (CK: Pm-Mf Mm-Mo_CFb) 
MUI saw it as a good opportunity, MUI has tremendous belief and 
confidence that this is a great brand and this is a good opportunity that 
could be exploited and they could turn it around over time and so they 
decided to take over the company (SJ: Suk_Tr-Mm-Mp) 
It enables us to control the company, develop the brand created over here. 
100% ownership enables us to pursue whole heartedly the operation. If 
there is a joint venture, it will distract us from what we have been 
pursuing (SP: Suk_Su_Bin__ý4p) 
It is also a strategy that is targeting failing U. K. companies, which meant that all the 
shares in the companies were open for purchase. 
The company was up for sale. I think at the time, that was the structure. 
I don't know whether they were looking at that structure or not. But the 
company was up for sale 100% and the judgement made was that the 
price was good and so they bought 100% of the company (SG: 
Suk_Tr_Bm_M-p) 
In cases where Malaysian companies have acquired less than 100% shares in the 
U. K. public listed companies, this was done for several reasons. In the case of non- 
controlling shareholders, the strategy of the investment in which the companies 
perceived that the percentage of shares that they have acquired is sufficient for them 
to benefit as shareholders without a need to become a majority shareholder. This is 
the case of the acquisition of 34% shares in subsidiary SF by company CF and of 
43.8% of subsidiary SJ by company CJ (see Table 7.3). 
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So, as you can guess, one of the primary reasons is to tap their expertise, 
their knowledge and their global reach (CF: Pm-Eng-Ml-Mp_Glc) 
You cannot control. It is different between London and Malaysia. Single 
shareholders cannot control a p1c. That means Plcs are bound to respond 
to all shareholders. No one shareholder is special. Directors are 
appointed by the majority shareholders and act in their own capacity. 
They don't act on behalf of the shareholder. So it is a big difference in 
the thinking there (CF: Pm-Eng___, Mi-Mp-Glc) 
In the case of company CJ, they have already owned majority shares in the U. K. 
and they are not in favour of taking more shares. Apart from the regulation of 
shareholding spread in which at least 25% of the shares have to be owned by the 
public (Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange)36 the Malaysian shareholders 
also perceived that it made no difference to them (the current level shareholding is 
sufficient to gain benefit from the acquisition) to increase the shareholding to a 
higher level from the existing controlling position; 
I don't think there is a necessity to increase the share since the rest will 
be just ownership of shares. It is pointless. You must have a block of 
shares that is tradable in the market to keep the public float (SJ: 
Suk_Tr-Mm-Mp) 
If we look at our structure now at 57-58%, the maximum that we can 
own is 75%. It is ridiculous to own that much because basically no 
resolution can move without MUL Whether you are talking about simple 
majority or bigger majority (SJ: Suk_Tr_Mm_Mp) 
The companies also indicated that the availability of the shares at the time of the 
acquisition has also determined the amount of shares acquired: 
You see, those shares were only available at that time. I guess that was 
the amount of shares that was made available at that point of time (CF: 
Pm-Eng_Mi-Mp_Glc) 
36 The Listing Rules stipulates that a company is required to maintain at least 25% of public 
shareholding to keep their listing status. Failing to comply with this requirement will resulted of the 
withdrawal from the listing. (www. londonstockexchange. com) 
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7.3.3 Joint Venture 
Malaysian companies have also been involved in joint ventures with U. K. partners 
although this entry method is not common (e. g. company CA and CR). Company 
CA, for example, had a joint venture in Encrypta Electronic in Wales but the joint 
venture (JV) collapsed because of conflicts over control. Although the Malaysian 
partner had 51% shares in the JV, according to them, the local partner was reluctant 
to hand over control of the running of the company. As a result, the JV collapsed 
and the company was later wound up. Another company, company CR, has 51: 49 
JV in Velosi U. K. Ltd. The difference between these two joint ventures is that 
although both are involved in technology, the technology in Encrypta Electronic 
had belonged to the local partner while Velosi U. K. uses technology in equipments 
that are also available in the market thus avoiding conflict of interest. 
The data suggests that Malaysian companies have not rejected JVs completely. This 
option may still be taken if the companies feel that the local partner can contribute 
in terms of technology, expertise and know how about local culture. Other\vise, 
100% ownership is preferred: 
Not in favour of partner that is trying to interfere with the business. Okay 
if you have a partner that works with you. He knows the business. 
Because of the distance I need somebody that I can trust and who is 
motivated to grow the business. In that case, yes it is good to have a local 
partner. It depends from case to case (CR: Pm-EnR-Mm-Mo_Glc) 
It enables us to control the company, develop the brand created over 
here. 100% ownership enables us to pursue whole heartedly the 
operation. If there is a joint venture, it will distract us from what we have 
been pursuing (SP: Suk_Tr_Bm_Mp) 
One possible answer to the lack of JV alliance between Malaysian and British 
is 
that the U. K. government is not intrusive (restrictive policy) on equity that can 
be 
owned by a foreigner in a U. K. company. Contractor (1990) and Asiedu and 
Esfahani (2001) for example suggest that some JVs are result of host countries 
restrictive policy. 
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Basically, the choice between greenfield, acquisition and joint ownership of 
Malaysian investment in the U. K. can be surnmarised as in table 7.4 below. 
Table 7.4: Reasons for Greenfieldg Acquisition and Joint Venture 
Greenfield Acquisition Joint Ownership 
-Failure in previous JV -Acquire technology -Technology 
-Require close contact with -Acquire brand -Sharing expertise 
customer Leverage on expertise and -Access new market 
-Holding of investment technology -Local market 
-It is a branch of parent in -Targeting the existing business knowledge 
Malaysia marketing network 
-Promoting own brand 
-Marketing own products 
Source: Author's Survey 
7.4 OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES 
The strategies undertaken by Malaysian companies in their investment in the U. K. 
are related to their investment financing, management and rationalisation of 
subsidiaries, diversification strategy, core competence strategy, synergy realisation, 
business networking, and niche market strategy. These strategies are in turn 
influenced by costs, product types, company characteristics and overall corporate 
obj ectives. 
7.4.1 Investment Financing 
Outward FDI always involves an outflow of funds from the investing countries into 
the host countries. In the case of Malaysian investment into the U. K., the fund 
generally comes from the parent companies. This form of financing involves two 
stages - the initial investment, and then any additional or operational 
investment in 
the acquired company. 
As shown in Table 7.5,89.5% of the companies studied cited that the financing for 
the acquisition or funds to establish the U. K. subsidiaries were obtained from the 
parent companies. In the case of greenfield entry (see Table 7.3), all 
funds are 
obtained from Malaysia except for company CI which was established 
during the 
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British administration of Malaysia and the financial arrangement during the 
handover to the Malaysian government was not known. This confirms the 
assumption made in Section 2.5.5 (iv) and is also similar to the finding proposed by 
Yeung (1994) in Section 2.5.4 that developing countries' TNCs as being self- 
financing in capital input. 
Funds are obtained from Malaysia which is much easier (CA: 
Pm-Su-Mc-Mo-CFb) 
As far as possible we will finance from internally generated funds. If not 
we will issue new shares, rights issues, bonds etc (CB: 
Pm-Mc-Mp_CFb_Cg) 
We fund it from here (Malaysia), we have the target (CI: 
Pm-Su-Mm-MP_Glc) 
Initially of course it has to be funded from here (CP: 
Pm-Su-Mc-Mo-CFb) 
We borrow against our local contract. Local projects do not need funding 
as we have generated profit from our project and also from shareholders 
fund. Thus, if we are not venturing overseas we don't need to borrow. 
We are cash rich and paying dividend. But the collateral for the loans are 
projects in Malaysia (CR: Pm-EngýMm-Mo_G1c) 
In entry via acquisition, almost all Malaysian FDI into the U. K. involved the 
transfer of funds from Malaysian purchaser companies into the U. K. subsidiaries to 
pay for the acquisition, and in some of the cases to assume the debt owed by the 
acquired subsidiaries to third parties. Only Company CS has issued bonds in a 
foreign market to finance its acquisition of a U. K. company. 
Post-acquisition financing appears to be a mix between continuous funding and 
subsidiary's self financing. Table 7.5 shows that only 26.3% of the companies 
studied continue to provide funds to the U. K. subsidiaries. Most of other Malaysian 
companies expect their subsidiaries to be self financing in their daily operations, 
especially larger subsidiaries: 
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The bonds are issued at the operating level like Wessex Water Services 
Ltd, the operating company or it can be issued at the holding company level namely Wessex Water Ltd. If we issue bonds over there, it is because the company is owned 100% by YTL Power (CS: 
Pm-Svs-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
In the early years when they acquired the business, they undertook 
restructuring. They injected funds to finance the restructuring. But by 
and large, the company at that time operated on internally generated 
funds (SG: Suk_Tr_Bm_Mp) 
Subsidiaries are also expected to find their own sources of funds because of the 
parent companies' perceived reluctance to continue financing the loss making 
subsidiary and also the high cost involved: 
Everything was completely self-funded. Any investment we want to 
make, even the purchase in South Africa was done through self funding 
by Bloxwich Engineering group here (U. K. ). We self finance everything. 
No money was invested by Malaysia. It is a case of 'I bought the 
company but I won't invest in the company (SL: Suk_Mf Bm_Mp) 
Subsidiary SL was a failing company when it was acquired by a Malaysian 
company. This company is making profit initially after the acquisition, but it cannot 
sustain the continuing rise of operational cost in the U. K. It seems that the 
continuing financial support from the parent is absent due to uncertainty about the 
future of the U. K. plant perceived by the Malaysian shareholder such as a 
continuing increase in manufacturing cost and costs related to compulsory 
contribution to pension funds and National Insurance Policy. 
The U. K. 's company is also quite profitable. The U. K. business is 
actually profitable for a while. But as in other part of the world, 
automotive industries also contracted in Europe, so many players, and it 
is very hard to manufacture in U. K. now. It is very expensive especially 
now with the Pension Cost Issues. Even the BT, Tesco also have a big 
problem with pension funds. The company have to spend more money to 
top up the deficit in the Pension fund. The U. K. government has also 
introduced the National Insurance policy for the employees, if want to 
trade, it is compulsory to subscribe and pay to this fund and this is an 
additional cost. So we find that U. K. is a very difficult place to 
manufacture, very expensive, but in order to supply to the European car 
market, it is compulsory for you to have a present in the U. K. (SL: 
Suk_Mf Bm_Mp) 
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In greenfield entry, the companies tend to receive continuous support from their 
parent companies for a number of years after their inception. Companies such as 
subsidiaries SE and SK, also received loans fTom their Malaysian parent companies. 
The data, however, show that there is some degree of reluctance on the part of the 
parent companies in Malaysia to continue injecting money into the subsidiaries over 
a long period especially when the previous investment had not shown any return. 
The economic crisis in 1997 is also a contributing factor to lack of follow-up 
financing from the parent companies. Apart from liquidity problems faced by the 
parent companies, stricter control on outflows of funds (see Section 3.3.2) have 
prevented them from continuing to send money to their subsidiaries: 
If we want to send money now it is difficult. Bank Negara will say no! 
You may be able to fulfil one condition that is to bring back the 
technology. But where is the dividend and so on? That is why they (the 
subsidiaries) are self sustaining (CG: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
It is impossible to use Malaysian money to expand overseas. Exchange 
control. The government is suspicious of you taking money out if it is not 
for real investment. Approval also takes time. By the time the approval is 
granted, the opportunity has gone (CN: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
7.4.2 Subsidiary Management 
As noted in the literature review, the main elements in the organisation of 
multinational firms are control and decision making (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984), 
human resources and level of autonomy (Forsgren and Pahlberg, 1992), and the 
separation of ownership and management (Newburry and Zeira, 1997). 
The main control structure of the subsidiaries formed by Malaysian companies is 
that of the centre-periphery, as suggested by Forsgren and Pahlberg (1992). The 
data show that Malaysian parent companies are not heavily involved in the daily 
management of the subsidiaries. About 63.2% of the companies studied cited that 
their U. K. subsidiaries are headed by local managers [see Table 7.5 (ii)]: 
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We do not want to rock the boat (CS: Pm-Svs-Mc-Mo_CFb_Cg) 
They run the business. They are not shareholders. We pay their salary (CE: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo) 
I leave it to them. But we meet two to three times a year. Like next week, I call all of my managers from all over the world to meet in Abu Dhabi 
since Abu Dhabi is the centre (CR: Pm_Eng___, Mm_Mo_Glc) 
Yes, our policy is that the local people run the business for us. It is the 
same in the U. K. Nobody from Malaysia runs the business (CN: 
Pm Mc Mo CFb Caý 
There are various reasons for limited involvement of the parent in the daily 
management of the company. Local people are perceived to have better knowledge 
about the local business environment. At the same time, the parent company is still 
kept well-informed about the subsidiary's activities: 
So it is marketed by locals who know local markets and it is easier for 
the product to be locallsed (CJ: Pm-Mc-MP-CFb-Cg) 
We are aware of the day to day running of our business, both in Wessex 
and Electranet. But we don't interfere too much because the system and 
structure are already there (CS: Pm-Mc_Mp_CFb_Cg) 
Limited direct involvement is feasible with a systematic reporting system between 
parent and subsidiary. The local management task is also concentrated on small 
decision making, mostly on the non-financial aspects of management: 
We set up system and control. We set up reporting. We give them the 
action plan. We monitor the implementation. Day-to-day running, they 
do it. But in the decision making, they talk to us. They can call us 
anytime. My phone will not be turn off until I o'clock (CL 
Pm_Mf Mc_Mp_CFb) 
For day to day operation they make the small decision. But on, for 
example, purchase of machinery, handling big project or contract, all are 
done from Malaysia (CM: Pm-Mf Mc_Mp_CFb) 
Malaysian parent companies also choose not to exploit their privileges of full 
ownership of the U. K. subsidiaries to avoid resentment from the current 
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management and workers. In other words, they prefer not to inflate the ownership 
issues. 
The resentment can create bad atmosphere in the factory. So why bother 
about the shareholding? As for the workers, they can sabotage if they 
want to. They ask for better scheme and privilege since they are very 
well protected. So, as far as we are concerned it is very straight forward. You do what you are supposed to do (CK: Pm_Mf Mm_Mo_CFb) 
However, this strategy has been viewed differently by some of the subsidiaries. 
Some local managers feel that this absence of personnel from the parent has 
resulted in a lack of understanding of the nature of their business: 
I think during the initial period there was an absence to some extent. It 
was when they left the business to run itself for a period of time (SG: 
Suk_Tr_Bm_Mp) 
It is strange because if you look at all the Japanese transplant companies 
in the U. K., not just Honda, Toyota, Nissan, you go to their businesses 
and they all have Japanese within their structure. In some cases they have 
the equivalent Japanese-English manager. So I would have Japanese 
sitting next to me assigning the job or other company would just have a 
Japanese manager or Japanese liaison people. In the Japanese transplant 
business they very much bring in Japanese people (SL: 
Suk_Mf Bm_Mp) 
The management of subsidiary by Malaysian companies reflects various degree of 
separation between ownership and management. Firstly, there are companies in 
which the key posts such as Chief Executive Officer or Managing Director are 
filled by Malaysian expatriates or person/persons from the parent companies who 
are not the owners but professional managers. The owner meanwhile may sit on the 
Board of Directors or act as Company Chairman. Malaysian managers in the 
subsidiaries are usually found in the larger subsidiaries (e. g. subsidiary SO, SJ, SG 
and SQ). Large subsidiaries are more difficult to manage from a distance in 
contrast to smaller subsidiaries. As such, a more direct management approach is 
preferred. The higher investment costs in these subsidiaries means that the parent 
companies need to exercise more control and may therefore choose to appoint 
Malaysian expatriates to the top posts. However, all middle level management 
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positions are filled by local managers to meet local demands such as in marketing 
and distribution. 
The second form of relationship is a clear separation between ownership and 
management, where the managers are mostly locals. The owners in these cases tend 
to have a close relationship with the managers whose appointments are made based 
mostly on trust. This is common in small subsidiaries where local managers are 
hired to avoid the high expatriation costs: 
[ ... ] if we send Malaysian there, they will demand higher salary than the local. The Malaysian, after two to three years, they will request to come 
home. There is no continuity. [ ... ] Like in Middle East, it is run by the Indian, Egyptian. If I were to assign a Malaysian, they will ask about 
US10,000 per month. A good Indian will ask about US3,000 but a good 
Malaysian will ask for a salary of US10,000 per month (CR: 
Pm-EngýMm-Mo-Glc) 
In the early days a Malaysian manager was in charge of the U. K. 
operation. After the acquisition, there were two or three Malaysians who 
headed the business. I know Adam Chiang who is now in charge of the 
finance division. He was GM here in the U. K. for several years. That is 
history. In the last 7 to 8 yrs, the U. K. business has been under the U. K. 
management team (SP: Suk_Su_Bm_Mp) 
Local managers are assigned to meet local demands, understand local 
environments, local culture and business network: 
But in the country where we don't have the expertise, where we need to 
understand local culture, then we employ local. For example in Australia, 
our Caterpillar business is run by an Australian (CS: Pm-Mc-CFb_Cg) 
In terms of knowledge, they know better about local environment (CG: 
Pm_Mc_Mp_CFb_Cg) 
So it is marketed by local who know local and it is easier for the product 
to be localised (CJ: Prq-Mc_ýMp_CFb_Cg) 
In these cases, close monitonng is possible with the advancement of 
communications technology: 
The company is managed by them from top to bottom. Of course on the 
Board we have representatives. The Chairman is on the Board. On the 
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financial side we also have representatives. If not, we don't know 
they are performing (CG: Pm-Mc-Mo_CFb_Cg) 
I am involved directly. I am on the Board of the company and everything 
that is outgoing and incoming is all in the system. In fact we are now 
going a bit further with the usage of electronic accounting system. Any 
time we can see the inventories in the U. K. and invoices (CA: 
Pni-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
Separation between ownership and management also relates to autonomy. The data 
show that 36.8% of the companies studied could be considered as implementing 
centralised decision making [see Table 7.5 (ii)]. This confirms the assumption 
made in Section 2.4 of the limitation of direct control due to the distance between 
Malaysia and the U. K. In general, the level of autonomy in Malaysian subsidiaries 
is limited to the daily management of the company based on rules set by the parent. 
A clear line of authority is set between the parent and managers in the subsidiary. 
Matters on finance, overall policy and direction of the business are still controlled 
by the parent irrespective of whether the management of the company is Malaysian 
or British. Table 7.5 also shows that about 47.3% of the companies studied cited 
that the parent companies play a significant role in cost control of the U. K. 
subsidiaries. Therefore, this form of autonomy has not fulfilled the concept of 
autonomy as suggested by Young and Tavares (2004) especially when the 
subsidiary has no control over financial resources. Communication between 
parent and subsidiaries is, however, limited to quarterly visits by people from the 
parent companies as well as a monthly or quarterly reporting system. As shown in 
Table 7.5 (ii), about 26.3% of the companies studied required periodic reporting of 
their U. K. subsidiaries. It is a strategy of centralisation (Birkinshaw and Hood, 
1998; Gates and Egelhoff, 1986), especially on financial matters (see also quotation 
by Company CL in Section 7.4.2). It is also similar to the case of Singapore 
multinational (Fong and Komaran, 1985; Hui and Fong, 1986): 
The subsidiaries are required to submit reports to the parent and the 
parent would review the financial and operations reports in order to 
monitor the performance and profitability of the subsidiaries 
(CB: 
Pm_Mc_ýMp_CFb-Cg) 
They come and report here every two months. The finance people there 
report here. My boss is in charge from here (CD: Pm_Mc_Mp_GLc-Cg) 
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For day to day operation they make the small decision. But on, for 
example, purchase of machinery, handling big projects or contracts, all 
are done from Malaysia. For example, I send my project manager ahead 
first to look at the project itself Estimate the cost of dismantling and 
eventually our U. K. people assist us to make up the quotation. Then we 
start the negotiation process (CM: Pm-Mf Mc-MP-CFb) 
I 
I very very very rarely communicate with them too much. The 
communication is between the Board of Mega First and our Managing 
Director who send report once a month and financial figures. That is the 
only time for any direction and the guy from Mega First would come 
over to do consultation on what we have done previous year and what we 
are going to do the next year. It is once per year (SL: Suk_Tr_Bm_Mp) 
During the early stages of the investment, however, this lack of communication had 
resulted in some misunderstandings between the parent and their subsidiaries. 
Because the businesses were left without proper involvement and monitoring by the 
parent, some managers in the subsidiaries did not feel confident about Malaysian 
business. They also questioned the honesty and integrity of the parent company in 
particular and the Malaysian business culture in general (see also quotation by 
subsidiary SG in Section 7.4.2): 
When they acquired C&E, my personal view is that I am not sure they 
have the trust and confidence that is standard in international 
management (SG: Suk_Tr_Bm,. _Mp) 
In the early stage, there was a need to really understand the acquisition 
which took longer to put in place. As a consequence of that, much of the 
thing that has not happened in the early period I think is only starting to 
happen now. It should have happened much earlier (SG: 
Suk_Tr_Bm_M-p) 
The typical management style of the subsidiary is therefore, that the parent provides 
the boundary within which the managers in the subsidiaries could act. Managers in 
the subsidiaries can make decisions as long as they are made within the stipulated 
limit, beyond which approval has to be obtained from the parent company. 
In describing this parent- subsidiary relationship, most companies tend to give 
glowing accounts, especially the Malaysian parent companies: 
Talking with each other very nicely. They are like brothers and sisters 
(CA: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
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All are part of a big family we are all like brothers (CD: 
Pm-Mc-Mp_GLc-Cg) 
We work with them, we share with them talk to them sincere 
with them (CL: Pm-Mf Mc_Mp-CFb) 
We share the idea they will get 
Pm-Mf McýMp_Ub); 
We are very free and they come 
Pm-Mf Tr_Mm_Mp_Glc); 
back to us (CM: 
very often (CO: 
You have to see them, make phone call (CR: Pm-Svs-Mm_Mo_Glc). 
However, some problems and cross cultural issues have arisen with the Malaysian 
acquisition of British companies which have resulted in delayed and even some bad 
business decisions. About 42.1% of the companies studied cited that there were 
cultural differences especially at the beginning of the investment and this view was 
supported by some of the UX managers (see Table 7.6): 
I think we have the split in terms of East and West. What we are used to 
in the eastern market requirement and western market requirement is 
different. Although we have small product development, in the eastern 
market this represents a significant amount to our business. The design 
team have a particular knowledge and expertise that is moving away 
from its priority in developing western product. Inevitably, because of 
the disadvantage of distance and the fact that they are a Malaysian-based 
company and we are a western-based company, there tend to be 
sometimes a lack of detailed knowledge, in this case of the U. K. market 
(SP: Suk_Su_Bm_Mp) 
There was a lot of no decision from Malaysia, in the past. There have 
also been bad decisions made about the business over a number of years. 
Malaysians are a little bit similar in my opinion to Japanese in that they 
are thinkers. They think about something for a long time before they give 
their commitment and decision. (SL: Suk_Mf Bm_Mp) 
They don't say a lot. Listen and listen and listen and then give decision. I 
think Malaysian guy like to listen and like to understand from different 
perspectives and then formulate opinion. They don't tend to give direct 
answer. [ ... 
I The biggest difference I found in the Malaysian culture and 
having Malaysian over here is that they are not confrontational at all. 
You may have to explain things two or three times to really get their full 
understanding of what you are trying to say. If you try to get information 
from them, you also may have to ask the same question three or four 
times in different ways to get the required answer (SL: 
Suk_Mf Bm_Mp) 
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Some British managers also expressed their lack of confidence in the Malaysian 
takeovers due to what is perceived as differences in attitudes towards business: 
Within the company that I worked for, if we develop the product we 
would make sure that everything is perfect before we put it into the 
market place. The Malaysian attitude is that if we have got it nearly right, 
just throw the product out into the market and move from there. If it 
works brilliantly, then we go forward. It there is a problem then we can 
sort the problem out as we go along. That is one of the differences 
between Malaysian and English and I find it very difficult to accept in 
the early days. Because I am English born and bred. I used to work with 
the company which get it right first before going into the market. We get 
everything ready before we launch it. Who is right and who is wrong, I 
won't decide. A merit to the English way is that it may take you 6-12 
months longer to get there. The Malaysian attitude is just being out there. 
And honestly it works (SA: Suk Su Bm M-1)) 
At the same time, Malaysian managers also harbour negative perceptions of British 
managers: 
British are good in technology but are less concerned about cost 
management. They are not motivated (CM: Pm-Mf Svs-Mc-Mp_CFb) 
British people are lazy. Sometimes we think only British are good, but 
Malaysians are also quite good (CN: Pm_Mc_Mo_CFb-Cg) 
Malaysians are more intelligent, our standards are also high (CS: 
Pm Mc Mo CFb 
In extreme cases, cultural differences could lead to dispute between the parent and 
subsidiary. This happened to company CA which experienced a failed joint venture 
with a British businessman. In this case, the Malaysian partner had felt that the 
British partner had not treated them as a true partner but more as a financier. As a 
result, the Malaysian partner refused to provide more funds leading to the collapse 
of the joint venture: 
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UK guys are very different; I think they are still very colonial type of 
people. They always think they are very much better than us, they are 
advanced, and we are still the third world. These are their mind set and it 
is very difficult to break this mind set. As a result of that we were refused to pump in any more money. All things fall short. They always have a feeling that once upon a time you are under us. As a result of that we said 
enough is enough if you want to put it under administration order let put it under administration order and do a voluntary liquidation or winding 
up (CA: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
Manager of company CA also observed that unlike the western culture, the 
Malaysian culture regards respect to the bosses as paramount irrespective of their 
backgound: 
It is difficult to find the right people, to understand the mind-set of the 
U. K. people. Not many of them can take instructions from people like 
us. They always have a feeling that once upon a tmie you are under us 
(CA: Prn_Mf Mc_Mo_CFb). 
He also believed in business secrecy which is not apparent in the British partner: 
If you don't have that kind of experience about their culture from day 
one, you are going to fail [ ... ] in western culture, whatever it is, 
everything is discussed with the wives. For example, when we invite the 
wife to a function or dinner, the wife would tell you that what you are 
doing is not right [ ... ] In our culture it is different with respect to the bosses, the elders (CA: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
In general, misunderstanding between the parent and subsidiaries is more about 
business culture. It is about different opinion between Malaysian and British 
managers on certain management issues. It also concerns a lack of exposure or 
ignorance of each others business culture: 
I don't think most people with any real knowledge consider Malaysia as 
a developing country anymore. I think very pragmatic to say that 
Malaysia is a developed country. A developing country consists of a 
very poor level of economy. I think if you go back two decades, then you 
can say Malaysia is a developing country. But Malaysia today is a 
prosperous country that has kept adding to its prosperity (SG: 
Suk Tr Bin M-P) 
A perception that Malaysia is developing young, well educated, very 
knowledgeable young businessmen. They are not people who are infenor 
in terms of education and knowledge. They come from different cultures 
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but only the culture is different. The level of knowledge and expertise 
and understanding is not the issue (SG: Suk-Tr_Bm, 
__Mp) 
I have only been to the Far East once to Singapore for international sales 
and marketing meeting. This is the first time I have been to Malaysia. As 
I said I was impressed with the people. Very professional people and 
very professional organisation (SA: Suk_Su_Bm, 
__Mp) 
7.4.3 Rationalisation of Subsidiaries 
It has been mentioned earlier in Section 7.2.2 that some Malaysian companies have 
been acquiring failing U. K. companies. Post acquisition witnessed subsidiaries that 
have recovered while some are still continuing with the losses. As in the financial 
year 2003/2004, four subsidiaries namely subsidiaries SD, SL, SO and SK had 
incurred losses. From the interview, subsidiaries SE and SA also failed to make a 
decent profit for the financial year 2003. Table 7.7 show the profile of the U. K. 
subsidiaries including its turnover and profit for the financial year 2003. 
Table 7.7: The Profile of U. K. Subsidiaries including Profit and Losses for the 
Financial Year 2003 
UK 
Subsidi 
SA 
SB 
sc 
SD 
SE 
SF 
SG 
SH 
si 
si 
SK 
SL 
sm 
SN 
so 
SP 
SQ 
SR 
ss 
Paid-up 
Capital (f) 
No. of 
Subs. 
No. of 
Employees 
Turnover 
(f. ) 
Profit (f) Financial 
Year 
320,000 na na na na 2003 
na na na na na 2003 
na na na na na 2003 
1,000,002 na 8 5,760,000 60,000 2003 
1 Ao na na na na 2003 
34,500A0 31 3,103 623,5001000 13,000,000 2003 
38,8979000 4 2,265 112,470,000 1,457,000 2003 
135,000 n. a 44 1,825,947 364,111 2003 
3,210,000 n. a 93 3,729,491 10,000 2003 
37,3009000 6 2,961 283,500,000 2,000,000 2003 
-3,040,000 1 222 
20,034,000 -777,000 2003 
3,393,000 7 621 23,506,000 -476,000 2003 
19750,000 2 8 2,265,512 228,432 2003 
2ý718,000 n. a 96 14,144,000 629,000 2003 
3,500,000 4 86 22,975,000 -1,859,000 2003 
29052,000 1 21 n. a 129,213 2003 
28,3945000 1 447 23,892,000 -3,693,000 2003 
200 n. a n. a n. a n. a 2003 
131,800,000 19 1,682 287,700,000 67,400,000 2003 
Note: Information on subsidiary SB and SC are not available. 
Source: (1) FAME Database (2004) 
(2)Hemscott Company Guru (2005) 
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The first strategy, Malaysian investing companies seek to undertake restructuring 
activities including implementing new business strategies and repositioning the 
portfolio of activities upon their acquisition of the U. K. companies. About 31.6% 
of the companies studied cited that they have undertaken measures to rationalise 
and restructure the U. K. subsidiaries (see Table 7.5). Subsidiary SL, for example, 
experienced a downturn in their business volume in the U. K. where lack of 
confidence among the clients had contributed to their poor market performance: 
We may change to Mega Automotive System, re-brand ourselves. Go 
back to customer. The marketing tool is that "we are not Bloxwich 
anymore. We are an international company, Mega First Automotive 
System (SL: Suk_Mf Bm_Mp) 
Another company, subsidiary SJ, began developing a new image for their brand, by 
concentrating on retailing only within the U. K. and closing down their retail shops 
worldwide and shifting to franchising instead. Its retail stores in the U. S. were 
closed and businesses in the U. S. are now run under licence. They have also 
completed their exit from Europe because European business was "bleeding the 
business" (Suk_Tr-Mm-MP): 
Critically, we also need to build up our brand because it is very old. The 
brand has been around for 60 years now. It has worked at some stages 
but not others. The focus now is on repositioning the brand to where we 
want to be now. In the last 18 months we have redefined the brand and 
repositioned it (SJ: Suk Tr_Mm_Mp) 
In business, strategy changes when the environment changes. There are many 
instances to show that Malaysian investors have changed the investment strategy of 
their U. K. subsidiaries. Subsidiaries that are involved in manufacturing, for 
example, had to reposition their activities because of the high costs of U. K. 
manufacturing. They have had to relocate their manufacturing activities to lower 
cost areas based either in Malaysia or other countries. Subsidiary SQ, for instance, 
has undertaken investments in China and Eastern Europe to produce household 
refrigerators, while its U. K. subsidiaries produce premium products such as wine 
coolers and medical cabinets for storing blood and serum. The Chinese and Eastern 
European production, however, use the technology of subsidiary SQ: 
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In manufacturing, if it doesn't make money we don't set up factory. Let 
other people do it. It involves a lot of money to buy machines and so on. 
The strategy is we enter into an off take agreement. I agree to buy so 
many fridges from you a year and in return I will transfer the technology 
to you and you will sell the fridges to me at this price (CD: 
Pm-Mc-Mp_GLc_Cg) 
Similar strategies were undertaken by companies such as Subsidiary SK which 
sources some of its parts from their factory in Malaysia, and Subsidiary SL, which 
produces parts and components in Malaysia and South Africa. Other companies that 
used to do manufacturing in the U. K. are subsidiary SP and subsidiary SM. 
Subsidiary SP has closed down its U. K. pewter manufacturing under the Englefield 
brand and now concentrates on its production in Malaysia using the brand Royal 
Selangor Pewter: 
Even though we have a small manufacturing base at Englefield, we 
decided it is not economical to continue the manufacturing there. The 
costs are higher and we already have the manufacturing facilities here in 
Malaysia where the costs are cheaper. Labour, packaging, and facilities 
are bigger here where we can utilise economies of scale (CP: 
Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
I think frankly throughout the world, the traditional pewter manufacturer 
in the West is becoming increasingly difficult to survive. A massive 
contraction has occurred in the U. K., France, and Germany. The 
traditional pewter manufacturers are terminally declining and we are now 
sourcing product from China, Indonesia and so forth [ ... ]. The giftware 
trading constantly changes. It is very difficult for the U. K. manufacturer 
to keep up with the trend (SP: Suk_Su_Bm_Mp) 
Another example is subsidiary SM which has moved from producing parts and 
components of paper mills to dismantling and selling second hand paper mill 
machines. The main reasons behind the shift are high costs and 
lack of 
competitiveness to produce in the U. K. 
The data shows that many Malaysian companies still perceive that the 
U. K. is 
excellent in technology and R&D and therefore, the strategy of the 
Malaysian 
manufacturing companies is to add value to their products with 
U. K. technology. 
Parts and components, for example, are sourced from cheaper countries: 
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There are cases where we manufacture the shell or incomplete boilers 
since the labour cost is much cheaper here. Then we send it to U. K. We then get the components from them, so it is a very flexible system (CK: Pm-Mf Mm-Mo-CFb) 
It is better for us to manufacture in Thai baht and sell it in Pound sterling 
or Euro (CA: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo_CFb) 
With regards to retailing, two contrasting strategies have been employed. For 
example, subsidiary SJ has closed all of their retailing business in Europe and the 
U. S. and has shifted to franchising and licensing. In contrast, subsidiary SG has 
consolidated its position as a retailer worldwide. The different strategies are, 
however, both related to cost and profit where subsidiary SJ has been burdened 
with the high overhead cost of its European operation which was also not profitable 
whereas, subsidiary SG's European operation is profitable. 
Overall, the rationalisation strategies undertaken by Malaysian parent companies in 
their subsidiaries have not been a total success. There are various reasons for this. 
One, as already noted, is that the many of the U. K. companies were already facing 
problems at the time of their acquisition. A second reason was internal problems 
faced by the parent company, particularly cash-flow problems and increasing debt; 
any such problems were exacerbated by the 'Asian Crisis' of 1997. Some 
companies have also experienced stiff competition. Company CO, for example, first 
exported its car into the U. K. to cater for the low end market and competed on 
cheaper price. It failed, however, to capture substantial market share because of 
competition from other manufacturers. The U. K. passenger car market is very open 
and thus is very competitive. It might also explain that although the cars were cheap 
they were not all that good, and there were much better cars that were not much 
more expensive. 
We need to strengthen our position in the U. K. since our old products are 
not really competitive. We are very limited in terms of product, whereas 
Toyota has 10 new products a year. We have only one product that is 
surely not enough. In U. K., for example, the Proton cars cannot be found 
everywhere in the U. K. It depends on where the dealers are. If you go to 
Bristol and Norwich, yes you can see the WAJA, for example. But when 
you are doing small volume, and you don't have spread of product, your 
composition to the dealers is not very well expanded. So you have to use 
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multi-franchise dealers, dealers that sell multi brands (CO: 
Pm-Mf Mm-MP_Glc) 
In another example, subsidiary SQ had claimed that it used to control 60% of the 
U. K. home refrigerator market; this has now been reduced to 4%. It has to compete 
with cheaper refrigerator from China and Eastern Europe: 
Today, refrigerator penetration into British home is 99.99%. That means 
the only market left is a replacement market or for people that started 
new home. So now the market is smaller and LEC is currently fought for 
that share. The British market also is quite open, the European can come, 
even the Chinese can come, and as a result we don't have enough sales 
because we need to compete (CQ: Pm-Mc_Mp_Glc_Cg) 
The higher operating costs especially in manufacturing have also contributed to the 
failure of some of the investments. This has been cited by 78.9% of the companies 
studied (see Table 7.5): 
By and large, the U. K. is not a low cost manufacturing base but it is a 
good trading port (CA: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
Now we still do manufacturing which is a problem. British 
manufacturing has come to a certain point, for example, where you want 
to source a compressor but nobody in U. K. makes compressors cheap 
enough. We have to import from Eastern Europe. The steel plates for 
refrigerators we imported from Italy since nobody in the U. K. can 
produce them cheap enough. I know that we entered the U. K. for 
technology transfer back into Malaysia. But now after so many years 
England has changed a lot where our manufacturer has found that it is 
not feasible to manufacture in England (CD: Pm-Mc-MP_GLc_Cg) 
Of course the learning took a little bit longer in terms of the high costs of 
manufacturing in the U. K. But we had hoped that the product sales could 
catch up with the costs (CG: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
It is very hard to manufacture in U. K. now. We find that U. K. is a very 
difficult place to manufacture, very expensive (CL: 
Pm-Mf Mc-MP_CFb) 
Among the main contributors to the high costs as raised by Malaysian companies 
are labour costs such as wages (e. g. company CA, CK, CL), very high overheads 
(e. g. company CE), and the obligation to contribute to National Insurance and 
pension funds which are perceived to be very costly (e. g. company CL). 
Many 
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companies regard the cost as being too high to bear, especially in manufacturing, 
and some have slowly restructured their manufacturing activities in the U. K. b%, 
outsourcing their products from low cost countries: 
I would rather relocate the manufacturing because the cost is too high. 
For the Japanese they are coming to the U. K. because the British 
Government gives a lot of incentive to those companies. Those 
companies are enticed with subsidies and grants. If not, it does not make 
sense to manufacture in the U. K. unless for high end product. In our case 
we are not in that segment. Our segment is very price competitive and 
our margins are not huge (CO: Pm-Mf Mm_Mp_Glc) 
The quotation above has also raised the question of why were the Malaysian 
companies not able to access investment incentives. The UK's Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) noted that incentives are often granted for investment in 
regions that have relatively low levels of economic activity and high and persistent 
unemployment or known as an Assisted Area. Companies that are looking at the 
possibility of investing in an Assisted Area, but need financial help may get the 
incentives. Malaysian companies may not be included in the category of supported 
projects since the investment has not created employment or are not in an Assisted 
Area or they entered by acquisition (few incentives offered) or entry was prior the 
incentives put in place (Department of Trade and Industry, 2005). 
A few managers in the parent companies have also attributed the failures to the 
difficulties in finding the right people to handle the business in the subsidiaries. 
About 26.3% of the companies studied cited that they have experienced problem 
with local employees (see table 7.6). They are also dissatisfied with the 
performance of local managers in the subsidiaries, and with the difference in 
motivation between parent and subsidiary managers with regard to the management 
of the business: 
The problem is that you are in Malaysia and the company is overseas. 
The key is to get a manager that you can trust. That is the challenge. It 
also takes time (CR: Pm_Eng_Mm-Mo-Glc) 
Yes, they do it their own way. I am not saying that they are not good. 
(Cl: Pm-R&D_Mm_Mp_Glc) 
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Unfortunately these people are incapable of running the company. They 
are good in technical areas such as workshop manager. But when we let 
them manage the project they are not concerned about the cost structure. 
Managing cost is something that is natural to us. Maybe because we are 
Asian, we are very particular about the cost. So that is the first problem 
we faced (CL: Pm_Mf McýMp_CFb) 
Unfortunately people in the U. K. are not motivated. We extend them 
fund from Malaysia to do contract and so on, because if we make money 
their shares will go up. Even that is not enough to motivate them, to 
change them, so eventually we have to control the management and 
decided to scale down (CM: Pni-Mf Mc-Mp_CFb) 
In the early days, the manager was not up to the mark. Until the current 
incumbent who is very good so we are able to have less meeting to 
review his work and he just produces good work (CP: 
Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
7.4.4 Diversification Strategy 
Diversification allows businesses to grow fragmented. Companies in downstream 
activities, for example, may consider upstream activities as a possible area of 
diversification and business expansion: 
We don't want to put everything in one basket. When the business 
grows, there will be limitation in terms of market. It is the nature of 
business. If you are producing palm oil and then go to downstream 
activities, there will be a stage where it cannot be expanded further. 
When producing products to the level of critical mass, further expansion 
is possible if we venture to other market. It is also because the size of 
business is growing (CG: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
The data show that an important precondition for diversification expansion 
undertaken by the Malaysian company is that the company have excess resources. 
Some may argue that the investing firms can always borrow, if they can persuade 
capital providers that their plans are good. However, Malaysian companies may be 
strange to U. K. financial institutions and may not have international track record to 
enable them to get financing. At the same time the status of the acquired company 
(some are failing) would be best to be funded by internal money. Bigger companies 
such as conglomerates are more likely to adopt a diversification strategy because 
they have to find ways of utilising their excess resources even if the activity is 
unrelated to its existing business. In the case of small companies the data shows that 
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they may face difficulties if they diversify into unrelated business. Company CK, 
for example, is involved in the boiler business as their main activity. It tried to 
diversify into property development and the retailing business but was not 
successful and later disbanded the business: 
To be honest at one stage we were diversifying into development but 
now we are back into boilers. Last time we were trying to do 
development in Penang. We established handi-mart (chain store for DIY) 
and other things. But at the end of the day, do things that you know best. 
Specialise and focus on what you know best (CK: 
Pm-Mf Mm-Mo-CFb) 
Diversification strategy is also influenced by trends and opportunities. It is not a 
fixed strategy but emergent (Mintzberg, 1994b). At one time, there was a trend for 
Malaysian companies to diversify into power generation in Malaysia or in another 
country. This was because this sector was highly profitable and because it was easy 
to get funding from financial institutions. Three of the companies studied, company 
CL, CS and CK are in the power generation business. Company CL's main business 
was initially engineering while company CK's main business is boiler 
manufacturing. Company CS is part of a bigger group involved mainly in the 
construction business before it became involved in the utilities business such as 
electricity and water. Therefore, as far as the Malaysian companies are concerned 
the diversification strategy has evolved over time as new opportunities emerged. It 
other words, they may not have a fix diversification strategy but based on random 
opportunism, an approach similar to an emergent strategy (Mintzberg, 1994). It 
might also follow the same argument of opportunistic strategy by Crick and Spence 
(2005) as discussed in Section 2.3.1. 
Generally, Malaysian investment in the U. K. could be considered as geographical 
diversification strategy. However, diversification of businesses especially into the 
European Union (EU) originated by the U. K. subsidiaries has not happened even 
though the initial motivation was to capture a larger UE market. This is shown in 
Table 7.5 in which three U. K. subsidiaries have diversified into other countries after 
they were taken over by Malaysian companies. The reasons could be due to limited 
capability and opportunity on the part of the U. K. subsidiaries and their inability to 
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raise fund for further diversification. Insufficient funds could in turn be due to 
financial constraints faced by the parent after the Asian crisis and high cost to keep 
the U. K. subsidiaries afloat. The continued losses of the U. K. subsidiaries and the 
deterioration of the UK businesses could also worsen their capability for expansion. 
Malaysian products are also not competitive in the European market and face 
competition from low cost manufacturers from Eastern Europe and China. Different 
motivation between parents and subsidiaries with regards to the direction of 
business of the U. K. subsidiaries could also deter the intended expansion into the 
European market. 
7.4.5 Core Competence Strategy 
Malaysian companies in the U. K. have to some extent employed their core 
competence in the establishment or acquisition of their U. K. subsidiaries. 
However, only 15.8% of the companies studied cited that they are utilising their 
core competence in the U. K. subsidiaries (see Table 7.5). This again confirins the 
earlier finding in Section 6.3.1. They have also, in turn, utilised the existing core 
competence of their subsidiaries. Many Malaysian companies, for instance, have 
used their financial strength in acquiring U. K. companies, in a 'financier and 
debtor' match, where some of the acquisitions can even be categonsed as 'rescue 
operations'. Although financial strength was used initially to secure the target 
company, Malaysian investors have shown restraint in further spending which may 
amplify the failure of some of the subsidiaries to gain profit in post-acquisition. 
Some might argue that by buying a failing company but not making further 
investment will not prevent the new operation continue to fail. However, further 
spending will not guarantee recovery if the company's fundamentals are weak, such 
as deterioration of market shares due to competition and increasing operational 
cost. Malaysian companies are thought to act cautiously in spending more money in 
the subsidiaries due to the uncertainty of the subsidiaries' future: 
We have to do it via acquisition. But we are very pragmatic and cautious. 
We don't simply spend. We have so much money even people are very 
sceptical as to why we are not investing more. There are a lot of projects 
out there. But we are very discriminating to ensure that this project can 
work (CS: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb_Cg) 
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The data also suggest that the parent companies have also extended their strength in 
cost management to revive their subsidiaries in the U. K.: 
The core competence of our company in Malaysia is manufacturing 
management which involves cost control. In U. K., we found our core 
competence when we switched the operation mode of the company. For 
them it is solely technology without thinking of the cost. But we 
managed to turn it around. [ ... ] So being familiar with the industry we have the advantage of doing things in a short period. Other competitors 
can play a small part but they cannot carry the whole project. We 
understand how many days and hours that we can take to finish the 
project (CM: Pm-Mf Mc-Mp_CFb) 
For conglomerate companies, there is a tendency for them to develop new core 
competences. Company CG, for example, has developed their core competence in 
plantation management but has never been involved in retailing unlike their 
subsidiaries in the U. K. This suggests that unlike the focused companies, the 
conglomerate firrns develop their core competence in the periphery. Core 
competence may be developed, owned and stays at the subsidiaries and the 
fragmentation of core competence prevents sharing of knowledge within the group. 
In other words, there is no central core competence because the activities are spread 
across various businesses. 
Malaysian companies have also undertaken a strategy of acquiring core competence 
in the U. K. subsidiaries via acquisition. This was cited by 42.1 % of the companies 
studied (see table 7.5). Specific technology is one core competence that some of the 
subsidiaries in the U. K. have and which the Malaysian companies wish to acquire. 
However, the extent of technology transfer from the U. K. subsidiaries to the 
Malaysian parent companies is unclear. Technology transfer is not guaranteed even 
with wholly-owned subsidiaries, because technology can be embedded in people 
and knowledge can be tacit. Company CQ for example, had acquired subsidiary 
SQ 
for the purpose of technology transfer to Malaysia, but since then is still 
fighting to 
revive the company: 
The original purpose is transfer of technology. But today we are trying 
to revive it in order to maximise its value. If we can revive and make 
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money, we will keep it. If it doesn't work that way, we may well look to 
sell it. But at the moment the purpose is to revive it. So we look at it from the professional business point of view. There is no sentimental 
value since the product has not even been sold in Malaysia (CQ: 
Pm-Mc-Mp_Glc_Cg) 
It has also been suggested that sharing core competence between parent and 
subsidiary is difficult because of the physic distance and limited direct involvement 
of people from the parent in the subsidiary. 
There are, however, some success stories, such as company CL that managed to 
establish a car pulley manufacturing in Malaysia using technology from their 
subsidiaries in the U. K. Company CS, although it had only just acquired its U. K. 
subsidiary, was optimistic about its acquisition: 
It is too early but it is only a matter of time that we start to draw upon 
Wessex Water management resources in terms of technical services and 
expertise to help enhance our other businesses elsewhere (CS: 
I'm Mc Mo CFb Ca) 
---- &I 
Other than to leverage on subsidiaries' technology, the strategy of Malaysian 
investment in the U. K. companies is also probably best described as 'exploitation' 
of brand and goodwill possessed by the U. K. subsidiaries: 
Therefore you have to associate yourself with a company that has been 
noted for the technology. Lotus Group International Ltd is renowned for 
its work for General Motors, Ford, all the major car players, renowned in 
engines, right hand drive (CO: Pm_Mf Mm_Mp_Glc) 
We maintain the company because we know that we have created a name 
for ourselves in machine dismantling. We have to use the U. K. company. 
We cannot use Malaysian company to go there and do the job. So we 
used the name L&G to deal with this business (CM: 
Prn-Mf Mc_Mp_CFb) 
7.4.6 Synergy Realisation 
The Malaysian companies studied stressed that they have managed to realise 
synergy in the forrns of resource and information sharing with Malaysian parent 
companies (see Table 7.5). For example, Malaysian companies whose subsidiaries 
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are involved in manufacturing in the U. K. have outsourced their raw materials from 
associated companies in Malaysia. This has promoted trading between subsidiaries. 
There are also cases in which the labour intensive part of the manufacturing which 
was previously done in the U. K. has been shifted to associated companies in 
Malaysia and re-exported back to the U. K. for assembly. In other words, certain 
activities including non-manufacturing activity such as information management 
have been moved to the lower cost country and in the process, synergy is realised 
via collaboration between business units: 
There are a number of synergies that have emerged from the business. At 
the operational efficiency level, the setup of the business where 
consolidating information for the products was previously done in the 
west, it is now done in Malaysia. It is done at lower cost because labour 
cost is lower, and it is done more efficiently than in the west because of 
the ability to retain better quality people. Everything you move to the 
East is to get lower cost since labour is cheap (SG: Suk_Tr_Bm_Mp) 
Synergy in the form of flows of human resources between parent and subsidiaries 
is, however, limited due to distance and cost. Communication between parent and 
subsidiaries is minimal and/or limited to a few people. Other than normal telephone 
communication, there were occasional visits by people from the parent company. 
A more direct means of human resource sharing is by mutual directorship between 
parent and the subsidiaries. In other cases, some of the U. K. subsidiaries were 
headed by people from the parent company. In the context of subsidiaries that are 
involved in product marketing, the most highly regarded synergy is sharing of 
market information between parent and subsidiaries. To them, sharing market 
information is necessary since the product is manufactured in Malaysia and the 
market is in the U. K. and other countries in Europe. However, there are also 
situations where interrelationship between business units is limited due to the un- 
relatedness of activities between them. This is further inflated by a 'remote' forin of 
management between parent and subsidiaries. 
Synergy has also been realised because of the different levels of skill owned by 
parent and subsidiary. This is a complementary form of relationship which enables 
synergy to be realised: 
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By nature, we are more creative (in overall business management). They 
concentrate more on R&D and design. So it is a good blend. We do swap 
people around. What they can pick up from us, it is transferred to the 
other side (CK: Pm_Mf Mm-Mo-CFb) 
We dictate to them what to do and when to do it in some project. They 
have the technology and we supply them with the management. They 
know how to take things out and put them back. That they know. But 
they cannot manage the things together, shipping and all these things. 
They don't have the management skills (CM: Pm-Mf Mc_Mp_CFb) 
Generally, the extent to which Malaysian companies have managed to realise 
synergy as a result of internationalisation is still unclear. It was difficult to ascertain 
between intended synergy creation and realised synergy between the parent in 
Malaysia and the subsidiary in the U. K. The synergy between Malaysian companies 
and the U. K. subsidiaries as raised by the respondents are justifications for their 
action rather than realisation or achievement of synergy. As Porter (1996) argues, 
the meaning of synergy itself is vague (see Section 3.2.5. ). Malaysian companies 
have tended to concentrate more on ensuring the survival of the U. K. subsidiaries 
rather than managing the synergy between the businesses. 
7.4.7 Ethnic Business Networking 
Most of the respondents believe that business networking is important in any form 
of business, both in Malaysia and in international ventures. Chinese business 
networking or guanxi, for example, remains an influential factor in the business 
environment in Malaysia and in Southeast Asian countries. However, this does not 
have much visible impact on the intemationalisation strategy of Malaysian 
businesses in the U. K., because Malaysian businesses tend to follow the western 
style of business networking rather than the personalised network characteristic of 
Chinese business. None of the companies studied cited having ethnic business 
network in the U. K. (see Table 7.5). This finding confirms the assumption in 
Section 4.4.6 concerning the irrelevance of guanxi in the U. K. investment. 
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Every respondent acknowledged the importance of business networks in Malaysia: 
In Malaysia, networking is very important. But not everybody can 
network. You must have Tan Sri, Dato"' etc. Otherwise how to open the 
door [ ... ]. What is important is not how much you know but who you know. Everybody needs to have networking, it is degree of networking 
(CN: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
The networking is very important particularly with the government, like 
Tan Sri Nik can pick up the phone and call the prime Minister (CD: 
Pm-Mc-Mp_GLc_Cg) 
Networking is important to open doors for business to grow and to gain favours. 
One respondent even believes that guanxi is more important in Malaysia than in 
China. This opinion is however difficult to be validated. In contrast, the main 
element of networking in the U. K. is to capture the market and win client. This is 
different from the networking of the parent company in Malaysia, where the 
purpose is to win the contract, and especially government contracts: 
I think whatever networking you need at that level is already there. It 
doesn't work in the same way as we do in Malaysia. In Malaysia our 
networking has to be at all levels. At the company level, between 
companies, business and bankers, with government, Malaysian 
Incorporated is just like the Japanese. I think it is much less here (SJ: 
Suk_Tr-Mm-MP) 
One Malaysian subsidiary views that, if networking does exist in the context of 
U. K. business, it is definitely not across race such as Chinese with Chinese or 
British with British but professional network: 
Yes we network, but not across race. What I have brought to the 
business, particularly Peter I think, were the contacts we have with the 
manufacturer, suppliers, retailers within our target sector. [ ... ]I 
don't 
think we have structured networking like the Chinese network. We 
don't 
tend to get that in our industry. It is an industry that depends very much 
on individuals (SP: Suk_Su_Bm_Mp) 
37 Honorary titles conferred by the King in appreciation for services to the country. 
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Obviously, while networking is important in the context of Malaysian investment in 
the U. K., it is on a more formal basis - membership of relevant trade and industrV 
associations, and participation in road shows and exhibitions. There are several 
reasons why networking of the guanxi kind is not found in the U. K. Yeung (1999) 
argues that the diversification strategy of Chinese business is motivated by the 
social relationship in the guanxi circle. Yeung, however, based this view on 
investments in the Southeast Asian region. It is possible that social networking of 
the guanxi kind will be found where Chinese business is dominant, but will become 
less relevant outside this environment: 
In our case, we don't do businesses locally (in Malaysia). We don't do 
Chinese networking (CA: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
We don't have any special connection (guanxi). Not here, not in China. 
America, Europe. Nowhere do we have special connection. We have to 
compete in the open market (CN: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb_Cg) 
The more that business is done outside Malaysia, the less important is the guanxi in 
the business. One manager said "When you go overseas people don't even know 
your title. But locally it is very important" (Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb_Cg). A younger 
generation of Chinese businessman who are western educated and spent most of 
their early years in western universities also think differently: 
I don't want to speak about it (Chinese business) which might anger 
people. We are the third or fourth generation of Chinese [ ... ]. We 
don't 
see ourselves as Chinese businessmen. We are Malaysian businessmen. 
We are western educated so we see ourselves more like western 
businessmen. [ ... ] We are not typical 
Chinese which have a limitation in 
how far they can go if they do not bring the professional (CA: 
Prn-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
A second reason for the absence of guanxi networks is that most of the U. K. 
subsidiaries are managed by locals. The local managers either bring with them their 
past network or the subsidiary companies have already established their own 
network. Thirdly, parent companies are not involved in the daily running of the 
business and therefore the parent's networking becomes irrelevant in this case. 
Apparently, there is an inability on the part of the parent company to build business 
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networks because of the different culture and physic distance. To the parent 
company, locals have a better position to establish networks: 
Even if I stay for 10 years in the U. K., networking between market 
communities is not that simple. This guy who is working with us got 
many years in the medical field. It will take years to build brand images 
and so on. If you look at all our customers, the biggest one is chain 
medical stores such as Boots. It took us three years before we could build 
the business to anything substantial, that gives us a good margin. If I 
stay there for 10 years, we will still not be able to do this. Whether you 
like it or not, there is a difference (SE: Suk_Su_Bm_Mp) 
It is also important to note that historically, guanxi had emerged in an environment 
of mistrust and insecurity between merchants and government back in mainland 
China. Early immigrants to South East Asia brought this feeling with them when 
they faced a similar hostile environinent with government and native people (see 
Chapter 3). Because this type of environment is perceived to be absent in western 
countries such as U. K., personalised networking is not necessary for the business: 
I believe I am a true businessman. Truly Malaysian businessman. Do 
manufacturing, trading, after sales services and going international. No 
political connection (CN: Pm-Mc-Mo_CFb_Cg) 
Not so much on 'kamching-kamching"' relationship. But of course in 
every business there are always inter-personal relationships but that is 
more on personal basis (CG: Pm_Mc_Mo_CFb_Cg) 
Generally, the findings about the Malaysian internationalisation process tends to 
agree with the suggestion by Crawford (2000) that the larger the corporation and 
the wider the business activities, the harder it is to maintain ethnic networks. 
Chinese business networks needs the environment of dominant Chinese business 
in 
the market and higher monopoly power in the business which 
facilitate the 
movement of resources. But based on the data, it seems that guanxi that 
is based on 
personalised relationships is not a sustainable strategy in the 
intemationalisation 
process. In addition, not every Chinese businessman 
believes in the business 
network such as guanxi as a valid business strategy: 
38 The expression used by Malaysian Chinese which is equivalent 
for western 'best of buddies'. 
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I am not a believer in this type of network. That is overblown, A good 
businessman anywhere will find partners that they can work with. Like 
Chinese and Taiwan, I feel far more comfortable to work with the British 
or Canadian, Australian. You look at YTL (refer to YTL in Wessex 
Water) there is no Chinese man involved. Every time, these people I 
think, they want something sensational to write. To me what makes 
business sense, you do it. The whole emphasis on working on ethnic 
basis is a wrong footing to start the business. Very, very wrong. Those 
who think along this line is very, very narrow-minded (CP: 
Pm_Mf Mc-Mo-CFb). 
The above comment comes from a family business which has been growing but 
which still remains in private hands until today. They also believe that the Chinese 
business can no longer depend on the network to grow: 
The businessman or consumer will choose products that are best, with 
the best services regardless whoever sells it (CP: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb). 
7.4.8 Targeting Niche Market Segments 
Malaysian companies also invest in niche markets as one of their 
internationalisation strategies. This was represented by 31.6% of the companies 
studied (see Table 7.5). A business that focuses on a niche market is addressing a 
need for a product or service that is not being addressed by mainstream providers, a 
company is not dealing in something that other companies have done and if it has 
been done, it is done it in different ways. Dalgic and Leeuw (1994) for example 
describe niche market as being: 
Sufficient size, to be potentially profitable; 
e No real competitors, or markets which have been 
ignored by other 
companies; 
Growth potential; 
Sufficient purchasing ability; 
A need for special treatment; and 
Customer goodwill. 
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Niche market targeting is also one strategy for entering a new market. Large 
multinationals often have highly sector-specific expansion routes, and leave market 
niches in and around these for SMEs to exploit (Buckley, 1989). 
Niche markets are either small, requiring specialised products, or they may have 
different consumer preferences that are not covered by other available products: 
Here, we are not dealing with something that other people have done. 
Like the first chemical that we were producing earlier, nobody else 
produce it in the world. It is our small niche market. It is where we use 
knowledge to generate product, the real knowledge-economy I would say 
(CI: Pm_R&D_Mm_Mp_Glc) 
It is a smallish company. They own a niche market. They are specialised 
in certain market sector in U. K. Beels Boilers is very active in African 
market. They are also strong in Hong Kong. I don't know how this 
British started to penetrate these markets and started developing these 
market segments (CJ: Pm_Mc__Mp_CFb_Cg) 
Malaysian companies in the U. K. which are targeting niche markets are basically 
companies that find it difficult to compete with other companies in the same 
market. Most of these companies sell products that are produced in Malaysia for the 
U. K. market and countries in the European Union. Company CO, for example, 
started selling their cars in the U. K. market by targeting the pensioner market. This 
market was previously flooded with Eastern European cars such as Skoda, but 
company CO felt that their cars were better in terms of quality. There are also U. K. 
subsidiaries that focus on specific areas such as producing premium products for 
the U. K. market and sourcing cheaper products from other low cost countries. A 
good example is subsidiary CQ which produces high premium fridges for the U. K. 
market. 
Some of these companies' business strategies are to penetrate markets that the big 
companies are not willing to serve because it is uneconomical for them to market 
their products in such an area. Their main business strategy is to produce speciality 
products for a special market and market directly to end consumers: 
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We have now focused on niche marketing, speciality of products, and 
expand our market and customer based at the end consumer level. We 
get a better margin (CE: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo) 
I think on the European front, in certain areas, the big boys don't want to 
go because it is too small for them. We go because it is just right for us 
as we are not big. We can control our production range and all that, and 
we can sell at a higher price which is more attractive to us rather than 
making a lot and selling at low prices (SE: Suk_Su_Bm, 
__Mp) 
The above example shows how subsidiary SE's presence in the U. K. is to find a 
niche market because they are not able to compete with the big player which sells 
medical gloves at low prices. 
The main advantage of niche market servicing is that in this market area, companies 
are able to sell premium products at higher prices and competition from other 
companies is also less because the market is small: 
Why is it important for us to grow globally? Because we believe that 
until an industry that is open, that has no protection capability and where 
you're competing with everybody else in the world, you must be able to 
find niches over market. That would be very good to do. Our preferred 
niche is actually looking at LNG transportation (CH: 
Pm-Svs-Mm-Mp_Glc) 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter shows the process and strategy of Malaysian investment in the U. K. 
Data in this thesis provide examples of the incremental process of market servicing 
strategy. The data suggests that the incremental stage of internationalisation does 
not necessarily start with a physically close neighbouring country. Instead, first 
time investors may invest in a distant country if they can not find a similar 
opportunity in nearby countries. Data on Malaysian companies investing in the U. 
K 
do not show a common route for internationalisation, nor do they suggest an 
ideal 
mode of foreign market servicing. Malaysian companies have taken a 
diversity of 
processes and strategies in their internationalisation paths. 
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The above discussion of the incremental process of investment suggests that 
exporting is the first step in the cycle of interriationalisation which increases foreign 
market experience. Companies which seek to protect or defend a market position 
previously served by export, have established their own sales unit to take over the 
role of marketing in the U. K. This is a defensive strategy rather than a rigorous 
expansion of market horizon. However, the decision to invest directly in the host 
country is not necessarily due to the increase in foreign experience alone. In the 
case of Malaysian companies investing in the U. K., the main strategy is to cut the 
agent out of the market transaction, with the intention of securing long-term 
presence in the U. K. market and beyond. This is a straightforward interrialisation 
procedure, where the transaction costs of using agents are deemed to be too high, 
compared with the costs of carrying out the activity within a foreign subsidiary. 
Acquisition of U. K. subsidiaries, on the other hand, is a strategy to increase 
technology core competence in the home country against other competitors as well 
as to expand competitiveness globally. Although Malaysian companies prefer 100% 
ownership, they still accept shareholding if it is considered sufficient to leverage on 
the U. K. companies' capability and expertise. A majority of Malaysian companies, 
however, prefer to become the controlling shareholder, and if that is not possible, 
they prefer to acquire shares that are considered sufficient to benefit them. 
Malaysian companies also tend to set up a new company in the U. K. to distribute 
Malaysian products. Joint ventures may be considered if the Malaysian companies 
perceive that the local partner can contribute in terms of technology, expertise and 
know how about local culture. Wholly-owned subsidiaries have generally been 
preferred, however, to avoid interference in decision making and to manage the 
resources effectively. 
The strategy of Malaysian investment in the U. K., therefore, depends on the nature 
of the business and products and the size of investment in the subsidiary companies. 
A majority prefer to retain the existing management of their subsidiaries to preserve 
continuity, in addition to accepting the notion that locals are more 
familiar with 
local needs and business environments. Even then, Malaysian shareholders still 
determine the companies' business direction and overall policy. 
The parent 
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companies may be inclined, however, to get involved in the management of the 
subsidiaries if performance is below expectation. 
Networking is often perceived by the scholars in Chinese business studies as the 
heart of corporate manoeuvres, but guanxi is not warranted in every business, and 
especially in western dominated business. In other words, it is less influential in 
overseas operations. Many businesses have adopted western-oriented business 
networking, and this is handled by overseas subsidiaries rather than by the parent. 
Customers' acceptance of the brand name is more important for the business to 
grow. Finally, investing in a developed country is very much about efficiency, cost 
structure, capability and transparency. The ability to find a niche market is 
important, where companies are unable to compete on a larger scale. 
Evidence also suggests that Malaysian investment in the U. K. has often targeted 
ailing companies, and that this opportunistic or emergent strategy has led to some 
failures, as a result of the poor state of the target companies. Generally, many of 
the Malaysian companies have changed their strategy as a result of the failure of the 
investment to contribute to the group's growth. Only a few companies are still 
looking for expansion if there is an opportunity to do so. Although some of 
Malaysian direct investments in the U. K. are not favourable in terms of profit, most 
companies still stick to the strategy of leveraging on the expertise, technology know 
how and experience of their subsidiaries in the U. K. 
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CHAPTER 8: TYPES OF FIRM AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTME. NT 
PRACTICES 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the type of Malaysian firms in the United Kingdom and the 
extent to which this determines their FDI practice. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 
7, firms' investment behaviour can be associated with factors that are embedded 
within the firm such as the ownership and management structures, and the actors 
within the organisation. Mutinelli and Piscitello (1997) suggest that the strategies 
underlying FDI are linked to international experience and other characteristics of 
the parent firm. These factors determine the evolution of their overseas operations 
such as how decisions are made, the initial process of investment, their strategies 
and mechanisms and also their management approaches in the relationship between 
the parents and subsidiaries. Thus, when firms decide to invest abroad they also 
realise that they have to face uncertainties and risks due to the lack of knowledge 
about the socio-economic environment of the foreign country. Their investment is 
also influenced by the amount of tangible and intangible resources demanded by 
their foreign ventures, where small firms may act more prudently than bigger fin-ns 
in foreign operations since they are bounded by scarce financial and managerial 
resources (Mutinelli and Piscitello (1997, p 186). 
As elaborated in Chapter 3, Malaysian fin-ns in the U. K. can be broadly categonsed 
into three groups: Chinese family businesses, conglomerate corporations and 
Government-linked companies (GLC). The Chinese family business is built on 
ethnic business networks (Yeung, 1999), is tightly controlled and has a 
family- 
centric operating structure (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002). This 
description, 
however, was largely based on Chinese capitalism in East and South East 
Asia. In 
conglomerate corporations, the diversification strategy of Malaysian 
firins has 
contributed to their business expansion and added value to the company. 
This 
contrasts with western conglomerate diversification which tends to 
be associated 
with 'conglomerate discount' (Burch et. al., 2000). Conglomerate 
diversification 
within the Malaysian corporation is also opportunity 
driven and this has added to 
the corporate value of the firm (Claessens et al., 2000a). Finally, 
Malaysian GLCs 
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undertake foreign direct investment to acquire foreign technology and expertise to 
spur the home country industrial competitiveness. 
Data and information used in this chapter are mostly drawn from the inten-ie, ývs, 
companies' annual reports, official publications as well as companies' ýN, ebsites. 
The approach of this chapter is to use descriptive tabulation supported by 
qualitative argument. This incorporation of numbers together with narrative 
explanation provides an in-depth account of the subject being presented in this 
chapter. This approach is taken in order to answer the third research question, 
namely the extent to which the firm's character influences their intemationalisation 
methods and strategies. 
8.2 LIMITATION IN THE SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 
The analysis in this chapter has, however, been carried out within certain 
limitations. One of the major constraints is the overlapping characteristics of firms. 
For example, a single firm may be a Chinese family business, or be a GLC, and still 
fit the model of a conglomerate corporation. No mutually exclusive typology fully 
fits the reality. It is useful, however, to think of the companies as belonging to 
these three ideal types, while recognising that many companies share the 
characteristics of more than one of these. Figure 8.1 shows the overlapping 
characteristics of the Malaysian companies studied. It shows that of the six 
conglomerate corporations, five are also Chinese family companies and one a GLC. 
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Figure 8.1: Company Cluster Based on Type 
Con2lomerate 
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Chinese Family Firm 
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Another limitation is the seeming reluctance of respondents to talk about the family 
business during the interviews. The family members and even professional 
managers engaged by the companies were unwilling to talk about family ownership 
in the company. There are even instances of complete denial when asked whether 
their companies can be considered as family business, although the shareholding 
structures suggest otherwise: 
No! I don't consider this as a family business. It is a public company. I 
don't believe in family business (CA: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb) 
I don't consider this as a family business (CB: Pm-Mc-Mp-CFb_Cg) 
Oh! We have discarded that image because eventually you need to 
progress. Although the majority shareholders are family, the terms and 
everything else are very transparent (CG: Pm_Mc_Mp_CFb-Cg) 
In Malaysia, we are actually a public listed company. We have key 
shareholders but they are not the majority. Tan Sri Lim and his family is 
one of the key shareholders. The company is owned through a private 
company which belongs to his associates. Some of them are executive 
directors and some are not (CM: Pm-Mc-MP-CFb_Cg) 
No, this is a public company. I cannot say it is a family business (CN: 
Pm-Mc-Mp_CFb_Cg) 
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The fact remains that the above companies CB, CG, CM, and CN are more than 
35% under the control of family members or family companies. One of the reasons 
for the reluctance to talk could be because the companies themselves are trying to 
downplay or even drop their family business image which may be perceived as 
inappropriate, especially with regards to corporate governance '39because of their 
current status as public listed companies (Plc). Another reason could be the 
negative perceptions relating to family controlled companies. Redding (1994), for 
example, argues that Chinese family business has a limited capability to expand, 
and that there is a concentration of control in the hands of a few family members. 
There are also perceptions that family businesses are secretive and lack 
transparency (Redding, 1993). As such, in a situation where family business may 
not be highly regarded as a business model, promotion of this status could be seen 
as detrimental to the company's image and may even undermine public confidence 
in it: 
In family business, it is very difficult. In the decision making process you 
take many things into consideration like uncles, aunties and all sorts of 
things. All are very confusing (CA: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb) 
Although the majority shareholders are family, the terms and everything 
else are very transparent (CG: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb_Cg). 
8.3 CHINESE FAMILY BUSINESS 
The data suggest that when Chinese family businesses expand internationally, some 
of the Chinese family fin-n's characteristics, such as close-knit networks, tend to 
become irrelevant and insignificant in the new international environment. Table 7.5 
for example shows the absence of guanxi in the U. K. investment. However, the 
motive and practice of investment may still be a reflection of the embedded 
characteristics of the Chinese family business, such as protection and preservation 
of family wealth and matters relating to the management of the company. 
39 The Security Commission of Malaysia stipulates that Malaysian Corporate Governance requires a 
company gives faiTtreatment to all shareholders (especially the rights of minority shareholders), 
has 
transparency, accountability and independence of the Board of Directors (Security 
Commission, 
2005) 
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8.3.1 Wealth Creation as a Motive of Investment 
The textbooks in corporate finance tend to take it as given that the objective of all 
firm investment is to achieve growth in shareholder value. As we have seen, 
however (see Section 3.4.1), family enterprises may need slightly more careful 
consideration. Family enterprises are often the major repository of wealth of the 
family members who are the shareholders; this may mean the business is not only 
considered with the growth of wealth, but also with its preservation and longevity: 
For C&E they have been investing in long terni business which I think is 
part of the Chinese culture, not necessarily Malaysian Chinese. I think it 
is a wealth creation aspect (SG: Suk_Tr_Bm_Mp) 
The investments of such a company can be the result of a combination of 
opportunitism, rent seeking and utilisation of excess resources. In particular, large 
cash balances but limited investment opportunities in Malaysia have driven some 
Chinese family companies to seek opportunities overseas so that their wealth could 
be increased: 
If we put too much money in the bank, the return is limited (CG: 
Pin Mc Mp CFb g) 
_C6) 
A lot of that (projects) involved the role of the key shareholders. To me, 
that is very important because the shareholders are always looking to 
increase wealth. They don't just sit back and say that this business has 
grown enough and I get (certain percentage) per annum in terms of 
dividend. They don't just stop there. They know that income growth is 
about capital growth and an increase of shareholders' value (CS: 
Pm-Mc-Mp_CFb_Cg) 
This is from the owner/manager of a Chinese family business, where the o 
of increasing shareholder value and the objective of increasing family wealth are 
one and the same. As such, intemationalisation by the Chinese family business can 
be considered as a means of increasing both family wealth and shareholder value. It 
also means that the owner-managers have personal motivation to increase their own 
wealth. On the other hand, professional managers could also wish to increase 
shareholder value but with the objective to safeguard their jobs. Although the 
motive of wealth creation is assumed to be important in the context of 
OCFB 
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(Yeung, 1999), it was not highly cited by the respondents in this study. Secrecy on 
family matter could be the cause of this. 
8.3.2 Investment Practices 
Malaysian Chinese family business investments in the U. K. do not seem to beha"'e 
in a similar manner to their parent in Malaysia. This may be due to distance and the 
different business environment between a western country (U. K. ) and an Asian one 
(Malaysia). The investments, in particular, are not based on guanxi, and are not 
within the same ethnic group. Centralisation of control is limited to finance and 
overall direction of the business. There is also an obvious separation between 
ownership and management in the subsidiary, in contrast with that of the parent 
company in Malaysia, where the shareholders are also the managers. 
8.3.2.1 Close Knit Network 
In Chapter 4, studies of Chinese business have emphasised that they are tied 
together in circuitous webs of cross-holding, and have developed through networks 
or guanxi (Redding, 1993; Tsang, 2002). Analysis of Malaysian parent companies 
in this study, however, has found that some Chinese or Chinese family companies 
do not regard ethnic business networking as being paramount in their organisation. 
Further examination of the subsidiaries in the U. K. also did not reveal any obvious 
influence of business networks among close-knit family members or within 
particular ethnic groups (see Table 7.5). Indeed, data on Malaysian investment in 
the U. K. suggest that close-knit networks are not significant for Malaysian Chinese 
family firms in their investment in distant countries: 
I think that whatever networking you need at that level is already there. It 
doesn't work in the same way as we do in Malaysia. In Malaysia our 
networking has to be at all levels. We at the company level, between 
companies, business and bankers, with government, Malaysian 
Incorporated is just like the Japanese. I think it is much less here. (SJ: 
Suk_Tr-Mm-MP) 
Yes we networked, but not across race. What I have brought to the 
business, particularly Peter I think, were the contacts we had with the 
manufacturer, suppliers, and retailers within our target sector. Between 
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Peter and 1, we have 15 yrs experience. We are complementary In that 
aspect I don't think we have structured networking like the Chinese 
network. We don't tend to get that in our industry. It is an industry that depends very much on individuals (SP: Suk_Su_Bm_Mp) 
We don't have any special connection (guanxi), Not here, not in China. America, Europe. Nowhere do we have special connection. We have to 
compete in the open market (CN: Pm_Mf Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
This is in contrast to the concept of 'social capital' in the Southeast Asian region 
described by Cheung (2004) as 'the socially constructed reaction to the political and 
social instability' in the region. This finding, however, supports another suggestion 
by Cheung (2004), that interconnection and transnational. networks among the 
'Chinese diaspora' 40 are relevant to regional internationalisation, but are less 
relevant to internationalisation beyond that domain (and so less relevant to 
4 globalisation' as properly understood). As such, the advantage of the 'Chinese 
diaspora' is limited by regional boundaries. 
The above findings suggest that the 'virtual nation' (Cheung, 2004) cannot be 
constructed if there is no potential community of ethnicity, languages, associations 
and Confucianism. As clearly described in Chapters 6 and 7, except for personal 
relationships developed through business, close-knit networks and ethnicity have 
not played a role in the motivation and intemationalisation strategies of Malaysian 
Chinese family firms. This finding is consistent with that of Gomez (2001) who 
noted that there is no indication that Malaysian Chinese businessmen have sought 
out or worked with British Chinese on investments in similar areas of business. 
Gomez is also doubtful that Malaysian Chinese in the U. K. have networked with 
other ethnic Chinese businessmen from East Asia in the U. K. 
This finding, however, contradicts the suggestion that Chinese capitalism 
institutionalised ethnic networks that permit diasporic co-ethnics to move capital 
across national boundaries (Gomez, 2001). Instead, data on Malaysian companies 
40 Chinese diaspora is being described as a dispersion of an originally homogenous people from a 
common place of origin, and to the elements of shared culture and inter-relationships that continue 
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tend to suggest that the movement of capital across boundaries beyond East and 
South East Asian are more likely to be driven by opportunities, entrepreneurship, 
rent seeking, and the desire to become a part of the global economy rather than 
being confined within ethnic networks. 
8.3.2.2 Centralisation in Management 
Centralisation in the context of this study is the centralised control of decision with 
the shareholder in the parent company, particularly the family member who is also 
the majority shareholder. Family members are involved in the management of the 
subsidiary, except for daily management which is held by local professional 
managers (see Table 8.2). 
Table 8.1: The Element of Controls by the Parent Companies of the U. K. 
Subsidiaries 
Malaysian 
Company 
Centralised 
decision making 
Periodic 
Reporting 
Control of 
finance 
Malaysian in 
subsidiary's Board 
of Directors 
CA (cFb mf su) V/ V V/ 
CB (cFb_svs cg) V/ 
CG (cFb_c V/ V/ 
CJ (CFb_Cg) V/ 
CK (cFb mf) V/ 
CL (cFb_mf) 
CM (CFb_Mf) V/ V/ 
CN (cFb_mf cg) 
CP (CFb Mf Su) 
CS (CFb_Svs_Cg) V/ 
Frequency 5 2 5 9 
Percentage 
1 
50% 20% 50% 90% 
Source: Author's, Survey 
However, centralised control in the case of Malaysian parent companies and their 
U. K. subsidiaries is rather limited to finance, budget and overall business policy. 
The physical distance between the parent in Malaysia and subsidiaries in the U. K. 
and the absence of personnel from the parent limits control of the daily operation. 
Table 8.1 shows that only 50% of the OCFB companies studied could be 
considered as undertaking a centralised form of decision making. About 90% 
to link them. It refers namely to the emigration of the Chinese out of China over the past 
150 years, 
scattered mainly in East and Southeast Asian countries (Tracy, 2002). 
270 
considered that being in the Board of Directors would enable control and 
monitoring. However, 50% of the OCFB companies studied agreed that the 
decisions with regard to the use of cash and funds have to be approved by the 
parent companies. 
Where centralised control is applicable to policy and financial matters, daily 
operations are more likely to be decentralised with the subsidiaries which 
communicate with the parents through some fon-n of reporting system: 
The ownership of the business is very hands-on ownership. How budget 
is approved is very much through contact and consultation. We submit 
our budget and discuss whether it is appropriate to carry on (SP: 
Suk_Su_Bm_Mp) 
The MD has retired and now we have a Malaysian MD that we report to. 
So now Malaysian far more interested and come here more regularly. In 
the last 12 months, he has been here four to five times. Mr Chew comes 
here four to five times. They spend a lot of time here. Understand the 
business and get involved in what need to be done. We are now in the 
middle of transferring the reporting on South Africa to Malaysia, from 
reporting to the U. K. as it used to be (SL: Suk_Mf Bm_Mp) 
Centralised control in the family business depends on the level of ownership 
(Carney, 1998), that is on whether the subsidiary is privately owned or a public 
company, and on the level of multinationality. The data show that centralised 
control is usually exerted by parent companies over small subsidiaries where the 
parent has whole ownership; centralisation is less likely when the parent has only a 
minority shareholding due to limited voting power. Table 8.1 shows that 
centralised control was not cited by company CJ which does not wholly own the 
U. K. subsidiary. 
The level of multinationality in the family company also affects centralisation. 
Company CN, for example, has decentralised. its international operations according 
to region: 
This is not a typical Malaysian company. We maybe the only company 
trying to be a true multinational. We manage our company 
based on 
geographical territory. Malaysia is not mentioned at all. 
(He shows the 
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researcher the company's chart). So if you ask me about the Malaysian 
turnover, I will scratch my head. We have broken down Asia into four 
zones. Malaysia is in the Southeast Asian zone. We also include Australia and New Zealand in Southeast Asia, whether they like it or not. We broke down China into four zones (CN: 
Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-M-CR) 
It is, however, unclear whether this arrangement is influenced by the family or the 
conglomerate nature of the enterprise, since company CN is an example of the 
'family conglomerates' mentioned earlier. The arrangement may even be due to the 
company's large international operations, which make it unfeasible to have 
centralised control. This suggests that for a multinational company, even with the 
help of electronic communications, it is still difficult to have the same style of 
centralised management and decision making as a Chinese family business where 
the control is at hand. 
8.3.2.3 Owner-management 
The separation of ownership and management in Malaysian Chinese family firms is 
not a common phenomenon. Having a family member in the top management post 
clearly distinguishes between the structures of management of family firms and 
firms with other forms of ownership in the Malaysian companies studied. In the 
family business, the owner and the family members hold important posts in the 
company (Lee and Tan, 2001). This study shows that in Malaysian family-owned 
companies, the owner and family members also hold the top posts such as the 
Executive Chairman, CEO or Managing Director. They also hold executive 
positions on the Board of Directors (BOD). In the Malaysian context, the BOD 
consists of. (1) Executive Director who is involved in the daily management of the 
company; (ii) Independent Non-executive Director who acts independently of 
management, is free from any business or other relationships that could materially 
interfere with the exercise of their independent judgement, and who provides 
unbiased and independent views, advice and judgement; and (iii) Non-independent 
Non-executive Director who acts independently of the management but may have 
other forms of interest in the company. Table 8.2 shows the composition of family 
members and professional managers on the BOD in the parent companies. 
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Most family members who sit on the BOD hold executive positions. Company CS 
as shown in Table 8.2, has more than half of its BOD members who are siblings. 
However, there are companies with executive directors who are not family 
members (e. g. company CA, CB, CG, CK, CM and CS). A quite different 
phenomenon is observed for company CN in which the member of the family does 
not hold an executive position. Further analysis, however, revealed that this 
company is actually a subsidiary of another family controlled company where the 
family member already holds an executive position in the holding company. In 
general, in the parent company, the family members who are also the shareholders 
are directly involved and hold executive positions in the management of the 
company. 
Table 8.2: Composition of Family Members and Professional Managers in the 
Boards of Directors of the Parent Company 
Malaysian Members of Board of Directors 
Company Directors Family ember* Pro fessional M nager 
Total Total x Total x NX 
CA (CFb-Mf Su) 7 1 1 6 4 2 
CB (CFb-Svs_Cg) 9 2 2 6 4 2 
CC (Glc_Bk) 9 - - 9 3 6 
CD (Gle-Mf Su_Cg) 9 - - 9 3 6 
CE (Mf Su) n. a. - - n. a. - - 
CF (GIc. Eng) 9 - - 9 1 8 
CG (CFb_Cg) 12 3 2 9 1 8 
CH (GIc-Svs) 7 - - 7 1 6 
CI (Glc_R&D) 13 - 13 n. a n. a 
CJ (CFb_Cg) 9 2 1 7 6 
CK (CFb_Mf) 7 2 2 5 1 4 
CL (CFb_Mf) 9 3 - 6 - 6 
CM (CFb 
- 
Mf) 7 3 3 4 1 3 
CN (CFb 
- 
Mf Cg) 8 2 6 
-- 
3 
CO (GIc-Mf Su) 14 14 2 12 
- CP (CFb Mf Su) - - - - 
CQ (Glc_Cg) 12 12 2 10 
CR (Glc_Eng) I -I -I -I - - - 
CS (CFb-Svs-Cg) 15 8 8 6 
Note: * Family member who is also major shareholder; X: Executive; NA: iNon-r-xecutive 
Source: Bursa Malaysia (2005) 
Mostly, the owner or the family members are involved in the day to day operations 
of the business and sits on the Board of Directors of the company. in company 
CA 
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and CB, for example, the CEO is also the single major shareholder who most of the 
time makes the final decision: 
(On final decision) Yes! (I will decide) because I am the CEO. I have to 
take the responsibility. If everything goes to the Board, I will close shop (CA: Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb) 
Tan Sri owns about 30% of the shares in Company CB. Since Company 
CB is an owner-managed company, he is involved in the day to day 
operation of the company (CB: Pm-Mc___, Mp_CFb_Cg) 
The influence of major shareholders in family business is also high. There is the 
personal motivation of the major owner in the corporate decision making: 
He (the major owner) likes to take the risk. He is very entrepreneurial in 
the sense that if there are opportunities and the investment have a 
potential for good return he will invest in it it is 100% 
(shareholder's role) (CB: Pm-Mc__, Mp_CFb_Cg) 
The above statements give us an idea of how powerful the majority owners in these 
companies are, even when the company is a public listed company. Corresponding 
to this, a strong indication of how the family member-owner is involved in the 
management of family controlled company is given by the following assertions: 
It is family owned. They are also the majority shareholder and therefore 
the company has a lot of owner management and influences (CS: 
Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
About the influence (by the family) yes, being they majority shareholder, 
I think they also command influences (CG: Pm_Mc_Mo_CFb_Cg) 
The Group MD who is also the major shareholder is the one that makes 
the final decision (CL: Pm-Mf Mc_Mp_CFb) 
Major shareholder is fully involved (CM: Pm_Mf Mc_Mp_CFb) 
Every quarter, we are 'butchered' by Tan Sri. It is a quarterly strategic 
business meeting. He is very much involved in the company operation 
(CN: Pm-Mc-Mo_CFb-Cg). 
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A high degree of family-major shareholder's involvement in the daily operation of 
the parent company has brought about the possible underlying motive and strategiv 
of such behaviour as discussed in Chapter 7: 
A lot of that (projects) involved the role of the key shareholders. To me, 
that is very important because the shareholders are always looking to 
increase wealth. [... ] income growth is about capital growth and an 
increase of shareholders value. To ensure appreciation of share value. I 
don't complain about the fact that shareholders, the X Family, is very 
involved in the business (CS: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
The above statement shows how the Director of company CS describes the 
involvement of family members in the running of business, with the motive of 
increasing their family wealth. It is indifferent between big and small family firm 
whereby they have similar motive of wealth creation. It is common that the key 
position in the management hierarchy, such as the CEO or Managing Director, is 
held by the family member. 
This study further revealed that in the U. K. subsidiary of Chinese family company, 
the involvement of family members in the subsidiary of a family-owned parent 
company is also high, as indicated in Table 8.3. However, it is not as high as in the 
parent companies. Their involvement in the U. K. subsidiaries is only on the board 
of directors and none in daily management. In the companies studied, none of the 
family members have become the CEO or Managing Director of the U. K. 
subsidiary. The Malaysian expatriates that do manage the companies are 
professional managers. Still, the separation of ownership and management is 
limited to non-core decisions. Family members are highly involved in policy and 
financial matters. 
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Table 8.3: Composition of Professional Manager and Family Member in Board 
of Directors of the U. K. Subsidiaries 
U. K 
Subsidiary 
Category of 
Parent 
Total 
Directors 
Professional 
(British/Malaysian) 
Owner/Family 
Member 
SA CFb-Mf 5 British= 1 
Malaysian =4 
Owner =I 
(Previous year) 
SB CFb_Cg 2 Malaysian =1 Siblings =I 
SD CFb_Cg 4 Malaysian =4 
SE Unknown 3 British =2 Owner =1 
SF Glc-Eng 10 British =7 
Malaysian =3 
SG CFb_Cg 3 British =2 Family Owner =1 
Si CFb_Cg 8 British =3 
Japanese =2 
Malaysian =2 
Family owner =1 
SK CFb-Mf 7 British =1 
Malaysian =3 
Co-owner =I 
Father & Son 2 
SL CFb Mf 4 Malaysian =4 
Sm CFb-Mf 5 British =1 
Malaysia =2 
Co-owner =I 
Family owner I 
SN CFb Cg 3 British =3 
so Glc-Mf 6 British =4 
Malaysian =2 
S02 Glc-Mf 5 British =I 
Malaysian =4 
SP CFb Mf 5 British =3 Family owner 2 
SQ Glc_Cg 4 British =2 
Malaysian =2 
SS CFb_Cg 13 British =8 
Malaysian =2 
Family 
Owner/siblings =3 
Note: Information on company SC, SH, S1 and SR are not available. 
Source: ICC Information Database and Author's Survey. 
The above Table 8.3 shows that almost all subsidiaries of family-owned parent 
companies have family members on their Board of Directors; the exception is 
company SN which is owned indirectly through a U. S. -based Intermediate 
company. This suggests that although Malaysian family members are rarely 
involved in daily operations, they are highly represented in higher decision making 
such as on the boards. Therefore, direct management from the family member in the 
parent company also occurs in the foreign subsidiaries, albeit at a 
different 
management level. As such, the family members remain visible in their overseas 
subsidiaries, indicative of the importance of control in Chinese family 
business. 
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8.3.2.4 Role of Professional Manager 
Earlier study of Chinese family business showed a minimum involvement of 
professional managers in the organisation (Carney, 1998) due to issues such as trust 
and the risk of information dissemination outside of the family circle. However, 
Malaysian Chinese family business, unlike other Chinese family business in Asia, 
shows more willingness to expand and modernise business activity (Yeung, 1999). 
The data in this study suggest that one of the reasons is limited managerial capacitY 
within the family, so that they have to bring in professional managers to manage the 
growing family business: 
This company is run by professionals. In my case, it is very straight 
forward, all driven by corporate goals and objectives. I believe if you run 
professionally it is the only way for you to expand (CA: 
Pm-Mf Mc-Mo-CFb). 
This finding confirms suggestion in the literature on Chinese family business 
suggests that managerial resources within the family become exhausted once the 
company expands and grows (Camey, 1998; Tsang, 2002). Even within their 
business domain such as in the domestic market, it is inevitable that family 
businesses have to hire professional managers. This could explain why most U. K. 
subsidiaries are run by professional managers. Table 8.2 and 8.3 clearly show the 
high composition of professional managers in the parent company as well as the 
U. K. subsidiaries. 
There is also a shift in the family business in terms of a high level of educational 
attainment among the later generation. The founders are normally former 
immigrants from mainland China who have grown the family business based on 
limited capability. The founders have reallsed the importance of education for their 
children, and the second generation family members are normally well educated, 
with some graduating from universities in the West. Therefore, many second 
generation family members are also professional managers in their own right. This 
is a comment from a second generation Chinese who graduated from Harvard 
University, but whose father had emigrated from China: 
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We are focused in a very professional way because we are also 
professional people (CG: Pm-Mc-mo_CFb-Cg) 
The companies, however, view the importance of the professional managers as 
providing checks and balances, and also showing to public shareholders that the 
companies are professionally managed: 
Check and balance between major shareholder and professional manager. 
Major shareholders give suggestions and the manager would see whether 
they make sense or not, give a feedback, and then have discussions. To 
be safe and in order for the company to expand, there is a need for the 
professional manager to be part of the process (CG: 
Pm Me Mo CFb 
Eventually there is a need to hire more professionals. Existing owners 
have become older and wom out and have started losing creativity. So 
now we start to hire people and have the second layer, eventually (CK: 
Pm-Mm-Mo_CFb) 
Another occurrence in the public company, including family controlled companies, 
is the implementation of Employees Shares Option Schemes (ESOS) as a reward 
for staff. As a result, the professional manager has also now become a company 
shareholder. Although the shareholding might not be big, to the company this will 
serve to ensure that the professional manager is committed to the company (e. g. 
company CB and CS). At the same time, the professional manager has slowly 
become the owner of the company albeit through a very small shareholding in the 
company. 
Although the level of involvement of professional managers in Chinese family 
business has increased over time, their authority is still limited. The main positions 
are still held by family members. Professional managers rarely have executive 
authority on the Board of Directors: 
Professional managers do the day to day running and administration. 
They report to the MD and the MD reports to the Board. If it involves 
policy, the MD will be involved. After a proper conclusion 
is reached, 
then it will go to the Board for endorsement 
(CM: 
Pm-Mf Mc_Mp_CFb) 
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These findings are similar to those reported by Carney (1998) on Hong Kong 
Overseas Chinese, where he found that the important decision making and 
management of overseas Chinese companies remained in the hands of close-knit 
family members and were rarely delegated to professional managers. 
The professional manager has not only become an important element of 
management for large family businesses, but also for smaller family companies. 
Company CP, for example, established as a small family business, has expanded 
tremendously over the decades, with increasing involvement of professional 
managers: 
By and large, the company is managed by professional here in Malaysia 
as well as in the U. K. In Malaysia, we have professional management. 
We have executive director and other departmental head and they run the 
business (CP: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb) 
The dependence on professional managers in foreign subsidiaries is even more 
critical due to the physical distance and lack of capacity of the family members in 
managing remote investment units. The family member is needed more in the 
management of the parent company over the relocation to manage foreign 
subsidiary. Only if the parent company requires more control of the investment will 
they assign Malaysian professional managers in the subsidiaries (but not family 
member), as in subsidiaries SG and SJ. Otherwise, local professional managers are 
hired to run the business. 
We can thus conclude that in the case of a family controlled company, the company 
can only survive on internal resources if they are small and stick with the status 
quo. Once the company expands, and in particular overseas, there is an overriding 
need for external human resources so that the company can be professionally 
managed and so remain competitive internationally: 
We have experience, and they do value. We appreciate the importance 
of professional manager in the business (SP: Suk_Su_Bm_MP) 
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Although professional managers run the foreign subsidiaries, the power and 
decision making are still within the control of family members. The Chinese famil-v 
business in Malaysia, however, has slowly transformed into a new hybrid of 
business entity, with more professional managers than previously. Also, new blood 
family members, having received better education, are professional managers in 
their own right. 
8.4 CONGLOMERATE CORPORATION 
Conglomerate corporations have resulted from firms undertaking diversification 
into unrelated activities. In the case of Malaysian conglomerates in the U. K., some 
have invested in un-related activity while there are companies that have invested in 
a weakly related activity (Davis et. al., 1994). Weakly related means the activity in 
the U. K. is related to other activities in Malaysia within the same production chain. 
There are also investments in business activity that are related with the already 
diversified un-related business in the parent company. In the case of diversification 
into unrelated activities, it can be considered as a strategic intent, where the move 
into a wider investment portfolio is motivated by the management and financial 
capability of the parent company, rather than by any other relatedness to existing 
activities. 
8.4.1 Form of Diversification in the U. K. 
Diversification by Malaysian companies into the U. K. can be classified Into three 
categories, namely vertical diversification, horizontal/geographical diversification 
and conglomerate diversification (Buckley and Casson, 2002). This classification Is 
used in Table 8.3 to present the diversification activities of the companies studied. 
The company is classified as focused if at least 90% of their revenues are 
derived 
from one segment of activities, and as diversified if none of the single segment 
activities accounts for more than 90% of the company's total revenue. 
Single 
segment means that the activities are closely inter-related to each other, as in the 
manufactUnng and trading of the same products. Claessens et al. (2002) classify 
firms as single-segment if at least 90% of their total sales are derived 
from one two- 
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digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) System segment. Firms are classified as 
multi-segment if they operate in more than one two-digit SIC industry and none of 
their two-digit SIC segments account for more than 90% of total firm sales (P. 8). A 
firm's diversification level is based on the number of its segments. The 
diversification level of the company is Alow' if they are only involved in a few 
segments of business and 'high' if they are involved in multi-segments of business 
including unrelated segments. 
Table 8.4: Home and U. K. Business Approach 
Level of Parent' 
Diversification in 
Malaysia 
Diversification Approach into the U. K. 
Malaysian 
Company 
(None/Low/Medium 
/High) 
Vertical 
Diversification 
(Vd) 
Horizontal/ 
Geographical 
Diversification 
(Hd) 
Conglomerate 
Diversification 
(Cd) 
CA (CFb Nlf Su) Low Vd 
CB (CFb_Svs_Cg) High Hd 
CC (GIc Bk) None Hd 
CD (GIc-Mf Su Cg) Low Vd 
CE (Mf Su) None Vd 
CF (GIc-Eng) None Hd 
CG (CFb_Cg) High Vd Cd 
CH (Glc_Svs) Low Hd 
CI (GIc-R&D) None Hd 
CJ(CFb Cg) High Hd 
CK (CFb-Mf) None Hd 
CL (CFb_Mf) None Hd 
CNI (CFb Mf) Low Vd 
CN (CFb Mf 
- -Cbl 
Low Hd 
CO (GIc Mf Su) Low Vd 
CP (CFb Mf Su) None Vd 
CQ (Glc_Cg) High Cd 
CR (Glc_Eng) None Hd 
CS (CFb_Svs_Cg) Medium Cd 
Source: Author's Survey; Bursa Malaysia (2005), see also Bumey ana k-'asson 
(2002) and Claessen et al., (2002) 
Vertical diversification occurs when the company diversifies into a new area which 
is 'forward' or 'backward' to its core or traditional activities. Based on Table 8.4, 
six companies are involved in forward vertical diversification, namely companies 
CA, CD, CE, CG, CO and CP- 'Forward' diversification here typically means that 
these companies have set up or acquired sales subsidiaries in the 
U. K, to meet 
demand which they have previously supplied through exports. Only company 
CNI 
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undertook 'backward' vertical diversification, when it acquired a company which 
was originally one of its suppliers. 
Horizontal diversification occurs when Malaysian companies acquire U. K. 
subsidiaries and undertake business similar to the parent's core or traditional 
business. Eight out of the nineteen companies studied are involved in horizontal 
diversification. Horizontal diversification is in these cases always accompanied by 
geographical diversification, as the companies are expanding their traditional 
business into a different country. 
The companies under study, in their investments into the U. K., show two slightly 
different forms of diversification. One of these occurs when a company in 
Malaysia invests in the U. K. in an activity unrelated to the core activity of the 
parent. This is clearly diversification in the simple sense, on the path towards the 
creation of a diversified conglomerate. Only three Malaysian companies, CG, CQ 
and CS, are invested in totally new activities (see Table 8.4). Subsidiary of 
company CG namely subsidiary SG involved in the manufacturing and retailing of 
toiletries, whilst the main activity of company CG in Malaysia is plantations. 
However, this diversification can also be described as vertically integrated, since 
the oil palm activities in Malaysia produce raw materials for the toiletries products. 
Company CQ acquired a refrigeration factory in the U. K. i. e. company SQ, which 
is totally unrelated to its core activities in Malaysia. Finally, company CS can also 
be considered to have undertaken conglomerate diversification when it acquired a 
U. K. water company i. e. company SS, since it had no previous experience in water 
supply. In this case, however, the company argued that it had experience in 
regulated utility businesses (for example in power generation in Malaysia and 
electricity generation in Australia), and that this gave relevant 'related' experience. 
The second occurs when the parent company in Malaysia is already a diversified 
conglomerate, and invests in the U. K. in an activity which is related to one of its 
existing activities. This is shown by company CB and CJ in Table 8-5. We can 
either regard this kind of investment as 'concentration on existing activities' (and so 
not a manifestation of 'diversification'), or we can regard it as 'confirmation of 
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diversification'. The business of their U. K. subsidiaries is the horizontal expansion 
of the parent's conglomerate activities in Malaysia. Company CJ, for example, Is 
involved in retailing and hotel operation in Malaysia. The company has extended 
these two operations into the U. K. by acquiring subsidiary SJ which is involved in 
retailing and the U. K. -based Corus and Regal Hotel chains. These companies can 
be described as multi-foci, where originally they were a focused company. Over 
the years they have developed different segments of businesses that have eventually 
become free-standing. These companies therefore have multiple core activities 
which makes them conglomerates: 
The core business of the company comprises of six businesses. Since the 
business is big by itself, they are also a core. As you know (we) are a big 
conglomerate and an investment holding company. So we have several 
core businesses (CQ: Pm_Mc_Mp_Glc-Cg) 
Looking at the business of the KLK itself, we are focusing on four 
business sectors: plantation, manufacturing, properties and retailing. Side 
by side of course we have overseas investment. Nevertheless we are 
focusing on four core businesses (CG: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
Another observation is that conglomerate companies that have been involved in 
conglomerate activities in foreign countries are also involved in conglomerate 
activities in the U. K. In other words, they have been involved in unrelated business 
activity in another country prior to entering the U. K. market. A possible explanation 
of this circumstance is that a conglomerate is naturally big and therefore is more 
capable of venturing into unrelated diversification activities compared with a 
smaller company, even in industrialised countries. 
Looking at conglomerate geographical diversification, the data suggest that most 
Malaysian conglomerates still undertake unrelated conglomerate diversification 
in 
the domestic rather than foreign market due to the perceived lower risks involved. 
Focused companies also definitely venture internationally into businesses that they 
are familiar with, and these are the same activities as their home country 
business. 
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Table 8.5: Conglomerate Diversification of Malaysian Companies 
Malaysian Conglomerate Multi-foci activities in Malaysia Activities of the U. K. Subsidiari 
CB Manufacturing activities - Hotel operator 
- Consumer marketing and direct 
selling 
- Investment holdings 
- Hotels, Recreation development 
- Financial services 
- Property development 
- Gaming and lottery 
CG - Plantation Manufacture and distribution of 
- Manufacture of palm and cocoa toiletries products 
product 
- Manufacture of gloves and other 
rubber products 
- Investment holding 
- Manufacture of parque floor 
- Property development 
ci - Retail operation Retailing of home products 
- Hotels Hotel operator 
- Food and confectionary 
- Financial services 
- Property development 
- Travel and tourism 
CN - Manufacturing industrial products - Manufacture and sale of air 
- Distribution of vehicles pollution control and 
- Ship building and repairing environmental products 
- Property development - Nianufacture of air-conditioning 
- Investment holdings roducts 
CQ - Oil palm cultivation & other - Manufacture of refrigerator 
agriculture farming 
- Property development & 
investment 
- Manufacture of tyre and other 
rubber based products 
- Automotive dealership 
- Hire purchase financing 
- Cinema operation engineering 
services 
- Warehousing 
- retailing 
- Travelagency 
CS - Property development 
Water treatment and supply 
- Manufacture of ready mixed 
concrete 
- Civil engineering 
- Aircraft chartering 
- Plantation 
- Car rental 
- Travel agent 
- Financial services 
- Internet business 
Power generation 
Source: Bursa Malaysia (2005) 
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8.4.2 Strategic Consideration Of Conglomerate Diversification 
Malaysian conglomerate firms argue that they are involved in multi-product 
activities. Their large size has meant that they are able to segment their actn-ities 
into multi-cores that are then treated as separate businesses: 
Since the business is big by itself, they are also a core. As you know (NA'e) 
are a big conglomerate and an investment holding company. So we have 
several core businesses. Since we are already in these big core 
businesses, we are also a conglomeration in all these core businesses 
(CD: Pm-Mc-MP_GLc-Cg) 
The strategic consideration is to maintain the existing conglomerate structure. For 
most of the companies, once they have diversified they will forever remain 
diversified. What this means is that, once the company is involved in multiple 
activities, over a period of time each activity will develop into a strong division by 
itself Then with the holding system, each business in the hierarchy is transfon-ned 
into a 'separate' core business but still remains within the hierarchy. Then the loose 
system of investment holding which allows most of the subsidiaries to run their 
businesses more independently, allows this company to further expand which 
results in the birth of a big conglomerate or a holding company of hundreds of 
subsidiaries. Company CQ, for example, will not stop looking to expand their core 
business, as pointed out by its director: 
Still looking for other businesses that have potential to become core 
business. We want to get more involved in power generation. We choose 
power generation because it has a future (CQ: Pm-Mc-Mp_Glc_Cg). 
8.4.3 Managing the Subsidiaries 
There are instances of direct involvement of the managers from the parent 
companies in subsidiaries owned by the conglomerate. An observation 
from the 
data shows that parent's representative is holding top management post 
in their 
U. K. subsidiaries which may be related to the size of their investment. 
Direct 
involvement by the parents in the management of a big investment is essential so 
they would be able to monitor their investment and minimise the risk of 
losing their 
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money. Therefore, they have appointed Malaysian expatriates to top management 
posts in their U. K. subsidiaries (e. g. company CG, CJ, CQ and CN): 
The Chairman is in the Board. In the financial side we also have 
representative. If not we don't know how they are performing. So we let 
them to do the business. We are not restrict them in managing the daily 
business, but we oversee them in different angle, so they can execute task 
properly (CG: Pm-Mc-Mo-CFb-Cg) 
LEC is run by a British but the MD is Malaysian who has resided many 
years in the U. K. He is married to a British, and he himself is half 
British. He maybe a British citizen but he is still Malaysian (CD: 
Pm-Mc-Mp_GLc-Cg) 
The reason for having Malaysians run the U. K. subsidiaries is also to enable the 
parent company to revive the subsidiary: 
Because we have a direct control and because it is in financial 
difficulties. A lot of Malaysians involve, which is good. But on the other 
hand, the local people are in the day to day operation (CD: 
Pm_Mc_Mp_GLc_Cg) 
8.5 GOVERNMENT-LINKED COMPANIES (GLCs) 
In Chapter 3, it was stated that most GLCs are owned by Khazanah Nasional, a 
government investment arms which invests on behalf of the country: 
Khazanah Nasional is the investment holding arm of the Government of Malaysia 
and is empowered as Government's strategic investors. As trustees to nation's 
financial assets, our main objective is to promote economic growth and make 
strategic investments on behalf of the government which would contribute towards 
nation building 
(Khazanah Nasional, 2005) 
This study on GLC companies show that their overseas investment is directly or 
indirectly to assist Malaysia to achieve growth in the certain areas of the economy, 
especially with regard to technology transfer and overall industry competence. 
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8.5.1 Motive for Investing Abroad 
The government's direct involvement as a shareholder in Malaysian companies is 
concentrated in areas which show one or more of the following characteristics: 
one, the area is considered to be of 'strategic' importance (where 'strategic' here is 
defined by the concerns and priorities of the Malaysian government); two, the area 
is considered to be high technology (and so valuable to the industrial future of 
Malaysia); and three, and most importantly, the area is one which will contribute to 
national development as a whole. In Table 6.1, there are eight GLCs such as 
Companies CC, CD, CF, CH, C1, CO, CQ and CR. The majority of them have 
acquired the U. K. companies under strategic assets seeking motive i. e. to own the 
technology. The motivation of FDI by GLCs is related to the government's 
industrial policy and the motive to achieve national competitive advantage in 
product and services (Porter, 1998). Company CO, for example, was established by 
the government to spearhead heavy industry development in Malaysia, especially in 
the automobile sector: 
This company was set up to be the main catalyst of the industrial sector 
especially when the government introduced the Industrial Master Plan. 
To be the catalyst in Malaysia plus for the country's industrialisation. It 
is to spur the industry (CO: Pm-Mf Mm-M-p-Glc) 
The intention was also to expand the export market and at the same time to reap the 
benefit from technology advancement in the U. K. automobile industry. The 
company had acquired Lotus Cars Ltd, a well-known British car engineering 
company. Company C1, which is owned by a government statutory body, has 
retained its research centre in the U. K. to enable them to take advantage of R&D in 
rubber products. A similar objective is held by the alliance between company CF 
and subsidiary SF, which is the market leader in construction engineering in the 
U. K. 
The other objective is to increase competitive advantage of the country in a 
particular sector of the economy. Company CH, for example has invested in many 
countries to help the country's competitive advantages in the shipping industry and 
to promote export from Malaysia. 
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The company was set up in 1968 under government desire to create 
national shipping line. More importantly at that time was to address trade balance because Malaysia is a large exporting nation. A lot of cargo destine for. It was also established to facilitate the government's desire to 
correct balance of payment (CH: Pm-Svs-Mm_Mp_Glc). 
Another example is company CC which has a branch in London, New York and 
Tokyo to monitor the development in international financial market so Malaysia 
would be able to react to any changes in the world economy that may affect the 
Malaysian economy; 
There are three different functions. First, because foreign exchange at 
that time is traded 24 hours a day, because of the time zone different, we 
need the center there to monitor our position. If the market crash, we 
know the position there while we are sleeping here. That why we have 
London and New York branches and subsequently we have Tokyo. So 
we have covered 24 hours [ ... ]at the same time it so call a listening post, to watch, learn anything that is new in the market and the place where 
our officers go there to learn, and bring something meaningful home. It is 
also to expose our officer to the players there, other major bank in the 
world. All maj or banks in the world are in London (CC: 
Pm-Bnk_Mm_Mp_GLc) 
In these companies, the government plays a very important role, especially with 
regard to big decisions. "Our Prime Minister also has a personal interest in this" 
said one of the directors of company CO, indicating the relationship of the company 
with the government. 
8.5.2 Separation of Ownership and Management 
The management structure in a GLC normally involves the separation between 
management and ownership in which all managers are professional managers (see 
Table 8.2). The government as the shareholder is represented by government- 
owned institutions. Professional managers do not own shares in the companies and 
are normally appointed by the government to act on its behalf The board of 
directors, which is the highest ranked decision maker, makes decisions based on the 
interest of the government, but the companies are run as private 
firins. The 
government as the owner has the authority to appoint Board of Directors, senior 
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management and make major decision such as contract awards, formulate strategy, 
restructuring and financing, acquisition and divestment (Kazanah Nasional Berhad, 
2005). Meanwhile, the manager has every right in running the day to day operations 
of the company; 
I chair the credit committee. Decide on Labuan offshore. On our own 
accord, based on our evaluation on risk and return. The government has 
nothing to do in the operation (CC: Pm-Bnk_Mm, 
__Mp_GLc) 
The government is not involved in day to day operation. They don't 
interfere. This is a private enterprise (CD: Pm-Mc_Mp_GLc_Cg). 
In the GLCs, only a few people have executive powers in the company; these are 
normally the person who holds the top key post, and other key directors (see Table 
8.2). The majority of other directors are either non-executive independent directors 
or non-executive directors (e. g. company CC, CD, CF, CH, CO, CQ, CR). This is 
in contrast to family-controlled companies where most of the family members are 
executive directors. The government, on the other hand, is represented by its proxy, 
consisting of professional managers who have no embedded interests in the 
company and who are also non- shareholders. The role of the professional manager 
is therefore greater in a GLC, where there is separation between ownership and 
management. 
There are, however, no differences in terms of the management of foreign 
subsidiaries between family-controlled companies and GLCs. The only positions 
that are normally assigned to Malaysian expatriates are the CEO or Managing 
Director of the subsidiaries,, while local managers fill most of the other posts. 
8.6 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FDI: A COMPARISON 
The organisational structure here is referred to firm size and type of business 
organisation - Chinese family business, conglomerate corporation and 
GLC - have 
to a certain extent provided an avenue for comparison between them in tenns of 
motives, strategies and practices of their foreign investment. The 
differences or 
similarities, however, are not matters, but rather variations in motives, strategies 
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and practices among these organisations. As described in Section 8.2, this could be 
due to the overlapping characteristics of a number of companies. 
8.6.1 Firm Size and Multinationality 
The importance of firm's size in determining firm's decision to involve in cross 
border investment has been presented in many previous studies (Horst, 1972; 
Kinoshita, 1998). Using the number of employees as the measurement for size, the 
data on Malaysian companies show bigger companies do not necessarily have 
higher proportion of overseas revenue compared with smaller companies (see Table 
5.3 and Table 8.6). 
Table 8.6: Comparing Company Size and Percentage of Overseas Revenue 
Malaysian 
Company 
Rank (% revenue 
from overseas)' 
Percentage of 
revenue from 
overseaS2 
No. of 
em loyees 
Size of 
companV3 
CA (CFb 
- 
Mf SU) 7 57.97 238 Small 
CB (CFb-Svs_Cg) 10 41.27 20,000 Large 
CC (Glc 
- 
Bk) 15 5.92 7,685 Large 
CD (Glc 
- 
Mf SU 
- 
Cg) 14 7.17 1,689 Medium 
CE (Mf Su) 17 n. a n. a Small 
CF (Glc Eng) 18 0 187 Small 
_ CG (CFb 
- 
Cg) 3 80.28 22,293 Large 
CH (Glc-Svs) 9 46.15 6,794 Large 
CI (Glc R&D) 19 n. a 1,702 Medium 
- CJ (CFb_Cg) 2 82.98 13,000 Large 
CK (CFb_Mf) 1 83.22 612 Small 
CL (CFb 
- 
Mf) 8 46.80 1,083 Medium 
CM (CFb-mf) 11 17.96 2,647 Medium 
CN (CFb Mf Cg) 5 68.28 8,766 Large 
Mf Su) CO (Glc 13 8.03 6,000 Large 
- CP (CFb Mf Su) 16 n. a 600 Small 
- CQ (Glc Cg) 6 60.22 26,384 Large 
_ CR (Glc Eng) 4 78.00 n. a Small 
CS (CFb Svs CR) 12 10.37 1,481 Medium 
'Ranking is between the case study companies only 
2 Percentage to total revenue 
3 Size of company is according to number of employees. This classification into small, medium and 
large is done relatively to other fu-ms to differentiate the size of these companies for easy analysis. 
Source: Bursa Malaysia (2005) 
This means that in terms of percentage, a larger company does not necessarily 
have 
a higher degree of overseas investment compared with the smaller company. 
In 
Table 8.6, company CK has the highest degree of overseas investment 
but is very 
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much less in terms of size compared to company CQ. About 83.22% of its revenue 
is generated from overseas investment compared to 60.22% of company CQ. 
Within the same group with company CK are companies CA, CR and CL. 
The above findings show that different degrees of intemationalisation is not 
sensitive to size of firm but more on the type of products and services. In the case 
of smaller Malaysian companies, their high degree of overseas involvement is 
attributed to the nature of product and services provided by these companies (as 
discussed in Chapter 7). The nature of the services and the location of their clients 
require them to be present overseas. 
For shore inspection you need a presence globally. Because for shore 
inspection like Petronas, Shell and etc. they will buy equipment from all 
over the world, Italy, Germany, Argentina and so on. So they tend to buy 
globally. So the client want company to do inspection in the manufacture 
company before it reach the project site (CR: Pm-Eng_Mm-Mo-Glc) 
The above findings seem to undermine the argument that large firms are often 
considered to be better credit risks than small firms and large firms may have easier 
time financing the fixed cost entailed in investing abroad (Horst, 1972) and that 
larger scale production implies that the firm is likely to produce goods efficiently 
through learning-by-doing (Kinoshita, 1998). In the case of Malaysian companies, 
the nature of products and services are still the core that determined the propensity 
to undertake such investment. Company CO, for example, is a big company in 
terms of turnover, but most of its products are dominant only in the domestic 
market. It has been producing car but is facing strong competition with other big 
global players in other markets. 
Higher overseas revenue in the case of Malaysian companies, however, does not 
correspond to high foreign product diversity. In the case of trading companies, they 
are selling single product. 
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8.6.2 Types of Companies and FD1 
In Chinese family business, the main impetus for their FD1 decisions lies in the 
vision of the major family shareholder, who normally holds the top post in the 
company. There is also an influence of the founder, although in some cases this 
figure has taken a backseat. The second generation family members also happened 
to be more rigorously looking for opportunities to venture outside the country. The 
main objective for investment is to preserve family wealth or to increase the value 
of shares in the company. 
In conglomerate corporations, the diversification motive plays a major influence. 
The objective is to expand their existing core business, either through related 
diversification, or through looking for new businesses that may potentially become 
new core businesses, that is, un-related diversification. Like the Chinese family 
business, the role of individual major shareholders in foreign investment decisions 
may exist if it is also a 'family conglomerate'. 
A GLC's FDI motive is different from a Chinese family business, because of its 
shareholder, namely the government. The government uses the GLCs to facilitate 
nation building and develop home country industrial segments. The aim is to bring 
foreign technology to Malaysia via the ownership of a foreign subsidiary that is 
strong in technology. At the same time, technology acquisition is also the motive of 
FDI for the other types of companies where they acquire foreign technology so that 
they become more competitive compared to others in the home country. This is 
shown in Table 6.3 for companies such as CK, CL and CM which had acquired the 
technology from the U. K. 
In many cases, a family member is involved in the management of foreign 
subsidiaries, especially at the level of the Board of Directors (see Table 8.3). For 
GLCs, the companies are managed by professional managers at all levels (see Table 
8.2). The study also shows that since the conglomerate firms undertake big 
investments, some of their subsidiaries are managed directly by Malaysian 
expatriates. This is including the U. K. subsidiaries owned by family conglomerates 
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such as subsidiary SG and SJ in Table 8.3, and also subsidiaries owned by the 
GLCs conglomerates such as subsidiary SQ and So. The separation between 
ownership and management is limited in Chinese family business compared to the 
other types of organisation. 
The level of ownership shows little differences among the type of organisations. 
Malaysian companies in the U. K. prefer majority ownership (see Table 7.3). In 
cases where there is less than majority, the shareholding must be sufficient for them 
to gain benefit from the investment (see Section 7.3.2). In terms of the status of the 
investment, GLC's investment can be considered as one-off and motive dependent. 
If the investment is to acquire technology in a particular company, there is no 
indication that they are also looking for business expansion in the host country. 
Chinese family business and conglomerates, however, may expand if it could 
provide profit to the shareholders. 
8.6.3 Malaysian Conglomerates vs. Chaebol and Keiretsu 
Malaysian conglomerates companies are similar to Korean chaebol (Choi and 
Cowing, 1999; Lee et. al., 1991; Shin and Park, 1999) and to a certain extent 
different from Japanese keiretsu (Lin, 2004). Like chaebol, there is a strong overlap 
between ownership and management, and there is a dominance of family members 
in the management. In most of the companies, the founders hold the top 
management posts, or remain in decision making team even when the second 
generation has taken over the management. In chaebol, support from the 
Government is substantial (Lee et al., 1991), but most Malaysian conglomerates do 
not benefit from direct support from the government, except for GLC 
conglomerates. The owners or major shareholders in the conglomerate companies 
do, however, have a close rapport with the political powers, and get some favours in 
return in the form of government projects. However, support from the government 
in Malaysian foreign direct investment is minimal compared to the Korean chaebol. 
However, as a comparison, Malaysian conglomerate more closely resemble chaebol 
than western conglomerate especially the element of family business. This 
is in line 
with the assumption made in Section 4.3.3. 
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In Keiretsu, the internal capital market is an important element. Keiretsus maintain 
close ties with financial institutions and implement the main bank system. This has 
created the 'power view' as described by Montgomery (1994) by taking advantage 
of internal capital market. Unlike Malaysian conglomerates and chaebol, Keiretsu 
shareholding is dominated by institutions and not by individual family members 
(Ferris et. al., 2003). The relatively homogeneous society of South Korea may have 
contributed to the Confucian corporate culture in the chaebol management system. 
In the Malaysian conglomerates, however, there is a mix between western style 
management systems and Chinese business culture. This is because Malaysian 
conglomerates have slowly been transformed from purely family businesses into 
modem organisations, with spread of ownership among institutions and the public, 
while often still retaining elements of family control. 
8.6.4 Intern ation alisation: Malaysian GLCs and Chinese SOEs 
Research on Chinese SOEs, including their intemationalisation experience, has 
been growing over time (Young et. al., 1998). Comparison between Malaysian 
GLCs and Chinese SOEs is interesting because of the close similarities between 
these two organisations. The main difference is that Malaysian GLCs are not 
necessarily owned 100% by the government, as are the Chinese SOEs. The 
comparisons made here are not exhaustive, however, and detailed comparison must 
be left to future research. 
With reference to Table 8.7, the main motive of internationalisation by GLCs and 
SOEs is to bring back the benefit to the home country from the investment. This Is 
probably due to the home country's developing economies status. Knowledge 
seeking (SOEs) and technology seeking (GLCs) are also important elements of 
internationalisation to improve the nation's competitiveness. There is also a clear 
strategy and direction that comes from the parent companies 
294 
Table 8.7: Intern ation alis ation: Malaysian GLCs and Chinese SOEs 
Malaysia GLCs Chinese SOEs 
Main motivation are nation Main motivation are industrialisation and building and industrial isation diversification 
The objective to acquire Knowledge generation motive 
technology 
I 
The objective to exploit global Utilise global trading 
trading 
I 
The objective to exploit 
natural resources 
Management of subsidiaries 
based on parent guided policy 
Substantial parent strategy in subsidiary 
To increase competition domestically 
Leverage on expertise of the Ambition to be global 
subsidiaries as investment 
strategy 
Investment driven by Korean and Japanese FDI as model 
opportunism Driven by relation with foreign correspondent/ bank 
Source: Authors survey; Young et al. (1998) 
8.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the extent to which the three types of Malaysian 
business organisations in the U. K. - Chinese family business, conglomerate firms 
and govemment controlled companies - have influenced their internationalisation 
practice. 
The ethnic business network remains one of the core aspects of the 'Chinese 
diaspora' in Asia, and is still considered as the catalyst of the expansion of Chinese 
capitalism. In this study of FDI by Chinese family firms into the U. K., however, the 
ethnic business network does not seem to play a significant role in the deten-ninants 
and strategies of internationalisation. This may be due to the small nature, or even 
lack of, an 'overseas Chinese' environment in the U. K., which makes it different 
from countries such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and to a 
lesser 
extent Thailand and Indonesia (Yeung, 1998). Thus, the motivation of 
investment 
295 
is rent creation and profit orientation, which ultimately leads also to the expansion 
and preservation of family wealth expansion. 
The remoteness of the subsidiary in the U. K. has also eroded the significance of 
some traits of the Chinese and Chinese family business in the Malaysian family- 
owned firms. There is increasing dependence on professional managers to manage 
the subsidiaries, as the companies expand and parent companies are not able to send 
family members abroad on a permanent basis because they are also required at 
home. Despite this, however, the parent still controls the finance and subsidiaries 
also have to adhere to monitoring systems between the parent and subsidiaries. 
Diversification into a purely un-related foreign activity by Malaysian conglomerate 
companies is not a normal strategy. They are more comfortable undertaking such 
un-related investment in the domestic market rather than in the foreign market. 
Shortage of human capacity and internal resources also explain the reluctance to 
venture into totally new ventures overseas. 
GLC investment abroad is obviously to assist the home government in achieving 
industrial advancement, through the transfer of technology and other expertise. At 
the same time, they are also seeking rent, like any privately run company. Basically, 
they have been supported by the government through the whole process of overseas 
investment. 
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this final chapter is to summarise the main findings of the thesis. 
The chapter will also draw conclusions from the findings, and show how the thesis 
has contributed to the body of knowledge concerning international business. The 
implication of the findings to the Malaysian government policy and managers 
undertaking FDI are also presented. Finally, there are also limitations encountered 
during the study and suggestions for future research are made. 
The thesis has provided new insights into how and why companies from Malaysia 
have penetrated U. K. markets. The value of this, in the context of the existing 
international business literature, is that the literature has tended to place great 
emphasis on FDI flows out of developed countries, and into developing countries. 
There has been much less written about FDI flowsfrom developing countries, and 
into developed countries. Existing literature in the area of FDI flows from 
developing countries is still limited, and where it exists has been structured 
according to models developed to understand western country multinational 
companies. Research on developing country multinationals has also tended to 
focus on the bigger developing countries such as China, India and the Central 
European transition economics. Research in international business needs to expand 
in scope, to cover international business activity regardless of direction, size and 
origin of FDL This thesis has contributed to this expansion of scope, by looking at 
the international operations of Malaysian multinational companies, and in particular 
their expansion into the United Kingdom. It is argued here that the three units of 
analysis - multinational companies, home countries and host countries - cannot be 
considered to be homogeneous. Any pair of countries, and the multinational 
companies operating between them, need to be considered in their specificity, 
before generalisations can be made. Heterogeneous multinational firms act in a 
heterogeneous way in international operations, and are influenced by a diversity of 
motivations and objectives. In the context of Malaysian firms, for example, we 
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have seen that an 'emergent strategy' has been common in their foreign investment 
practices. 
This thesis has contributed, in particular, to understanding the relationship between 
the ownership and organisational structure of the firms, on the one hand, and their 
investment practices on the other. This is related to the exposition of the three 
major (and sometimes overlapping) characteristics of Malaysian firms - Chinese 
family businesses, conglomerate corporations, and government- linked companies. 
Given the nature of the research questions and the need for the respondents to recall 
events that had happened in the past as well as recent issues, the research was 
undertaken using a qualitative approach, using interviewing techniques that were 
found to be the most appropriate methods of data collection. The ability to conduct 
interviews with respondents in two different countries, with the parent company in 
Malaysia and some of the subsidiaries in the U. K., has enriched data quality and 
triangulation. It has also contributed to the improvement of validity, as the 
managers that interviewed in the U. K. were professional managers, able to give 
independent opinions about the research topics. 
This chapter presents the conclusion about the research questions with regard to the 
determinants, mechanisms and strategies of Malaysian firms. The discussion 
incorporates the findings to the existing body of knowledge, and discusses their 
theoretical implications. It is also acknowledged that because this research 
has been 
undertaken in a specific context, of Malaysian corporate investment 
into the U. K., it 
has limitations deriving from this. However, the research has achieved the objective 
of researching FDI from Malaysia into the U. K., and it 
is hoped that this in itself 
will enrich the resources of international business studies. 
The research also has 
implications for managerial action and government policy, and 
for future research, 
and these are discussed in the final part of this chapter. 
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9.2 THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH 
The origin of this thesis is based on the idea that existing research in international 
business is biased towards outward FDI conducted by multinational corporations 
from western countries. This has resulted in an incomplete picture of 
internationalisation. The thesis argues that a firm's internationalisation decision is 
influenced by its geographical location, and by its ownership and organisational 
characteristics. These points have been recognised in international business 
literature, not least through Dunning's eclectic paradigm. They have not, however, 
been extensively illustrated through examples of outward FDI from developing 
countries to developed countries, and this thesis fills the gap. 
9.2.1 Motivation of Investment 
The motivation of Malaysian firnis undertaking direct investment into other 
countries seems to conform to most of the frameworks discussed in the literature. In 
other words, the conventional theoretical framework of international business can 
be used to explain the data about Malaysian investment into the U. K. However, 
there is some evidence of inconsistency between theoretical suggestions and 
research findings. This has confirmed the assumption made in Section 2.2-1.4 that 
Dunning's four types of FDI can only provide partial explanation on Malaysian FDI 
into the U. K. For example, the resources seeking motive does not necessarily seek 
low cost input (but skilled personnel and technology) and synergy seeking and 
competence seeking FDI have been highly rated by Malaysian companies. Another 
important observation is that every company has its own specific determinants that 
are different from other companies, and that these firm-specific factors are probably 
more important than other considerations. 
This research on the motivations for FDI by Malaysian companies suggests that 
there is lack of evidence to support the assumption that Malaysian 
firms that 
undertake investments in the U. K. are strongly driven by their own 
firm-specific 
advantages. Therefore, the assumption made in Section 
2.3.3 that Malaysian 
companies have greater competitive advantages (arising 
from ownership specific 
299 
advantages) relative to those of the U. K. domestic firms is refuted, with the 
exception of only company CS that had entered competitive bidding with other 
local firms. This contrasts with earlier studies on multinational firms from 
Singapore and Hong Kong (Fong and Komaran, 1985; Tolentino, 2000), South 
Korea (Kumar and Kim, 1984), Taiwan (Tolentino, 2000) and Brazilian 
multinationals (Wells, 1988; Neto, 1995), which invested overseas to exploit and 
sell their technology (see Section 2.5.2, Table 2.1). They, however, used advantages 
in technology in other developing countries, while research in this thesis looked at 
Malaysian investment into developed countries. Since this research did not look 
into Malaysian investment in other developing countries, therefore, it could not 
confirm or refute whether Malaysian firms also have advantages in technology in 
their investment in other developing countries. In investment into developed 
countries, this thesis suggests a similar motive of FDI to acquire technology as 
multinationals from China (Gang, 1992; Young et al, 1996), Indonesia (Lecraw, 
1992) and India (Encarnation, 1982). This finding also confirmed earlier study by 
Ragayah (1999). In the context of entry by acquisition, for example, the impetus for 
a firm to enter the market seems more likely to be driven by the firm's financial 
strength which is matched with the need for new funding of the target company. In 
this case, the financial strength of the acquiring firms has played a key role. 
Malaysian companies do not make extensive use of managerial and human 
resources from the parent companies, in the subsidiaries. The acquisition involves 
taking over an existing and viable package of managerial and human resources, to 
which the new parent company does not need to add. This contrasts with Korean 
multinationals (see Section 2.5.2) which exploit their own human resources in 
foreign investment (Ghymn, 1999). This thesis therefore suggests that a finn's 
specific asset other than firm's financial capability is less likely to determine the 
decision of entry by Malaysian companies into the U. K. market. 
This research also suggests that Malaysian companies perceive there to 
be 
locational advantages and disadvantages in the U. K. Location advantages among 
other are the availability of skilled personnel, the presence of advanced 
technological resources, and the market potential, particularly as a platforin 
to 
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penetrate the European market. Locational disadvantages, such as distance from the 
home country, and higher operating cost such as high wages and compulsory 
contribution to the pension fund and national insurance. The finding confin-ned the 
assumption (as in Section 2.3-3) that Malaysian investors do perceived locational 
cost disadvantages in the U. K. They were aware about the higher costs but it did not 
put off the firms from remaining in the U. K. because they recognise that the 
benefits, in terms of market potential and technological capabilities of the 
subsidiaries, outweigh the costs of operating in Western countries and the market 
transaction costs. They are also confident that they would have continued leverage 
from subsidiaries' core competence that would benefit the parent. This means that 
locational advantages do attract inward FDI and locational disadvantages do not 
necessarily keep away the investors, as investors tend to respond interactively to 
any location factors they can leverage. This finding therefore contributes positively 
to the understanding of locational. factors in FDI and how it affects firm's 
investment decision. 
Small home country market also seems to be an important motivation for the 
overseas expansion of Malaysian companies. This is similar to the motivation of 
firms from Taiwan and Singapore based on a study by Tolentino (2000). Other 
factors, such as competition in the domestic market and economic recession, have 
also impacted on Malaysian investments abroad. However, the data indicate that the 
Asian crisis is more likely to affect the ability of Malaysian companies to make 
further investment overseas rather than to drive the FDL There is some suggestion 
in the data that the legal and regulatory regimes surrounding business in Malaysia 
were also a factor encouraging firms to look outside Malaysia for investment 
opportunities, in particular the NEP. This finding is similar to the observations 
made by Yeung (1999) and Redding (1993) on the effect of home government 
intervention in the creation and distribution of wealth on investment decision 
among Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia (see Section 4.4.2). Information about 
this, however, was difficult to obtain, since those most strongly affected 
by 
problems in this domain, that is to say the ethnic Chinese business community, 
were reluctant to give opinions that might be construed as criticism of 
Malaysian 
government policies. 
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The thesis also shows that market seeking is one of important motB'es of 
investment in the U. K. This finding is similar to earlier studies (see Section 2.5.2. 
Table 2.1) on developing countries's firms from Singapore (Hui and Fong, 1986), 
China (Gang, 1992; Young et al, 1996), Brazil (Neto, 1995; UNCTAD, 2004c), 
India (Encarnation, 1982), Indonesia (Lecraw, 1992). It also confirms the earlier 
study on Malaysian FDI by Ragayah (1999). The majority of market seekers 
usually involved companies that market their products in the new market by 
creating sales and production subsidiaries. The market seeking objective may also 
explain the related diversification by conglomerate firms through forward 
integration with their Malaysian business activities. Although their investments are 
based in the U. K., most companies consider the U. K. as the gateway to the larger 
European Union market. Their presence in the U. K. is perceived to have an adverse 
I country of origin' affect in the minds of customers especially in the third world 
and at the same time increased product value deriving from the increased 
capabilities of their U. K operation. This might not have been possible had the 
product originated directly from Malaysia. 
Efficiency seeking FDI is also found to be one of the motivations of Malaysian 
investments in the U. K. There are two key elements that can be associated with the 
objectives of gaining efficiency: these are exploiting differential cost in different 
countries, gaining economies of scale and scope. Data in this thesis suggests that 
Malaysian companies are undertaking upstream value-added activity in the U. K. at 
relatively lower real cost due to their access to cheaper factors endowment in 
Malaysia. This finding confirmed the assumption made in Section 2.3.3 that 
Malaysian companies engage in foreign operation to combine spatially transferable 
intermediate products produced in Malaysia with other intermediate product in the 
U. K. Previous studies on multinationals from developing countries rarely 
emphasise this element of efficiency seeking FDI except concerning the motive 
for 
vertical integration by Chinese multinational (Young et al, 1996). The motivation of 
gaining economies of scale and scope could be achieved by access to technology 
and R&D, which increase the capability of production in Malaysian plants. 
An 
access to bigger network could also allow production at a bigger scale. 
302 
Synergy seeking, competence seeking and growth seeking could also describe 
Malaysian FDI into the U. K. Synergy seeking and competence seeking are rated 
higher than growth seeking. This shows that adding these three factors to DunnIng's 
existing types of FDI could provide more explanation of the factors that motIvate 
Malaysian FDL Synergy is expected to be achieved through business 
complementary, as resources and networks of the parent and subsidiaries are 
combined, and to use the U. K. subsidiaries as a platform for further market 
expansion. The target is a strengthening of the position of the parent company in its 
home market. The findings regarding Malaysian investment in the U. K. also 
suggest that efficiency is attainable through leveraging the subsidiary's core 
competence, including its technological capability. There is, however, lack of 
evidence to support the contention that the subsidiaries are also leveraging on the 
core competence of their new parent companies. Although Malaysian companies 
consider themselves as having certain degrees of core competence, the root of their 
6core competence' is unclear and requires further study. There is no evidence, 
either, to support the argument that they have distinctive advantages compared to 
competitors, except in their financial strength. Thus the assumption made in Section 
2.3.3 could not be confirmed. 
Similar to Dunning's (1988) argument on technology seeking FDI, this thesis 
suggests that technology seeking FDI of some Malaysian companies can also be 
regarded as a form of strategic asset seeking FDL The main motive of technology 
seeking FDI by Malaysian companies is to achieve product competitiveness and 
product confidence, via acquisition of companies that have the technology that is 
associated with renowned brands. Brand and technology represents strategic assets 
to the company. An earlier study of Indian multinationals also found that 
acquisition of brand name is one of their overseas investment motives (UNCTAD, 
2004b). 
The findings on technology acquisition have also raised issues of tacit 
knowledge 
and people-embedded technology. The Malaysian companies perceive 
that the 
ability to mobilise people between the two countries 
is limited due to costs, and due 
to the unwillingness of some workers to be relocated. 
Consequently, this limits 
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technology transfer between parent and subsidiary. This is also the reason why the 
Malaysian government has retained its R&D laboratories in the U. K. since the 
1950s, because the majority of its scientist are British. It also supports the earlier 
argument that the benefits of having access to technology outweigh the higher costs 
of remaining in U. K. Technology acquisition motives are widely supported by 
previous studies on multinationals from the developing countries (see Table 2.1) 
Home and host country factors are another important elements on the motives of 
Malaysian direct investment into the U. K. Home country factors such as the 
continued development of the Malaysian economy have increased the competitive 
advantages of the Malaysian companies which drive them to expand across borders. 
Malaysia's domestic market is relatively small for companies to expand their core 
activities thus diversifying into other activities overseas is inevitable. This finding 
is similar to a previous study of multinationals from Singapore (Fong and Komaran, 
1985; Tolentino, 2000). The Asian crisis and how it directly drives the outflow of 
capital initiated by Malaysian into the U. K. could not be clearly determined from 
this study. Table 3.9 in Chapter 3 also does not show a clear difference in the 
pattern of investment into the U. K. before and after the Asian crisis in 1997. The 
Asian crisis, however, has clearly reduced the flow of capital into the U. K. as a 
result of capital control policy to contain the effect of the Asian crisis to the 
Malaysian economy. Another government policy that drives overseas investment is 
the NEP) especially overseas investment by Chinese family business. This finding 
confirms the earlier observations by Yeung (1999) and Redding (1993) on the 
effect of restrictive equity domestic policy on outward direct investment 
in 
Southeast Asian countries. 
This research has also found that, given the choice of many countries 
in Europe, the 
Malaysian companies in the sample prefer the U. K. as their entry point. 
Familiarity 
with the market place was one of the factors that contributed 
to this decision. 
Familiarity also comes from the historical link between Malaysia and the 
U. K., and 
the effects of this in shared aspects of language, 
law and regulations, and the 
educational system. The evidence from the Malaysian companies also 
suggests that 
familiarity about the host country as an outcome 
from socio-political link could 
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reduce the disadvantages of geographical distance between Malaysia and the U. K. 
The research focus on 'psychic distance' has made this point before, as well as 
Hofstede's cultural dimension between nations. Previous studies also found 
similarity as one of the factors for the choice of location of investment such as the 
motivation of Brazilian multinationals to invest in other countries in South America 
(Neto, 1995). An earlier study by Ragayah (1999), however, found that close 
cultural factors are not highly rated as motives of investment by Malaysian 
companies (see Section 2.5.2, Table 2.1). 
In banking and other services, the findings in this thesis are similar to other 
research, where the 'follow the client' motive is shown to be important in overseas 
investment. This motive however, is not confined to financial institutions, but also 
affects other forms of services such as engineering and shipping services. One 
trading company shows that its decision to locate subsidiaries in different locations 
worldwide is to enable them to be close to big international clients that operate 
around the world. A similar finding is also found among the motive of 
multinationals from India (UNCTAD, 2004b), Brazil (UNCTAD, 2004c) and the 
motive of FDI by banks (see Engwall and Wallenstal, 1988). 
The motive of diversification for FDI is most likely to be associated with 
conglomerate firms, and also with owner-managed firms. This thesis suggests that 
diversification is driven by opportunism, by the availability of financial resources, 
by the desire to achieve future business growth, by the search for enhanced earning 
potential, and by the search for a widened asset base. Although international 
diversification by Malaysian conglomerates is not likely to achieve market power 
internationally due to the size of the investment which is not big and expanding, 
such diversification supports a resource-based view of the firm, where 
firms are 
driven by abilities and resources within their organisation. However, the 
findings do 
not support the argument in the literature that diversification 
is a result of the 
manager wishing to diversify his or her risk and widen the scope of 
their discretion. 
Many Malaysian family conglomerates are owner-managed and diversification is 
always the decision of the owner. Even conglomerates that are controlled 
by the 
government and the role of professional manager 
is bigger compared to the family 
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business, the influence of the government in the decision making is still vital. In 
addition, some of the conglomerates are actually family-controlled and like any 
Malaysian family business, this means little separation of ownership and 
management. Therefore, it is business diversification to expand income base and 
risk-hedging. 
Modem financial management literature tends to frown on corporate diversification 
as a risk-hedging strategy. It is clear, however, that some Malaysian conglomerates 
consider their investment in multi-business activities as a means of risk 
diversification. A similar element was proposed by previous studies such as a study 
of Hong Kong multinationals (Wells, 1978), Singapore (Fong and Komaran, 1985; 
Hui and Fong, 1986) and China (Young et al, 1996). The findings, however, show 
that most diversification occurred because of existing opportunities. Most 
Malaysian conglomerate investments in the U. K. are in activities that are related or 
loosely related to their core activities in Malaysia, which means that these activities 
are not totally unrelated. 
Another important consideration is that Malaysian companies invest in the U. K. to 
avoid transaction costs in the market, such as difficulties with agents and 
distributors, and costs resulting from psychic distance. One company, for example, 
took another step ahead to reduce the potential transaction cost by acquiring the 
company that used to be their supplier. The objective was to avoid changes to the 
existing contract if the company were to be taken over by another party. 
Improvement of customer services such as timing of supply has also induced 
Malaysian companies to invest and operate nearer to their customers. This finding 
confirms the assumption made in Section 2.2.2 that the decision by Malaysian 
companies to internalise activities in the U. K. within the hierarchy is to avoid 
transaction cost due to perceived market failure. The transaction cost motive with 
the acquisition of former supplier and licensor is not widely cited in previous 
studies of developing countries' multinational. This motive is also related to the 
emergent strategy of Malaysian firms. 
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This thesis has also argued that two prominent determinants of Malaysian I 
investment into the U. K. are business opportunism and owner entrepreneurship. 
Opportunism occurs when the owner or company acquires a target company. as the 
result of an unexpected and unplanned discovery of a business opportunity. Wells 
(1978) also reported that Hong Kong multinationals invested overseas in search for 
business opportunity. Opportunism of this kind requires that the acquiring company 
has the financial resources to react at short notice to discoveries of this kind. By 
opportunistic acquisition of this kind, the acquiring company can pursue the 
objective of taking a presence in a western country market. The creation of such a 
presence may, in itself, be a major corporate objective for the acquiring company, 
irrespective of the sector or product. Such opportunistic investment may not be part 
of a carefully thought out business plan, and may not fit well into the strategic 
management literature. Investments of this kind, however, have certainly happened 
in Malaysian corporate involvement in the U. K. Another factor that drives FDI is 
the entrepreneurship of the owners, involving a combination of opportunistic 
behaviour and risk taking. Many investments in the U. K. by Malaysians are due to 
the owner's initiatives, and the subsequent high involvement of the major owner, 
especially in the early investment stage. 
To conclude, there are determinants and motivation elements that may be 
considered more important thanothers, when looking at Malaysian investment into 
the U. K. These are, investment opportunity, entrepreneurship, market seeking, 
strategic asset seeking, diversification seeking, home and host country 
factors and 
transaction cost considerations. Investment opportunity and transaction cost 
considerations are relevant to almost all the companies. In addition, opportunity is 
not only confined to opportunity to acquire but also opportunity to gain rent and 
profit in longer term investment. The element of entrepreneurship, on 
the other 
hand, is common in Chinese family firms, or more precisely 
in the entrepreneurship 
of the major owner of the family firm. Market seeking 
is frequently associated with 
trading firms, technology seeking is relevant for manufacturing 
firms, and finally 
diversification seeking is associated with conglomerate firms. 
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9.2.2 Mechanism, Strategies and Investment Performance 
The research reveals that some Malaysian companies were involved in export prior 
to their direct investment in the host country. The decision to move from exporting 
to direct investment was a result of the increased experience In foreign markets, 
although not necessarily of an increased experience in a particular country. There is 
also lack of evidence to suggest that companies started their investment in sequence 
from neighbouring to distant countries, thus this finding could not confirm the 
assumption made in Section 2.3.2 that Malaysian companies directly follow the 
incremental path of internationalisation. This is also in contrast to the study of 
international investment from Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore which 
show a regional phenomenon (Tolentino, 2000 and Yeung, 1998). International 
experience is not only gained across markets but also across projects, thus distance 
sometimes becomes irrelevant. In other words5 Malaysian companies based their 
investment strategy on projects as well as on countries. This research shows that 
Malaysian companies are familiar with the target companies through having acted 
as agents for them in Malaysia, producing products in Malaysia under license, and 
sourcing their parts and components from the U. K. This finding has therefore 
broadened the understanding of the incremental involvement in foreign markets due 
to increased experience. 
Every company has a different entry strategy into the foreign market. Malaysian 
companies differ between themselves because of the different motivations for their 
investment. In companies that are not involved in trading of products, the findings 
tend to confirm the assumption made in Section 2.3.4 that Malaysian companies do 
not directly follow a sequential entry choice from less integrated to integrated 
mode. The decision to engage in integrated mode of entry for example is 
influenced 
by motives of investment and types of investment. In an integrated mode of entry, 
acquisition is preferable if the motivation for the acquisition is to acquire 
technology or an established brand. This allows companies to 
leverage on expertise, 
technology and established brands, to exploit the existing 
business for rent seeking, 
and to utilise the existing marketing network. On the other 
hand, greenfield is 
chosen if it involves the marketing and distribution of own products 
that originate 
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from the parent company in Malaysia. The strategy of trading based companies 
tends to refute the assumption made in Section 2.3.4 as they have been involved in 
export to the U. K. prior to their direct investments into the U. K. In greenfield entry, 
the companies are not acquiring an existing marketing network, the strategy is to 
assign experienced local people to head these subsidiaries, as these individuals 
coming along with personal networks established through their previous work in the 
sector. Joint venture (JV) is not a popular entry choice among Malaysian firms in 
the U. K. A lower incidence of JV contradicts the suggestion by Yeung (1998) that 
developing countries' TNCs prefer minority equity JVs. This is because joint 
venture is not a requirement set by the UX government as found in many 
developing countries including Malaysia in which the government does require 
joint venture between foreign investor with a local party. Malaysian parent 
companies seem to want to control the acquired company in the U. K., develop the 
brand and wholly pursue the operations. However, Malaysian companies do not 
reject joint ventures completely. A JV will be chosen if the inward investor 
perceives that the local partner can contribute in terms of technology, expe ise and rti 
know how about local culture. Otherwise 100% ownership is preferred. The 
assumption made in Section 2.3.4 that the higher the cultural distance between 
markets, the more control the Malaysian companies was likely to maintain over its 
foreign operation is refuted as a majority of Malaysian investment in the U. K. are 
wholly-owned and Malaysian investors also feel that they are familiar with the U. K. 
because of their historical relationship. In other words, even in a situation of lower 
cultural distance, Malaysian investors still prefer majority ownership. 
The element of opportunistic investment and investor's entrepreneurship stated in 
Section 9.2.1 could also be regarded as fundamentals in the concept of 'emergent 
strategy' as suggested by Minztberg (1994). This thesis has provided plenty of 
evidence (see Section 7.2.2) to suggest Malaysian investment in the U. K. has 
been 
influenced by strategies that are not elaborately planned but resulted ftom 
opportunities that emerged in the U. K. market that suited the company's corporate 
strategy. Therefore, this thesis has provided an example of emergent strategy 
in 
international business, an obvious contribution to its existing framework. It also 
confin-ned the assumption made in Section 2.3.1 that 
Malaysian investment has 
309 
swayed away from structured strategy and general norrns of investment. This 
emergent strategy is also related to a defensive strategy of internationalisation such 
as to strengthen the marketing of product which were previously controlled by 
distributors or to secure the control of the supplier. There is also lack of evidence 
that Malaysian companies aggressively undertake FDI into the U. K. based on 
technology competitiveness and other advantages. This confirms the assumption 
made in Section 2.5.5 concerning the importance of defensive strategy in the 
intemationalisation process of the firms sampled. 
This research shows a consistent approach in terms of the way Malaysian 
companies manage their subsidiaries. The majority of the parent companies 
consider that their investments in the U. K. need to be handled from a distance, 
because of the high costs involved in sending people from the parent to manage the 
subsidiary. Therefore, most subsidiaries are managed by locals, except for a few big 
subsidiaries where the top managers are Malaysians. This suggests a relationship 
between the size of the investment, and the perceived need for direct management. 
Malaysian expatriates tend to hold top posts in bigger subsidiaries, and where 
management control is considered necessary to revive the performance of 
subsidiaries. In contrast, management of smaller subsidiaries tend to be 100% local, 
because the companies could not afford to spend on expatriation costs. Local 
management is also important in understanding local environments, local culture 
and local business networks. This finding suggest that the bigger the investment and 
the higher the parent perceived the importance of the business to them, the more 
direct is the preferred management approach. The research also shows that 
transparency, sincerity, sharing of information and forming good relationships help 
the company to be managed efficiently, thus avoiding 'psychic distance' problems 
(Hofstede, 1999). This strategy has to be taken because of the absence of people 
from parent companies in the subsidiaries. However, many parent companies found 
that because of the remoteness of the subsidiaries from the parent, it was difficult to 
find the right people to handle the business in the subsidiaries. This finding 
contrasts with the study by Ragayah (1999), who suggests that most decisions of 
Malaysian investment are made at the subsidiary levels, but confirms the reporting 
procedure between parent and subsidiary. The parent and subsidiary relationship is 
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also similar to that found among Singapore mult'nationals (Fong and Komaran, 
1985 and Hui and Fong, 1986) which implement direct management in larger FDI 
but use periodical visits and periodic reports for smaller FDI projects. 
Another strategic area concerns decision making and control. Distance between 
Malaysia and U. K. seems to affect only daily control, but not overall control of the 
operation of subsidiaries. Malaysian parent companies undertake intervention 
policies in subsidiaries, involving things like daily reporting and communication, 
setting control systems and providing a clear line of authority to managers in th he 
subsidiary, based on a set of rules and policies. Therefore, autonomy in the 
Malaysian subsidiaries is limited to the daily management of the company which is 
based on rules set by the parent. Autonomy is also limited to non-financial matters. 
The distance between Malaysia and the U. K. and its effect on the level of control 
and autonomy of subsidiaries seems to confirm the assumption made in Section 2.4 
that Malaysian companies are not able to implement total control of subsidiaries. 
However, the subsidiaries have not experienced a high level of autonomy either. 
Investment strategies by Malaysian companies in their U. K. subsidiaries focus on 
developing the core competence of the target company, and creating synergies 
between the subsidiaries and parent. The research, however, shows that shared core 
competence between parent and subsidiary is difficult to achieve because of the 
physical distance, and also because of the limited number of people from the parent 
that are directly involved in the subsidiary. Although there is successful transfer of 
core competence to the parent from the subsidiaries, the result is not conclusive 
for 
every company. This has contributed to the understanding that ownership of 
foreign 
subsidiaries does not guarantee transfer of technology, as knowledge 
is with people 
and sometimes people are immobile. For example, there 
is limited movement of 
people between the Malaysian parent companies and their subsidiaries in 
the U. K. 
The performance of the U. K. subsidiaries of Malaysian companies 
is rather weak. 
There are several possible reasons such as 
improper investment decision and 
incorrect investment strategy. Opportunistic investment, as undertaken 
by 
Malaysian companies, does not confom-1 to strategic management good 
practice, 
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and there are reasons for this. Acquiring an ailing target company may not be a 
wise investment decision, or a good entry strategy. There are reasons, after all, why 
a company comes to be in difficulties in the first place. Malaysian companies may 
also underestimate the costs of investing in a distant and high-cost country such as 
the U. K. For example, the finding suggests that parent companies try to reduce 
agency costs through close monitoring and policy control, but a lot of their UX. 
businesses are still failing and there was dissatisfaction with the perforinance of 
local managers in the subsidiaries. There was also evidence of different motivations 
between parent and subsidiary managers with regard to the management of the 
business. This suggests that close monitoring and policy control does not efficiently 
resolve agency problem between parent and subsidiaries. 
There were also problems due to cross cultural differences between the parent in 
Malaysia and the British business culture. This may have been due to lack of 
exposure to, or ignorance of, each other's culture. There were also real internal 
problems within the parent company, such as lack of cash flow and increasing debt, 
partly because of the Asian economic recession in 1997. Stiff competition and 
changes in the world economy have also affected the subsidiaries' performance. 
We might conclude that the performance of U. K. subsidiaries has been poor for a 
number of reasons: because either the parent or the subsidiary lacked firm specific 
advantage; because the entry strategy was wrong; because management was 
remote; because there was a lack of understanding on the part of the parent 
companies; and/or because there was inadequate financing from the parent 
companies. Also, this study has shown that there are easy ways to enter a foreign 
country market, but that easiness does not necessarily lead to success, or constitute 
an appropriate entry strategy. If a company has the finances available, it is easy 
acquire a company in difficulties. It is more difficult, however, to manage 
subsidiaries successfully in foreign countries, due to the many social and economic 
challenges. 
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9.2.3 Firm Organisational Form and Investment Practices 
It was expected that one of the major contributions of this study would be to 
establish a link between the FD1 theoretical literature, and the investment behaviour 
of the three kinds of company under study - Malaysian Chinese family business, 
conglomerate firms and, government-linked companies. However, research on 
some of these subjects proved to be difficult, especially concerning Chinese family 
business. This problem was also observed by Yeung (1995) in his study of Hong 
Kong TNCs. Members of the family, and even professional managers engaged by 
the family firms, tended to avoid discussion of family ownership. There were 
instances of outright denial when asked whether they considered the company to be 
a family business, despite the shareholding structure suggesting otherwise. This has 
confirnied that Chinese family business is still full of secrecy to outsiders. This 
finding is similar to previous studies by Carney (1998), Tsang (2002) and Redding 
(1993). Consequently, this has limited the ability of this research to get inside 
information on family business in Malaysia. It is difficult to see how this research 
problem could be overcome, short perhaps of participant observation and 
ethnography. However, the research has made a contribution concerning the role of 
business networks or guanxi in the internationalisation practices of Chinese family 
firms. 
The study revealed that although guanxi remains an element in the development of 
Chinese family business in Malaysia and Southeast Asia, it has lost its significance 
beyond this region. This suggests that interconnection and transnational networks 
among the Chinese are less likely to go beyond the domain that 
is constructed based 
on ethnicity, languages, associations and Confucianism. This 
has confirmed that 
networking in Chinese business networks is strong only within the environment of 
Chinese business culture. It also confirmed the assumption made in 
Section 4.4.6 
that guanxi is less important or not relevant when 
doing business in the westem 
countries. It becomes less relevant outside this environment. 
In the U. K., where the 
subsidiaries are run by local managers, they tend to 
follow the western type of 
business network. The research shows that networking 
based on ethnicity is also 
less acceptable to second or third generation 
family members, due to their exposure 
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to western education and business culture. This finding also confirms the same 
observation by Gomez (2001) that there was less interaction between ethnic 
Chinese in the U. K. in business. 
In terms of management of subsidiaries, there is still the element of centralised 
control, especially for Chinese family business concerning financial matters. 
Therefore, the assumption made in Section 2.5.5 that the Malaysian TNCs are 
dominated by centralisation of control is true. It also confirms similar observation 
by Carney (1998) about concentration of decision making in Chinese family 
business. However, there is a lower degree of centralisation in overall management. 
Due to the distance, Chinese family businesses have also allowed greater control of 
the subsidiaries by professional managers, and this is rare in Malaysia in domestic 
Chinese family companies. However, the family members still represent their 
family's interest in the subsidiaries' Board of Directors or the decision-making 
body in the company. This has again confirmed the assumption made in Section 
4.4.6 about the retaining of control and family members role in the management of 
OCFB. However, in the case of investment in the U. K., the finding contrasts with a 
study by Tsang (2002) that family members are in charge of key expatriate position 
in Singapore OCFBs. 
In the case of conglomerate companies, their diversification strategy is influenced 
by trends and opportunities rather than careful planning. Their strategy evolves over 
time as new opportunities emerge. The U. K. subsidiaries, for example, do not 
diversify within the U. K. and its region due to lack of opportunity and limited 
resources available from the parent. The ownership of excess resources seems to be 
one of the factors that drive Malaysian companies to diversify into the U. K. market. 
Market power view and agency theory could not explain the motivation of 
Malaysian companies' diversification. Malaysian companies are relatively small 
and would not be considered to have market power. High 
incidence of owner- 
managed companies also would not suggest diversification as professional 
manager's initiatives. This has confirmed the assumption made in 
Section 4.2.5 
about the usefulness of the resource base view in explaining 
Malaysian FDL In 
addition, although the term conglomerate suggests unrelated 
diversification 
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activities, the research has not found a true example of Malaysian conglomerates 
that are involved in totally new activities in the U. K. What this research has found 
is that the U. K. activity is similar to some aspects of the diversified domestic 
activities of the parent conglomerate. This suggests that Malaysian conglomerates 
undertake unrelated conglomerate diversification in the domestic market rather than 
the foreign market, and it may be that unrelated diversification in the domestic 
market is perceived as carrying less risk. The data also reveal that Malaysian 
conglomerates are multi-foci, which means that each segment of activity is 
managed as an independent unit within the same business group. The assumption 
made in Section 4.3.3 that Malaysian conglomerates are engaged in unrelated 
activities in the U. K. as they are in Malaysia could not be confirmed. 
This research also contributes to the understanding of developing country firins that 
are controlled and/or owned by the government. As privately run firms, their 
motivations, objectives and strategies of foreign investment are not much different 
from to other Malaysian firms. However, because they are controlled by the 
government, they may be pushed to undertake investments so as to fulfil the 
government's development policy in the home country, especially with regard to 
the acquisition of technology resources. This finding is similar to the motives of 
FDI by Chinese SOEs (Gang, 1992). However, the structure of Malaysian GLCs 
and China SOEs is different in which Malaysian GLCs are not wholly-owned by 
the government as are Chinese SOEs. Moreover, although the separation between 
ownership and management is made clear, the Government still influences many 
aspects of the company's operations. This finding refutes the assumption made in 
Section 2.5.6 on the domination of Malaysian FDI by the private sector initiatives 
because although GLCs are privately run, there are still elements of governinent 
initiatives in their FDL 
The motives, strategies and characteristics of Malaysian TNCs presented in 
Section 
9.2 confirms the assumptions made in Section 2.5.6 about similanties and 
differences of FDI between Malaysian TNCs and other developing countries 
TNCs. 
A similarity in some of the motives of Malaysian outward investment with 
the 
Chinese and Indonesian TNCs (Gang, 1992; Lecraw, 1992) are probably 
due to 
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similar level of technological development between these two countries. Malaysian 
TNCs, for example, do not export technological capabilities as TNCs from Korea 
(Kumar and Kim, 1984), Singapore (Fong and Komaran, 1985) and Brazil (Wells, 
1988; Neto, 1995). Like other developing countries as presented in Table 2.1, 
Malaysian investors frequently treat market seeking and access to technology as the 
main motive of their FDI. 
9.3 THE POSITION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS THEORY 
The main consideration of this research with regard to the theoretical framework of 
international business is whether the existing international business theory is 
sufficient to explain developing country FDI and to what extent the research on 
Malaysian outward direct investment has contributed towards reviewing the 
existing theory. 
9.3.1 Has the Findings Confirmed International Business (IB) Theory? 
The conventional theoretical framework of international business can be used to 
explain Malaysian investment into the U. K. However, it is not possible to find a 
single theory that provides an explanation of FDI for every country. Every FDI 
decision will be influenced by specific factors such as type of firm, country of 
origin, types of product, location of investment and type of industry. 
The findings in this thesis suggest that it confirms the explanation given by the 113 
theory on the motivation, strategy and mechanism of direct investment by 
Malaysian companies in the U. K. However, there is some evidence of 
inconsistency. The ownership advantages in OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1988) for 
example, suggest the investing firms should possess ownership advantage over 
local firm to enable them to successfully undertake FDI. Evidence from the 
Malaysian companies investing in the U. K. has not shown this. 
Location 
disadvantages such as high cost of investment in the U. K. should put off any 
FDI 
but this study suggests that providing the investing 
firm could benefit from the 
investment, they are willing to absorb the cost. This is normally 
found in 
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technology seeking FDI. The decision to intemalise the activIty "'IthIn the 
hierarchy is as suggested by the 1B theory which is the effect from transaction 
market failure. Dissatisfaction with agents and distributors in the market for 
example, has driven Malaysian companies to establish sales subsidiary In the U. K. 
In this regard, this finding also confirms the theory on the transaction cost 
(Williamson, 1985). 
Types of FDI as suggested by Dunning (1993) can also be used to explain 
Malaysian investment in the U. K. But this thesis would not suggest resource 
seeking FDI by Malaysian companies to gain access to natural resources. The 
finding on the other hand, suggests the investment is to acquire technological 
capability and to exploit skilled personnel in the U. K. The finding, however, 
confirms the view of market seeking which is related to selling of Malaysian 
products in the U. K. and 'follow the client' motives. Under the efficiency seeking 
motive, Malaysian companies have lowered the real cost of the product by sourcing 
input from Malaysia. Strategic asset seeking FDI by Malaysian companies is more 
on the acquisition of technological asset and brand name. 
The strategy of investment, especially 'stages' FDI (Johansson and Vahlne, 1977), 
has been experienced by some Malaysian companies but there are investment that 
follow business opportunity rather than distance between countries. In addition, 
although Malaysia and the U. K. have historical relationship, this does not diminish 
cultural differences (Hofstede, 1999) as have been experienced by some companies. 
Generally, this study confirms that 113 theory can be used to provide a broad 
explanation of FDI by Malaysian companies, but other consideration outside the 
OLI paradigm and the 'seeking' motives of FDI are equally important to explain 
Malaysian FDI. 
9.3.2 Is the existing international business (IB) theory sufficient to explain 
the developing country FDI? 
It has been identified in this thesis that Malaysian investment in the U. K. was 
influenced by government role, specific home country factors, opportunistic 
behaviour and entrepreneurship of the owner and the emergent strategy 
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perspectives. These factors are not in the forefront of the existing EB theory. Some 
of these factors are even probably outside the acceptable norms of business practice 
such as in the case of opportunistic emergent strategy. Opportunistic emergent 
strategy for example, does not necessarily follow the 'stages' theory of 
internationalisation. This emergent strategy can still fit into 'stage' theory if the 
investors limit their opportunistic investment within close countries. This thesis 
shows that this is not the case with Malaysian companies undertaking opportunistic 
investment in the U. K. 
This thesis also shows the important role of GLCs in Malaysia's direct investment 
overseas and, hence, the role of government in Malaysian FDL In past research, the 
role of government is also obvious in the case of multinationals from Singapore and 
China (see Section 4.5). The implication to the OLI paradigm is that the 
government as the shareholder would provide additional ownership (0) advantages 
for developing countries' TNCs. In the case of Malaysia, GLCs would have an 
advantage in terms of access to capital input and government to government 
bilateral relationship. Government may use its position to initiate or facilitate FDI 
by Malaysian GLCs. The important role of government in developing countries' 
direct overseas investment could also provide an additional perspective to 
Dunning's four types of FDL The objective of GLCs in Malaysia and Singapore 
(see Ragayah, 1999; Tolentino, 2000) and also in China's SOEs (see Gang, 1992; 
Deng, 2004) to become a global company and to raise their profile internationally 
could provide the basis for the 'fifth' type of FDI, thus it would provide more 
complete explanation of types of FDI by developing country TNCs in addition to 
Dunning's four types of FDL Finally, home country factors such as the availability 
of cheaper resources could also be considered as firm's ownership advantages since 
developing countries firms can sell or provide services in foreign countries at 
lower 
real cost. Therefore, there is a need to strengthen the elements of ownership 
(0) 
advantages of developing country firms. 
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9.4 POLICY IMPLICATION 
There are three key implications of the research concerning the existing Malaysian W 
government policy concerning outward direct investment (ODI): the policy on 
promoting ODI, the NEP and capital control policies. The research found that 
although the Malaysian government agrees that it would benefit from outward 
direct investment (ODI) in ten-ns of profit remittance, they still believe that 
Malaysia would benefit more from inward investment. The study has revealed that 
transnational operations by Malaysian companies are not necessarily driven by state 
ODI policy. There is evidence, however, that the state has used the GLCs to achieve 
the transfer of technology and expertise to Malaysia. Malaysian policy on ODI is 
very general. Malaysian companies have received limited incentives to go abroad; 
incentives that also are dwarfed by the incentives for inward investment. In 
contrast, multinationals from Korea and Singapore have received huge government 
support in the initial stages of their foreign investment. The Malaysianisation of the 
British owned companies by Malaysian Government in 1970s could not be 
considered as the era of active involvement of state in ODI since it was a respond to 
political pressure at that point of time only. Other than the GLCs, the transnational 
operations are very much an outcome of the individual entrepreneurship, 
conglomerate diversification and an expansion of the horizon of family business. 
Government agencies may not provide the best assistance thus leaving the 
companies with their own effort in new venture overseas. For the policy-makers 
this study could provide an indication of the need to have a systematic approach 
and thorough policy with regards to overseas investment. 
It is also critical to acknowledge that Malaysian companies 
investing abroad still 
lack competitiveness. This in turn gives rise to the 
implication to the Malaysian 
government policy on inward investment i. e. whether 
Malaysian inward FDI policy 
has created the linkages between foreign and local companies 
in term of developing 
local companies' competency. 
The social fabric of Malaysia that has created the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) has 
been identified as one of the factors that have driven 
ODI especially of the Chinese 
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family business. The effect of this policy has also been suggested in earlier studies 
by Yeung (1999) and Redding (1993). The socio-political and economic 
justification in NEP may be well understood, but the implementation of such polic"', 
should be done in more pragmatic manner to prevent 'capital flight' (Cuddington, 
1987). 
This study also reveals that government policy on capital controls, which restricts 
the movement of Ringgit from Malaysia, has badly affected the ability of Malaysian 
parent companies to undertake further investment overseas and to expand existing 
investment. The government may need to realise that the capital control policy that 
has benefited the country as a short term measure to control currency speculation 
has also affected any potential investment abroad. 
9.5 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION FOR MALAYSIAN INVESTORS 
ABROAD 
This study demonstrates the implications at the managerial level involving 
Malaysian investors abroad- particularly with regards to strategic management, 
corporate finance and cross cultural management. The main issue for strategic 
management is whether the processes and strategies undertaken by Malaysian 
companies are supported by acceptable corporate norms and practices, and are 
driven by well-thought out considerations of profit and risk rather than merely by 
opportunism. It was revealed in this study that limited resources and competence 
has a direct effect on the capability of Malaysian companies to revive failing U. K. 
subsidiaries. Therefore it is recommended that managers should make a systematic 
and prudent approach in the decision to invest overseas, and the decision to buy the 
failing overseas target companies simply because of their give away price is never a 
wise decision. Equally, it shows that Malaysian companies underestimate the risk 
and overestimate the potential benefit achievable in such investment. The findings 
show that many target companies are not profitable before the acquisition and 
continue to make losses under Malaysian ownership. Furthermore, FDI is not 
merely a matter of the ability and the opportunity to enter a market but also having 
the potential to remain in the market competitively. The decision to acquire an 
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ailing U. K. company, for the first time investor, is probably a bad decision with 
regards to established norms in corporate finance. 
In relation to cross-cultural management, there is evidence in the study that shows a 
delay in the acceptance by British managers of the fact that the company no longer 
belongs to the British, and that they have to receive directives from a foreign parent 
company from Malaysia. British managers also admitted that there are some 
differences in approach between British and Malaysian managers, especially where 
there was influence from Chinese business culture. For example, the British 
manager would make sure that everything is perfect before the product is marketed. 
The Malaysian Chinese manager's attitude is that if the product is nearly right, just 
put into the market and move from there. This indicates that culture and perception 
are complex and intricate in nature. Familiarity as mentioned by Malaysian 
managers which is brought about by the historical relationship, language and laws 
and regulation may facilitate an investment but does not warrant a straightforward 
business relationship. 
The above issues, arising from strategic management, corporate finance and cross- 
cultural management, also provide lessons on managing remote subsidiaries, where 
there is separation of ownership and management. In particular, the absence of 
expatriate managers from the parent company in the foreign subsidiary, has slowed 
down the process of understanding the business, the realisation of synergy and the 
transfer of technology. The managers in GLCs, for example, need to rethink their 
strategy to ensure that ownership of a technology-based foreign company will result 
in the transfer of technology. 
This study also has specific application to the managers of a family business (which 
also includes the family member). In particular, such firms need to realise that 
business cannot be developed internationally, on the same models of guanxi or 
close-knit networking that work within the Chinese business in Asia. The 
modemisation of the Chinese family business is critical. They need to reorganise 
their structure of organisation to allow more transparent corporate governance. 
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9.6 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
This research has many limitations, especially with regard to data and scope of 
research coverage. Resource limitations and time constraint would allow only one- 
off interview with the target companies in Malaysia and in the U. K. Although 
repeat interview would be beneficial in this kind of research, one-off interviews 
have enabled broad explanations to be gained about the research questions, and are 
sufficient in a new and exploratory research area of this kind. Future research of 
this kind has to take into consideration the time and resources required due to the 
distance between the U. K. and Malaysia so as to make it possible for multiple 
interviews to be undertaken in the same organisation. 
The research is also unable to get a complete set of match pair firms (one Malaysian 
parent company and one of their UX subsidiaries) as intended in the beginning of 
the research project. This was due to the reluctance of the UX subsidiaries to 
participate in the interview, even though permission had been granted by the parent. 
The problem of non-respondent however, is very common in research of this kind. 
Therefore, the ability to 'triangulate' data from the parent with data in the 
subsidiary is limited for some of the companies. However, triangulation is still 
permissible using documentary data especially from the 'announcement' made by 
the company to Bursa Malaysia. 
There is also a possibility of respondent and interviewer biases in undertaking the 
interview. The respondent bias in this research would come from the situation when 
the respondent is not able or reluctant to tell the 'true' opinion or facts in the 
conversation such as: 
The respondent may not be able to tell the 'truth' in the companies due to 
their lack of authority in the organisation such as holding a lower 
management post in the company; 
The respondents are reluctant to tell the 'truth' for matters regarded as secret 
in family business. In Chinese family business, secrecy still prevails, and 
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many respondents were reluctant to discuss the family issue openly. They 
either declined to talk on the subject, or sought to portray themselves as 
public companies even when the family was the major shareholder; 
* The position of the interviewer as a Malaysian government servant could 
encourage the interviewee to give only positive remarks about govenunent 
policy. 
The interviewer bias may arise from the following aspect: 
9 The conversation could be influenced by perception of the interviewer about 
the respondent and vice versa as a result of cross cultural effect such as 
between Malay and Chinese and between Malay and British. This 
perception could arise from the sentiment in the context of the socio- 
political relationship between Malay and Chinese in Malaysia and historical 
relationship between British and Malaysia; 
9 The position of the interviewer as a government servant could encourage the 
respondent to alter the answer in order to impress or please the interviewer. 
The interview may not be able to get the 'true' inner feeling, attitudes and 
behaviour of the respondent. 
The above limitations could impose a threat to the reliability of the research. 
Several measures have been taken to reduce this threat. The use of semi-structured 
interview as well as guiding questions has been able to present to both the 
respondent and the interviewer the expected question to be asked in the interview. 
The use of documentary data and interview with the subsidiaries (where applicable) 
has enabled confirmation or rejection of the data. 
A limited availability of past research about Malaysian outward investment limits 
the possibility to make comparison, or to compare data between this research and 
other research. The scope of research is also limited to the U. K., thus giving results 
specific to the U. K., and which may not be applicable elsewhere. 
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9.7 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study was undertaken purely based on qualitative approaches. Future study 
should look at the possibility of undertaking research on Malaysian outward 
investment in general, based on a larger sample size, and looking beyond one 
specific host country. Such research would complement the findings of this 
research, and make possible a more rounded understanding of Malaysian outward 
investment. 
Another possible approach is selecting fewer companies, so that the study of each 
could be more detailed. This would lead towards a case-study approach. Some of 
the problems of secrecy and reticence might be overcome by such an approach. 
Another possibility would be to compare Malaysian outward investment with 
outward investment from other countries at a similar stage of economic 
development. 
A last area of interest would be further comparison of the strategy of Malaysian 
Chinese family businesses and conglomerate firms with western corporations. One 
key research question concerns whether Chinese family-run conglomerates will 
become more like western corporations, as they engage in international activity, or 
whether they will remain faithful to their domestic model of business. This is an 
area of research relevant not only to Malaysia, but to large parts of East and South 
East Asia. 
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Appendix 1.2 
Malaysian Investment Outflows by Country* 
1992-2001 (Percentage) 
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Appendix 2.1 
Countries in Asia 
West Asia 
Bahrain 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Oman 
Palestinian Territory 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Turkey 
United Arab Emirates 
Yemen 
South, East and South-east Asia 
East Asia 
China 
Hong Kong, China 
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, Republic of 
Macao, China 
Mongolia 
Taiwan Province of China 
South Asia 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
India 
Maldives 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
South-East Asia 
Brunei Darussalam 
Cambodia 
Indonesia 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 
Malaysia 
Myanrnar 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
VietNam 
Source: UNCTAD (2005b) 
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Appendix 3.1 
Malaysia: Major FDI Indicators, 1970-2003 (US$ million) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
FDI Inflows 94 100 11 172 571 350 381 406 500 
FDI Outflows 0 o o 0 o 0 0 0 0 
FDI Inward 
Stock 
0 0 
I 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
I 
0 
I FDI Outward 
Stock 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1979 1980 1981. 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
FDI Inflows 573 934 1265 1397 1261 797 695 489 
FDI Outflows 0 201 293 260 226 242 210 249 
FDI Inward 0 5169 5369 6066 6322 6510 7388 6111 
Stock 
1 11 1 
FDI Outward 0 197 496 741 960 1160 1374 1527 
Stock 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
FDI Inflows 423 719 1668 2611 4043 5138 5741 4581 
FDI Outflows 214 198 273 129 175 115 1063 2329 
FDI Inward 
Stock 
6806 7054 8096 10318 12440 16860 20591 22916 
FDI Outward 
Stock 
1812 1855 2136 2671 3043 3736 
I 
5008 7940 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
FDI Inflows 5815 7297 6323 2714 3895 3788 554 3203 2474 
FDI Outflows 2488 3768 2675 863 1422 2026 267 1904 1370 
FDI Inward 
Stock 
f 
28731 
I 
36028 42351 
I 
45065 
F 
48960 
i 
52747 53301 56505 58979 
- FDI Outward 
Stock 
11042 15212 12361 15472 ý 18425 1 21276 124428 1 28316 1 296 
Source: UNCTAD (2005a) 
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Appendix 3.2 
Equity Investment by Country, 1992-2002 
Countries 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 200Lý 
Singapore 165 569 680 1616 1319 1108 832 589 756 300 382 
United 
States 
159 585 
I 
332 364 1064 1072 1494 267 1032 1277 229 
United 
Kingdom 
32 91 150 358 620 1453 501 224 66 43 270 
Hong Kong 99 284 642 370 345 350 107 356 73 46 99 
People's 
Republic of 
China 
10 107 181 308 461 292 67 137 103 303 299 
Australia 68 99 433 475 271 324 2696 76 52 257 88 
Indonesia 8 4 75 232 329 547 110 197 161 1375 685 
Philippines 5 3 167 614 283 148 48 80 98 47 34 
South 
Africa 
- - 26 42 1157 214 40 14 23 53 3 
Thailand 18 5 34 78 94 107 501 89 276 132 30 
Vietnam 13 7 60 94 110 110 62 67 25 78 65 
Japan 36 19 30 77 593 350 45 107 34 35 63 
Switzerlan 
d 
45 9 45 88 57 135 11 16 6 12 11 
Canada 7 3 43 95 32 58 28 1 26 34 2 
Netherland 
s 
- 26 171 47 14 5 2 12 1 
515 927 
Germany 2 3 6 3 17 33 10 30 23 10 2 
France 24 2 10 14 91 86 206 1219 743 154 1 
india - 2 25 3 18 32 
34 82 2 35 60 
Others 84 251 182 516 870 735 1554 1593 656 1040 3743 
TOTAL 775 2058 3292 J5394 7745 7159 8348 5156 4156 5746 6993 
3 inclusive of RM1,099 million investment to Chad and RM654 million Investment to 
Cameroon. 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2003) 
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Appendix 5.1 
Invitation Letter to Malaysian Parent Companies 
[Address] 
oSalut, ation>>,, 
RE: MALAYSIAN OUTWARD INVESTMENT - THE CASE OF MALAYSIAN COMPANIES INVESTING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
My name is Mohd Mokhtar Tahar. I am a Malaysian civil servant, presently on 
study leave as a PhD student at Leeds University Business School (LUBS), Leeds, 
United Kingdom. Prior to this, I was attached with the Foreign Investment 
Committee (FIC), Economic Planning Unit, in the Prime Minister's Department, 
Malaysia. 
I am currently pursuing a research project for my PhD programme under the Centre 
of International Business, University of Leeds (CIBUL). This project is an 
investigation of the determinants, strategy and process of Malaysian company 
investment in the U. K. Information to be gathered includes the decision to make an 
investment into the U. K., motivation for operating in the U. K. , investment method 
and strategies, difficulties encountered during the process, and future plans. The 
fundamental objective is to answer the question of why and how Malaysian 
companies undertake foreign direct investment in a developed country such as the 
U. K. The research that I am undertaking will involve an in-depth interview with 
selected Malaysian companies that have currently undertaken direct investment in 
the United Kingdom (U. K. ). 
The interview would ideally be held with a person(s) who has knowledge of your 
company's overseas investment. This person may be involved in decision making, 
operation and monitoring of investment in the U. K. 
The interview may take between one to two hours. The questions will be based on 
several themes that will be sent to the respective person prior to the actual 
interview. All the information supplied in this interview will be treated in strictest 
confidence and will not be used for any purposes except those of this research. No 
reference to your company will be made other than by consent. 
In this respect, I earnestly seek your cooperation to participate in the research, and 
to suggest a person for the interview regarding your company's 
direct investment in 
the U. K. The actual interview will be held during the months of August and 
September, 2003. Further correspondence will follow upon your company's 
agreement to participate in the study. 
Thank you for your time, cooperation and support 
for this research. 
Yours Truly, 
Mohd Mokhtar Tahar 
Doctoral Researcher 
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Appendix 5.2 
Invitation Letter to U. K. Subsidiaries 
JAddressj 
f Salutationj 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH PROJECT. 
TITLE: MALAYSIAN OUTWARD INVESTMENT: A CASE OF MALAYSIAN 
COMPANIES INVESTING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
My name is Mohd Mokhtar Tahar. I am currently pursuing a research project for 
my PhD programme within the Centre of International Business, University of 
Leeds (CIBUL). This project aims to investigate the determinants, strategy and 
process of Malaysian companies' investment in the U. K. With regard to this, on () 
September 2003,1 conducted an interview with (Name of interviewee) in Malaysia 
to gather information on these subjects. At the same time I conveyed my intention 
to interview the subsidiaries in the U. K. and your parent (associate) company in 
Malaysia encourage me to meet you. The interview with the subsidiaries/associates 
of the Malaysian companies in the U. K. is regarded as the second phase of data 
collection for this project. Information to be gathered in this proposed interview 
includes subsidiaries' perception of the motivations, strategies and determinants of 
Malaysian investment in the U. K., the relationship between parent and subsidiaries, 
management and decision making, investment method and strategies, and also the 
costs and benefits of the investment to the Malaysian parent companies. 
The research that I am undertaking will involve an in-depth interview with 19 U. K. 
based companies, wholly owned or partly-owned by Malaysian(s). The interview 
would ideally be with an individual at senior managerial level (preferably 
British/non-Malaysian) who has knowledge about the history of the Malaysian 
investment in the company. 
The interview may take about one hour. The questions will be based on several 
themes as attached together with this letter. All the infort-nation supplied in this 
interview will be treated in strictest confidence and will not be used for any 
purposes except those of this research. No reference to your company will be made 
other than by consent. 
In this respect, I would like seek your cooperation to participate in the research. The 
proposed inter-view will be held in June 2004.1 am very hopeful that you are able to 
participate in this research, and would be very pleased if you could 
kindly propose 
the person(s) for the interview. 
Thank you for your time, cooperation and support for this research. 
Yours Truly, 
Mohd Mokhtar Tahar 
Doctoral Researcher 
Leeds University Business School 
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Appendix 5.3 
Guiding Question Interview I 
A. Background Information Concerning the Company 
" The history of the company, the evolution of its overseas operation, and specifically of its investment in the U. K. 
" The ownership and management structure of the company in Malaysia and 
overseas/U. K. affiliates. 
The nature of the company: Focussed or Diversified? Conglomerate? 
Identity and character of owners - Family-owned or shareholder-owned" Owner-managed? Etc... 
B. Motivations for Overseas Operation and Investment in the U. K. 
The driving force behind the company's overseas operation. 
The specific driving force of the company's investment in the U. K. 
The extent to which the nature of the parent company has been a driver of 
overseas/U. K. investment activity. 
C. Mechanism and Strategies of Investment in U. K. 
What is the core competence of the company? How is it being developed 
and utilised in the context of overseas/U. K. operations? 
What is the rationale of the company's diversification activities/strategies? 
What are the major sources of funds for overseas/U. K. investment? 
What was the mode of entry to the U. K. market (acquisition, greenfield, 
joint venture, etc)? 
How would you describe the relationship between parent and subsidiaries? 
Are there strategic relationships between your subsidianes? 
To what extent are the major shareholders involved in the overseas/U. K. 
operations? 
" Can you explain the role of professional managers in the company and their 
relationship with major shareholder/owner, 1) in Malaysia, 2) in the U. K.? 
" (where appropriate) Do business networks of any kind (sectoral, ethnic, 
etc. ) play a role in your company's overseas[U. K. investment? If networks 
are important, how have they evolved over time? 
D. The Impact of U. K. Investment 
The positive or negative impacts of U. K. investment on company 
performance. 
E. Difficulties Encountered in U. K. Operation 
Has the company faced any difficulties in its operation in the U. K.? 
If yes, how were these difficulties overcome? 
F. Future Direction of Foreign Investment 
'ate other What are the company's future plans for the U. K. (and if appropri 
foreign markets)? 
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Guiding Question Interview 11 
Appendix 5.4 
INTERVIEW WITH THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
0 Government attitudes towards outward investment 
I- What is the overall Malaysian government policy toward outward investment? 
2. What is the Malaysian Government policy towards Malaysian investment in 
the developed country in general and in the U. K. in particular? 
o Benefit and cost of outward investment to the Malaysi 
3. What benefits gained by Malaysia from this outward investment? And Nvhat 
is the cost? 
0 Detail Malaysian Government policy toward outward investment 
4. What from of incentive that Malaysian government provides to the 
Malaysian companies investing abroad? 
5. How far the policy has benefited the Malaysian company abroad? 
6. What form of problem encountered so far? 
o Govemment London office role in Malaysi 
7. What role that your office played for Malaysian investment in the U. K.? 
Problem encountered by Malaysian companies investing the U. K. - how it 
has been resolved? 
8. What are the problems encountered by Malaysian company investing in the 
U. K.? Can you quote any example? 
Effect of bilateral agreement between Malaysian Govemment and Bntish 
Govemment in flow of investment into U. K. 
9. To what extend the bilateral relationship between Malaysia and Britain 
help promote investment between these two countries? 
* Cgpital flight 
10. What is your comment on the statement that' Malaysia outward 
investment represents a capital flights" 
MATTER ARISING 
" Ask for any written document that may 
help the research 
" Ask permission for another 
interview/contact as the research goes on. 
359 
Guiding Questions Interview III 
Appendix 5.5 
OBJECTIVES, THEMES AND TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION DURING 
INTERVIEW WITH THE U. K. SUBSIDIARIES 
The following are items and topics which might be discussed during the Inter-v'eNk'. They do not necessarily cover all relevant issues, however, and should be seen as a 
starting point for discussion rather than an exhaustive questionnaire. 
Main Objective: 
To find out whether subsidiaries view issues similarly or very differently ftom the 
parent. 
To find out whether subsidiaries' perceptions of motivations, strategy and 
determinants differ from the parent. 
To find out the relationship between the British managers and their Malaysian 
counterparts. 
Themes and Topics for Discussion during the Interview: 
1. PRE-REQUISITE INFORMATION 
The extent to which the British manager is familiar with the Malaysian shareholder 
or the Malaysian parent company. 
2. DETERMINANTS AND MOTIVATION 
The motivation and determinants for the Malaysian company investing in the U. K. 
Have the motivation and determinants for the Malaysian company changed over 
time, after experience of the U. K. 
3. MECHANISM OF INVESTMENT 
Rationale for using a particular mode of entry into the U. K. market (for example, 
acquisition, joint-venture, greenfield investment, and so on). 
Justification for business diversification or business focus (where applicable). 
The justification of the present degree of ownership in the U. K. subsidiary. 
Source of funding for the U. K. activity (for example, recurrent parent funding or 
self-generated funding). 
4. STRATEGY OF THE INVESTMENT 
The specific business strategy undertaken by the U. K. subsidiary; the extent to 
which this strategy is influenced by the Malaysian ownership. 
The core competence of the U. K. subsidiary; the development of this core 
competence before and after acquisition 
by the Malaysian company. 
The realisation of synergies (if any) between the 
U. K. subsidiary and the Malaysian 
parent. 
The role of business networks for the U. K. subsidiary, and the role of the 
Malaysian 
parent company in these networks. 
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5. MANAGEMENT OF SUBSIDIARY 
Relationship with the parent/owner in Kuala Lumpur. 
Level of autonomy granted to the company by the parent. 
Balance between British and Malaysian management. 
PERCEPTION ABOUT MALAYSLkN SHAREHOLDING 
Perceptions of working for the Malaysian company. 
Perception about the contribution of the Malaysian shareholder to the U. K. 
company. 
Pro and Cons of the Malaysian ownership or shareholding in the company. 
7. PROBLEMS 
What has gone right, what has gone less than right? 
8. ANY OTHER ISSUES of outstanding importance not covered by the above. 
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